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
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HISTORY OF SERBIA





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TO

SIR ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD

MASTER OF PETERHOUSE

I DEDICATE THIS BOOK

P R E F A C E

THIS little book is the fruit of some years of travel and study in the Near East. Its publication was interrupted by the War, but was finished during a period of convalescence. The original intention was to relate the story of Serbia from the revival of her independence in the nineteenth century until the period just before the Balkan War of 1912, at which past history evidently melts into present politics. The aim was to show how the diplomacy of the Great Powers affected the destinies of Serbia in the nineteenth century, as a companion study to a similar one of Bavaria in the eighteenth century published previously under the title of *Kaiser Joseph and Frederic the Great*. In both the object was to draw attention to the unpublished sources of British diplomacy at the Record Office, which furnish material as rich and important as it is neglected.

But, as the study progressed, it became evident that it could not be confined to the nineteenth century. The principles of strategy are eternal, and geography has affected diplomacy in Serbia in all ages in a strikingly similar way. It was well to show that the aims of Byzantium or Turkey or Hungary in the Middle Ages affected Serbia like the aims of similar Powers to-day. Nor is modern Serbian history intelligible without reference to its splendid and tragic past. A study of the Serbian past, though almost unknown to English readers, is complicated by the abundance of historians and the

amazing variety of their views. In the Balkans history is a sort of pacific warfare in which every native scholar is a general. Kossovo and Stephen Dushan, Czar Simeon and Küstendil awaken far more living sentiments between Serbians and Bulgarians than do names like Sebastopol or Waterloo to us and our Allies. National policies in the Balkans are still affected by the wrongs wrought five centuries ago. In such a confusion the judgment of the onlooker may be of more value than that of the native.

Apart from the influences of travel and experience at first hand, the authorities to which or to whom I owe most are Jireček, Cvijić, Marczali, and Ranke among historians, and Steed, Eliot, Seton-Watson, and Miller among contemporaries. To hold the balance between their conflicting opinions has been my aim, others will judge of its success.

It can seldom be the lot of an historian to find that the nation, whose story he has written, no longer exists when his book is completed. Yet, if the history of Serbia teaches anything, it is that her spiritual forces have always been stronger than her material ones. If it be true that rare manuscripts and books have been burnt and the dust of King Miliutin scattered to the winds, these acts will have no more effect upon Serbia than the scattering of the ashes of Huss had upon Bohemia. Disaster has sometimes created and has always intensified national feeling in Serbia. So long as the songs of Kossovo are sung and a Serbian exists in any land to sing them, so long there will always be a Serbia.

“There resteth to Serbia a glory,
A glory that cannot grow old;
There remaineth to Serbia a story,
A tale to be chanted and told!”

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HISTORY OF SERBIA

INTRODUCTION

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

SLAVONIC nationalities are the despair of the historian. Their story is complex beyond ordinary complexity, and bloody beyond ordinary bloodiness. To write the history even of that part of the Slavonic races known as the Southern Slavs or Jugo-Slavs is like threading a labyrinth. The only method which offers a real chance of success is to trace the fortunes of a specific race among the Southern Slavs and to relate it closely to the other nationalities of that area. For this purpose the history of the Serbians of Montenegro and of Serbia is the simplest as well as the most important. One has been always free until to-day, the other constitutes a powerful unit round which the aspirations of the Southern Slavs now centre. If there ever is a Southern Slav federation, it will be because of the kingdom of Serbia, which has held up the same kind of hope and example of unity to the Southern Slavs that the kingdom of Piedmont did to the Southern Italians. The history of the Serbian race in Montenegro and Serbia is therefore the most important, because these lands are the core of that rugged stock which has preserved or achieved freedom, and thus become a hope and a beacon to the Slavs enslaved under

other rulers or imprisoned in other lands. Why have the Serbians achieved freedom and the Montenegrins preserved it? Still more important—What is the legacy of Serbian history? Does it offer hope for the future and pronounce that the modern Serbian nation is qualified to head a federation? History should throw flashes of light on all these problems even if it does not solve them.

The racial distribution of the Southern Slavs has remained fairly constant since the twelfth century. Conquerors have overrun all the Southern Slav lands, have mingled their blood with the natives, and set up their altars or their governments in their territories. But though at certain points races have absorbed or overwhelmed the Slavs, the main bulk of the population has remained uniform in race though not in religion. The five great divisions of the Jugo-Slav race are the Serbo-Croats of Croatia, the Serbs of Dalmatia, the Bosnians, Montenegrins, and the Serbians of Serbia proper.¹ All these races are enclosed within an area which runs from the Tyrolese Alps on the west to the Balkans on the east, and from the Adriatic coast on the south to the Drave and Danube on the north. This district forms a solid block of Jugo-Slav territory, which includes five great rivers and five important mountain ranges. These natural features have profoundly affected history. Man is at the mercy of geography until he can take liberties with nature. Therefore, until he could tunnel mountains, dry up marshes, and render rivers navigable, the unity of the Jugo-Slav race was an impracticable dream. A glance at the map will show that the geographical unity of these lands has only become possible within recent years.

To-day even natural barriers cannot destroy sympathy

¹ There are also the Slovenes, who inhabit Carniola and part of Styria east of the Tyrolese Alps.

or keep out ideas, and the spiritual unity of the Jugo-Slav race has already been achieved. But it is worth while to study more closely the physical conditions of the country, as they show what difficulties this aspiration for unity has overcome.

The most westerly of the Jugo-Slav lands, as well as the most civilised, is Croatia, a long narrow duchy stretching from the upper reaches of the Drave down to Fiume and the Adriatic in the south. A great range of limestone mountains begins near Fiume and runs all along the Adriatic coast to Montenegro. Unlike all other Jugo-Slav lands, Croatia is not cut off by mountains or rivers from access to her neighbours. The fact has been most important in her history, for Latin and Teutonic influences have penetrated deep into her fibres. Fiume is a fine harbour which has nurtured a hardy race of Croatian sailors or pirates since the early Middle Ages. The Croats were subdued by the Magyars from the north, and are still subjects of the Hungarian Crown. But they have always claimed autonomy, and have had a precarious kind of Home Rule since 1868. Their most serious difficulty, however, has not been the oppression of the Magyars, but the religious divisions of their own race. Two-thirds of the Croats of Croatia are Catholics and one-third Orthodox Greeks, and it is only within recent times that Magyar oppression has welded the two fragments of the race into one. The result has been a great impulse towards realising the unity of the Jugo-Slav race, for Zagreb (Agram) is not only the capital of Croatia but the cultural centre of Southern Slavdom. This home of literature and art has nurtured the educating influences which have produced the thought and expression of unity. If Serbia is the steel which struck thought into flame, Croatia is the flint enclosing the spiritual fire.

The Carst range runs, like a bare white wall, along

the Adriatic coast as far as Montenegro. Parallel to it but inland run the Dinaric Alps, their wooded heights contrasting sharply with the bald white summits of the Carst. Between these two great mountain ranges lies the coast province of Dalmatia, stretching from Zara to Cattaro, and destined by its long coast-line and high mountain walls to become a seafaring province. It has always had a close and easy connection with Italy, and its shores are strewn with the wrecks of Roman and Venetian art. Diocletian built his famous palace at Spalato, noble Roman ruins are scattered over the coast, Ragusa with her blood-red cliffs is still a mediæval walled town, and Venice has left her ineffaceable mark on splendid ruins at Zara, Träù, and Cattaro. The present population of Dalmatia is predominantly Slav, but it has been deeply influenced in the past by Latin civilisation. Its literature and culture have been affected by Latin models, and its population is mainly Roman Catholic. As in the case of Croatia its nearness to the sea has made the task of the Latin conqueror easy, while inaccessible mountains have severed it from Southern Slav brethren. North of the Dinaric Alps lie Herzegovina and Bosnia, a district of high mountains cut by deep and rapid streams, and of magnificent scenery. Nature has not only severed Bosnia from Croat and Dalmatian neighbours, but has separated the different districts and populations of Bosnia from one another. The high mountains prevent communication, the swift streams forbid navigation. Not until the advent of railways was unity possible in these districts, and the Austrian Government has taken great care to prevent the railways being of much value to the country. These natural and artificial barriers have produced surprising religious diversities. The population is overwhelmingly Slavonic, but is divided into three religions—Roman, Greek, and Mohammedan. The Mohammedan part of Bosnia is

the west and north, the Catholics are in the south, and the Orthodox are strongest in the Bosnian highlands. Here again history has combined with nature to establish differences. North of Croatia and Bosnia is the province of Slavonia, enclosed between the Save and the Drave, those great tributaries of the Danube. The population of Slavonia is partly Catholic, partly Orthodox. Placed as it is, Slavonia has never been in a condition to defend itself or to resist outside influences, and its population has the least defined characteristics of any of the Southern Slav districts. The kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia will be described in detail in another place. Here it is enough to say that the Carst and Dinaric ranges meet in Montenegro, and that it is bordered on the east by the Albanian Alps. It thus lies enclosed in a natural fortress, secure from outside influence until modern engineering made roads for heavy traffic and guns for long ranges. Serbia, which stretches from the Albanian Alps to the Balkans, is also mountainous. It is traversed by the river Morava, which falls into the Danube near Belgrade, and by the river Vardar, which falls into the Ægean by Salonica. Along this highway alone have invaders from the north or the south been able to attack Serbia.

Thus the general characteristics of the Jugo-Slav block are clear. Croatia and the flats of Slavonia are accessible to invaders from the land, Dalmatia can only be approached from the south, and the Carst and Dinaric ranges practically prevent conquest of Bosnia and Montenegro from the sea.¹ These conclusions hold good if tested by history. The sea power of Venice never penetrated into Bosnia, though it reached to

¹ An exception to this rule may be found in the present conquest of Montenegro (1916), but this was only rendered possible by the existence of a magnificent modern road from Cattaro to Cetinje, which passes right over the mountains.

Dalmatia and the lake of Scutari. Conquests of Bosnia, Slavonia, and Serbia had to be made from the land side, the Turks advanced to the conquest of Serbia up the valley of the Vardar and down the Morava. Both Turks and Magyars attacked Slavonia and Bosnia from the flats between the Slav and the Drave. The highlands of Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro enabled the bold mountaineers to prolong an almost indefinite resistance. While these districts have remained free and Orthodox, the Bosnian lowlands became Mohammedan, and the Croats and Dalmatians yielded to Rome. Physical distance from the Turk, the neighbourhood of Italy, and better economic conditions have developed civilisation in Croatia to an extent quite unapproached by other Jugo-Slavs. Dalmatia has been less fortunate, and is still wretchedly poor in some economic resources. Bosnia and Herzegovina have suffered much from lack of communication with the coast and with Serbia. A railway from Belgrade linking Sarajevo with Ragusa and with Cattaro, and pouring Serbian products into non-Austrian ports, is essential for the future unity of the Jugo-Slav lands. Since the Balkan War of 1912-13 Montenegro and Serbia have for the first time joined hands in the Sanjak of Novibazar and along the northern frontier of Albania. Up till that date Turkish or Austrian policy had always maintained a separating wedge between the two kingdoms. In the same way Austrian or Hungarian railway policy has separated Croatia from Bosnia and Bosnia from Dalmatia. But all these attempts have been in vain. The most astonishing fact about the whole Serbo-Croatian history is that the differences erected by nature between the Serbo-Croat races, differences increased and made permanent by Austrian and Turkish diplomacy, have never yet succeeded in destroying the feeling of unity of nationality and sympathy between these long dispersed fragments

of the Serbian race. Geography is now indeed in process of being conquered, Turkish diplomacy has ceased to be an agent of disunion, it may be hoped that Austrian will now cease also. Railroads and steamers and motor services will then bring the different elements of the Serbo-Croat race into a closer physical and economic union than has ever been possible before. Why was it that these natural conditions, which are now being neutralised, never succeeded in breaking the bonds of racial unity and sympathy? Why was the Serbo-Croat race never broken by the barriers of rivers, mountains, seas, by "Turkish force and Austrian fraud"? The answer is not to be found in geography, it is to be found in history.

Though Croatia has been the spiritual force behind Jugo-Slav unity, Serbia has been the material arm which has achieved it. Spiritual emancipation might be won within the Austrian Empire, practical freedom could only be attained outside it. Thus Montenegro and Serbia were the only districts around which practical hopes could centre. In each case the population was predominantly Serb and almost wholly Orthodox, so that race and religion were one. In each case they had the advantage of being governed by native dynasties, and this sentimental asset was of great importance in the Balkans, where German princelets ruled every other state. But Montenegro and Serbia for a long while seemed too small and insignificant to awaken Slav hopes, and the Austrian Jugo-Slavs dreamed of a liberty under the Austrian power. It was not till Austria's annexation of Bosnia in 1908 that the sentiments of the Jugo-Slavs definitely turned towards Serbia. Then in the amazing campaigns of 1912-13 Serbia defied Austria, crushed Turkey, and humbled Bulgaria. She had drawn all eyes upon her. She had won back from the hated Turk the sacred places of Serb legend, and had "brought

her steeds to water in the Adriatic." Montenegro could no longer contest against her for the headship of the Jugo-Slav, and Serbia, free, armed, and victorious, became the champion of the whole Jugo-Slav race. Her victory had kindled the spark which turned thought into action.

I

THE COMING OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

THE Jugo-Slav block, extending from the Tyrolese Alps to the modern Bulgarian boundary, corresponds roughly to the old Roman district of Illyricum. It was in the later days of the Roman Empire a civilised land ; Trajan had made the Danube a Roman waterway and built fortresses along its banks, and others had adorned the Adriatic shore with masterpieces of Roman architecture. All along the coast from Pola in the west with its perfect Roman amphitheatre to the majestic ruins of Dioklea in Montenegro the Roman influence is felt. It is most apparent at Spalato, whither the great Emperor Diocletian retired to spend the evening of his days in planting cabbages and in erecting the most splendid of Roman palaces. It was this magnificent civilisation that the Slavs were to destroy.

The original home of the Slavs was in the wooded and well-watered flats north of the Black Sea and around the Dniester and the Bug. Little is known of them until the beginning of the sixth century, when they became a formidable menace to the East-Roman or Byzantine Empire, which then possessed or claimed to possess Illyricum. They are first heard of in the days of Justin and his more famous successor the Emperor Justinian (527-65). The accounts of their invasions are curious, and represent the movements of the Slav

peoples as the slow and unconscious advance of a numberless and irresistible mass. They do not seem to have been formed and organised armies with leaders whose designs were ambitious and whose aims were definite. We look less on a military invasion than on a popular movement pushing slowly forward under pressure of hunger or greed into rich but depopulated lands. The Slavs came not like an invading army which could be defeated, but as a swarm of locusts or caterpillars, overwhelming in numbers, weight, and mass. It was easy to destroy individuals or large bodies among the Slavs, it was impossible to arrest the glacial certainty of their advance.

By the middle of the sixth century the Slavs were pressing over the Danube and moving slowly into Illyricum, the Balkans, and Greece. The writers who describe them are agreed as to the main features of Slavonic society. The Slavs are tall, and strong in body, with brown skins and reddish or brown hair. They differ from the Teutonic invaders of Rome because they bear heat and cold more readily and are a hardier and more enduring race of men, though their society and religion, as described by Procopius, seem closely akin to that of the Germans, as described by Tacitus some four centuries earlier. They were thus behind the Germans in civilisation and organised government. Their religion was a simple nature-worship, of which traces to-day can still be found in many Serbian customs. They worshipped a Supreme God, though every wood was haunted with fairies and every lake harboured evil spirits. They preferred to plant their settlements among woods and waters in remote and inaccessible spots. The houses in their villages were not packed close to one another but scattered over vast areas, in a manner that may still be seen in Montenegro. Such villages could not be defended, but they

could not be surprised by an enemy, and on the first alarm the inhabitants vanished to the shelter of the neighbouring hills or forest. Their political structure was loose and weak, being primitive and democratic. They were divided into many small tribes ruled over by hereditary chiefs, and more rarely into larger tribes ruled by kings. In each case the ruler's authority was small. In closeness of political organisation and in military discipline they were certainly far behind the Teutonic tribes of the fifth and sixth centuries, who went to battle under strong national kings. The Slavs were not a nation but a race, and their tribes were scattered and numerous. Even within each tribe, small as it was, there were divisions. Their ideas were democratic, but also lawless and disorderly. Robbery and war were their chief occupations, and they fought with one another when they were not attacking the Romans. Their methods were those of guerilla warfare, and, as the small tribes could not be got to act together, they seldom attempted siege operations or extended campaigns. But as irregulars they were extraordinarily effective, for they were experts in all the arts of savage warfare. Wearing no body armour, but carrying poisoned arrows and lances, they moved with great speed. It was their delight to lure enemies into the dark recesses of woods or narrow defiles, or to lie in wait hidden by reeds for foes who trod the dangerous paths across the marshes. No enemies could ultimately be more formidable than the Slavs, for their numbers rendered their extermination impossible, and their tactics prevented large armies from moving against them. Secure behind ramparts of hill, wood, or water, the Slavs multiplied exceedingly and developed their strength, until they were ready to move forward and destroy the cities of the plain.

The Byzantine Empire was a powerful state, but

its military policy was scientific and adapted only to the operations of regular warfare. Moreover, in the half-century between the death of Justinian and the rise of Heraclius its military strength was exhausted. Hence from the end of the sixth to the beginning of the seventh centuries it relied more on diplomacy than on arms, and sought to divide the Slavs against themselves. Many Slavs were enlisted as mercenaries in the Byzantine armies; others were civilised and planted by various emperors as colonists in the more settled parts of the Empire. But it was impossible to absorb the whole Slav people, and the Byzantine emperors sought to turn the arms of the fierce barbarian Avars against them. For a time this Machiavellian diplomacy succeeded, but eventually the Avars subdued or controlled the Slavs, and led a vast host of both peoples to the siege of Byzantium (627). Had this enterprise been successful the course of history would have been changed. But it was defeated by the military skill of the great warrior Emperor Heraclius, and this disaster marks a decisive turning-point in the history of the Slavs. They emancipated themselves from the control of the Avars and pressed forward in their invasion of Byzantine territory. By the middle of the seventh century their migrations and settlements were practically complete. The Slavs occupied the old Roman Illyricum, and had also settled in Thessaly and the Morea. Eventually the Byzantine Empire converted and civilised the Slavs in Greece, but, with this exception, the Slavs retained their hold on the territory occupied, which corresponds roughly to the modern Jugo-Slav block.

The Southern Slavs split up into several distinct groups, which are approximately those of to-day. All these groups eventually flung off their dependence on the Eastern Empire and developed governments of their own. Yet their independence of one another

always persisted, and no Slavonic ruler in the Balkans has ever united the whole Jugo-Slav race within his borders. The Slovenes in Carniola and Styria were the first to assert and the first to lose their liberties. They formed an independent state under native princes in the seventh century, but in 778 they were conquered and Christianised by the great Frankish ruler Charlemagne. Since that date they have always been either under Teutonic rulers or under Teutonic influences. What the great German Emperor took from the Slavs in one way he returned in another, for he turned his arms against the Avars. These ferocious warriors had loosened their grip on the Slavs except in the plains between the Save and the Drave (the modern Slavonia). But they were powerful on the Upper Danube and the Hungarian plain, until they were attacked and almost exterminated by the soldiers of Charlemagne (796). This service was a great one, for it destroyed a powerful enemy. Charlemagne's generals also occupied Istria and the modern Croatia. Eric of Friuli, the German Governor of this region, was killed in battle near Fiume, and the poet of Charlemagne's court prayed that there might be neither dew nor rain on the mountains and that light might never fall on that accursed shore where the noble Eric met his doom. All that we know of the history shows the Teutonic conquest to have been difficult, and perhaps explains why it was not permanent. At any rate the end of the eighth century witnessed the fall of the Avars and Slovenes and beheld the rise of the Croats.

Croatia began to exist as an independent unit shortly after the fall of the Slovenes. The fall of the Avars and the decline of the Frankish Empire gave the Croats a real opportunity. They extended their territory far beyond the limits of modern Croatia and included parts

of Dalmatia and Bosnia. The northern shores of the Adriatic nurtured a hardy race of sailors, equally suited for fishing, piracy, or commerce. Croatian sea power developed rapidly, with centres near Zara, at Träù, Clissa, and the mouth of the Narenta. But dangers were awaiting them in the north, for in the ninth century Hungary was occupied by the Magyars. This people had both military and political capacity of a high order, and their fierce valour proved too much for the Croats. The Magyars have indeed usually been savage and implacable enemies of the Slav. Croatia seems to have been in a state of dependence on the Magyars for some time before her final surrender in 1102, when Croatia was united to Hungary and the Hungarian King Koloman was crowned King of Croatia and Dalmatia. None the less, Croatia, though united to Hungary, was not absorbed by her. The Croats had now a foreign king, but they retained their own nobility, their own language, their own laws, and the substance of self-government. Ever since that date they have preserved their political self-consciousness and a species of internal home rule; its amount has varied and its theory has been disputed, but self-government has never become a mere memory or tradition in Croatia. The most important result of her relations with foreigners was, however, that the official religion of Croatia became Catholic. She was won over to the Latin communion and was thus separated by religion from her Serb brethren of the Greek faith.¹ A still more important result was that the Croats adopted the Latin characters for their written language, while the Serbians retained the Cyrillic

¹ The mediæval native liturgy was retained by the Croats as a substitute for the Mass. Curiously enough, the official language of the Croatian Diet was Latin until 1848. It is a singular result of their national self-consciousness that they should have persisted in retaining Latin as a political language and Slavonic as a domestic one.

letters.¹ This difference has done more to sever Croats from Serbs than all the intervening mountains, and still forms an important barrier between the two races. A difference about the alphabet has proved in the end more serious than a difference about religions.

The history of Bosnia, which first became of importance in the twelfth century, is less striking. As in Croatia, the Magyars sought to gain control of Bosnia, but physical difficulties hindered their attempt. Part of Bosnia was controlled by the Croats, part by the Serbs, part by the Magyars. In the middle of the twelfth century Bosnia was finally emancipated and formed into a principality under native rulers. But struggles with the Magyars and with the Bogomile heretics fatally weakened her and made her a prey to internal anarchy. She attained a momentary greatness in the fourteenth century, when her ruler, King Turtko (1353-91), conquered all Dalmatia except Ragusa, and created an imposing power for himself. But he proved unable to unite with the other Serb rulers against Islam, and the weak and disorganised state fell before the Turkish army in 1463. Herzegovina, which detached itself from Bosnia at the last moment, was subdued twenty years later (1482). In all these regions only one Slav city retained power and independence amid the general wreck. Ragusa, with its fine castle and harbour, had become an important centre of sea power. It was originally ruled by the sea power of the Byzantine Empire, but in the ninth century fell under the influence of Venice and of Italian art and civilisation.² It con-

¹ The difference between the Serb and Croat language is mainly a difference of dialect, and it is hardly a paradox to say that the Croat tongue is Serb with Latin characters and the Serb tongue Croat with Cyrillic characters.

² The coast and the inland province of Dalmatia were split into several different principalities until the thirteenth century as Zachlunia (north of Ragusa) and Trebinje (south-east of Ragusa).

tinued to be a place of great literary and artistic importance until it was finally annexed to Austria in 1815. The poets and writers were often Slavs, though their models were classical and Italian, and the economic life of Ragusa depended entirely upon Venice and Italy. There is no doubt that Dalmatia as a whole, as well as Ragusa, is ethnologically Slav, but the civilisation and the Roman Catholic religion prove the importance of Latin influence in their development.

A survey of the more westerly of the Southern Slavs seems to show that the weaknesses noted in the primitive organisation of the Slavs persisted in the mediæval framework. Croatia and Ragusa alone developed their civilisation and preserved their autonomy, and both owed much to foreign influences and support. Bosnia and Herzegovina were typically weak and disunited states. Their rulers seldom showed foresight or patriotism, and were unable to evolve a strong machinery of government which might keep in check their powerful and turbulent nobles. Eventually, when Bosnia was conquered and settled by the Turks, the worst oppressors of the natives proved to be their own Mohammedanised Bosnian nobles. This fact points to the fundamental weakness in the Slav political organisation. Its tendencies were at once democratic and feudal, and the state sometimes combined the worst evils of both. In military courage and capacity the Western Jugo-Slavs were not at fault; the mediæval Crusaders who encountered them all praise their courage. The Croats proved the bravest of warriors in the border warfare against the Turks; the Slovenes more than once defeated them, and many Bosnians prolonged a desperate and heroic resistance in their mountains. Nor was literary and artistic talent wanting; the claims of Croatia and Ragusa have already been noted; but it seems fair to add that some of the greatest modern scholars and writers in

the Serb language have been natives of Dalmatia or Bosnia. None the less, the Croats alone among these peoples have persistently shown political gifts of a high order.

NOTE ON THE MEANING OF THE WORDS SLAV AND SLAVONIA, SERB, SERBIAN, AND SERBIA

The names Slav and Slavonia, and various modifications of both, are used loosely to describe the people and the districts of Jugo-Slavlom. The derivation of Slav has been hotly disputed, for even ethnology becomes a party-question in the Balkans. Friends of the Slavs have derived the word from a root signifying "glorious," enemies, from the roots or terms indicating slavery. There seems to be little doubt that Schafarik has proved that the original form of the word was Slované or Slovené, and that this is derived from a locality, the word meaning "the folk who dwelt in Slovy."

On these derivations, *vide* Gibbon, ed. Bury, vi. 131-2, n. 9-11 (1902), and Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, 24-5 (1908), the words Serb and Serbian have similarly been derived by some from *Srb*, a word meaning "free," and by others from *Servus*, the Latin for Slave. The latter derivation is certainly incorrect. The term Serb occurs in Procopius, and, as it is used by him to designate the whole Slav race, is the oldest collective name for the Jugo-Slavs. In the text I have tried to use the expression Serbs for the Jugo-Slav race as a whole, or for the Jugo-Slavs outside Serbia and Montenegro. Up to the conquest in the fifteenth century, the words Serbian and Serbia are used generally of Montenegro and Serbia, while Serbia proper, when used, applies to the mediæval kingdom of Rashka and excludes Montenegro. After that date it is used to designate the inhabitants and the territory of the two modern Serbian kingdoms as defined in 1913. The difficulty of preserving this uniformity is, however, very great. Names changed and boundaries fluctuated in the Middle Ages with great rapidity. Even to-day "Old Serbia" is popularly used as a technical term to denote the districts round Prishtina and Prisrend.

II

THE RISE OF THE MEDIÆVAL SERBIAN KINGDOMS—ZETA AND RASHKA

A GREAT writer has said that to look back from modern to mediæval history is to turn from the simple to the indefinite. The condition of peoples and nations in the Middle Ages was seldom uniform and never easily described. It would be wrong to assume that the settlement of the Southern Slavs was made as easily as our account might suggest. Like every other land, Illyricum contained many different peoples, layer after layer of loam deposited by regular and successive waves of migration or invasion extending from the most primitive times till the seventh century. Hence though the Slavs eventually gained the predominance in the Illyrian lands by their numbers and power, it was only by absorbing or expelling other races. The Slavs, who penetrated into Greece, were absorbed by the Byzantine Empire and transformed not indeed into classical Greeks but into something different from Balkan Slavs. On Albania the Slavs never made any serious impression, but the North Albanians have left many traces in Montenegro and Prisrend. The Pseudo-Roman and Illyrian races persisted in Dalmatia at Ragusa, at Cattaro, and Antivari, and their relative triumph is marked by the fact that the Roman Catholic religion was eventually

adopted by the Slav conquerors in all these places. Macedonia was never wholly occupied by Serbian Slavs, but was partly settled by Bulgarians. Through all Macedonia, "Old Serbia," and modern Montenegro have wandered from time immemorial roving gipsies and the unobtrusive Vlach or Roumanian shepherds. These have retained their own religious and national customs and have formed an element independent of the Jugo-Slav population. Retiring, vagrant and unorganised, sometimes without settled homes or objects, their methods and habits still resemble very closely those of the earliest Slav settlers in the Balkans. It is, however, true that the influence of alien elements is least conspicuous in Zeta and Rashka (the mediæval equivalents of Montenegro and Serbia proper), with whose fortunes we are now concerned.

The Emperor Constantine VII. Porphyrogenetus, or an imperial scribe, alludes to these districts in a tenth-century treatise which touches on Slavs. The work, bearing the name of Constantine, was published in 953. It places the Serbians well in the interior of modern Serbia around the sources of the Lim. They extended south-west to the Tara and the Drina, and north-east to the Ibar and Western Morava. The evidence is scanty and conflicting, but there seems to be no doubt that in the tenth century the bulk of the Serbian race was well established in the north-west territory of Montenegro, in the Sanjak of Novibazar, and extended north of "Old Serbia" to include some of the Shumadya Mountains. Ras, near Novibazar, was the chief town, and the Ibar the eastern boundary. They did not anywhere reach to Belgrade or to the Danube, or to the great military highway of the Morava and the Vardar. In these inland regions cut off from the sea and from great rivers and protected by hills against invasion, lies the earliest Balkan home of the Serbians. Either Bulgarians

or Byzantinists occupied the valley of the Morava and Macedonia until the twelfth century.¹

The history of how Serbia and Montenegro came to be what they are can best be understood from their geography. Montenegro is a mountain fortress, four-square to every wind of battle. It is watered by the tiny river Zeta and the larger Moratcha, which flow into the lake of Scutari. Below Scutari lies the most mountainous part of Albania, which made a formidable and effective barrier to Serbian expansion in the south. In fact, the fierce mountaineers who inhabit the Albanian Alps have never long submitted to any ruler. Round the shores of the lake of Scutari and the warm Mediterranean coast-lands of Albania, Serbian influence often extended but never penetrated deep. Serbia aimed at Durazzo, which was not only an important seaport but the starting-point of that great Roman road and mediæval highway of commerce which ran across the Balkan Peninsula to Salonica. The Via Egnatia ran from Durazzo to the rich Albanian market-town of El-Bassan, where mediæval weapons are still nailed to the town gateway. Thence it ran over mountains to Struga, and from Struga to the magnificent castle overlooking the town of Ochrida. Descending from the mountains, it ran to Monastir, and thence across the moorland round Vodena to Salonica. It was along this great Roman road that the life-blood of commerce ran and that Byzantium received the products of the Adriatic. Along this road, too, Byzantine and Bulgarian, Serbian and Norman conquerors marched.

The Carst range in Montenegro itself is barren

¹ The name Serbia was a very indefinite term. Constantine also calls the Bosnians Serbs. The Serbs are described as dwelling in certain cities or fortresses in Zeta and Rashka. Of these the chief, Dostinica, was in the Sanjak, near Prjepolje. Five others mentioned are difficult or impossible to identify.

and stony on the side which faces Cattaro, but the mountains on the east of the Zeta are rich and well wooded. The general character of the mountains in the Sanjak is the same. The valley of the river Lim is wooded with picturesque rocks, and that of the Ibar is also green with forests. The mediæval roads from the coast to this interior were few and difficult, and suited only to pack animals, not to wheeled carriages. There was a road from Ragusa through Herzegovina to the Drina, and another from Cattaro to Niksich and the upper reaches of the river Tara. But the easiest route was from Scutari up the white Drin to Prisrend and so to "Old Serbia." This road served to unite Montenegro (the mediæval kingdom of Zeta) with Novibazar in "Old Serbia" (part of the mediæval kingdom of Rashka). The districts stretching north-eastwards from Montenegro to the vale of the Morava are the true and the oldest home of the Serbian race. The character of the whole land is similar, mountainous but on the whole fertile, giving pasture even at high ranges to cattle, yet offering few advantages or possibilities to the invader. The climate is temperate though cold in winter; oaks, chestnuts, and firs abound, and in these forests were to be found wolves, lynxes, bears, and even the formidable aurochs. The Serbians found it more profitable to be trappers than hunters, and the marten, the beaver, the ermine, and the fox supplied a valuable fur trade. There are also mines of copper and silver in these districts, which were not worked until the later Middle Ages, when Ragusans and Germans were imported for the purpose. In the valleys of the Tara, the Lim, the Ibar, and Western Morava were bred a hardy race of mountaineers, who nursed their strength and bided their time until ready to undertake conquests. Zeta, or the modern Montenegro, was the first scene of their expansion, but in the eleventh century they began to

extend in other directions. A new kingdom of Rashka arose at Ras, near Novibazar, a central point between Bosnia, Zeta, and "Old Serbia." An extension to the south into "Old Serbia" was easy. Ipek was founded as a great ecclesiastical centre and eventually became the holy city of Serbia. The ground here is lower and more fertile, and the rich plains invited to conquest. Thus it was that Prisrend and Uskub (Skopia) were occupied and formed into important centres of Serbian power. It was not until the thirteenth century that the Rascians were strong enough to expand toward the north. There they seized Nish, a strategic centre whence the mediæval roads (like the modern railways) led to the four points of the compass. Of these there are two immensely important ones : first, the road leading direct north to Belgrade and south to Salonica—that is through the vale of the Morava and the Vardar ; second, the famous road which branches off east at Nish to Sofia, Philippopolis, and Constantinople. Once Nish was captured it was easy to follow the valley of the Morava northwards to Belgrade or southwards along the Vardar valley into Macedonia. The attempt in the north was the more permanent and successful. Nearly all mediæval Serbia is included in the two kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia, as defined in 1913. Except in Macedonia, the natives are almost all of the Greek Church and of the Serbian race.¹ Macedonia was in mediæval times a bloody debatable land between Serbians and Bulgars. The history of Serbian expansion and conquest in the Middle Ages well illustrates the natural law that the wealth and population of the plains are often absorbed and overwhelmed by rude and vigorous mountaineers descending from their native hills. It is

¹ Another exception may be found in the district of "Old Serbia," which has been artificially colonised by Albanians in relatively recent times.

among the rocks around Novibazar that the Serbians learnt valour and endurance, but it was on the plains of Macedonia and the shores of Ochrida and Scutari that they proved the worth of these qualities.

It was well that the Serbians remained unnoticed and obscure in their rock citadels while two terrible powers confronted and destroyed one another. During the early Middle Ages the two great powers in the Balkans were the Bulgarian kingdom and the Byzantine Empire. It was to prove exceedingly fortunate for the rising Serbian state that they were opposed to one another. The Bulgarians had grown to be an extremely formidable power in the ninth century. They were originally of Slavonic blood but included a Roumanian element, and were crossed with Asiatic or Mongolian tribes. Their faces and characteristics are clearly distinguishable to-day from those of the Serbians. They are uglier in feature, shorter and sturdier in build, more dogged and practical in temperament. It is certainly a coincidence and perhaps not an accident that the difference between them and the Serbians was already marked even in the days of Charlemagne. By that time the Bulgarians had grown to be exceedingly powerful. Leo VI. (d. 911) in his *Tactica* described the Bulgars as superior in government and discipline to other Slavs. They were well armed, well disciplined, and well governed, and in every practical respect in advance of the Serbians. They had mines which produced precious metals ; they had developed an extensive commerce ; their soldiers were clad in steel and their kings were dressed in cloth of gold and jewels. Wealth did not produce civilization, and the first of Bulgarian atrocities was in 811. In that year the able Bulgarian king, Krum, destroyed a great Byzantine army and slew the Emperor Nicephorus. He set the imperial skull in silver and used it as a drinking-cup at banquets when he drank to the health

of his nobles.¹ A barbarian king who could inflict so great a disaster on the Byzantines was even more to be feared for his power than for his ferocity. The Bulgarians not only occupied all modern Bulgaria but began to expand rapidly in every direction. Bulgarian armies were already on the Danube and in modern Slavonia by 811, but the mountains of Bosnia and the Shumadya protected the Serbs from their attack on the north. It appears probable that they were threatened from the south by the Bulgarian occupation of Western Macedonia. At any rate the danger produced a semblance of union among the Serbian tribes in the Zeta-Rashka district, and a certain Vlastimir appears to have been the first head of the united Serbian race. The Serbians were still nominally subject to the Byzantine Emperor, and his diplomacy may have stirred them up against the Bulgars. At any rate about the year 840 the Serbians came into sharp conflict with the Bulgars. It is quite clear that the latter suffered a serious defeat. Some years later the Byzantines inflicted further defeats on the Bulgars and seem to have forced them to evacuate Macedonia. The struggle was renewed by the Serbians in 852, who again had the advantage. In the peace that followed we have an authentic glimpse of old diplomacy. The Bulgarian king, Boris, went in person to the Serbian frontier at Ras, then the north-east boundary of Serbian expansion. There the Serbian princes, sons of Vlastimir,

¹ This is not an isolated instance of atrocity. Pope Nicholas I. (866) accuses the Bulgarians of cruel practices of wholesale murder and tortures, though he seems to think their practice of bigamy a still worse crime. *Vide* Bury, *Eastern Roman Empire* (1912), pp. 372-4, 390-1. Atrocities have always been prevalent among all the inhabitants of the Balkans. The Byzantine emperors frequently showed great cruelty, especially Basil II., who blinded fifteen thousand Bulgarian prisoners. The cruelties of the Byzantine code and the dreadful penalties of amputation and maiming which it enjoined have been considered by some to be the origin of Balkan ferocity. *Vide* Gibbon (Bury), v. 529-30.

made peace, and presented King Boris with two slaves, two falcons, two hounds, and ninety skins. This gift has been interpreted by Bulgarian pride as a seal of Serbian submission. But, inasmuch as the main motive of the king's peace was to redeem his son and chief nobles from their captivity in Serbia, there seems to be no reason for this assumption. At any rate there can be no doubt that the Serbians had scored a signal success in their first round with the Bulgarians. It was exceedingly important for the future of Serbia that they did so. But for these victories they might have been overwhelmed by the Bulgars in 840 when the Byzantines were weak and unable to assist them. As it was they gained a breathing space, and in the next two centuries the Byzantine Empire increased so greatly in military strength that it finally overwhelmed and crushed the Bulgarians. While Byzantine and Bulgar were fighting, the Serbians were enabled to develop unmolested, though it was only for a time that the Bulgarian danger was averted.

The triumphs of peace were, however, to be even more important in moulding the future of the Serbians. At the end of the ninth century, Cyril (or Constantine) and Methodius, the two Slavonic apostles, travelled through the Balkans to convert and evangelise the Slavs of Moravia. These apostles were even more distinguished as scholars than as evangelists, for they composed a Slavonic alphabet apparently by adapting the Greek alphabet. This Glagolitic writing, in the later and improved form known as the Cyrillic script, is still used by Russians, Serbs, and Bulgars.¹ It is now the most formidable

¹ The difference between the two is that Glagolitic was based on Greek minuscules, while the Cyrillic, which was invented at least fifty years later, is based on Greek uncials, with necessary additions to represent Slavonic sounds. *Vide* Bury, *Eastern Roman Empire*, 397 sqq.; ed. Gibbon, vi. 549-51; Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, 335 and n. Jagitch is the leading authority on the subject.

obstacle to the complete union of the South Slavs, for the Croats have adopted Latin characters. The inventors of this Slavonic script probably had as little thought that they were dividing the Slavonic race as that they were composing an alphabet which was to be used by more than a hundred millions of men.

It has been well said that "the adoption of Christianity by pagan rulers has generally been prompted by political considerations and has invariably a political aspect." There can be no doubt that this was the case with the Slavonic evangelists. Cyril and Methodius were used as pawns by the Byzantine emperors in their political game of extending Byzantine influence among heathens by conversion to the Greek Orthodox religion. The Balkan lands and the Illyrian provinces were already a battle-ground between Constantinople and Rome. The Catholic Pope had firmly planted his influence on the Dalmatian coast and in Albania. The Adriatic coast had fallen, but the Orthodox Patriarch and Emperor could maintain the interior. There seems little doubt that during the year 862-63 the Byzantine Emperor used the threat of war to force the Bulgarians into the Greek communion. The instruments were the Glagolitic writing invented by Cyril and the Macedo-Slavonic tongue into which he translated the Scriptures. These made an irresistibly popular appeal to the Slavs, and eventually converted the lands round modern Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro into Greek Orthodox communities.

The struggle with paganism does not seem to have been a severe one. Perhaps the reason of this is that the conversion of both Serbia and Bulgaria was political and therefore superficial. At any rate the old nature-worship remained in many forms, and can still be traced in national customs. Even in the seventeenth century a Montenegrin ballad speaks of their Orthodox ecclesi-

astical bishop praying to a Veela (or fairy) on the mountain top. Serbian popular fancy still peoples the woods with fairies, the mountain caves with giants, and the lakes with serpents. The Serbian bear is a human being because he walks upright, the Montenegrin jackal a lost human soul howling in the night-time. All Serb peasants still believe in human vampires, in the corpses which feed on human blood. These superstitions could hardly have survived in such abundance had the religious conversion been more than superficial. There is other evidence which seems to show that the struggle with paganism was not severe among the Serbians.¹ It is known, for instance, that the new ecclesiastical organisation was weak, and that there were few churches and fewer bishops among the early Serb Christians.

But though the Serbs accepted Christianity, they oscillated throughout the early part of the Middle Ages between the Latin and Greek form of it. It is probable that Bulgaria would have accepted the Latin form but for the fact that she was weak and that the political influence of Byzantium was strong in the years 862-63. The Serbians continued to swing backwards and forwards between the two faiths, as it suited their ignorance, prejudice, or convenience. Even Catholic Croatia coquetted with Orthodoxy for a moment,² but the Dalmatian coast-line remained steadily Latin, and its outpost at Antivari was and still is a Catholic bishopric. Catholic missionaries carried the Latin rites into North

¹ The beautiful custom of keeping the "Slava" or name-day of the family saint is finely described by Petrovitch, *Hero Tales and Legends of the Serbs*, 40-6. It is often used as an argument in favour of the view in the text. But according to the latest authorities this custom is not a survival from the period of conversion to Christianity, since it does not appear before the fourteenth century. *Vide* Jireček, *Gesch. der Serben*, 180-1.

² About one-third of modern Croatia-Slavonia is Orthodox.

Albania from Durazzo to Scutari. Bosnia, Zeta, and Rashka oscillated unsteadily between Rome and Byzantium. The fact that early Serbian rulers bore the names of Latin saints, as Peter, Paul, Zachary, especially in the ninth century, shows the Roman influence. In Bosnia and in the extreme north of Dalmatia the struggle was balanced, but Zeta and Rashka yielded to the continued and powerful diplomatic pressure of Byzantium. In fact, the new and formidable development of power in the Bulgarians obliged the Serbians to adopt the views of the Byzantines, the only power who could aid them against their oppressors. The effect of Serbian conversion to Christianity, though in the religious sense superficial, was in the cultural sense profound. Like all other mediæval evangelists, Cyril and Methodius carried with them civilisation, learning, and the arts. The Latin and Greek priests and missionaries, who visited the valleys of the Lim and the Ibar, brought education, light, and beauty. They encouraged communication with powerful civilised peoples both in the East and the West, and developed commerce and the arts of building, glass-making, painting, jewellery, as well as those of writing. The Serbians who had hitherto lived in wooden huts and built only rude castles of refuge, gradually learned to erect stately buildings. The transition from barbarism to relative civilisation is marked by the appearance of churches and palaces.

Apart from its civilising influences the conversion of the Serbians must be looked on simply as a phase in their struggle with the Bulgarians. The victories of the Serbians had angered the rulers of Bulgaria, who proved as dogged and unforgiving as do their people to-day. The second war had been begun by Boris to avenge the defeats of his uncle, and its humiliating end stirred up future rulers to vengeance. The Bulgarians were far more dangerous to the Serbians than were the Byzantines,

for they were not only practised in mountain fighting, but were endowed with a discipline that even Byzantine critics admired. They were nearer neighbours and were more accustomed to the Serbian methods of warfare. It only needed a strong king and a good general in Bulgaria and a period of Serbian anarchy and Byzantine weakness for the Serbians to be in peril. The Serbians were no doubt conscious of this fact, for their princes acknowledged themselves as the vassals of the Eastern Empire at the end of the ninth century, and remained so in actual fact for nearly three centuries.

Czar Simeon, the powerful Bulgarian ruler, began by attacking the Byzantines (893-96), and in the reign of Constantine Porphyrogenetus (911-59), to whom we owe the description of the Slavs, Simeon's attacks became most dangerous. He profited by the anarchy then prevalent in the various Serb tribes. Finally, in 924, Czar Simeon invaded Serbian territory, annihilated the armies, and devastated the country with unheard-of cruelty. Like Sennacherib, he determined to transplant his enemies, and forcibly transferred numbers of Serbians to the Bulgarian Babylon. The Emperor Constantine or his scribe pictures the Serbian lands as absolutely deserted wastes, in which there were no women and children and where a few hunters eked out a precarious living. The misfortune fell chiefly on the Serbians of Rashka, though the Serbs of Croatia and Dalmatia also felt the force of Simeon's arm. Only the death of this savage tyrant (927) saved the Serbian race from extermination. As it was, Bulgarian greatness really ended with him. No subsequent ruler undertook conquests on the scale on which he planned them, and though the Serbians were still oppressed by the Bulgars, they were no longer in danger of total destruction.

There is no better proof of the degradation of the Serbians than of the treatment which the Bulgarian kings accorded to her various rulers. Some were taken into captivity, to wear gilded chains at the Bulgarian court ; those who remained on their thrones were exposed to endless humiliations, and sometimes to invasion or to murder. One example may illustrate the age. In 1015, John Vladislav murdered King Radomir and seized the Bulgarian throne. As his own father had been murdered by Radomir's father, King John determined to end this family blood-feud by massacring all the rest of Radomir's kinsmen. Among these was the Serbian prince, Vladimir of Zeta, whom King John invited to visit him at his residence on an isle in the Presba Lake. Prince Vladimir hesitated to accept the invitation, and King John sought to allay his suspicions by sending him a golden cross. The Serbian returned it with the saying : "The Holy One hung not on a golden nor yet on a silver cross, but on one of wood." King John then sent his archbishop with a small cross of wood and a promise of safe-conduct. The Serbian prince took the cross as a pledge of safety and accepted the invitation. He journeyed to the island of Presba, and at once entered the church to pray. King John, who was sitting by the altar, had the church surrounded with soldiers. Prince Vladimir, attempting to fly, was slain in the porch, while still clasping in his hands the little wooden cross. He was murdered before the eyes of his wife Kosara, who had reached Presba before him in the hope of giving her life for his. The body was interred in the church, until King John learnt that a mysterious light hovered strangely over the tomb at night-fall. In superstitious terror he handed the body over to the widowed princess. The corpse was disinterred, and the wooden cross found still grasped in the dead right hand. The faithful Kosara placed the body in St. Mary's Church at Krajina, took the veil, lived in an adjoining

cloister till her death, and was buried at the feet of her husband. The mysterious light and the still more mysterious clemency of King John were both miracles of a kind, and it is not surprising to learn that Prince Vladimir became a saint, with a name-day in the calendar and with Serbian churches dedicated to his name. His bones were eventually transferred to El Bassan, but the famous wooden cross, enclosed within a gilt case, now lies in a Montenegrin coast village between Dulcigno and Antivari.¹ Every Whit-Sunday the whole population, Latin and Greek Christians and Mohammedans as well, march with the cross in procession to the summit of a neighbouring mountain. There they watch the sun rise over the magnificent panorama stretching from the sparkling turquoise of the Adriatic to the wooded heights around the glassy blue lake of Scutari, and the stony crags of Montenegro in the distance.

The calamities of the Serbs were terrific, but perhaps not so great as they have been represented. It is improbable that Simeon penetrated into all the wooded and rocky fastnesses of Rashka, Zeta was hardly touched, and some other fragments of the Serb race must have remained unconquered. Yet the murder of Serbian princes and the service of Serbian soldiers in the Bulgarian armies prove the completeness of the disaster. Even after 1018, when the downfall of the Bulgarians was accomplished, we hear of Bulgarian bishops in Ras, Prisrend, and Ochrida. These were as yet all on the boundary of Serbian territory, but if Bulgarian influence could penetrate so far, Serbian expansion was impossible. In fact the terrific disaster retarded further advance towards the Morava valley or Macedonia for nearly two centuries. The Serbians

¹ The name of the village is Velji Mikulitchi; the hill is Rumija (1595 metres high). *Vide Jireček, Gesch. der Serben*, 206-7.

developed their strength elsewhere, and it was in Zeta, not in Rashka, that they founded their first real national kingdom. In mediæval as in more modern times, the land of Montenegro was emancipated before the land of Serbia.

The great disaster which befell the Serbians in 924 had proved the dangerous nature of the Bulgarian power. But the Byzantine rulers of the time were contemptible, and it was most fortunate for them that Czar Simeon's successor had in no way inherited his greatness or his ambitions. The new Bulgarian king, Peter, was a pious man who made peace with Byzantium. In the second half of the tenth century, when Samuel, a Bulgarian king as great as Simeon, tried to revive Bulgarian greatness, he found the time too late. Byzantine military power had now reached its greatest height under a series of warlike emperors, all of whom attacked the Bulgarians. The last, Basil II. (d. 1025), fairly earned the title of "The Bulgar Slayer" by which he is known in history. In a series of systematic campaigns he finally crushed and overwhelmed the Bulgarian power, and in extreme old age entered the Golden Gate of Constantinople in triumph, surrounded with the spoils and captives of Bulgaria (1019). A second Bulgarian kingdom arose in the later Middle Ages, but it was never strong enough again to threaten the very existence of the Serbians. In fact, when a struggle did arise between Rashka and the second Bulgaria, it was the latter which was crushed.

It has been necessary to anticipate events, in order to show that the Bulgarian danger had been removed during the years 950-1019. For the first time for several centuries the Danube was cleared of barbarians and again in Byzantine hands. None the less, Serbian power did not as yet arise in this neighbourhood. The Serbian district of Rashka fell into anarchy, and a number of petty chieftains, or Župans, competed for power. A great deal of quarrel-

ling and bloodshed took place, in which all parties suffered. The situation was somewhat like that in Saxon England under the Heptarchy. Half a dozen different chiefs held sway, and occasionally one or other asserted a nominal headship under the title of Grand Župan (or Grand Duke), the Serbian equivalent of Bretwalda. In Rashka this welter and carnival of anarchy lasted for two centuries and a half after the disasters inflicted by Simeon. In Zeta, on the other hand, a stable government was much sooner developed.

The destruction of the Bulgarians removed immediate danger from Rashka and Zeta, only to bring them face to face with two formidable neighbours. The fierce Magyars soon established themselves on the Danube, and gradually worked round to the south-west, subduing Croatia and Bosnia. The more immediate danger was on the east of Rashka, from the Byzantine power. The policy of the Eastern emperors now that they had conquered Bulgaria was to extend their power into Macedonia and to the Morava and the Danube. In order to do this the Serbians of Rashka must be weak or tributary. The strong Byzantine rulers led armies into the Serbian woods and mountains, and set up or pulled down puppet princelets; weaker emperors relied on diplomacy to divide and weaken the Serbian princes by supporting one against the other. One result of this policy was to create a Serbian heptarchy in Rashka, but another one was to produce a friendly feeling and alliance between Serbians and Magyars. During the tenth to the twelfth centuries the Byzantine Emperor was the most dangerous enemy of both Magyar and Serbian. Hence the Rashkan princes and peoples looked to a Hungarian alliance as a refuge against the Byzantine Emperor, and Magyar and Serbian are often found united against him. The fact is of importance, because a permanent alliance between Magyars and the Byzantine

Emperor at that period must have been fatal to the Serbians.

Rashka, wasted and depopulated by Simeon, pressed by external dangers from Byzantium, and torn by internal disorders, was unable to advance as quickly as Zeta. The latter kingdom roughly covered the territory occupied by Montenegro in the years 1878-81, but included also the lake and town of Scutari. It was secure in a mountain fortress, and practically inaccessible from all sides except from the lake of Scutari and the vale of the Zeta. Even an advance from this side was a costly and difficult operation, and consequently Zeta for a time developed its power in comparative immunity. Little is known of the kingdom of Zeta, but its importance appears from the fact that we hear of a king in Zeta when there is only a Grand Župan in Rashka. Kingship usually implies a longer and more complete union of tribes and peoples than is indicated by inferior titles. In spite of our scanty evidence there seems to be no reason to doubt this fact. For the rest, the amount of territory ruled often extended beyond the limits already described. Sometimes the kings of Zeta ruled parts of Dalmatia and of Rashka ; sometimes they acknowledged themselves vassals of the King of Croatia, sometimes of the Emperor. The succession was often disputed, and the crown sat uneasily on every ruler's head. Yet if the rulers of Zeta seldom died in their beds, it was even rarer for them to escape disaster or captivity. Still, there can be no doubt that by about the middle of the eleventh century the King of Zeta had organised a state and ruled a country which had achieved a *de facto* independence, and was not, like Rashka, dependent on the diplomacy or arms of Byzantium.

The most authentic incident of the mid-eleventh century in Zeta is the reign of King Stephen Voislav. After the death of the great conquering Emperor Basil II.

(1025) the Byzantine hold on Zeta had relaxed. Stephen Voislav, a Serbian prince imprisoned in Constantinople, escaped to Zeta and had himself crowned king. He ruled not only Zeta strictly so-called but much of the Dalmatian coast as well. When an Imperial ship laden with a thousand pounds' weight of gold was wrecked on the Dalmatian coast, King Stephen pocketed the treasure and openly defied the Emperor. A punitive expedition was sent but defeated with heavy losses. A great army was then organised by the Imperial Governor of Durazzo, who pressed up the valley of the Zeta with fifty thousand men. Dioklea (near the modern Podgoritsa) was reached and the neighbouring valley plundered. But as the great army retreated, laden with booty, it was entangled in defiles. King Stephen and his men rolled down heavy stones and poured showers of poisoned arrows on the troops struggling in the narrow way. The Byzantine leader escaped with a mere handful of his men. King Stephen had been the first to play the game which the Montenegrins played so often on the Turks in days to come. A pretended retreat before superior forces, until these were well trapped in the ambush, then a surprise attack, a sudden shower of stones and deadly missiles, a wild charge of the mountaineers down the hillside, and a bloody heap of corpses in the pass below. These are the constant features of warfare in the district, whether the name is Zeta or Montenegro, and the opponents Byzantines or Turks.

That King Stephen achieved a *de facto* independence is proved not only by this great triumph but by a story told of him at a later date. The Byzantine Empire had lost many men in the invasion of 1042, and was too hampered by a Bulgarian rebellion and internal anarchy to organise another elaborate expedition against the defiant King Stephen. Where force had failed craft might succeed, and Katakalon, Imperial Governor of

Ragusa, asked permission to be godfather to the son of Stephen. Katakalon went to the baptism with a fleet of armed vessels, with which he intended to overawe the Zetan ruler. But Stephen was as crafty as he was fearless. The haughty Imperialist landed with an imposing train. Hardly had the first greetings been exchanged, when Stephen gave a sign and his followers seized the Imperialists and fettered them. The armed ships in the bay were taken by stratagem, and the would-be godfather, now thoroughly awakened from his fool's paradise, was conveyed in chains to Stagno on board his own flagship. These incidents are typical of the age. By a mixture of skill, fraud, and good fortune Stephen of Zeta had defied Byzantium. Instead of paying tribute he robbed the Byzantine treasury ; instead of submitting to authority he plundered one Imperial governor, imprisoned a second, and routed a third with the loss of more than half his army. In the same way his son and successor, King Michael, who accepted the title of Byzantine official and was formally termed the Exarch of Dalmatia, actually sent his son to aid the Bulgarians in one of their rebellions against the Emperor. Imperial governors sometimes invaded Zetan territory, and one of them defeated and took prisoner King Bodin, the second in descent from Michael (1091). Bodin appears to have extended his authority over Bosnia and controlled at least two of the Župans of Rashka. His importance is marked by the fact that Pope Clement III. had written him a letter in which he described him as "*rex Sclavorum gloriossimus.*" From the date of Bodin's captivity (1091) Zeta begins to lose its importance. In 1099 the Crusaders passed through the vale of the Zeta to Scutari, where they were received by Bodin.¹ This is almost the last appearance of a strong king in Zeta.

¹ Curiously enough, his name is only given by an English chronicler. Ordericus Vitalis, *Hist. Eccl.* ix. 5 ; Migne, *Patrol.*, 188, col. 659.

During the twelfth century its history is that of a divided state, with horrors of disputed successions, massacres at banquets, blood and anarchy such as would have delighted an Elizabethan dramatist. The only clear deduction is that the house of Zeta was waxing weaker and weaker. None the less, the moral influence of Zeta had been of importance ; like Montenegro in later times it realised the idea of a wild independence to the Serb race at a time when Rashka could only dream of it.

The external history of Rashka in the eleventh century is that of a long series of border raids on the part of the Serbians, of friendly co-operation on the part of the Magyars, to resist the larger and more systematic Byzantine operations against both peoples. The Rashkans and Magyars were more accessible to the Byzantines than were the Zetans. Great Byzantine armies marched up the Morava valley, and strong Byzantine garrisons watched the frontiers of Rashka from Monastir, Ochrida, and Nish. As long as these fortresses gave the Byzantines access to the Morava valley neither Rashka nor Hungary was safe. In all the confusion of the period it is evident that the Serbians of Rashka realised the growing weakness of the Byzantine Empire and were determined to achieve their independence at its expense. It is clear that by the end of the reign of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus (d. 1180) they had achieved this purpose.

The wars of the Emperor Manuel are the last great military effort of the Byzantine power before it was fatally weakened by the Latin Crusaders. Manuel headed many campaigns against Magyars and Serbians, and his exploits border on the fabulous. The most skilful knights could not meet him in battle ; the strongest could not wield his lance or bear the weight of his shield. He is said to have cut his way through five hundred Turks with only two attendants ; in one

Hungarian battle he snatched a standard from his vanguard and occupied a bridge single-handed ; in another, in which he defeated both Serbians and Magyars, he led the pursuit in his gilded armour. The Hungarian leader, "a frightful Goliath," turned on him ; Manuel's lance glanced from the shield and the Hungarian's sword broke the links of the Emperor's vizor. The herculean Manuel seized the Hungarian by the arm, unhorsed him, and made him a prisoner. But Manuel was more of an Amadis than of a Charlemagne, a knight-errant rather than a strategist. In his ten campaigns against the Magyars and Serbians he gained much glory and little real advantage. Poets told of how the golden wings of the Kaiser overshadowed Rashka, and how the spirits of the Tara and the Save complained to Manuel that he had choked them with blood and corpses. History tells that more than one Serbian Grand Župan knelt at his feet in humble submission, and that more than one Magyar king owed his crown to the Emperor. But the end of these chivalrous exploits was not the triumph of Manuel but of Stephen Nemanya the Serbian.

It is from Stephen Nemanya, the Grand Župan of Rashka, that modern Serbia has always dated the rise of Serbian national greatness in the Middle Ages. The judgment is a just one, for his dynasty reigned till the fourteenth century, and his arms united Zeta to Rashka and produced a new era of prosperity and cohesion. But the incidents of his early career are doubtful and legendary in character. He seems to have been born in Zeta, whither his father had fled after being expelled from his županship in Rashka. On the restoration of his father, Stephen appears to have acquired a principality on the eastern boundary of Rashka. The district seems to have stretched from Ras to Nish, and included the valleys of the Toplitsa, of the Lower Ibar,

and the land round Krushevatz. Thus he was a Warden of the Marches, holding an eastern outpost against the Empire. In 1171 Manuel quarrelled with Venice, and Stephen Nemanya seems to have co-operated with the Venetian fleet in an attack on Byzantine Dalmatia. In the next year a Byzantine army, based on Nish, tried to advance to the capture of Ras. Stephen Nemanya met this army at Pantino, south of Zvetchan, and totally defeated it. His victory was complete, but it was followed by the defection of his allies. The Venetian fleet, stricken with plague, sailed back to Venice, and the new king of Hungary came to terms with Constantinople. Hence the Emperor Manuel turned his undivided attention to Nemanya. The accounts of his submission vary, but there is no doubt of the fact. The tall, broad-shouldered man, as he is described by contemporaries, was seen in the train of Manuel as he entered Constantinople in triumph for the last time. The subsequent defeat of Manuel in Asia Minor weakened the Byzantine army, and his death in 1180 produced a disputed succession. Stephen Nemanya seized the opportunity to ally himself with the Hungarian king, Bela III., and to emancipate his country. Between them they laid in ashes the strong fortresses of Belgrade, Nish, and Serdica. Stephen turned towards Zeta and conquered the whole territory, including both Scutari and Cattaro. By 1186 a charter of the commune of Cattaro is dated "in the time of our Lord Nemanya, Grand Župan of Rashka." Thus Stephen Nemanya had by this time already united Rashka to Zeta, the true home of the Serbian race. William of Tyre, a contemporary chronicler, describes the Serbians of the time "as an uneducated and undisciplined race" (*populus incultus absque disciplina*), and as "bold and warlike men" (*audaces et bellicosi viri*). For the first time a real centre of unity and a real

national ruler existed to educate, to govern, and to discipline the Serbians.

The Eastern emperors were still further weakened by a revolt of the Bulgarians. This was assisted by Stephen Nemanya, and led to the foundation of a second Bulgarian kingdom. Stephen's policy thus interposed a strong buffer-state between Constantinople and Rashka, which impeded further Byzantine attacks on the Serbians. It was in the course of this revolt (1187) that Stephen Nemanya captured Nish and some of the surrounding district. Thus he had at last extended Serbian influence to the Morava valley, and by holding Nish he controlled not only the valley of the Morava and Vardar but the route to Philippopolis and Constantinople. His culminating triumph came in July 1189, when he received the Holy Roman Emperor at Nish.¹ Frederic Barbarossa, the most splendid of German mediæval rulers, was on his way to a crusade. Perhaps his own passions misled him into a quarrel with the Eastern Emperor; at any rate Nemanya profited by their hostility to conquer a long row of Byzantine fortresses stretching from Prisrend to Serdica. The Eastern Emperor attacked Nemanya in the following year and forced him to sue for peace (1190). But though Nemanya was forced to surrender some of his conquests, he had recovered much territory which had long been considered Byzantine. The territory definitely ceded to Nemanya included part of Northern Albania as well as Scutari. The Byzantine boundary was defined as running from Alessio to Prisrend and to Uskub then up the Morava to Nish and Belgrade. Thus the great fortresses of the border were still Imperial, but the

¹ Bulgarian delegates were also present at this meeting. The next emperor of German blood who appeared at Nish was William II., in January 1916, when King Ferdinand of Bulgaria received him with the words, "*Miles es et gloriosus.*"

interior of Rashka was permanently Serbian. The old boundary town had been Ras, but Nemanya now acquired territory beyond the Western Morava up to Kragujevatz and below Nish to Leskovatz. For the first time there is a recognisable outline of a united Serbian kingdom. The treaty was sealed by the marriage of Stephen's son to a Byzantine princess, an event which shows the Emperor's desire to conciliate the powerful Serbian prince. In result, this treaty was to prove the last effective appearance of an Eastern emperor in the Morava valley. In fourteen years Constantinople was sacked by the Latin Crusaders, and the continued revolts of Bulgaria interposed an effective barrier between Rashka and a Latin or Greek Empire.

III

THE NEMANYID DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MEDIÆVAL SERBIAN GREATNESS (1190-1321)

THE Nemanyid dynasty was the most stable as well as the greatest of the Serbian royal races. It was the destiny of this royal family to piece together the scattered elements of the Serb race, and to form out of them that imposing fabric of national greatness displayed in the reign of Stephen Dushan. But it was Stephen Nemanya rather than Stephen Dushan who made greatness possible. Stephen Nemanya based the Serbian state on what was a rough national unity. In so far as his successors sought to control other races than the Serb and thus exchanged the national ideal for the Imperial one, they were probably undermining the security of the State.

The Nemanyid dynasty had three aims: that of securing internal stability and unity; that of civilising the State by means of the Church; and that of extending Serbian power by a spirited foreign policy. Until the first two objects had been achieved, that of diplomatic or military expansion in the large sense was impossible. The political and ecclesiastical aims of the Nemanyid dynasty were similar but by no means identical. In Anglo-Saxon England it has been claimed, with some appearance of truth, that ecclesiastical unity preceded and occasioned political union, that the ecclesiastical parish was the germ of the civil township, and that the Primacy of Canterbury proved a model for the unity

first of Wessex and then of all England. In this sense it may be claimed, though with some exaggeration, that the Church produced the State. Such claims could never have been made in mediæval Serbia. Here the State clearly existed before the Church, for the organisation in democratic communes and under Župans preceded the conversion to Christianity, and the Slavonic ideas of feudalism differed greatly from the ecclesiastical model. The Church could not and did not create institutions in Rashka or Zeta ; it could be and was used to harmonise, to civilise, and to perfect them. Nothing is clearer than that the Church was a political instrument in the hands of the Nemanyid kings. This statement does not reflect upon the personal piety of the rulers. Most of them revered the Church : Stephen Nemanya took the cowl and died in a monastery, and his example was followed by several of his successors. But the truth remains, and subsequent history only illustrates and emphasises it, that the Serbian Church was the servant of the Serbian State.

Stephen Nemanya himself exercised a most important influence on the future of Serbia by his attitude towards the Bogomile heretics. This Bogomile heresy was akin to the much older Paulician heresy. Its origin is doubtful and, as is invariably the case in the Middle Ages, its doctrines have been greatly misrepresented by orthodox opponents. Its main principle does not appear to have been the dualism or equality of good and evil, as is often asserted.¹ It was rather the Adoptionist theory—that is, that Christ was a mere man until the Holy Spirit entered into him in his thirtieth year. This doctrine appears to have led to singular conclusions : the Bogomiles asserted

¹ *Vide* Bury, Gibbon (1902), vi. App. 6, pp. 540–3, and Jireček, *Gesch. der Bulgaren*, pp. 176 *sqq.* ; *ib.*, *Gesch. der Serben*, pp. 222 *sqq.* The older view is asserted in Lazar-Hrbeljanovitch, *Servian People*, i. pp. 350 *sqq.*

that the sacraments were the symbols of Satan, declared war on the Mass, the Cross and on all images, rejected the Old Testament and the Fathers, and stood by the New Testament, the Psalter and certain Apocryphal works. It is not certain that these are not the exaggerations of enemies, but there can be no doubt of the furious intolerance of the Bogomiles. The accusations of unnatural wickedness in practice and of infernal doctrines in theory prove the danger and the horror felt by Orthodox Christians against the Bogomiles. Their doctrines seem to have produced a kind of spiritual exhilaration or madness on their adherents similar to the physical effects of *bhang* or other Eastern compounds. This spiritual excitement appears to have been at its height in the twelfth century, when all the Slavonic lands of the Balkans were filled with its missionaries. In Serbia the doctrines evidently had a special hold on the monks and the clergy, and it was at this critical juncture that Stephen Nemanya declared himself resolutely against the Bogomiles. He summoned his Sabor or Representative Assembly, and the strength of the Bogomiles is shown by the fact that only his prolonged effort could induce it to condemn them. Armed with this authority he proceeded against them, deprived the leaders of their tongues or their lives, and the followers of their houses or their money. This brutal persecution was effectual, and the Bogomiles speedily disappeared from the Serbian land. The fact that they continued to divide and distract the State in Bosnia and Bulgaria at critical moments proves the greatness of Nemanya's practical service. At this period toleration was not a political possibility in any state except in one ruled by Turks or Tartars. Stephen Nemanya did not live to attain the next great religious object of his dynasty. His son Stephen, the First-Crowned (1196-1228), was the first to strengthen his authority over the

whole Serbian race by acquiring the title and status of King. It was agreed by all in theory that this title could only be granted by an emperor or a pope. Innocent III., that most powerful of mediæval popes, delighted in putting down the reigning monarchs of the West and in issuing new crowns to aspiring chieftains of the East. During his reign rulers of Cyprus, Armenia, and Bulgaria all possessed themselves of this new prize. But Stephen negotiated in vain, for Innocent listened to a remonstrance from the King of Hungary, and it was not until 1217 that Innocent's successor, Honorius III., actually sent a legate who crowned Stephen as King. Even as late as 1220 Stephen was declaring himself the true son of the Pope, but his allegiance was already straying back to the Greek Church. It has already been mentioned that Roman Pope and Byzantine Patriarch or Emperor had bidden hard against one another for supremacy in the Balkan lands. At this time Rome seemed to have greatly the advantage. In 1204 the Crusaders had conquered Constantinople and founded a Latin Empire, and the Greek Empire had been transferred to Nicæa in Asia Minor. Constantinople for the first time beheld with horror a shaven Patriarch and a communion served with unleavened bread by clergy who believed in the Double Procession. Roman ritual had already conquered in Hungary, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Latin princes ruled in Greece. Bulgaria and Bosnia were wavering. If Serbia now accepted the Latin ritual the papal influence might be triumphant. It was a supreme religious crisis in the history of Serbia as well as in that of the Balkans.

The situation was naturally complicated by political influences outside the Serbian kingdom. What seems to have weighed most with King Stephen was the consideration that Serbia still had no archbishopric within its

borders. Even their one bishopric, that of Ras, was at this time (1219) under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ochrida. The archbishops were autocephalous—that is, subject to no other ecclesiastical authority; they were learned Greeks who encouraged civilisation, but were dominated by the rulers of Bulgaria. Stephen, who was clear-sighted and sharp-witted, decided that he could get an ecclesiastical independence from the Greek Patriarch and Emperor in Asia, such as he would be unable to obtain from the Bulgarophil Archbishop of Ochrida or from the Holy Father at Rome. Inspired with this view, he extricated his brother Sava from his monastic seclusion in Mount Athos, and sent him on a mission to Asia (1219). Sava's attempt was crowned with success. The Byzantine Emperor Theodore and the Patriarch Germanus were flattered at the mission, and alive to its political importance in extending their influence. Sava promised to bring back all Serbia to the Orthodox faith, if the Greek Patriarch would make the Serbian Church autonomous and autocephalous, and erect a Serbian archbishopric independent of all except himself. The terms were mutually advantageous, and a settlement was easily reached. The Greek Patriarch conceded the archbishopric, appointed Sava himself as the first incumbent, and promised to the Serbian Church independence of the Latin Patriarch and ecclesiastical autonomy. Sava returned and fixed his archbishopric at Ushitze, a not very convenient centre from which to control Rashka and Zeta. He speedily showed his authority and deposed the Bishop of Prisrend, in spite of a threat of excommunication from the Archbishop of Ochrida (May 1220). But Sava and Stephen disregarded these protests, and carried their conversion through with relentless completeness. The papal coronation was now illegal, and Sava is rumoured to have crowned his brother Stephen according to Greek rites with a new crown sent from

Nicæa (1222).¹ In any case he had formally restored the not very reluctant Serbians to the bosom of the Orthodox Church. Stephen's coronation took place at Ushitze, and his portrait is still to be seen there in the frescoes of the monastery. He is represented as a fine black-bearded man, wearing a cap ornamented with pearls, and clad in a carmine-coloured robe, on which yellow two-headed Imperial eagles are embroidered. The picture shows clearly enough the ambitious claims of the Nemanyas. Sava was canonised, and is regarded as the most holy of Serbian saints. The Serbian Holy City is not, however, Užitze, but Ipek (Peć), to which the seat of the archbishopric was soon to be transferred. St. Sava deserves his fame, for he certainly increased the independent character of the Serbian Church. His action was really decisive; for, though dissensions with the Orthodox Patriarch arose in later times, there was never the same danger of return to Latin rites as at the time when Stephen was crowned by the Pope. A different religious faith has cut off Serbia for ever from Hungary, Croatia, Venice, and Rome. By thus separating herself Serbia secured an independent position, but at the risk of isolation when she needed help from the West. Henceforth her ideas and ambitions turned Eastward.

The individual action of Stephen Nemanya and his kingly and saintly sons had thus permanently transformed the religious policy of the Serbian realm. Their energy had suppressed the Bogomile and the Latin heresies, and henceforward religious dissensions were rarer in Serbia than in other Balkan lands. Full scope was thus allowed to the kings to develop the civilising agencies of the Church. But these may be described

¹ The accounts of the Byzantine coronation ceremony are duly recorded by mediæval chroniclers. But these are regarded by many modern writers as an invention to save the self-respect of the Byzantine Church, which could not allow a reconciliation without a re-coronation.

later ; here it is enough to note that the work of civilisation went hand in hand with religious and national unity.

Like so many sovereigns of the Middle Ages, Stephen Nemanya and Stephen the First-Crowned adopted the dangerous policy of portioning out parts of their realm as appanages to their sons or relatives. The practice was continued to the end of the Serbian kingdoms, and only increased the disturbances fomented by rebellious barons, who supported a son or a brother of the reigning sovereign. Stephen the First-Crowned was himself in flight and exile for a time (1202-3). More serious dissensions broke out under his tame successor, Stephen¹ Radoslav (1228-34), who was even weak enough to wish to bring ecclesiastical Serbia once more under the archbishopric of Ochrida. St. Sava in a rage went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and the indignant nobles dethroned King Radoslav and set up his brother, Stephen Vladislav, in his place (1234-43). Now that the Byzantine peril was of the past, Bulgarian and Hungarian neighbours threatened the Serbians. The line of fortresses down the Morava from Belgrade to Nish were always in the hands of Bulgarians or Hungarians. Ochrida and Prisrend were also in Bulgarian hands. It was therefore a main object of Serbian national policy to break through the encircling chain of Bulgarian fortresses, and it seems to have been the deference of Radoslav and Vladislav to the Bulgarians which stirred up the nobles to revolt. In 1241 a terrible invasion of Tartars swept over nearly all Eastern Europe. The Mongols of the Golden Horde were undoubtedly the most scientific military nation in the world, and their invasion of Hungary in 1241 was a masterpiece of mediæval strategy. In 1242 they swept through Bosnia, and burnt Cattaro and other towns of Zeta, and finally retired to the Lower Danube

¹ All the Serbian kings were called Stephen, from *στέφανος*, a crown.

via Rashka. The Serbians seem to have taken refuge in their woods and mountains, and to have incurred little loss from this lightning flash of an irresistible invasion. Poor Stephen Vladislav felt his weakness so much that he gave himself a colleague in the shape of a third brother and a third Stephen. The new ruler, Stephen Urosh I. (1243-76), was really sole King from the moment of his accession, and proved himself a vigorous warrior.

Foreign policy was still a difficulty. The Latin Empire of Byzantium was tottering to its fall, but the Latin princes of Epirus and Thessaly were a danger, and the possession of the line of fortresses by Bulgaria directly threatened the Serbians. Moreover, there was an obvious necessity that the latter should be on good terms with Ragusa, which offered a commercial outlet to the Adriatic. Yet Stephen Urosh I. often fought against Bulgarians and Ragusans, and sometimes against both united. He was a brave soldier but a poor diplomatist, and the result of his long reign was to show that his qualities were overbalanced by his defects. It was not until the reign of his two sons that Serbia made a real extension of its boundaries.

Like most other Serbian kings, Stephen Urosh I. was dethroned, as he grew feeble, by his son. Stephen Dragutin, his successor, only reigned as a real king for six years (1276-82), and the reason of his resignation is typically mediæval. Whilst riding with his nobles he fell from his horse and permanently injured his foot. He regarded his misfortune as a punishment from God for his wickedness in rebelling against his father. To atone for his sin, he summoned his Sabor or Assembly, and divided the kingship with his younger brother, Stephen Urosh II. In theory the kingship was still legally in the hands of Dragutin till his death in 1316, but in practice he had little power. He reigned as a

sort of under-King in the district north of Ras and south of the Save. This district was granted him by the Hungarian King, and was actually outside the then acknowledged Serbian boundary. His residence was fixed at Belgrade, the white city whose mediæval name *Alba Bulgarica* shows that it was essentially a non-Serbian city. On one occasion Dragutin revolted against Urosh II., put him in great danger, and extended the boundaries of his territory to the Rudnik Mountains (1313). But with this exception he gave little trouble.

Stephen Urosh II. (Miliutin) outlived Dragutin by five years, reigning from 1282 to 1321. This period of forty years is of the first importance in Serbian national history. It witnesses a steady upward rise in her power, but this result was produced by the development of the country rather than by the personal policy of Urosh II. The main cause of the advance was an economic one. At this time the whole Balkan peninsula was filled with adventurous soldiers, disbanded Greek, Latin, Tartar, and Spanish mercenaries, all ready to sell their swords to the highest bidder. Unless the Serbian ruler had been able to buy professional military support it is doubtful if he could have extended his power. As it was, the economic and commercial resources of Serbia began to be exploited. Agriculture developed and Serbian flour became famous, and the fur trade was also profitable. These two industries were worked by native Serbians. More friendly relations were established with Ragusa, and the commerce of the Adriatic flowed again along the long road from Ragusa through Bosnia into Serbia. Internal resources were also developed, and the minerals of Serbia began to be worked. The mines of silver, gold, tin, and copper, which were well known in Roman times, began again to be exploited. The friendly relations with the Magyars enabled the Serbians to import German colonists from Hungary. These as well as

Ragusan and Italian immigrants worked the mines, produced the wealth, and peopled the towns of Serbia. A significant index of wealth is the fact that gold and copper Serbian coins were for the first time minted under Urosh II. Silver Serbian coins had already existed for over half a century. All this influx of wealth enabled the Serbian kings to purchase the aid of skilled professional mercenaries, who formed an element indispensable to military success against the highly trained Latin or Greek armies. Thus armed with riches the Serbian kings could make more ambitious schemes of conquest than any they had hitherto attempted.

Urosh the Second was a bold, handsome soldier, full of energy if sometimes dangerously rash in his projects. The Latin Empire at Constantinople had been destroyed in 1261 by the Greek Emperor Michael Palæologus, who had extended his power into Macedonia and seized many fortresses which formerly belonged to the Bulgarians. Making an alliance with the Latin Prince of Thessaly, Urosh II. declared war on the Greek Emperor, advanced on Uskub (Skoplje), which he captured (1282), and extended his arms to the river Bregalnitsa. This was a great triumph, for Skoplje henceforth became the political capital of Serbia. No event aroused greater enthusiasm among all Serbs than the capture of Uskub from the Turks in 1912. The renaming of it as Skoplje marked clearly that the Serbians aimed at reviving their old mediæval glories. It was the strong hand of Urosh II. that first won that city for his capital. The Greek Emperor felt keenly the disgrace, but his great preparations were interrupted by his death. His son, Andronicus II., sent an army of Tartars, Franks, and Turks, who savagely devastated some parts of Serbian territory. Urosh II. defeated them and made a counter-attack on Byzantine territory. He extended

his boundary to the mountain fortress of Dibra, but made no impression on Ochrida or Prilep. He subsequently pushed the Serbian territory to the coast near Durazzo. The treaties the Byzantine Emperor was forced to make with him show the extent of his power. But the last years of his reign were darkened by defeat. Civil war broke out, and the Hungarians occupied the Matchva and stormed Belgrade. But failure in the north was not so important as success in the south and east, in which directions Urosh II. won great triumphs. Before his death he described himself as King of Albania as well as Serbia, and thus undoubtedly traced the lines of future Serbian ambition. That his diplomacy was not always successful is certain, but the eternal complexity of Balkan politics reached its extreme of confusion during his reign. It needed a very great diplomatist to foresee the permanent elements in the shifting kaleidoscope of interests and powers. His strong hand crushed civil war and kept his mercenaries in order, his wise measures increased the resources of his country, and his generosity to the Church saved him in his utmost need. During the civil war Urosh II. would have been crushed but for the support of the monks and clergy who lent him money which enabled him to hire mercenaries and to regain his power. The witness of the Church to his merits is perhaps interested, but there can be no doubt that the other evidence supports it. The best testimony to the internal administration of Urosh II. is the confusion which his death produced (1321).

The religious influences which affected the history of Serbia under the Nemanyid dynasty depended greatly upon the sovereigns. The ideas of the relation of Church and State were thoroughly of the East; the temporal sovereign was a religious person and controlled the chief religious official. There seems little sense of

that separation between Church and State which enabled popes to overthrow emperors and bishops to defy kings in the West. As in Constantinople the Patriarch was the creation of the Emperor, so in Serbia the Bishop was the creation of the King. The astute diplomacy of St. Sava emancipated the Serbian Church from the Greek archbishopric of Ochrida, created a Serbian archbishopric, and made the Serbian Church autocephalous and free. But the net result was to hand over the control of the Church to Stephen the First-Crowned. The only independent movement of the Church seems to have been in the direction of Bogomilism, and that was speedily crushed by Stephen Nemanya. The numerous occasions upon which the Serbian sovereigns coquetted with Rome do not appear to have aroused great opposition among the Serbian clergy. Under some sovereigns, especially Stephen Dushan, there seems to have been some deliberate persecution of those following the Latin rites. Its worship is forbidden in Dushan's code, and in negotiations with the Pope he promised to restore to Latin worshippers the abbeys and churches of which he had deprived them. But there does not appear to have been enough persecution seriously to divide or alienate parts of the nation, and Latin influences, in so far as they survived, added a new and rich element to the civilisation of mediæval Serbia. Traces of them may still be seen in the Italian architecture of some of the buildings on the western borders of Serbia. The Lion of Venice is deeply graven in marble at Cattaro, and the churches of the coast of Zeta are almost wholly Latin in feeling. Antivari, as has already been remarked, remained constant to the Latin tradition, and Rome stretched and still stretches a long arm into Scutari and Northern Albania.

Arts and letters were promoted both under Greek and Latin auspices, sometimes by the kings, sometimes

by prominent ecclesiastics like St. Sava, sometimes by the private generosity of individual nobles. The archbishops of Ochrida were learned and often unworldly men, Greeks not Bulgarians, and the churches as well as the buildings of Ochrida show the Byzantine influence.¹ This centre of culture, from which roads lead to both Skoplje and Prisrend, must have been the chief civilising agency until St. Sava assumed his archiepiscopal mitre in Ushitze. Afterwards, in consequence of Tartar raids, the religious capital was placed at Ipek, a true centre for the Serbian lands. Though the Byzantine Patriarch was not always recognised as their ecclesiastical superior by the Serbians, the general influence of the Byzantine Church was always assured. Its customs regulated the cut of vestments, the marriage of priests, the penalties for sin, and the theories of the sacrament. In the same way it supplied not only the models for ecclesiastical thought, but also the Greek and Latin classics. The influence of Latin civilising agencies came sometimes from the north, when Belgrade and the districts along the Danube were occupied by Hungary. An important Latin influence was exercised by Helena, the French princess (d. 1314), the queen of Urosh I., who spent sixty-four years in Serbia honoured alike by Latins and Greeks. Almost all her munificence seems to have been devoted to founding or endowing churches and schools of the Latin form, and she founded at least one Latin monastery on the Ibar. It is impossible to say how far her influence extended, but there is no doubt that it was great.

All the kings of the Nemanyid dynasty made ample gifts to the Church, Urosh II. and Stephen Dushan excelling them all. The results are seen in the direct encouragement of architecture and learning. Church

¹ The Patriarchs of Ochrida were usually under Bulgarian influence but were themselves always Greeks and of Byzantine tendencies.

building had already made great strides even under Stephen Nemanya. Two magnificent monasteries had been erected on Mount Athos by Stephen Nemanya and St. Sava, and these were but a type of the rich cloisters and churches that began to spring up everywhere. Of these, one of the most famous is the small white marble church of the Mother of God, erected by Nemanya north of Ras; another is the cloister of Moratcha in Montenegro, founded by a prince of the blood. Urosh II. was the greatest of all Serbian ecclesiastical architects, and the great cloisters of Gratchanitsa and Banjska are his. The Convent of Detchani was dedicated by the third Urosh, and Dushan was distinguished for his rich gifts to the churches. Activity in church building was accompanied by an outburst of furious energy in the direction of monastic learning. Here again the great Serbian monastery on Mount Athos was specially distinguished. St. Sava and King Stephen published under their own names the life of the great Stephen Nemanya. These were but the first examples of other biographies of Serbian rulers and statesmen. These again were succeeded by the lives of the saints, treatises on heresies, especially Bogomilism, and whole libraries of theological dissertation. In addition appeared translations of Greek and Latin authors, of the codes and treatises of Byzantine lawyers, and of popular poetry and romance. The literary medium was Palæo-Slovene, the sacred language of the Orthodox Church. The inspiration was almost wholly Byzantine, and thousands of works were translated or adapted from the Greek. But the industry is beyond all praise, and indicates to the full the civilising agency at work and the desire of Serbian monks to profit from it. Moreover, there is a Serbian mediæval literature of a sort which, though originally based on Byzantine models, was beginning to acquire characteristics of its

own. It is the same feeling of national unity which afterwards had so wonderful a flowering in the cycle of epic ballads and folk songs of Kossovo and Marko Kraljevitch, which surpass the Border ballads of our own story and challenge comparison with the Volsung Saga and the Iliad. But whether we judge by the test of acquired or native inspirations there can be no doubt that the Serbian civilisation was real. The evidence surviving is overwhelming in its mass. The numerous manuscripts which still remain are inferior in number to those which are known to have been destroyed by Greek or other hands. That the monasteries of Serbia contained very many learned men who had acquired a high standard of culture is undoubted. Of universities we hear nothing, but many of the Serbian writers and monks had studied in Byzantium itself. There is every reason to suppose that the Turkish conquest destroyed a rising and rapid civilisation and important artistic and cultural developments which the wealth and policy of the Serbian kings had fostered into vigorous life. It is a saying of old about the Turk that no grass grows again where his horse's feet have passed, the flowers of Serbian art and learning certainly did not.

IV

STEPHEN UROSH III. AND STEPHEN DUSHAN— THE SERBIAN MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE IN ITS GLORY (1321-55)

THE generation of power and glory which the Serbian people were now to enjoy opened as inauspiciously as any period in Serbian history. Now that the strong hand of Urosh II. was removed, his mercenaries revolted, claimed their pay, plundered abbeys and cities, and even insulted the corpse of their dead master. Three claimants arose to dispute the succession, and by a singular chance the one who succeeded was the son of Urosh II. whom the stern father had blinded for the unfilial crime of rebellion. The blinding could only have been partial, as was sometimes the case in these times.¹ The injured prince called on the Serbians to choose him for their king, as God had restored his sight by a miracle. This typically mediæval election cry carried the day, and the new prince was saluted by the Sabor as King Stephen Urosh III. (1322). In this case, however, a coequal kingship was instituted, Stephen Urosh III. (*rex veteranus*) being recognised as sovereign of Rashka and overlord, and his fourteen-year-old son, Stephen Dushan (*rex iuuenis*), as under-king of Zeta.

A serious result of the confusion produced by the death of Urosh II. was the loss of Zachlunia, which

¹ e.g. with Pope Hadrian of Rome and the Byzantine Emperor Justinian II.

he had controlled. This province was of importance, because access to the Adriatic lay through the vale of the Narenta, which was valuable for commercial and political reasons. As a result of a great deal of confused fighting the rulers of Bosnia remained masters of the vale of Narenta. The struggle had involved the Serbians again in a war with Ragusa. This was always a misfortune, for Ragusa was impregnable to attack on the landside and was supported by Venice from the sea.¹ Hence no military gain and much commercial loss might come from this hostility. Eventually a peace was patched up, and in after years Stephen Dushan showed that he appreciated to the full the advantages of a good understanding with the Ragusans. Even in these days, however, fate seemed to have decided against a development of Serbian sea power. The centres of Serbian strength and wealth lay many miles from the sea over long and difficult roads. Salonica barred their way to the Ægæan; Durazzo and Valona were always coveted and usually occupied by other powers. The town of Cattaro was often in Serbian hands, but they never held the whole circle of hills surrounding it. The narrow entrance to that most magnificent of harbours would have enabled a power, which possessed the circumference of the Bocche di Cattaro, to build up a military navy undisturbed by the hostility of neighbouring powers. But, as both sides of the Bocche were never in the possession of the Serbians, such an enterprise was impossible. It is reasonably certain that our period is the only one in Serbian history in which such an enterprise could have been attempted. Urosh II. had


¹ The wealth of Ragusa was very great in the fourteenth century. The importance of her connection with Serbia is shown by the fact that she leased three gold mines from Serbia for a yearly rent of 300,000 ducats, which Sir Arthur Evans has reckoned as half the total revenue of Queen Elizabeth of England.


advanced to the Adriatic and held some of the Albanian coast, and the wealth and the commerce of Serbia were now sufficient to maintain and create a navy. There can also be no doubt that the Serbian power would have been equal to the conquest of both sides of the Bocche, and it is a fair question whether "a window in the Adriatic" and the growth of naval power would have involved less difficulty than the expansion of Serbia in Macedonia and towards the East. It is reasonably certain that conflict with Ragusa and Venice would have ensued, but a struggle with these states, while disastrous when Serbia was purely a land power, might have had other results when she commanded an impregnable base at Cattaro and dominated the Albanian coast. There is certainly no reason to suppose that the national spirit of the Slavs was ill-adapted to the sea. The seamanship and enterprise of the sailors, pirates, and fishermen of Croatia and Dalmatia prove clearly that the Jugo-Slavs have no natural prejudice against the sea. But there can also be no doubt that Stephen Dushan, the wisest head and strongest hand among the Serbians, decided definitely against any such policy. His consistent aim was that of military expansion to the south and east, whilst on the west his power was confined to a few coastal towns, and his policy was friendship with Venice and Ragusa. If he ever sought a base of sea power, it was at Constantinople, not at Cattaro; in the Ægæan, not in the Adriatic.

The reign of Urosh III., which began with the loss of a maritime province and the definite abandonment of a policy of sea power, was to end in great military glory. Yet even here the beginnings were inauspicious. The Bosnians, who had more than once been under Serbian control, not only entirely emancipated themselves, but ravaged Rashka along the boundary of the Drina, and destroyed Serbian churches. In diplomacy Urosh III.

proved fairly successful, though moderately unscrupulous. A civil war had broken out in the Greek Empire between the two Andronici, grandfather and grandson. By espousing first one side and then the other, Urosh III. contrived to seize Prilep from both. This fortress, afterwards famous as the residence of Marko Kraljevitch, made an important advance in Macedonia possible. Situated as it is on a tableland and forming the centre of a network of small roads, it guards the Babuna Pass and opens the gate to Monastir and Western Macedonia. But, though Prilep was never again in Byzantine hands, it was only a break in the iron chain of fortresses. Andronicus III., who had at length forced his grandfather into a monastery, still held Proshenik, Strumitsa, and Melnik. He defeated an attempt on the great fortress of Ochrida, and with the view of further embarrassing the Serbians made an alliance with the Bulgarian Czar Michael. The latter had rejected his Serbian bride, imprisoned her, and married a Byzantine princess, so that personal as well as popular reasons increased the enmity between the two races. The second kingdom of Bulgaria had never been as strong as the older one; it was distracted by the Latin and Bogomile heresies, and had been weakened in conflict with its neighbours. None the less, it is matter for considerable surprise that Urosh III., who had hitherto failed against the Bosnians and prevailed against Byzantium only by craft, was to overcome both Bulgaria and Byzantium by arms.

Urosh III. showed no eagerness for the fray, and sought to avert the war by negotiation. In the Middle Ages campaigns are seldom intelligible and battles rarely decisive, but the present war was an exception to both rules. The Bulgaro-Byzantines were certainly to be feared, not only because of their own forces, but because of assistance derived from various Wallachian and Tartar auxiliaries. Their plan seems to have been for





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the Emperor Andronicus to move up from Macedonia and turn the Serbian flank in the direction of Prilep, and for the Bulgarians and their auxiliaries to strike for Uskub from the direction of Sofia. Urosh III., accompanied by his son and colleague Dushan, a young man of twenty-two, concentrated his forces just below Nish. Having ascertained the direction of the Bulgarian advance, the Serbian army hurriedly marched down and took up a position near Küstendil, just beyond the present Serbian border. There for several days the two armies faced one another, while the peace-loving Urosh again offered terms to Czar Michael. The Bulgarian Czar, despising his timid antagonist, dispersed his troops on missions of forage and plunder. Serbian reinforcements arrived, and Urosh, perhaps encouraged by this accession of strength, perhaps under the influence of the fiery Dushan, decided to attack. The numbers were about equal, fifteen thousand a side, but the Bulgarian troops were widely scattered and not expecting attack. It was the 8th of July 1330, a day for ever memorable to Serbia. Dushan, supported by a bodyguard of German horsemen in complete mail, led on the attack and charged straight for the standard of the Bulgarian Czar. Even the mild old Urosh was seen on horseback cheering on his men. The surprise was complete: the Bulgarian ranks were broken by the first impetuous attack. In the rout that followed the Serbian arrows caught the flying Bulgars on both banks of the brawling Struma, whose waters were crimsoned with their blood. The Czar borne away in the rush of fugitives, fell from his war-horse and was slain by a pursuing Serbian. The returning foragers were mercilessly cut down, the camp at Zemlen was beset and those within it surrendered at discretion. That night the Czar's body was carried on a horse to King Urosh. On the morrow the Bulgarian nobles, sullen and fettered, formed a long line behind King

Urosh, before whom the foemen's horses were led laden with armour and spoils. Suddenly a wail burst from the lips of the Bulgarian boyars. The Czar's corpse was carried past them in the procession. At their request the dead Czar was interred in the chapel of St. George at Nagoritchin, near Kumanovo. Urosh gave honourable burial to the Bulgarian dead, but refused it to their allies the Tartars, whose heathen corpses were left to rot in the sun. The victor ascribed the glory of his victory to God, and the great monastery of Detchani near Ipek was one memorial of the battle. Another is still to be seen in the ruins of a small church which crowns a solitary vine-clad hill near Küstendil. It was the Battle Abbey of King Urosh, built on the spot where he pitched his tent the night before the great victory.

The conquering Urosh III. advanced into Bulgaria without finding any serious opposition. The captured Bulgarian nobles were anxious for freedom and wealth; those who remained free were unable to resist him. Anna, the Serb princess rejected by the dead Czar, was called from a prison to the throne of Bulgaria, which she was to rule until her son came of age. This complete subjection to Serbia was only temporary: within a year from this date the Serbian Czarina was deposed by an internal revolution and a nephew of the dead Czar crowned as King (1331). Bulgarian independence was restored, but Bulgarian greatness was destroyed. The second kingdom of Bulgaria never recovered from the disaster of Küstendil, and proved often submissive and never dangerous to its neighbours in Serbia. Urosh now turned against the Greek Emperor in Macedonia, drove him back within his own borders, and captured Veles, Proshenik, and Ishtip. Andronicus hastily made peace and went off to attack his former ally Bulgaria. Thus in a single battle Urosh had won enduring renown, while in the space of a single campaign he had vanquished

a Czar and an Emperor. It would seem that Urosh had done enough to endear him to his subjects. But, as was common in Serbian history, disputes between father and son unfortunately broke out. It appears that he envied the fame won by the dashing Dushan at Küstendil, and contemplated setting him aside in favour of a younger son. There are two utterances on these incidents, recorded at a later date by Dushan himself in public documents. Wicked people according to one document, demons according to another, inspired his father to cherish designs against his life, and Dushan ascribes his rescue to God alone. The evidence is partial, but there seems little doubt that Dushan was at first anxious for peace and was ultimately driven into rebellion to save his life. He advanced with great rapidity from Scutari, and Urosh, unable to oppose him, was captured and imprisoned in a strong castle. Urosh III. was deposed by the Sabor, and Stephen Dushan was solemnly crowned a second time by the Archbishop in the presence of his assembled nobles (8th September 1331). Within five weeks from this date the captive monarch was dead. He was sixty years old, but there is no doubt that his death was unexpected and very little that it was a violent one. The most plausible explanation of the whole affair and that advanced by one very well informed chronicler is that Dushan, who was still under twenty, was an instrument in the hands of the nobles.¹ There can be no doubt that the mild and peace-loving Urosh was despised by the nobles as much as the hot-blooded young Dushan was admired. The warlike nobles supported Dushan, whom they knew to be a warrior, against the child prince

¹ Jireček (*Gesch. der Serben*, pp. 365–6) gives an elaborate discussion of the different theories. The nickname Dushan is variously interpreted as “the Strangler” or “the Victorious.” The first derivation refers to the story that he is supposed to have strangled his father.

whom Urosh wished to impose on them. At any rate the feebleness of resistance can only be explained on the ground that he had wholly lost their support. There is some evidence that Dushan felt remorse for the deed, there is none that any of his nobles did. Later chroniclers, remembering the glories of his reign and the cruelty of his end, pronounce Urosh III. to be a martyr and regard him as a saint. It is doubtful if he is well qualified to sustain either part, unless the chroniclers regard his recovery from semi-blindness as a proof of Divine favour. He had rebelled against his own father, had murdered his own brother, had sought to disinherit and possibly to murder his own son. His previous character does not suggest that he would have been merciful to Dushan if he had conquered, and timidity not piety produced those peace-loving tendencies for which he suffered. But his career was chequered even for a monarch of mediæval Serbia, and few have passed so quickly from such triumph to such disaster. Perhaps this contrast struck the imagination of the people, who revered the memory of so singular a saint. Dushan at least gave full honour to the dead, and laid the old man to rest in that great cloister which had risen to commemorate their joint victory. The peasants of Serbia still remember him by the name of the King of Detchani.

All the Balkan states had great rulers and warriors to show during the Middle Ages. Bulgaria had its Simeon and its Samuel, Hungary its Louis the Great, Wallachia its Vlad. Stephen Dushan is the only ruler of Serbia who need fear comparison with none of these. Yet there seems to be no vital difference in policy between the ideas of Dushan and those of his predecessors. The development of internal resources to make possible the expenses of a brilliant foreign policy, the hire of foreign mercenaries, the extension of the Serbian Empire over

men of alien races and nationalities, the pursuit of aims which were imperial rather than national, all these tendencies are already evident. The only real difference is that Stephen Dushan was a genius and carried out all these ideas with a daring and energy such as no predecessor could show. He was at once a legislator, a diplomatist and a general, and in all these departments he excelled his predecessors. Dushan was formed by nature to impress his subjects. His body was cast in a giant mould, but his limbs were well proportioned and graceful. His handsome face, long full beard, and lofty stature made his appearance impressive and splendid on all public occasions, while his fiery courage and energy endeared him to a nation of warriors. Yet this external splendour served but to conceal the inner qualities. There was nothing rash or impetuous in his policy or temper. He seems sincerely to have wished the good of his subjects and to have ruled by relatively mild and conciliatory methods. In diplomacy he was singularly patient, and his impetuosity in war was the calculated result of well-thought-out military plans.

Of his internal policy more will be said in another place. Here it is enough to say that he never forgot the domestic needs of his subjects amid the clash of arms. Every effort was made to encourage commerce and stimulate industry by the importation of foreigners as well as by diplomacy and treaties. Saxons, Ragusans, Venetians, Greeks, Albanians, all jostled one another in his anterooms, fought side by side in his armies, peopled his cities, worked his mines, or garrisoned his fortresses. He took pains to govern the districts he conquered according to their own laws and customs. He was obliged to delegate his authority even over the Serbian lands to semi-independent governors. In the second year of his reign he had to suppress a rebellion of Albanians and Serbians in Zeta. During the rest of his

reign the nobles were quieter, and seem to have been kept in awe by his achievements and prestige. All accounts agree as to the wealth of the country and its internal peace during his rule, and after ages spoke regretfully of the golden girdles and fine raiment of the reign of Dushan. Yet this tranquillity was something of an illusion, and his death was the signal for the unity to dissolve into fragments. Dushan's noblest monument is his *Zakonik*, or Code, which he published in 1349. This collection of laws and customs testifies clearly to his ideals. It shows that he definitely sought to pierce the Slavonic darkness with Byzantine light. The efforts to improve the condition of the lowest class of his subjects and to impose the rule of law on his turbulent barons are equally obvious and praiseworthy, and give him a nobler renown than all the splendours of his coronation or the triumphs of his sword.

The diplomatic and military aspects of his reign are inseparable from one another. Here his good fortune corresponded with his ability to make use of it. As a diplomatist he saw both deep and far, and was one of the very few statesmen to perceive the greatness of the Turkish danger and to make plans to avert it. Both in diplomacy and in war his objective was Constantinople, and to this purpose all other aims were subsidiary. Dushan is one of the very few mediæval rulers who gives the impression that he was ready to sacrifice trifling considerations to substantial ends, and that he was using other states and rulers as instruments in his hands. At the beginning of his reign the diplomatic situation was a complex one. Beyond the Danube, Hungary, under its powerful King Louis the Great (1342-82), was soon to threaten the northern border of Serbia. On the west and in the south the rulers of Bosnia were increasing in power, and had not only attacked from the Drina in the previous reign, but had wrested the vale of the

Narenta from Serbia. Dushan seems to have been quite clear that a conquest of either Bosnian or Hungarian territory was not worth the money or the men. His policy towards both was therefore in the military sense defensive, in the diplomatic sense aggressive. He left as few troops as possible to maintain his north and west borders, and sought by diplomatic means to embarrass his enemies. Ragusa was threatened by the coastal advance of the Bosnians, and Venice her suzerain was alarmed by the naval ambitions of Louis the Great, who sought to conquer the kingdom of Naples and thus to become a great power on both sides of the Adriatic. Stephen used his advantage with much skill, and showed none of that mean jealousy by which his predecessors had formerly provoked Ragusa. Stagno, the one Serbian port remaining north of Ragusa, was ceded to that republic in the well-justified assurance that it would strengthen her friendship to himself and increase her opposition to the Bosnians (1333). He reaped his reward, for in the war which broke out with Hungary and Bosnia two years later the Ragusans supported Dushan and did much to bring the war to a close. Some years afterwards Dushan dexterously detached Bosnia from Hungary, and supported Venice in her opposition to the Neapolitan designs of Louis the Great. He played off one enemy against the other with great skill, and finally mediated between Venice and Hungary in 1348.

The only occasion on which Dushan led a large army in person against Bosnia was in 1350, when it seemed that Ragusa, depopulated by the plague, might lose her hold on the coast. Stephen captured the mouth of the Narenta, and was preparing further operations when he was recalled to Macedonia by a Byzantine invasion. The demonstration was successful, and was aided by the benevolent neutrality of Venice. On this, as on several

other occasions, Dushan tried to induce the Venetians to throw in their lot with him. Though seldom securing them as an active ally, Dushan always relied on them for transport and protection of his trade in the Adriatic. His relations with Venice remained excellent, and she enrolled him, his queen, and his son in the golden book of her citizens. In the last war with Hungary (1354-55) Dushan had the advantage in the north, and for the second time expelled Louis from Belgrade. Venice supported him in the south, where, though other Dalmatian towns were protected, Clissa fell into the hands of the Hungarian King after the death of Dushan (1356). Thus on the whole Dushan had attained his ends by diplomacy. Venice and Ragusa did not exhaust the list of his allies; the petty rulers of the Adriatic coast and the Archduke of Austria were also his friends. Even the Emperor Charles iv. sent a letter to Dushan addressing him as "dearest brother," and welcoming him not only as a brother ruler, but as one who shared "in the same noble Slavonic tongue" (*eiusdem nobilis slavici idiomatis participatio*). Charles iv. was a patriotic Bohemian, who believed in the "sublimity of that same noble speech" (*eiusdem generosae linguae sublimitas*), and set an early example, followed by other mediæval Slavonic rulers, of claiming community of thought and sympathy with one another on the ground of blood or language.

The wars with Bosnia and Hungary were but so many distractions from the main objects of Dushan's ambition—the advance in Albania and Thessaly, which was to prove the base for operations against Byzantium. It marks the wise diplomacy of Dushan that he made no attempt to restore direct Serbian rule in Bulgaria when the Serbian Czarina was deposed by a revolution in favour of a native Bulgarian prince, John Alexander (1331). So far from interfering, he married the new

Bulgarian ruler's sister, Helena. John Alexander was related by marriage to Basaraba, the ruler of Wallachia, and thus Dushan secured an alliance with two friendly powers, who were useful allies both against Hungary and the Byzantines. Basaraba had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Hungarians in 1330, and Alexander proved a formidable foe to Byzantium.

Thus secured by allies from attack in the north and west, Dushan was able to turn his attention to the south and east. His conquests in the south are explained by the fact that he could hardly advance against Byzantium until his flank was secure. In 1331 there had been a serious revolt against him in North Albania and Zeta, and the whole territory along the road from Durazzo, Ochrida, and Thessalonica was still in the hands of Latin rulers, Albanian chiefs, or the Greek Emperor. Until he controlled the plains of Macedonia he could not march to Constantinople. The whole series of military operations shows a systematic policy and definite aim, combined with diplomatic skill. The operations were largely those of siege and blockade ; there were no decisive battles and more than one serious disaster. The troops used were often mercenaries, but the armies were capable and well skilled. No defeat disgraced the Serbian arms when Dushan himself commanded, and the operations along the Narenta and the lightning march to Salonica in 1350, as well as the upward sweep to the Danube in 1355, show that he possessed some of the qualities of a great captain. Did we know more of his campaigns it might prove that he was as able in the field as he was in the cabinet.

It appears that Urosh III.'s conquest of Prilep had been lost perhaps during the confusion on his death, and that in 1334 Dushan's southern boundary followed a line drawn from Dibra to Veles, Proshenik, and Ishtip. Dushan made successful use of the counsel of a deserted

Byzantine general in his first campaign against the Greek Empire. He eventually made peace with Andronicus III., restored some of his conquests, but apparently retained Prilep and Strumitsa. During the next few years Dushan was occupied by affairs in the west, while the Emperor Andronicus by a desperate effort conquered Thessaly, Albania, and Epirus. On his death in 1341 a broad band of Byzantine territory stretched from Thessalonica to the Albanian coast, and Dushan at once prepared to take advantage of the confusion occasioned by that event. The two claimants to the throne were John Palæologus, the infant son of Andronicus, and John Cantacuzenus, who had been Prime Minister, was now Regent and aimed at being Emperor. His policy was purely personal, and his treachery was to be disastrous to Byzantium. Cantacuzenus could not restrain his ambition, was compelled to fly from Constantinople, and raised his rebellious standard at Dimotica. The disturbances and disputes occasioned by this revolt distracted the Empire for fourteen years and opened the door to Turkish and Serbian aggression.

The news of the civil war in the Empire aroused enemies on all sides. Stephen Dushan advanced against Vodená, the key to Salonica; the Bulgarians advanced on the north; the Albanians arose in their own land and in Thessaly; the Turks plundered the coasts. Cantacuzenus, with only 2000 men, sought refuge with Dushan and was well received by him. A partition treaty was arranged between them. The terms are uncertain; all we know is that Cantacuzenus lies about them in his memoirs. In 1342 the allies advanced into Greek territory, Dushan seized Vodená and Melnik, Cantacuzenus failed before Serres, where a plague swept away his Serbian auxiliaries and reduced his own followers to 500 men. In the next year a second failure before Serres induced Dushan to cast off

Cantacuzenus and make peace with the Dowager Empress. The rebel Cantacuzenus fled to Thrace and to the Turkish Emir of Smyrna, and next year gave Dushan a very unpleasant introduction to his new allies. Three thousand Turkish sailors, worsted at sea by the Venetians, were pursued by the Serbian heavy cavalry. At Stefaniana, between Salonica and Serres, the seamen turned at bay on a hill, caught the mailed horsemen in flank and inflicted heavy losses on them. But, in spite of these checks, the general advance of Serbia was unmistakable. Macedonia was entirely conquered, and the great fortress of Ochrida, whose magnificent ruins still overlook the blue waters of the great lake, became Serbian. Valona and Berat were captured, and finally the important city of Serres at last surrendered its keys to the Serbian conqueror (1345). Thus in four years Dushan had extended his power from west to east and conquered a continuous band of territory, including Albania and Macedonia and stretching beyond Serres. The organisation of the new lands was made on statesmanlike lines. Serbian governors were placed in supreme authority, but the privileges and customs of the newly acquired territories were elaborately confirmed by red-sealed charters. There is evidence that Dushan was somewhat hostile to the Greeks, who were at this time more active as administrators than at any period of Byzantine history. It is certain that in most of the newly won lands there was a pro-Greek or pro-Byzantine party, and it was reasonable to exclude Greeks from the important posts. But if Greek officials were not usually encouraged, Greek subjects were seldom oppressed. The Byzantines of this age were weak and rapacious, the Serbian ruler was rich and strong. There can be no doubt that Dushan's rule taxed the territories less and protected them more than the Byzantines had done. As a precautionary measure

Dushan repaired and improved the walls of all strong places, and used Serbian garrisons to defend them.

The aim of Dushan was already clear—he was trying to found a cosmopolitan empire of the Byzantine type, based on a central power controlling and administering a medley of races and nationalities. All barbaric rulers from Charlemagne downwards had aspired to the Imperial title, and it had been assumed in the East more readily than in the West. The rulers of Bulgaria had long called themselves Czars, and Dushan, who was as powerful as any Bulgarian ruler had ever been, was justified in assuming the same proud title. But the crisis of the Byzantine Empire and the ambitions of Dushan himself made his claim to the Imperial title of great significance at this moment. There can be no doubt that Dushan regarded himself as not only a claimant to the Imperial title, but as a successor to the Byzantine throne. He had already publicly described himself as ruler of Serbs and Romans (*i.e.* Greeks), and king and autocrat of Serbia and Roumania. On Easter Sunday (16th April 1346) the Serbo-Roman Empire was formally inaugurated by the Serbian Sabor or Assembly. In the presence of his Sabor,¹ two Patriarchs, one of Serbia and the other of Bulgaria, set the crown of Empire on the brows of the great Serbian conqueror. Together with the Emperor his consort Helena was crowned as Empress and his son Urosh as King of Serbia. The scene was magnificent, and the ambassadors from Ragusa, the Serbian, Greek, and Albanian nobles, the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian abbots and bishops,

¹ Serbian authorities place the scene of this coronation at the Serbian mediæval capital of Skoplje (Uskub). Finlay and Gibbons have given some reason for supposing it to have been at Serres. The latter, as a wholly Greek city, might be deemed more suitable to the Imperial inauguration. It is possible that there is a confusion between two ceremonies and that Dushan was proclaimed Emperor at Serres in 1345 and crowned at Skoplje in 1346.

formed a medley of different races testifying to the extent of his rule and power. That Easter Sunday which proclaimed Dushan the Emperor of Serbs and of Romans is the proudest moment in Serbian history.

The organisation of his conquests had already been made by Dushan, but his new title required changes in the titles and rank of his officials. An Emperor was incomplete without a spiritual equal, and accordingly the Archbishop of Ipek was transformed into a Patriarch, a title which implied autocephalous rights. In imitation of the Greek Empire he distributed empty titles among his Župans with a lavish hand. The highest rank, that of king, was bestowed on his son, the next, that of despot, on three rulers, that of Cæsar on two rulers of the Southern Marches, while the pompous Byzantine title of Sebastocrat was freely dispensed. The Imperial purpose and title was founded on a firmer basis by the *Zakonik* or Code of Laws which was issued three years later, and which aimed at combining the best elements of Byzantine law with those of Serb national custom.

The wealth and power shown at Dushan's coronation may be contrasted in an interesting fashion with that with which the despicable John Cantacuzenus sought to imitate him a year later at Constantinople.¹ The Byzantine historian speaks contemptuously of a crown of gilded leather and jewels of coloured glass, and of a banquet where his admirers drank to the pinchbeck Emperor in beakers of tin and lead. The splendour of Dushan's coronation was universally acknowledged: the fair raiment, the cloth of gold, the purple and the jewels, the splendour and profusion of his gifts to his supporters—all these became a tradition even in his own age. The contrast was a real one. Dushan with his well-paid

¹ Cantacuzenus was twice crowned (21st May 1346), at Adrianople, probably in imitation of Dushan, and Feb. 1347, after his triumphant entry into Constantinople.

mercenaries and his well-governed territory was far superior in strength to the bankrupt Greek Empire, distracted by civil war within and by enemies without. There was the same difference in personal character between the two rulers—Cantacuzenus, intriguing, crafty, but incompetent; Dushan, far-seeing, wise, and courageous.

Though Cantacuzenus was personally despicable, the Turkish allies on whom he relied were not, as both he and Dushan speedily discovered. After vainly trying to conciliate Dushan, Cantacuzenus induced a Turkish host to attack the Serbian frontier. The Turks got out of hand, plundered and robbed the Greek population, whom Cantacuzenus wished to conciliate, insulted the Byzantine leaders, and then returned to Asia heavy with their spoils. Dushan was busy elsewhere on the Bosnian front. In 1348, the year of the "Black Death" in the East, Dushan himself led his army to Janina and conquered the great stronghold of Epirus. Then by rapid parallel advances on both west and east coasts he occupied all Northern Greece from Arta to Volo. All the Balkan lands, except Thrace, the Peloponnese, and the districts round Durazzo, Salonica, and Byzantium, were now under the control or in the alliance of Dushan. His ever-faithful friends, Ragusa and Venice, hastened to congratulate the *Imperator Rasciae et Romaniae* on his new conquests.

The instructions of Dushan to his ambassador at Venice (1350) show very clearly the scope of his ambitions. He formally proposed an offensive alliance between Venice and himself for the conquest of Constantinople. The child Emperor was to be freed from Cantacuzenus, who had treacherously imprisoned him, Constantinople was to be captured by the aid of the Venetian fleet, and the Republic was to be rewarded by the Province of Epirus and by commercial privileges in

Constantinople. The cautious diplomacy of the Republic rejected this dazzling offer. In 1350, as has already been narrated, Dushan came himself with a great host to the mouth of the Narenta, where he hoped to crush the Bosnians and to impress Venice with his power. Cantacuzenus promptly seized the opportunity of Dushan's absence to invade the eastern boundary of the Serbian territory with his Turkish allies. The operations were startlingly successful. Verria and Vodena fell, and the invasion into Thessaly was only checked with difficulty. Then Stephen Dushan showed himself a great captain. Hurrying back from Bosnia, he brought a small army by forced marches right up to the gates of Salonica. The point of this masterly move was that the burghers of Salonica had a sturdy independence of their own, hated Cantacuzenus, and had more than once considered delivering up their city to Dushan. Cantacuzenus hurried to Salonica and interviewed Dushan outside the walls. The account of the negotiation given by Cantacuzenus is tinged with his usual mendacity, and the fact that he accuses Dushan of duplicity is not necessarily against that ruler. Negotiations were abandoned, Cantacuzenus sailed back to Constantinople, and Dushan turned round and stormed Vodena about the New Year (1351). The youthful John Palæologus remained in Salonica, and Dushan sought to ally himself with him against Cantacuzenus. When civil war again broke out between the Byzantine rulers in 1352, John Palæologus, being soundly beaten, sought help from Dushan. Both Serbian and Bulgarian levies were sent to his aid, only to suffer a defeat of great importance. A Turkish force of cavalry under Suleiman sent to assist Cantacuzenus at Adrianople fell in with a mixed Palæologite force on the way, consisting of Greeks with Serbian and Bulgar heavy cavalry. The onset was unexpected, and the Turkish

light horsemen won a victory. The Serbians suffered the severest losses, but a remnant under their leader pierced the Turkish ranks and escaped. It was the second time Serbian forces had been defeated by the Turks. This disaster is usually considered an event of world-historical importance. It is not easy to understand why, though the appearance of the Turks in Europe is unquestionably the most momentous fact in modern Balkan history. But this was not their first defeat of Christian arms, and their appearance must be held to date either from the earlier invitation of Cantacuzenus or from the Serbian reverse in 1343. Their first definite establishment in Europe dates from 1354, when Suleiman occupied and fortified Gallipoli, and thus secured control of the straits which would enable him to transport troops from Asia to Europe.

The Eastern world as a whole was now beginning to realise that Turkish danger which Dushan had certainly foreseen for ten years. The feeble Cantacuzenus could not control his formidable auxiliaries, who plundered at will and finally occupied a point of such importance as Gallipoli. Greeks, Bulgars, and Venetians all saw the danger. Dushan, who had at length been excommunicated by the Byzantine Patriarch for assuming the Imperial title, now turned to the Pope for sanction and assistance. He desired the Pope to appoint a Captain of Christendom against the Turks. Some years before, Stephen had secretly insinuated that he was himself willing to revert to Rome. This promise was renewed in 1354. In reply the Pope at Avignon showed much prudence. He received his message with great joy and bade him God-speed in his enterprise. It is curious to see that the Pope addresses him only as *Rex Rasciae*, perhaps in order to enforce the conversion of the Serbians to Rome by refusing the title of *Imperator* until that was public and acknowledged.

The Bohemian Emperor Charles iv. was more generous and sent a word of greeting in which he gave some acknowledgment of Stephen's imperial claims, perhaps because of his enthusiasm for that community of speech "in the noble Slav tongue" which existed between him and Dushan.

The plans for the conquest of Byzantium were made on a great scale and were now matured. But suddenly the King of Hungary interfered with them and invaded the northern border. Dushan marched against him, as already described, and concluded a truce by the middle of the year 1355. In the autumn he was on the eastern border of his realm, organising the preparations for a great campaign in the next year which should end in a final victory in Byzantium. But a mightier foe than either Turk or Greek assailed Dushan in the winter of this year. The dramatic character of his death, at the moment when his long-planned combinations seemed certain of success, have induced some to mark his death as an event of world history. A very competent critic remarks: "Perhaps few but students have read of Dushan's expedition against Constantinople, but it was certainly one of the most critical moments of European history."¹ Dushan had been unable to secure the Venetian fleet, and it is not certain that an attack from the land would have been successful. Yet Dushan's military skill was great, and the disputed succession and the prospect of internal treachery might have opened the gates of Constantinople. The chances are then in favour of the view that he would have conquered Constantinople. But, granting that he had done so, would the Serbian Empire have been more lasting than the Byzantine? It is true that Dushan had planned a great union against the Turk, and that success might have bound his friends to him in a stable

¹ *Turkey in Europe*, Sir C. Eliot (1908), p. 38.

alliance. Yet it is certain that Serbian rule in Constantinople would have introduced a new element of dissension in the Empire, which might have destroyed any other advantage. The Serbian government of alien races, though mild and just under Dushan, does not seem to have reconciled them. There was a disloyal Greek party even in Skoplje, which had been under Serbia for two generations, and the easy surrender of Vodena and Verria in 1350 points to Greek treachery within the walls. Again the whole fabric of the Serbian state crumbled to pieces almost immediately on Dushan's death. These considerations suggest that a Serbian occupation of Constantinople would have had no permanent results under leaders less powerful and skilled than Dushan. Yet there is always an element of uncertainty in history which gives fascination to a problem of this kind. Popular opinion in Serbia fastened on it with unerring instinct. Dushan was still in the prime of life, fully a dozen years younger than his father when he led the Serbs to victory at Küstendil. He was gathering a mighty host to capture the Byzantine capital and rout the armies of Islam. Fortune had smiled on him as yet, and seemed to promise him further triumphs. Yet, as the tender melancholy of the old folk-song records,

“When the Imperial city was nigh
Then the Day of Doom found Dushan.”

In truth the Day of Doom was near for mediæval Serbia as well as for her most splendid monarch.

V

A GLANCE AT SERBIAN MEDIÆVAL SOCIETY

THE reasons for the collapse of the imposing Serbian Empire, only thirty years after its greatest glory, are both near and far to seek. Obvious are the military and the religious causes. The Serbian Empire was exposed to attack from Hungary in the north, from Venice in the west, from the Byzantines, Bulgars, and Turks in the south. Even the most skilful diplomacy could hardly prevent an enemy on both front and rear. The enmity of Rome separated Serbia from the Croats, Magyars and Bosnians, and the Imperial pretensions of Stephen Dushan had estranged Byzantium. Finally the Serbians were confronted by the Turks, the one power in the fourteenth century which really possessed a professional army. These explanations do not, however, wholly suffice. The Serbs have always been great warriors, and their unfortunate situation between upper and lower millstones was no worse than that of some other mediæval peoples. To take two instances, the Brandenburgers (afterwards the Prussians) and the Austrians survived and became great states under conditions which were hardly less difficult. It is worth noting that these two were Teutonic states with a Latin civilisation, and that no mediæval Southern Slav kingdom states ultimately survived. Of the Northern Slav kingdoms, Bohemia and Moravia were absorbed by Austria; Poland fell into anarchy, and became the

prey of other nations. Russia, the only ultimate survivor among Slav nations, was originally founded and ruled by a Scandinavian dynasty and oligarchy, and has been ruled by foreign and bureaucratic ideas ever since, until the day when the Partition of Poland was reversed and Petersburg renamed Petrograd. Lord Acton solved the problem simply by denying that the Slavs as a race possessed political ability. This is putting the case with too great strength, but there seems to be no doubt that the social institutions of the Slavs hindered political unity and military efficiency. All early writers represent the Slav races as fierce and brave warriors, but as weak and disorganised in the political sense; and it is at least singular that the Bulgars, who were crossed with a Tartar strain, were the first Southern Slavonic race to develop political unity and the military efficiency which resulted from it.

To say that Slavonic institutions are inferior to those of the West is like saying that Buddhism is inferior to Western Christianity. The statement in either case deals only with the strictly practical side of institutions, and ignores their ideal values. As a military agency Christianity has beaten Buddhism, just as the Teutonic polity beat the Slavonic. But this statement does not mean that early Serbian institutions do not possess many elements of interest, especially in the ideals which they present. The Serbian laws dealing with the relations of man and wife attracted the admiration of Maitland, the Serbian attempt to raise the status of the serf was a most striking humanitarian effort, while the adaptations of the Byzantine code were enlightened attempts to improve Slavonic law. Slavonic political institutions, like Slavonic music and poetry, have an interest and originality that is all their own.

The unit of social and political organisation is always the family, and the Serb family system had many differ-

ences from that of the Latin and Teutonic peoples. Among the latter the so-called patriarchal system existed, the father of the family having supreme powers extending to life and death over the rest of the family. The importance of this system lay in the fact that it was relatively advanced, that it trained the members of the family to the doctrines of military obedience, and enabled the family unit to be easily absorbed in the clan, in the tribe, and eventually in the nation. By the eleventh century the West European peoples had already got far beyond the tribal stage. They had adopted the feudal system, under which barons agreed to raise numbers of troops in event of war in return for land granted them by the Crown. Even the feudal unit was a great advance on clan, tribe, or patriarchal family ; but its danger lay in the fact that feudal barons might become independent sovereigns in their own territory. This tendency was sharply checked wherever strong kings arose, and in the fourteenth century strong rulers began to develop something like nations in France, England, Hungary, and Spain. Even in Germany, where the emperors were weak and feudal anarchy prevailed, states like Austria, Brandenburg, and Bavaria developed advanced political organisations, and became miniature nations with legal, political, and military standards of their own. To all this there was no parallel in the Serbian lands, for political culture was still primitive.

The patriarchal society proved itself a good fighting organisation wherever it existed in Europe, especially in Rome, where the father's authority was greater than in any other known land. But the patriarchal stage is a relatively late development, and the Serb society shows traces of a much earlier unit than the patriarchal. Serbian institutions certainly show traces of that very early organisation the matriarchate, where power rested more in the hands of mothers than of fathers. We know little more

than that the most ancient Slav tribes were loosely organised. It is tempting to regard the earliest Serb tribe as an association of Zadrugas, or enlarged families. This view would greatly simplify matters, but unfortunately the evidence does not lead us to suppose that the Zadruga is an aboriginal institution. It is primitive, but by no means prehistoric. There is even some evidence to show that it did not develop till the early Middle Ages. Then the imposition of taxation by family or by hut or house led to the development of immoderately large families and houses. This organisation of each family was known as the Zadruga.¹

Whatever the real origin of the Zadruga, and it is almost certainly not an extremely early one, its importance on the development of Serbian society and politics cannot be overrated. Moreover, the differences from the patriarchal families in the West are extraordinarily striking. In the Zadruga the unit of the Serb family is, in one sense, hardly the father. At any rate one individual had not the same despotic authority as in the West; the whole family or community shared it. It was rather a loose primitive system, badly defined and queerly constructed. One can still get a good idea of it in some parts of "Old Serbia" to-day. You can see there vast shapeless buildings, consisting of a number of rooms and lean-tos added on to a central cottage, containing in all some sixty or seventy persons housed under one roof. This is the Zadruga, or family. As each son marries he builds a new room, and the total building represents a primitive communal house. It is now only a survival, but it represents the mediæval Serb system. The eldest male was "Pater-familias," but his authority was not unquestioned: he was senior partner with the other males, and the women often had a share in the settlement

¹ For Zadruga, *vide* Jireček, *Gesch. der Serben*, 138-42; Hrbeljanovitch, *Serbian People*, 12-3, 1902.

of important questions. The whole system was far more primitive than the paternal system of the West. It was much more democratic, and therefore much more difficult to change or to make progressive. In primitive times democratic rule always means conservatism, for the daring few alone can be enterprising. As a military system, too, the Zadruga was not as good as the paternal, for absolute obedience could not be enforced. As a system for preserving the sanctity of the hearth, the sacredness of home, purity, and moral discipline in a relatively large circle, the Zadruga had a great advantage. Songs were sung and stories told in the presence of all round the hearth, and customs were enforced by the moral weight of the whole family. Thus, though it injured national unity in one way by detracting from military efficiency, the Zadruga preserved it in another. But for the Zadruga the Serbian armies might not have been beaten at Kossovo. Yet but for the Zadruga the Serb legends of national unity and the longing for vengeance for Kossovo could not have been preserved as a living and uplifting force for centuries.

A Zadruga in early times seems to have consisted of only thirty or forty members; later it sometimes had over a hundred members. A group of several Zadrugas formed a Rod, and a number of Rods formed a Pleme or clan. The territory inhabited by the Pleme was called a Župa, and the Župan or head was elected by the Pleme, usually from the same family. The primitive democratic idea applied to clan as well as to family, and the Župan was forced to rule in consultation with a Sabor or Assembly of the heads of the Rods. The Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenetus (953) distinguished the Serbs from other Slavs by saying that they had no princes or kings, only Župans or elected "chieftains." The chieftains were elected and controlled by the Assembly of free warriors, for the essential

idea of the Serb was, and indeed still is, the supremacy of the assembly or the community rather than the individual. Subject to the existence of a number of slaves, there was democratic equality among freemen. Unfortunately, democratic equality, which is a possible reality for the modern world, was an impossible anarchy in the Middle Ages.

The first changes came from contact with the Eastern Empire, especially in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Byzantine culture was then the most advanced in Europe, and the Imperial administrators had the best system of law in the world, had a scientific if harsh system of taxation, and understood the needs of industrial and urban communities. Contrast with this the Serb family and clan system, rude, primitive, and almost wholly agricultural. The Serbs were never wholly under Byzantine domination ; but they were usually under the influence of their ideas. Whenever a strong civilised state controls a barbaric one it tries to erect a system of taxation, and for this purpose concentrates fiscal authority by making chieftains responsible for the tribute demanded. Thus it was in India when the British came, and in Zeta and Rashka when the Byzantines came. Constantine Porphyrogenetus testifies to this fact, and declares that the Emperor Basil I. (d. 886) remodelled the Slav tribal organisation. The Župans of the tribes had hitherto been controlled and chosen by the Assembly of free warriors. Instead of this system, Basil induced the Serbs to choose the Župans from special families. In this way, no doubt, he hoped to train up families of hereditary tax-gatherers in the tribes. The result was that the office of Župans became hereditary. In all probability this change also caused the development of hereditary nobles. In each district the Župan made a great noble responsible for taxes, in each of his villages the greater noble made a lesser noble responsible, and

the offices of each and all in turn became hereditary. The Serbs of the ninth and tenth centuries were surprised by the advent of hereditary nobles, monsters unknown to the savage Slav democracy. They were divided into greater and lesser nobles (*Vlastela*). Traces of the old democratic feeling survived in several ways. Primogeniture was never recognised in Serbian mediæval law, which insisted on an equal division of property among the children. The exercise of justice was reserved for the King or for the community of freemen, and was only grudgingly extended to individual nobles.

The pressure of taxation and the fixing of responsibility had produced a lesser and greater nobility and a hereditary *Župan* of each tribe. These changes led on to others, and small tribes began to coalesce into larger units. We hear of a Grand *Župan* in *Rashka* by the end of the tenth century. He is an official chosen by the *Župans* to rule over the whole coalition of tribes. The evolution of *Zeta*, because it was smaller and more open to external influence, was the swifter, and the King of *Zeta* was a recognised institution in the early eleventh century. Both in *Zeta* and *Rashka* the elective tradition always hovered round the kingship. Many kings took the precaution of associating their sons with them as colleagues, or giving them the title of sub-king. The revolutions, which so continually dethroned monarchs, were a sort of aristocratic protest against the acknowledgment of hereditary rights to the Crown.

The growth of the hereditary tradition did not destroy the powers of the Assembly or *Sabor*. Each village, county, or tribal district retained its *Sabor* or Assembly of freemen, and a strong local government is, and always has been, a Serb characteristic. When the National *Sabor* was formed in *Zeta* and *Rashka*, the tradition of freedom still remained both in its power and its composition. In the time of Stephen Nemanya, a

Sabor or National Assembly limited the power of the King and this Assembly consisted of bishops and abbots, nobles and delegates of the people. These delegates of the people were usually heads of villages, and eventually became lesser nobles. None the less, there was never a complete surrender to the feudal system. The Knez and the Župan were always in theory royal officials governing districts, not hereditary officials holding land from the King on condition of supplying military service at need. By the time of Stephen Dushan we do get a state, which in appearance resembles the political institutions of the West. Stephen Dushan, the contemporary of our own Edward III., is like him a strong and warlike king, but subject to financial and political restraint from an Assembly of lords spiritual and temporal. Beneath this Assembly is in each case a mass of local self-governing communities and feudal barons holding their own lands in return for the tax of blood. In reality the picture is very unlike. Stephen Dushan never had one tithe the real power of Edward III., because the Serbs were politically backward. The King in Serbia was a glorified Grand Župan whose power rested more on his personal prestige or authority in war than on solid political institutions. The oligarchy of the great nobles paralysed the centre, the democracy of the freemen paralysed the extremities, of the Serbian kingdom.

Under Stephen Dushan a great national code of Serb customs and law was drawn up and sanctioned by the Sabor or National Assembly. The Code itself (*Zakonik*) is a revelation. In so far as its political ideas are advanced they seem to be due to Byzantine influences; and a study of the whole reveals the great primitiveness of the Serb civilisation. Some examples will make this fact clear. The code of Dushan gives little evidence of town life among the Serbs. Such of them as were forced to live in towns seem to have regarded their

obligation as a burden. Ragusans and Venetians controlled commerce, Germans were imported to work the mines, and these foreigners, who received great privileges in the code of Dushan, comprised the bulk of town populations. The Serbians themselves were trappers, foresters, and ploughmen living in scattered villages. Yet at the moment we see this state of things in the Serbian lands, the magnificent city life of the Middle Ages was fully developed not only at Constantinople and Venice, but at centres like Ghent, Paris, Nuremberg, and London. Again, in almost all Western countries the free landowners were relatively few, barons or feudal lords ruling over numerous serfs who cultivated the land. In the Serbian lands the serf (or *ostrok*) was the smallest class in the community, and the small free landholders were the largest. The relative freedom thus enjoyed by the Serbs, though in one sense a unique distinction and a glory, was militarily a disaster.¹ In the West European lands, lords and landowners forced their serfs to till the land, exercised justice upon them, and led them to battle when occasion called. Peasants led by lords, who were landowners, justices, and military captains in one, were likely to obey them. In Serbia no such conditions were present; there were far more landowners, land was scattered among the many. Very few landowners had the rights of justice over their numerous free tenants, only over a few *ostroks* or serfs. The local courts of justice were not controlled by the lord or his representative but by the whole free community. The King was supposed to dispense a system of royal justice from above, but there never was in the Serbian lands a judicial system, centralised under the Crown, such as Henry II. devised for England. In the same

¹ It is often said that the Serbian law did not recognise the status of a slave, but this appears to be an error. Jireček, *Gesch. der Serben*, 132. There are several German editions of Dushan's code,

way there never was a centralised control of local administration such as the kings were introducing into France in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Local liberties, local courts, and local assemblies all remained relatively free from central influence. The King seldom interfered in his executive capacity, and the Sabor or National Assembly never seems to have attempted to interfere with local self-government. Even when the National Sabor came to be formed simply of nobles and higher clergy, the Sabors of the districts, the county, or the village were still formed of the whole free community.

In the Serb as in all mediæval lands the army was theoretically the people, and all men could be summoned to fight. In practice as elsewhere it was found convenient to rely on feudal levies, small well-armed, mobile, and prompt to respond to the summons. In West Europe the completeness of the feudal system enabled regular schemes to be worked out and quota to be calculated, and ensured the good working of the scheme. In Serbia, on the other hand, the confusion of tenures, the absence of a uniform system, the primitive democratic feeling prevented the same unity of plan. In the fourteenth century little feudal tyrants were beginning to arise in different parts of Serbia, reducing the number of free landowners, and yet, owing to their independence, not really strengthening the King or the nation.¹ Just when France and England were getting rid of feudal dangers and anarchy Serbia was falling into it. The confusion into which the Serbian lands fell on the death of Stephen Dushan marks the inefficacy of the social and military system and the slow progress Serbia had made. The social system was penalised for its very virtues. It

¹ The Dushan code defines the *bashtina* or system of holding landed property, which differed from the customary method and gave the lord absolute possession of his land and of the serfs on it, *i.e.* practically recognising a feudal tenure.

retarded the feudal system, which was a military need in that rough age, until the chief use of it was passed. Then, when the feudal system began to develop, even the strong kings were unable to control the excesses of the large landowners (the Knez). The spirit of freedom showed itself in every grade of society in Serbia, in the freedom of the small landowner, in the independence of the Knez, and in the dependence of the King on the Sabor or Assembly of nobles. Peace or war never were decided by the King alone as in England ; in Serbia the Sabor always decreed it. Thus at every point a Serbian ruler was hampered in a conflict with an army of the West, clogged and bound by old customs and primitive liberties, by assemblies and freemen and turbulent nobles. When the Turkish armies moved against the Serbians with their invincible professional infantry and their highly organised military system, it was impossible for the Serbs to resist them. But it was not Kossovo or a series of defeats that was fatal to the Serbs. They possessed recuperative power and military skill which could have survived those shocks had their social conditions been adequate ; after Kossovo they had a breathing space of some seventy years in which to reform themselves. But the existence of a social system, primitive in its ideas and encumbering in its weight, rendered complete reorganisation impossible.

The Serbs had defeated themselves by their ideas of communal liberty and democratic freedom even before the Turks vanquished them on the "Field of Blackbirds" at Kossovo. Yet ultimately it was these ideas and this system which gave to the Serbs a spirit which proved unconquerable in defeat, sorrow, and utter servitude.

A general examination of Serbian society and polity undoubtedly shows a looseness of structure and a less perfect development than in West Europe. The native institutions were more original and therefore more

difficult to fit into the feudal framework. The serf was more free, the freeman and the noble more powerful, than in the West. All these causes worked to the disintegration of the state. Without a real system of slavery the Serbs were at a disadvantage compared with the Turks in industry and liberty. The freeman, fierce, independent, and warlike, hindered unity and concentration, the turbulent noble used his independence for the most selfish ends. The blood-feud among the peasants, the feudal harryings and plunderings among the nobles, all combined to disorganise the state. The Serbian nobles seem seldom to have possessed any enlarged ideas or patriotic feelings. Their selfish quarrels divided the state and distracted the monarchy. The extraordinary quarrels between fathers and sons, which brought about the fall of so many Serbian kings, were almost all produced or fomented by aristocratic self-seekers. To remedy the evils of individual independence and of turbulent feudalism there was only one mediæval solution, a strong monarchy. But a strong monarchy must rest on a centralised administration, on a wealthy burgher class, or on a professional army. The free spirit of the Serbs made it impossible for a centralised bureaucracy of the Byzantine or French type to be developed. This difficulty was only increased when the extent of the Serbian Empire under Dushan necessitated further subdivision and compelled the parcelling out of lands among a crowd of semi-independent chiefs. In England the monarchy became strong partly by reliance on the wealthy burghers who gained seats and influence in the national Parliament and developed interests different from those of the barons. Here again the mediæval Serb King was unfortunate. He could not persuade his sturdy freemen to forsake their scattered villages, their woods and their hills, for residence in walled towns. Hence to make citizens he was obliged

to import Ragusans and Germans, and these he could protect but could not enfranchise. Consequently the popular representation in the Sabor was from the lesser nobles, not from the foreign burghers. Foiled in all other directions, Dushan and his two predecessors fell back on the professional army of mercenaries as a means of developing their power over the nobles. This force depended on punctual payments, and was notoriously capricious and uncertain in use. After a big defeat mercenaries frequently deserted, and on the death of Urosh II. they openly rebelled. The force was not always efficient but was always unpopular. It was not an institution but a temporary and uncertain expedient. In the hands of a strong king like Dushan it was effective, but a weak ruler found it a danger to himself and the State. What Serbia wanted was a succession of strong kings who would have slowly perfected her institutions and moulded her into a complete unity. This period of construction was precisely what was denied to her.

Serbia was not fully a nation before she became an empire. The earliest moment at which we can say that the Serbian kingdom was based on national unity is the reign of Stephen Nemanya. Yet even at that date the aim was hardly a national one. The double-headed eagle brodered on the robe of Stephen the First-Crowned shows that his ambition was Byzantine and Imperial. This does not mean that the Serb was not national in sentiment, but that he did not consider that a kingdom needed to be founded upon unity of race. It has been noticed that the Tchech word for language is *jazyk*, and that it signifies not only *language* but *nation*.¹ But it is pressing the coincidence too far to say that this fact "illustrates the Slavic conception of nationality." In all mediæval lands the problem of nationality and racial unity was

¹ Lützow, *John Hus*, p. 239. *Vide* Gibbons' *Ottoman Empire*, 196, n.

very little understood. It is, however, certain that it was less understood in the Balkans than elsewhere. The Magyars were the least exclusive of races ; they imported Germans into their towns and admitted Roumans and Croats promiscuously into the ranks of their nobles. The Bulgarians mingled freely with Tartars, Greeks, and Roumans. The Serbians, like them, imitated the Byzantine Empire, which based its power on a central control of diverse races and nationalities. Dushan in founding his empire deliberately set aside a purely national conception, as Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Byzantine rulers had done before him. He described himself as Emperor of Serbs and Romans (*i.e.* Greeks), and named his son King of Serbia, which was only the first of his provinces. Thus he exchanged national for imperial ideals, and based his power on the reconciliation of many races, not upon the unity of one. This is one of the many reasons which explain why no mediæval king ever ruled over all the Jugo-Slavs, and why it was that men of the Serbian race dealt the final blow to the Serbian Empire in the Middle Ages. Until the Ottoman oppression welded the fragments into one, Serb unity was of a racial, not of a national, type. It is a true and tragic reflection that it was not love but hate which united the Serb nation.

VI

THE FALL OF THE SERBIAN EMPIRE AND THE TURKISH CONQUEST

THE splendid empire which Dushan had founded broke into fragments upon his death. The crowd of Despots, Sebastocrats, Cæsars, and Župans hastened to assert their independence of the young Urosh, the youthful heir of the great Dushan. They took advantage of a disputed succession to question his title as Czar, and only ultimately acquiesced in his rule when his actual power was gone. None the less, the empire of Dushan had permanent results on the history of the Balkans. As such is the fact, it is well to understand its extent and the racial elements contained in it. On the west, Dushan's empire was not so extensive as that of Urosh II., the vale of the Narenta was not under his control, and the Prince of Bosnia was not permanently his subject. His control of a few ports like Stagno and Cattaro, and his alliances with Venice and Ragusa, gave him an important influence on the North Adriatic shore. The kingdoms of Zeta and Rashka were his as of old. Of the new districts added, the most important were Macedonia from Ochrida to Monastir and part of Thrace as far as Serres. All Albania, except Durazzo, nearly all Epirus, and Thessaly were under his rule. Bulgaria was in practice an ally or a tributary. In fact, it may be said that with the exception of districts around seaports like Durazzo, Salonica, Cavalla, and

Constantinople, the whole Balkan peninsula was his. From the Danube to the gulfs of Arta and Volo (the boundary of modern Greece in 1878) the sway of Dushan was acknowledged and supreme. When his empire fell the practical effects of his conquests did not altogether pass away. His wars with the Albanians produced a great migration of these tribes into Northern Greece and Thessaly. His conquest of Macedonia introduced a new and Serbian element into that district, which has subsequently contended for the mastery with Greeks and Bulgars. His laws and his power undoubtedly consolidated the authority of the Serbs in districts where their conquests were relatively recent, as at Skoplje and Pristina. There can be no question also that his great renown and the glory with which he invested the Serbian arms gave the Serbian nation a tradition and a memory which has proved stronger than all the armies of Islam.

Urosh III., the youthful King of Rashka, was not recognised as Serbo-Roman Emperor by Simeon, the half-brother of Stephen Dushan. Simeon, who was Despot of Epirus, declared war on Urosh, but the motley crowd of Despots, Cæsars, and Sebastocrats who ruled the dependent provinces of the new empire paid real allegiance to neither party. Every ruler aimed at establishing his own independence in his own lands, and seized the opportunity of the civil war to gain it, taking one side or another as occasion served. It would be tedious to relate the strife in detail, but the immediate result was the revolt of the untamable Albanians and the permanent loss of Thessaly. In Zeta, three brothers of the name of Balshi established their power by the year 1360, and their descendants laid the foundations of the modern kingdom of Montenegro. In the same way the districts in Macedonia and Thrace fell away, ultimately to be swallowed piecemeal by the Turk.

The two most important of these independent rulers were Vukashin and Lazar Hrbelianovitch. Vukashin was Despot of Prilep. Lazar, who is known merely by the title of Knez (lord), ruled the Rudnik district in the north. Between these two chieftains the feeble Czar was powerless, and it is not surprising to learn that Vukashin assumed the title of King in 1366 and occupied the cities of Prisrend and Skoplje. The only difference between him and his master was that he called himself *Dominus Rex Slavoniae*, while Urosh was still *Dominus Imperator Slavoniae*. Documents and proclamations and officials were used by each separately, but apparently with joint authority. The probability is that the growing Turkish danger induced the minor rulers to acquiesce in the authority of a strong man who might be able to avert it.

While the Serbian Empire was falling to pieces, its rivals, the Bulgarian and the Byzantine Empires, were being consumed by civil wars and divided by heresies. The powerful Louis of Hungary wasted his armies and injured Christendom by attacking the Bulgars. During the same period the Ottoman Sultans were laying the foundations of power by a policy of consummate wisdom and shrewdness, and slowly acquiring the strategic points from which to master the Balkans. Having their origin in the north-west corner of Asia Minor, under the shadow of the Asiatic Olympus, they were naturally tempted to attack the Byzantine Empire and to pass the Dardanelles. In fact, their advance and their aim was for long European rather than Asiatic. Their first ruler, Othman, whose name in the corrupt form of Osmanli still describes the Turkish race, conquered Brusa before his death in 1326. Orkhan, his successor, expelled the Byzantines from the last corner of their Asiatic dominions, and entered into those relations with Cantacuzenus which have already been

described. The Serbians had been twice defeated by the Turks before Dushan died. Then the great step of permanently occupying and fortifying the town of Gallipoli was taken either in 1354 or 1358.¹ By holding this bridge-head the Ottomans were able to pass into Europe, and so many availed themselves of the opportunity that its temporary loss in 1366 did not seriously interrupt their plans. Sultan Amurath, the third in succession from Othman, had already based his power firmly in Europe. In the years 1360-61 a large Ottoman force advanced on Bulgaria and heavily defeated a combined army of Bulgars and Byzantines at the first famous battle of Lule Burgas. The fall of Philippopolis and Adrianople were the immediate results of this victory, which was soon followed by the loss of all Bulgaria south of the Balkans and of most of Thrace. Thus the Ottomans severed connection between Bulgars, Byzantines, and Serbians. By occupying Philippopolis they threatened all three powers. As against Bulgars and Serbians they had the advantage of interior lines, but they were exposed to an attack in the rear from Constantinople. Had the feeble Byzantine seized this golden opportunity, the fate of Eastern Europe might have been very different. As it was the news of the fall of Adrianople startled the Balkan world and made it for a moment forget its feuds. A league was speedily formed. Vukashin, Lazar, and Czar Urosh were the Serb representatives, the Bulgarians promised aid, and some Hungarian troops were present. By Tchermen, about twenty miles due west of Adrianople and on the banks of the Maritza, the armies met (1371). Legend has been busy with the details of the fight, but there seems general agreement that the Serbs were surprised in camp by an attack at dawn. The slaughter was certainly terrific.

¹ The latter is the Turkish date, but the Turkish chronicles are not contemporary.

King Vukashin was drowned along with thousands of his men in the river, for the battle derives its name from the Maritza, which ran scarlet with blood. The political results were as immense as the slaughter. The Serbian Empire, already broken in all its limbs, received a finishing stroke. Serres was reconquered by the Ottomans, who profited by the defeat of the Serbians. Macedonia and its princes came entirely under Turkish influence. Thessaly and Albania were already lost. Within fifteen years all the conquests of Dushan had vanished, and his unworthy son died in the same year that witnessed his shame.

The Turks showed their usual caution in their campaigns in Macedonia (1371-72). Turkish armies devastated the land so thoroughly that packs of wolves followed in their train to feast on the corpses. As a terrible contemporary account says, they wasted the land like vultures, till the hearts of warriors turned to water and all wept for the happier dead. Punitive expeditions seem to have penetrated even to Albania, "Old Serbia," or Bosnia. But the shrewd Amurath was not yet ready for the conquest of the whole of Macedonia. He had cowed all the Serb rulers, and he made those of West Macedonia dependent upon him. Macedonia east of the Vardar and Thrace were all that he was as yet prepared to conquer and to assimilate. In pursuance of this policy Turkish settlers were imported, and Drama and Serres were made military colonies or Turkish garrisons. The Ottoman laws and habits were also introduced, and the whole country east of the Vardar was gradually Osmanised. In Macedonia west of the Vardar a number of Serb princes retained a shadowy and precarious independence. All were tributary to Sultan Amurath in fact if not in name. Of these the most famous is Marko Kraljevitich, the son of King Vukashin and his successor in the kingdom of Prilep.

This hero is the favourite of all Serb legends, and has left a name at which every Serb heart thrills. His fame even extends far beyond the boundaries of the Southern Slav races, and Bulgars and Albanians admire him as a hero. He is celebrated as the perfect Balkan knight, unrivalled in strength, beloved of the nymphs (veelas) for his beauty and of the eagles for his valour. All nature is marked with his imprints. The passes through mountains are cut asunder by his sword, isolated rocks are the balls which he tossed from the mountains when playing at bowls with the giants. Rounded hills are his petrified bell-tents, the hollows of craters are the watering-places for his famous grey horse Shabatz. All Serbs love the tale of how he cheated the Doge of his bride, defended the Sultan's daughter from assault, and slew Moussa the bully and the giant Moor. Historically little is known of him except that he was King of Prilep, and it is certainly something of an irony that the national Serb hero should have been a Turkish vassal. It is quite probable that he fought against his countrymen on the fatal day of Kossovo, and there is some real evidence for showing that he died in battle in the year 1394. Before the battle, in which he was compelled to fight on the Turkish side, he is said to have remarked to a friend, "I pray God that He may aid the Christians and that I may be among the first to fall." He had his wish, and died while the Christian shouts of victory were ringing in his ears. This slender historical foundation is the origin of that beautiful legend that he rests sleeping in a cave near his own castle of Prilep, and will once more come to the aid of the Serbs when the day comes that the Turk is to be driven from the land. So deeply was this legend written in Serbian hearts, that thousands of soldiers saw Marko leading them to victory on his famous white horse when they drove the Turks from Prilep in 1912.

The work of assimilation and settlement went steadily on. Turkish troops captured Ochrida and invaded Albania, and all Bulgaria south of the Balkans submitted by 1382. At some time subsequent to this date Sultan Amurath must have permanently occupied Nish.¹ Once this central strategic point was in Turkish hands, the whole Balkan peninsula was controlled. At Nish four ways met—the way to Constantinople through Philippopolis, the way to Salonica down the Vardar, to Belgrade down the Morava, and to Skoplje down it. He who held Nish prevented all communication along the best roads between Bulgaria, Salonica, Serbia, and Byzantium. Either Nish must be reconquered, or all the Balkan princes would become vassals of the Turks.

The sole hope now lay in Lazar, the ruler of North Serbia, and in his ability to unite the still independent Slav princes against the Ottoman. Lazar's weakness is evinced by the fact that he owes the title of Czar entirely to legend; he did not even claim that of Kral (king) but was content with that of Knez (lord). His efforts were praiseworthy: he had succeeded in reconciling Serbia with Byzantium, and in 1274 the Greek Patriarch withdrew the ban of excommunication which he had laid on the Serbs in the days of Dushan. He had been beaten and forced to sue for peace at Nish, and compelled to send a thousand horsemen as auxiliaries. But he broke with Amurath again in 1387, and prepared to resist him. His ally Turtko, the Bosnian ruler who called himself King, came to his aid. The Turks were caught at a disadvantage, because their main army was in Asia, and at Plotchnik on the Toplitsa an army of

¹ 1375 is the date of some authorities, which Gibbons (p. 161) rejects. It is possible that Nish was taken in a raid in 1375, temporarily abandoned, and reoccupied after 1382. Bands of Ottoman robbers were frequent and daring in their enterprise, a fact which Mr. Gibbons seems rather to ignore in dogmatically asserting that geography prevents Nish being captured before Sofia.

Ottomans was practically annihilated. Great joy was caused by this first and last victory of the Jugo-Slav League, and Bulgarians threw off their enforced allegiance to the Turk and openly joined the union. Bulgaria took a year to subdue, and in 1389 Amurath marched straight against Lazar. On the 15th of June the two armies met on the fatal "Field of Blackbirds," in the plain of Kossovo, which won so sad a glory on that day. Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, Croats, and even Roumans fought on one side; the Turks and their Christian vassals, including probably the famous Serb hero King Marko himself, on the other. The leaders on each side, Knez Lazar and Sultan Amurath, were killed; but victory declared itself for the Turks.

All the legends agree in suggesting that the issue of the battle was determined by treason. A certain Vuk Brankovitch is represented as the Serbian Judas who led his forces over to the enemy at the critical moment. "Accursed be she who gave the traitor birth . . . accursed for ever be his progeny." But if we put any trust in the legends at all, we must also lay stress on the fact that Knez Lazar spoke mournfully to his chief officers on the night before the battle, accusing some of treachery. This fact suggests faint-heartedness and distrust both in commander and chief officers. Treachery is always the excuse of the vanquished, for it assuages the bitterness of defeat. This accusation is frequent in Serbian epics dealing with other battles. A well-known modern instance proves that such a legend can be manufactured to excuse defeat, and it is quite plausible to suppose that the same kind of fiction was used in mediæval times for a similar purpose.¹

¹ The surrender of Hungary in 1849 was excused by Kossuth on the ground that Görgei, his commander-in-chief, had betrayed him. No impartial reader of the controversy can doubt that this charge was absolutely baseless, and that it was made by Kossuth either in the excite-

Another famous legend of the battle is concerned with Milosh Obilitch. Stung by Lazar's reproaches on the evening before the battle, he determined to show his patriotism. With this view he sought out Sultan Amurath at daybreak in his tent, and there murdered him. This deed, so dramatic in its effects, has always been famous in Serbian poetry, and Milosh is regarded as one of the greatest of national heroes.¹ In fact, the death of Murad did not affect the result of the battle, though it considerably increased the severity of Bayezid's treatment of his Serbian captives. The whole cycle of legends of Kossovo abounds in pictures of dramatic or tragic force, drawn with a tender beauty and pathos. "All remain on Kossovo, O my lady. Where the glorious Prince Lazar fell there were broken many, many lances, but more Serbian than Turkish. . . . Till all perished there mightest thou have seen the valiant Boshko, his flag fluttering in the breeze as he rushed hither and thither, scattering the Turks like a falcon among timid doves. There by the streamlet where blood was running above a hero's knees, perished Ban Strahiya. Twelve thousand Turks lie prone upon the plain."²

ment of his grief or with the deliberate intention of sparing sorrow to his country by blackening the character of an individual. Görgei himself favoured the latter view in conversation with a friend of mine.

¹ Mr. Gibbons (*Ottoman Empire*, p. 177) remarks *ad hoc*: "It is a commentary on the Serbian character that this questionable act has been held up to posterity as the most saintly and heroic deed of national history." Generalisations of this sort are dangerous: the murder of the Red Comyn did not prevent Bruce from becoming the idol of Scotland, and the assassination of tyrants by Harmodius and Aristogeiton and by Brutus was much admired at both Athens and Rome. Yet these facts do not establish the Scot, the Greek, or the Roman as a nation of barbarians.

² A good brief summary of the Kossovo legends is given by Petrovitch, *Hero Tales and Legends of the Serbs*, pp. 170-6. The whole cycle has been published in English several times, the latest edition being by Madam Mijataich, London, 1881. There is a good discussion of the critical side in Chadwick's *The Heroic Age*.

Clio is a muse, but not the muse of epic or lyric poetry. These beautiful legends attest the tragedy, but do not supply the causes of disaster. It is not even certain that the Jugo-Slavs were outnumbered by the Turks, or that Milosh Obilitch was the murderer of Amurath. Even the discouragement which the legends represent as prevailing in the Serb ranks may be a reflex effect from the subsequent disaster. History really knows little or nothing of the facts, except that the battle was not at the moment regarded as an overwhelming calamity. The first reports, based on the death of Amurath, were of a Serbian victory, and Te Deums were sung to celebrate it in Dalmatia, Italy, and France. Even when the actual result of the battle became known its effect was not immediately perceived. Turkish historians lay more stress on the battle of the Maritza eighteen years before, which they call *Serb Sindin* (Serbian defeat). The contemporary chroniclers regard Kossovo as but one of a series of bloody engagements. Yet even in the military sense Kossovo is an epoch-making battle. Its meaning was that all the efforts of the Southern Slav combination could not wrest Nish from the Turks, and so long as Nish was in their hands they controlled the meeting-point of the roads to Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In a political sense it was almost equally decisive, for most of the Serbian princes and nobles, including Knez Lazar himself, were killed in the battle or beheaded immediately after it. Hence Kossovo even increased the existing disunion and anarchy. In the popular sense the Serbian national instinct was right in regarding Kossovo as the field of fate and the 15th of June as the day of wrath. It was not till four years ago that a Serbian king and a Slavonic league were again able to face the Ottoman with the same chances of success as they had had at Kossovo. The direct effects of the battle were felt for five hundred years.

To the Serbians Kossovo was much more than what Flodden was to the Scots, a defeat in which king and army perished ; more even than Hastings was to England, a defeat which enabled a conquering race to impose its will on the conquered. The Normans were civilised kinsmen and men of the same faith as the English. But the Ottomans were alien barbarians, with a lesser civilisation and a religion totally different from that of the conquered. Hence the terrible effect which Kossovo produced on the Serbs, as the overthrow of their language, civilisation, nationality, religion, of all that they held dear. The Montenegrins still wear round their caps a black border in mourning for Kossovo. The 15th of June (Old Style) is yet observed as a day of mourning by all Serbs, and there is an annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Lazar, where his body rests in the monastery of the New Ravanitza in Slavonia. The popular anguish found expression in that famous cycle of songs on Kossovo, which were preserved by the guslars, the wandering minstrels, and which were compared by Goethe with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Expressions of the most tender human pity are found in them. In one poem the hand of a dead warrior is brought to his mother :

“Whispering to the hand, she stammers starkly :
‘My hand, my dear, dear hand, my green apple !
Where didst thou grow, and where hast thou been plucked ?
Here, in my lap, ’tis here that thou didst grow,
Torn from the tree thou wert, on Kossovo.’”

The chord of human pity is one on which every poet can play, but another poem of this series reaches a height of mystical religious resignation which is rare indeed. Before the battle of Kossovo the holy saint Elijah sends a message to Czar Lazar, asking him to

choose between the kingdom of God and the empire of the world. Czar Lazar ponders :

“The earthly kingdom is a little thing,
God’s Kingdom is for ever and for aye.”

The Czar willed for the kingdom of the Lord rather than for worldly empire. No people which can treasure such a height of Christian idealism as this can be unworthy of regard. Yet it was in the midst of their sorrow and suffering that these glorious testimonies to national feeling were fashioned and poured forth.

So far as Serbia was concerned the real Ottoman conquest was inevitable after Kossovo. Her own efforts had failed and these of neighbouring powers were not to succeed. The great league formed by the Emperor Sigismund was dissolved in blood on the field of Nicopolis, his defeat being assured by the Serbians, who fought on the Turkish side (1396). Even the Asiatic troubles of the Turks and the defeat of Bayezid by Timur the Tartar in the great battle of Angora (1402) could not loosen their grip on the Balkans. Their work of absorption went steadily on, and more and more Serbian princes became tributary. Leaf by leaf they were swallowed like the artichoke. Serbian princes became Turkish subjects, Serbian contingents now regularly fought in the Turkish armies, and the Serbian cavalry greatly distinguished themselves in their service. Only on the famous Black Mountain did the Balshitch dynasty maintain their independence of the Turk, and this was at the cost of ceding Scutari to Venice. Those Christian princes who remained independent fought with one another, and were conquered in detail by the Turk as it suited his convenience. George Brankovitch became despot of North Serbia in 1427, but found the Belgrade district already ceded to Hungary. Accord-

ingly he fortified Semendria (Smederevo), at the head of the Morava valley (1430). The place was chosen with a military eye, but, unfortunately for him, the Turks obtained Salonica in the same year. As they already held Nish they commanded two-thirds of that Morava-Vardar road which is the easiest way of approach to Hungary.¹ A formidable expedition, organised by George Brankovitch and the great Hungarian leader John Hunyadi, inflicted severe losses on the Turks in 1443, but in the next year their forces were almost annihilated at Varna (1444). The capture of Constantinople in 1453 greatly facilitated further Turkish conquests, and the ever-increasing disorder and anarchy completed the disaster. The aged despot, George Brankovitch, the last really vigorous and patriotic Serbian ruler, died in 1458. Smederevo, the last great Serbian fortress, fell in 1459, and with it all hope of an independent Serbia.² Bosnia and Herzegovina fell within a few years, and Serbian freedom was confined within the narrow walls of the Black Mountain, from which wave after wave of Turkish onslaught rolled sullenly back.

¹ Nish was evacuated by the Turks on several occasions after the first occupation in 1375.

² Smederevo is better known as Semendria. Belgrade was in Hungarian hands, and remained so until conquered by the Turks in 1521. Its successful defence in 1458 was the last and most glorious exploit of John Hunyadi.

VII

THE TURKISH OCCUPATION OF SERBIA (1459-1739)

THE victory of the Turks over the Serbs was a victory less of arms than of institutions. The Turkish system was framed purely and simply to secure military success and to devise solid institutions for that purpose, and there can be no doubt that these institutions produced a race superior in all the qualities which secure immediate practical success. The centre of Ottoman power was in the north-west corner of Asia Minor, and it was in the reign of Orkhan that the characteristic institutions of the Ottoman race were devised. In the Anatolian peasant of Asia Minor, Orkhan found an ideal instrument for his purpose, for that peasant has been for five centuries a patient, docile, industrious tiller of the soil, never a rebel, always a good taxpayer, and at need a fearless, hardy soldier. There was no fear of his revolting in the absence of his ruler, or of his running away from the battlefield in his presence. Contrasted with the rough, poetic Serbian peasant with his zeal for blood-feuds and his wild liberty, the mild Anatolian was a pliant instrument of despotism. The peasant supplied the means of paying the real military force, the Ottoman cavalry. Othman, who gave his name to the race, seems to have done little but use his squadrons of wild Tartar horsemen to conquer territory.¹ It was under Orkhan (1326-60)

¹ The Arabic form is Othman, but the Turks had a difficulty in pronouncing *th*, hence the corruption Osman and Osmanli or Ottomans.

that the systematic organisation of the machinery of conquest was devised. Whether this system was the direct inspiration of Orkhan himself, or of his brother and Grand Vizier Ala-ad-Din, has been disputed.¹ But the main outlines of the system are clear. They aimed at three objects—the establishment of a regular military system, the regular organisation of an Ottoman civil polity, and the regulation of Ottoman relations with Christian subjects. The military system aimed at establishing a permanent professional army. The general levy was of cavalry—for every Ottoman rode a horse if he could—and was to be drawn from those to whom the Sultan assigned military fiefs of land in return for military services, or for its money equivalent on demand. Here then was a feudal system, but one carefully devised and new, without the dangers and obscurities of European feudalism. Orkhan or his advisers further showed their ability in realising that feudal levies were only useful as a last resource, and that they must depend in the main on a regular military force. This was supplied by the establishment of regular cavalry and of professional infantry, both of whom received pay and could therefore be depended on for systematic and lengthened service. The infantry who were thus established were the famous janizaries (Yeni Chari, or new soldiery). These proved the main strength of the Turkish army and the chief cause of their ultimate victories. Finally the janizaries were supplied by a levy on the children of Christian subjects of Turkey. There is some doubt at what time

¹ Gibbon (ed. Bury, vii. 25, n. 67) favours Ala-ad-Din. H. A. Gibbons (70-3) favours Orkhan. Ala-ad-Din died early and so could not have carried out the principles, but that is no reason why he should not have devised them. The Turkish account that he was a holy man who devised the system in years of meditation is quite in accordance with Oriental tradition, and is indeed singularly like what happened in the case of the early Arab conquerors who followed out the ideas devised by Mahomet in lonely meditation.

this tribute began to drain the Christian lands and to strengthen the Ottomans. At first the number of janizaries appears to have been small, and their influence was therefore not so overwhelming as it subsequently proved. But there seems no doubt that the institution goes back to the age of Orkhan (probably 1330), and it is certain, therefore, that the Ottomans possessed a small force of paid infantry and a larger one of paid cavalry—that is the germ of a national standing army—before any Western sovereigns did.¹ The Western host of Orkhan's time consisted of feudal levies, of hired mercenaries, and of soldiers who were paid only during the period of a war; the Serb Empire relied on mercenaries and on barons and peasants whose attendance it was difficult to enforce; the Eastern Empire had indeed the germ of a standing army but had no national principle to back it.

In tactics and strategy the Ottomans seem to have excelled Western nations as much as they did in permanent organisation for war. The light horse, whose evolutions and rapidity vanquished European heavy cavalry, had learnt much from the Tartars, who were the supreme military authorities both under Zinghis and Timur. It was they who taught the Ottomans that cavalry drill which caused their line to move "like a wall," and which was so admired for its perfection. The discipline of the janizaries, who were trained from the age of eight years, was necessarily superior to that of other soldiers. Moreover, they represented that new arm of infantry which was rapidly destroying the feudal heavy cavalry. The characteristic Turkish method of fighting in battle seems to have been to cover the front with cavalry scouts and irregular infantry, to operate with light cavalry on the flanks and to keep the janizaries in the centre. As

¹ *Vide* Gibbon, ed. Bury, vii. 25, n. 67; contrast H. A. Gibbons, 117-21. The first Western standing army was that established by Charles v. of France in the middle of the fifteenth century.

the Christians usually possessed only heavy cavalry they were almost always outflanked by the light horse. In such case their only resource was a frontal charge on the centre, a most difficult and expensive operation of battle. The fact that the Ottomans usually kept their reserves in the flank and not in the centre seems to prove that they could trust the latter to remain unbroken. Their confidence was justified, for the janizaries remained steady in battle, and on the fatal day of Angora were cut to pieces by Timur long after their light cavalry had fled the field. To these Turkish forces the Serbians had no professional soldiers except mercenaries to oppose, though they had a native cavalry of lancers and mailed cuirassiers and native bowmen. The deadliness of the Serbian archery was recorded by Western Crusaders, and Serbian cavalry, though more than once defeated by the Ottoman light horse, were irresistible when on favourable ground. They seem to have crushed the Ottoman left at Kossovo, they won the day at Nicopolis, they broke Timur's left wing at Angora, "charging with faithful hearts and irresistible arms." Their admirable behaviour was praised by Timur himself, and Timur was the only general of the age whose military skill excelled that of the Ottomans.

The regular army of the Ottomans does not seem to have been under one hundred thousand men in the fifteenth century, but it is not clear that the Christian armies were superior in numbers to the Turks at the Maritza, at Kossovo, or Nicopolis. If the Christians ever opposed to them a host of similar size in that period it was certainly inferior in training and discipline. The Serbians had no infantry to oppose to the janizaries, and their untamable valour was not the result or the cause of discipline. The unity of the Ottoman army was as marked as was the disunion of the mixed armies of Bulgars, Serbs, and Magyars who opposed them. The

regular establishment, the drill and the discipline, explain the monotonous record of three centuries of military victory. The legislation of Orkhan rendered the true Ottoman a soldier in nature as well as by training. His political indifference was that of a soldier, his vices of cruelty and lust, his virtues of temperance and serenity and endurance, were equally of the camp.

Military efficiency does not at all explain why the Turks could maintain a political empire for six centuries, which increased its boundaries and power for three. For that result the political reforms under Orkhan were responsible. The aim was to devise a system which would secure Ottoman supremacy and attract the Christian races. With this end in view a distinctive dress of flowing robes was prescribed for all Ottomans, and a new Ottoman coinage superseded the Seljuk and Byzantine currencies. These reforms originated about 1328, but the subsequent working out of the ideas underlying them took more than a century. The fundamental principle was the superiority of the Mohammedan to the Christian, marked by the fact that the latter paid taxes in money and the former taxes in blood. All offices in the State and all posts in the army were confined to Mussulmans ; Christians, when employed, served always in subordinate capacities. Christians were not generally allowed to serve in the army, but were, with certain exceptions, given complete liberty of private worship. There was a fairly complete religious tolerance and a fairly complete political intolerance. A Christian was at liberty to worship his God in his own Church, but he was debarred from high office and rank in the State. Yet once a Christian abjured Christ for Mahomet he was able to rise to anything except the Sultanate. A Palæologus became a famous admiral in the sixteenth century under the name of Piali Pasha, and he is but one of many

instances to show that a man who becomes a Mohammedan becomes at once an equal of any Ottoman, whatever his previous religion may have been. The Ottoman system regards the religion, not the race, of a man, and one can still occasionally see in the Ottoman army a coarse, thick-lipped Nubian commanding a force of thin-lipped Arabs or of superior looking Anatolian peasants. This policy attracted men to Islam, while at the same time it did not directly persecute Christians. The foundations of belief were sapped by the pickaxe of interest and the spade of political advantage.

In the matter of toleration the Ottomans afforded a complete contrast to all Christendom. The hatred of the Latins and the Greeks for one another was intense, and a lasting cause of division. It was the main reason which induced Orthodox Christians, whether Serb, Byzantine, or Greek, to acquiesce in the Ottoman rule. Their attitude of mind is well illustrated by the song which tells that George Brankovitch, the despot of North Serbia, once asked John Hunyadi what religion he would enforce on Serbs if he saved them from the Turk. "The Latin," said the great Hungarian with decision. Greatly perturbed, Despot George put the same question to the Turkish Sultan. "I will build a church near every mosque," said the Sultan; "I will leave the people to bow in the mosques or to cross themselves in the churches as they will." This story is unquestionably true in spirit if not in fact. The mass of Greek Christians preferred limited toleration under the Turk to unlimited persecution under the Latin. Co-operation between Greek and Latin was always unwilling; they reviled one another as dogs and infidels even while they spoke of agreement and union. The Serb rulers, who treated with Rome in their extremity, undoubtedly hastened the destruction of their country by so doing.

Their Orthodox subjects rebelled against them, or opened the gates of fortresses to the Turk rather than to the Pope. The fall of Constantinople was undoubtedly hastened by the unquenchable Greek hatred for the "Azymite" Latins. It is only in the most recent times that Orthodox and Latin Christians have been induced to co-operate as fellow-Slavs in Bosnia and Croatia. If this barrier has been of such practical importance even in our own times, its importance may be imagined in the Middle Ages. In any case, the hatred of one Balkan race for the other, of Greek for Serb, and of Serb for Magyar, was acute. The Latin and the Greek rites were both intolerant of differences of opinion. The Turkish policy offered better terms than the Latin, and was therefore preferable to it. *Divide et impera* has ever been the maxim of Turkish policy, and limited toleration was its most effective lever.

The last general cause of Turkish victory and empire must be sought in that personal and moral region where so much of history is accidentally shaped. It happened that for two centuries the leaders of the Ottomans were generally men of personality and power, true leaders, brave generals, or wise statesmen. Less of a direct accident is the fact that the Ottomans were, as a race, superior in morality to those whom they conquered. In the early stages of a nation's conversion to Mohammedanism, their elevation and purity of life is often most marked. It was so in the case of the Arabs for a generation after the death of Mahomet, it was so for several generations after the death of Othman. Sultans and peasants alike were men of simple faith, earnest ideals, and heroic bravery. It is not till the days of Bayezid I. and Mahomet the Conqueror that we get any real evidence of corruption among the rulers and their followers. Thus during the days that Kossovo was won the Serbians were opposed by a nation full of moral

ardour, fatalistic and utterly fearless of death, yet armed with the latest weapons and skilled in the latest tactics of war. The union of science and faith, of discipline and fervour, was resistless. The Turks represented for the time being that "most formidable and terrible of all combinations" a nation of "practical mystics." The Turkish Empire was won by the simple means of faith and valour ; it was retained by refined arts of policy and diplomacy long after the glow of religious passion had died away.

What has already been sketched is a general outline of Turkish institutions and policy. Its application differed in detail according to the race and nation affected. The settlement of the Balkans was practically made in the fifteenth century. It was not possible, even had it been thought desirable, to uproot or to convert forcibly the Christian races to Mohammedanism. Neither in Asia nor in Europe would the Ottomans have been numerous enough to supply the place of massacred Christians. The policy was therefore to recognise each race as a nation with rights of its own, and to plant Turkish colonies in strong places. The traces of these military garrisons may yet be seen in Macedonia, Adrianople, and Constantinople, where there are large Turkish populations. The Ottoman believed also so strongly in the supremacy of his own race and in the superior attractive power of his religion that he trusted to time to Mussulmanise some of the subject races. There is no doubt that he had a large measure of success in this policy. Great numbers of Greeks and Bulgarians shaved their heads and assumed the turban. In Bosnia about one-third and in Albania about two-thirds of the population became Turks. The success was all the greater in these lands because the nobles were Mohammedanised as well as the people.

In Serbia as a whole Islam was decisively routed.

Turkish governors and janizaries ruled in the towns, spahis had estates in the country, Arnauts or Muslimised Serbs appeared, but the majority of Serbia was never Mohammedan. It is worth while trying to ascertain the true reason of this fidelity to the Orthodox Church and the Serbian nationality. Serbia differs from all other Balkan nations in the very important fact that a small fragment of the Serbian race never yielded at all to the Turks. The battle which the dwellers on the Black Mountain (Montenegro) fought with the Turks lasted for five centuries and ended in the triumph of freedom. It will be described in more detail elsewhere, here it is enough to say that the moral effect of this independence reacted perpetually on the Serbians under Turkish rule. It spurred them constantly to revolt, and offered them a city of refuge when that revolt was unsuccessful. But Montenegro was not the only mountain fortress that could be defended against the Turk. All along a line from the Danube to the Albanian Alps are caverns, forests, and hills which formed the lairs of desperate and broken men. Chatham said of the Americans there always remained to them "their woods and their liberty." These wild foresters or mountaineers, the Robin Hoods and William Tells of Serbian legend, were known as uskoks or heydukes. They lurked in their wild haunts like their ancestors of old, ever ready to destroy small bodies of men, and swift to fly into pathless marsh or forest when large forces moved against them. It is said, and the story is probably true, that even in the Rudnik Hills there are fortresses and hiding-places which have never been penetrated by the Turk. It is at any rate certain that they did not do so for several centuries. The stories of this fierce and desperate resistance were well known among the Serbian families who had submitted to the Turk, and tales round the hearthstone

spoke as much of the doings of the local brigands as of Dushan the mighty and Marko the hero. Thus memory and hope, the two sources of nationality, never died out among the Serbians as they did among the Albanians and Bosnians.

The settlement of Serbia and the application to it of the Turkish feudal and military system extended over several centuries. The Turkish penetration and infiltration of lands inhabited or conquered by the Serbians began almost immediately after the death of Dushan, but the process was not in any degree complete till the seventeenth century, perhaps in the true sense never complete at all. In Macedonia and Serbia as a whole the process began by demanding contingents for the Ottoman army from native dependent princes. Such were the troops supplied by Marko Kraljevitch and by Knez Lazar. A treaty subsequent to Kossovo in 1389 arranged that Knez Stephen should supply 1000 cavalry to the Turkish army and pay tribute of 1000 pounds of silver. Similar arrangements supplied the Serbian levies which fought at Nicopolis and at Angora. This early arrangement continued in one form or another throughout the Turkish domination of Serbia. It is one of considerable importance, for it violated the Ottoman rule that Christians should not serve in the army.¹ This was an ingenious policy, for a people not allowed to use arms must eventually become unwarlike. It was therefore fortunate for the Serbians that a part of the contingent from Serbia (as also from the Catholic Albanian tribes) always consisted of Christians. In this way those Serbians who submitted to the Turks remained accustomed to the use of arms. One fact

¹ There have always been exceptions to this rule, but they have usually been in the case of dependent princes, as in Wallachia, or of gendarmerie. *Vide* Finlay, v. 46 n. Towards the end of the seventeenth century Christians began to be admitted to high political office.

which rendered the land settlement in Serbia easier than in many lands was that the wars destroyed almost all the great native landowners of Serbia. Large numbers of Serbian nobles were killed or beheaded after Kossovo and other battles, and during the fifteenth century most of the survivors sought refuge in the hills or fled to Bosnia and Montenegro. Consequently there was no fear that the Serbian nobles would retain their lands on condition of becoming Turks, as did the nobles of Bosnia and Albania. The result in both cases was to alienate the people from their aristocracy, for Bosnian nobles and Albanian beys have always oppressed those of their subjects that were Christian. In Serbia the aristocracy eventually disappeared, and upon the peasant democracy of native Christians arose a feudal and military oligarchy of Turks. This produced more oppression, as Turkish landowners naturally sided with the Turkish Government, but it also welded the Serbs into a nation. The land policy followed the system of Orkhan. Parts of the land were portioned out as feudal fiefs to supply the general levy of irregular cavalry, other parts were given to those spahis, as they were called, who formed the chief regular cavalry. In Macedonia feudal grants were made on a large scale, and there still exist some Turkish landowners with castles and feudal estates which they claim to have held in hereditary descent for five centuries. But in Serbia the distribution of fiefs to Turkish settlers was certainly less than in Macedonia, partly because of the difficulties of subduing the interior of Rashka, partly because the levy demanded from the Serbian districts always included Christians. These Christians were probably supplied by those independent Christian nobles or district governors known as the Bashi-Knez, who occupied considerable districts. In general the towns of Serbia, which were few and had been always inhabited by

foreigners, were occupied by the Turks, by the janizaries of the garrison, by officials, and by a dependent Mussulman population. The spahis who owned villages did not usually live in the country as the Serbian nobleman had lived on his estates. The spahis drew the rent and money from their land, but lived themselves in the larger or more fortified villages, or in the towns. Turkish local landowners were not numerous enough seriously to affect the character of the Serbians or to destroy their national feeling.

The Turkish conception of government is singularly limited, and, after the land distribution had provided a military force, it was only needful to secure tribute from the Christians and justice for the Mussulmans of Serbia. The organisation of the civil government was not completed until 1557, when the Serbian apostate Grand Vizier Mehemet Sokolovitch reorganised the Turkish Empire about a century after the final conquest of Serbia. Nominally Serbia was placed under a pasha dignified with a standard of three horse-tails and entrusted with the government of the whole Balkan peninsula (Roumili as it was called). In practice Serbia formed a lesser pashalik ruled by a two horse-tail pasha with his headquarters at Belgrade. The pasha fixed the amount of tributes and taxation, and was the head of justice as well as of government. As against the pasha Christians had no rights, but they could appeal to him for protection against the spahis. It was illegal for a spahi to deprive his villagers of their land or to expel them from his property. Thus a good pasha often protected the Serbian peasant against petty tyranny. The taxes were very complicated, including feudal rents to the local spahi, and various other contributions in money or kind to pasha and to Sultan. The amount of these taxes was not excessive, and it was not until the incurable economic evils of Turkish administration began to appear that

any real injuries were inflicted on the Serbians. Corruption and extortion are almost inseparable from Turkish rule, because the legitimate salaries of officials are never sufficient for their needs. As years went on and central control relaxed, the pashas became corrupt and their officials extortionate and cruel. But for some considerable time the financial oppression was kept within bounds.

The Serbian pashaliks were divided into nahies or districts presided over by kadis for the purposes of justice and civil government.¹ The kadis simply existed to protect the rights of Ottoman subjects in Serbia. "Political offences" alone were punishable with death. A Christian who disobeyed or insulted or killed a Turk, or refused to pay tribute, was at once summoned before the kadi, and his punishment was summary and swift. A kadi usually made his own rules of procedure, and could define almost anything as a "political offence" if he wished to be rid of a troublesome Christian. Less serious offences, such as the murder of a Christian by a Christian, were punished by money fines, usually imposed on the whole district where the murder occurred. The kadi was responsible only to the pasha, but if disturbances occurred frequently in his district he was liable to removal or to death.

Until almost the end of the seventeenth century there were large districts of the Serbian soil occupied by the Bashi-Knezes. These persons were usually the descendants of Serbian nobles or princes who had become dependent upon the Turk, and had managed by their services to win his goodwill and retain their lands re-

¹ Four pashaliks were comprised in the modern kingdom of Serbia, excluding Novibazar, Pristina, and Macedonia. The pashalik of Belgrade ran south from Shabatatz along the Drina to Ushitze and turned east to the Morava just above Krushevatz, extending from there in a north-easterly direction to the Danube near Orsova. The pashaliks of Leskovatz, Nish, and Widdin comprised the territories round these three towns.

lately intact. In their own districts the Bashi-Knezes were responsible only to the pasha at Belgrade. So long as they supplied men for the army and money for the tribute to pasha and Sultan, they were independent. The kadis had no jurisdiction and the Turks no habitations within their districts.¹ Thus large portions of the Serbian soil were withdrawn almost wholly from Turkish jurisdiction. The rebellion of St. Sava in 1595 caused the extinction of a number of districts held by the Bashi-Knezes, and that of 1689 caused the fall of nearly all the rest.² Even so, however, a few survived, and the exploits of the warlike heydukes kept other remote parts of Serbia free from Turkish rule.

So long as they got their soldiers and their money and protected Mussulmans against the infidel dogs, the Turks cared very little about civil government. Hence each nahie or district was governed by an Obor-Knez, a Serbian elected by the people subject to the pasha's approval. The Obor-Knez was responsible for the order of the district, and was assisted for that purpose by a force of pandurs (armed police). In all executive matters he was legally controlled by the kadi, to whom he was responsible. He was the representative of the Christians of the district in all relations with the kadi or pasha. He assessed its taxation and was responsible for delivering the right amounts. His judicial functions were particularly important, because he judged the Serbians according to their old laws and customs, assigning penalties and settling disputes. In reality he had executive functions, for it was to the interest of all Christians that his judgments should be carried out and his decisions final. If they were not, the matter was referred to the kadi, and the kadi had a swift and

¹ Chiefly in western and mountainous parts of Serbia, round Novibazar.

² The last Bashi-Knez died as a British Vice-Consul in Bosnia in 1821.

not always agreeable method of settling disputes. The same principles applied with greater force in the villages into which each nahie or district was divided. Each village was ruled by a knez or village headman, popularly elected by the village council. The Serbian commune had always been democratic, and the Turkish conquest in no way interfered with its character. Speaking generally, all the national departments of government were destroyed or Osmanised, but all the organs of local self-government were left intact. The result was to increase and develop their utility, and when the national insurrection came, it was the knezes who united with the heydukes and ensured the success of the revolt.

On the whole, the Turkish rule during those centuries does not appear to have been as oppressive as that of a Latin conqueror might have been. The Serbians were not forced to forsake their religion, nor much interfered with in their local government. Occasionally a venal or a savage pasha impoverished or depopulated the inhabitants of particular districts. But the continual Serbian revolts which we encounter in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were produced less by oppression than by general restlessness and by disturbance from outside. The independence of the heydukes, of the Bashi-Knezes, and of Montenegro stimulated and kept alive the stubborn national spirit of the Serbians.

The chief grievance of the Serbians, as of all Christians, was the institution of the janizaries. This was simply a system by which the Turk levied a tax of children upon his Christian subjects, and made use of the sons to oppress and slay the fathers. This infamous tax of human flesh could not at first have been heavy, for even in the days of Mahomet the Second the number of janizaries was relatively small. But they were reckoned at many thousands in the reign of Suleiman (d. 1566), by which time its effects must have been felt. Every

three or five years each district had to supply a certain number of tribute-children of the age of eight years. These were then taken, converted to Mohammedanism, and trained in a strict school of military discipline. The system has been happily compared to that of the Jesuits, and the one was the most efficient method of producing a military as the other of producing a spiritual soldiery. In both cases the essential aim was to take the child at such tender years that all previous ties would be broken and an absolute obedience produced in the pupil. The prohibition of marriage existed at first among the janizaries as well as among the Jesuits, but had to be relaxed in the former case. The result of this training was that the janizaries were for over two centuries the strongest stay of the Turkish Empire and the finest professional infantry in the world. In so far as they were recruited from the subject races they were indirectly a drain on Christian manhood which benefited the Turk. But in 1566 the first ominous signs appeared on the death of the great Suleiman, and the janizaries broke out into rebellion. Their demand, which the trembling Sultan conceded, was that in future the ranks of the janizaries should be recruited from their own children. The point was of great importance, for their children would be Mohammedans, whilst the tribute-children were Christian in origin. Consequently the janizaries became a hereditary corporation, which desired to include Mohammedan children and to exclude Christian ones. The result was that the tax on Christian tribute-children gradually became less, and finally ceased altogether, the last levy being in 1676. It is worth noticing that the abandonment of the system synchronised with Turkish military decline. The changes impaired the discipline of the janizaries. In future they formed a separate element in both army and State, and were difficult to handle both in peace and war. In the

provinces such as Serbia, where the janizaries were garrisoned in the towns, they often showed cruelty and oppression. But speaking generally, neither the janizaries nor the spahis, nor the Turkish régime in Serbia as a whole, were unendurable to the subject race up to the end of the sixteenth century.

An immediate practical result from the Turkish conquests in the fifteenth century was a large migration of Serbians across the Danube into South Hungary. This migration is known to have been encouraged by George Brankovitch in the middle of the fifteenth century, and probably began much earlier. Despot George had acquired large estates in Hungary, and had peopled them with Serbians. Subsequently Serbian refugees increased, and large tracts in Slavonia, including several towns, were peopled entirely by them. They struggled with difficulty to maintain their free status and their Greek faith against the Latinised Hungarians. In all probability their lot was actually improved by the Turkish conquest of Hungary in 1526. During the Turkish occupation of Hungary many settlers were imported from Serbia to settle in the Hungarian plain. Subsequently this settlement was to be of great educational importance, and it is no exaggeration to say that the Serbians of Serbia were saved from despair by the Serbians of Montenegro and from ignorance by the Serbs of South Hungary. The stubbornness of the Serbian resistance to the Ottoman rule is shown by their constant revolts in the sixteenth century.

While the Sultans were conquering Hungary and carrying terror to the walls of Vienna, the indomitable Serbians were still distracting Turkish forces by their revolts. It was now that the position of the Church became of supreme importance. The Serbian Patriarch of Ipek from 1592-1614 was Jovan II., and like all Serbian Patriarchs he was as national and independent as

he dared to be. The status of the Serbian Church was peculiar. In 1352 it had been excommunicated by the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, but in 1374 the ban had been removed at the request of Knez Lazar, and the independent and autocephalous character of the Church had been again acknowledged. But when Mahomet the Conqueror conquered Constantinople he used the Byzantine Patriarch as a tool. Being at Constantinople, this official was unable to resist the Turkish pressure, and was always a pliant and usually a venal instrument of Turkish policy. The authority of the Greek Patriarch was extended in order to support the Turkish rule, and in the middle of the fifteenth century his authority was extended over the autocephalous Church of Ipek. It will be remembered how earnestly and successfully St. Sava had striven to emancipate the Serbian Church from the Greek Archbishop of Ochrida. The danger of submission to Constantinople was now much greater, for this was the first introduction of the Phanariot system.¹ This Phanariot régime meant a mixed system of Turkish and Greek influence directed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. This system was not directly applied to Serbia, for the Serbian national Church was placed under the autocephalous Archbishop of Ochrida, who was a Greek but independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople and not devoted to the Phanariot system. It is not clear how far the system was really applied to Serbia in the fifteenth century, because the Archbishop of Ochrida was subject to Serbian local pressure.² But there can be no doubt that it injured and impoverished

¹ So called from Phanar, a suburb of Constantinople peopled by Greeks.

² Jireček (*Gesch. der Bulgaren*, pp. 466-7) points out that the service books, etc., at Ochrida have traces of Serb influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and that only in the middle of the sixteenth is the Greek influence again supreme.

the Serbian national life. In 1557 the ex-Serbian Grand Vizier Sokolovitch restored to the Serbians their national Church. In this measure he was no doubt strongly influenced by his brother Macarius, a Serbian monk, whom he made the Patriarch of the restored Serbian Church. Ipek once more became the seat of a Patriarch who was autocephalous and a national Serbian champion. Even so, there was quite enough danger from the Ottomans. Many of the Christian churches had been turned into mosques, or defiled and appropriated to civil uses. The theory was that Christians must not conduct their worship so as openly to offend or compete with the Mussulmans. But in practice an unlimited measure of toleration for private worship was allowed, and gradually public worship was again permitted. Some part of the taxes was devoted to Vakufs, or funds for Mohammedan religious observances. The result of this policy was to lessen the total of funds necessary for Christian religious purposes. Many of the monasteries were ruined and abandoned, others subsisted on the precarious basis of voluntary offerings made by poverty-stricken peasants. Education suffered even more than religion proper. Thousands of precious manuscripts were lost in the ruin of monasteries or fell victims to the contempt of the Turks or to the incendiary zeal of Phanariot Greeks, who destroyed all Slavonic writings. One great source of the preservation of Slavonic liturgies and literature was the printing press set up at Obod by the Bishop of Montenegro in 1493. This press was eventually smashed by the Turks, but it had served its purpose. During the time when the dangers of hellenisation were greatest it printed books in the Slavonic tongue and diffused them through Serbia; their spread must have done much to preserve the national tongue and ideas at the moment of sorest need. Schools naturally suffered like the manuscripts; for the

monasteries, which provided both, were in large part extinguished. It is to the credit of the Patriarchs of Ipek that they did their best to encourage education. It was sorely needed, for many of the village priests were unable to read. The monasteries preserved the dimly burning lamp of learning, and often supplied the place of parish priests when these could no longer be provided. The manner in which both monks and priests were supported by the scanty savings of the poor is the most beautiful passage in Serbian religious history. In return the clergy proved not only the sole educated and civilising influence, but showed themselves the greatest of patriots. In the absence of a Prince the Patriarch became the only real national leader. His eminence was really his peril. As yet the Patriarchs of Ipek were independent. The danger was that the Serbian revolts would induce the Turks to abolish the Patriarchates and thereby open the Serbian Church to Greek influences.

There can be no doubt that the great Serbian revolt known as "the Insurrection of St. Sava" was directly stimulated by Patriarch Jovan II. It broke out in Slavonia, Rashka, Bosnia, and South Hungary. Jovan blessed the revolt and presented its leaders with an image of St. Sava inscribed on a banner of blue, white, and red—the Serbian tricolor. The revolt broke out in 1593, and in 1595 the Turks solemnly exhumed the body of St. Sava, conveyed it to Belgrade, and there burned it to ashes. This symbolic act failed to crush a rebellion whose success really depended on Austrian support. When the Austrians made peace with the Turk in 1606 the rebellion collapsed. An attempt by Jovan to bring in the Duke of Savoy as King of Serbia failed, and the embers of revolt were finally stamped out in 1609. The attempt showed how formidable was the dogged resistance of the Serbians, and the Turk perceived,

though he did not yet remove, the danger of an independent Patriarch at Ipek.

Throughout the whole of the seventeenth century the Turkish power steadily declined. It is unfortunate for their Christian subjects that the Turk is always more dangerous and tyrannical as he grows weaker. So it was in the seventeenth century. The age of great Sultans had gone, and a vizier of the famous Kuprile family remarked in 1691 that all the Sultans since Suleiman (d. 1566) had been "fools or knaves." As in all Oriental monarchies, the efficiency and purity of the members depended on that of the head. The consequences of weak rule were at once felt in the mutinous spirit of the janizaries, in the lack of preparation for war, above all in the corruption and oppression of the Christians. As the central control weakened the local landowners and pashas ruled as they wished, tortured, oppressed, and tyrannised over the native Christians. A Christian had no legal remedy against robbery, rape, or murder if committed by an Ottoman until the measures of the last Kuprile in 1691. Even so, the honour of Serbian women and the life of Serbian men depended on the caprice or goodwill of their masters. A power such as was wielded by the Turk depended on goodwill and salutary neglect on the part of local officials. When the local pasha was independent of the Sultan, the lot of the Christian might be a hard one.

The great Powers of Europe were so occupied with struggles in the West that they had little time to spare for the East. Consequently the decay of Turkey was not disastrous to her until the end of the seventeenth century. The signs already pointed that way when the Austrian General Montecuculli inflicted a heavy defeat on the Turks at St. Gothard in 1664. This was the first decisive land victory won against the Turks, and showed clearly that they were no longer the progressive

power that they had been. Their military ideas were old-fashioned, their armaments once the admiration of Europe were out of date, the discipline of the famous janizaries was gone. In a last frantic effort of energy the Ottomans advanced to the siege of Vienna in 1683. The Serbian hopes rose high when they were defeated and forced to a disgraceful retreat, which became the prelude to a long series of disasters. The citadel of Buda was finally won back to Christendom in 1686, and most of Hungary was reconquered in the next year. Belgrade was captured by the Austrians for the first time in 1688. The Serbians of South Hungary rose in revolt against their Turkish masters and were aided by their brethren in Serbia. The Austrians were for a time resistless; their standards waved in the heart of the Turkish Empire, they captured Skoplje, and stood victorious on the fatal field of Kossovo. Then the tide turned, so far as the Serbians were concerned, and the Ottomans recaptured Belgrade and all Serbia. The Peace of Carlowitz (1699) ceded all Hungary except the Banat of Temesvár to the Austrians. It is remarkable also for the fact that it ceded Azov to Russia, made her a Black Sea power, and brought the Slav Colossus on the road to the Balkans. Yet for the time being the great Slav Power was too distant to afford the Serbians any effectual support. It was Austria alone who could protect them from the Turk.

The negotiations which centred round the Serbian Patriarch Arsen III. during this period are of singular interest. He seems to have been a level-headed, patriotic Serbian, and it is not certain that his policy, at best a choice of dangers, did not choose the lesser evil. Even at this early date Russian and Austrian interests began to clash in the Balkans. At first the Serbians welcomed the Austrian victories with transports, but Arsen III. very soon discovered that the Emperor Leopold intended

to force the Latin rites upon the liberated Serbians. Consequently he began to negotiate with Russia for support of the Orthodox faith. The Serbian peasants were not as keen-sighted as Arsen, and they were induced to support Austrian arms by promises of plunder and the memory of their wrongs. George Brankovitch, an alleged descendant of that famous Serbian family, was used by the Austrians to raise the Serbians to revolt. A successful invasion of Serbia took place, and an Austrian force reached Arsen at Ipek in 1689. Brankovitch, who had been proclaimed Serbian Despot, was treacherously seized and imprisoned for the rest of his life by the suspicious Austrians. This action, combined with the lukewarm attitude of Arsen III., caused the Serbian peasants to lose heart. The plumed helmets of the Kaiser's soldiers and the black robes of the Jesuits who came with them soon became as hateful in their sight as the turbans and the muezzins of the infidel. Thus it was that the Serbian auxiliaries melted away in the winter of 1689, and sought their own hearthstones rather than fight for the Austrian dogs with their shaven and celibate priests. The military results were speedily seen. Nish was occupied by the Turks at once, and eventually the vale of the Morava and Belgrade fell once more into their hands. The Austrian armies were everywhere in retreat, the Serbian auxiliaries in hiding. In anticipation of a successful campaign a proclamation calling on all Serbians to revolt had been issued by the Emperor Leopold in April 1690. The news of defeat obliged him to add to his grandiloquent utterance a postscript in which he promised to all Serbians migrating into Austrian territory full rights of religious worship and certain national privileges. Arsen III., whose position became singularly unsafe with the return of the Turks, at once organised a vast Serbian emigration. Over 30,000 Serbian families joined the

new Moses in this great migration.¹ Crossing the Danube, these settlers took up their homes in the southern part of Hungary and along the flats of the Danube. Even there they were not free from danger. The pendulum of battle swung to and fro, and Serbian settlers were plundered and persecuted by both Austrian and Turkish troops. It was not until 1697, when Prince Eugène won the first of his great victories at Zenta, that the Turks were finally driven over the Danube and that real peace ensued.

The terms of Arsen's agreement with the Emperor Leopold were, in some respects, undoubtedly obscure and gave opportunity for genuine misunderstanding. Arsen's negotiations with Russia do not suggest that he entirely trusted in the religious liberty now guaranteed by Leopold. As for the national rights, it is not easy to accept the old assertion that Leopold swore to give the Serbians complete self-government. What he did intend to do was to employ Serbian contingents in the army headed by a Serbian Voivode (general). With this view Leopold conceded the right to the Serbians of Hungary to elect their own Voivode as Civil Governor, to judge them according to their own customs. But Leopold hardly intended to allow them rights or liberties which would have endangered the Austrian supremacy. The Serbian national levy fought bravely in the war and was highly praised by Prince Eugène for its conduct at the crowning victory of Zenta, when the Sultan was put to flight and half his army drowned in the Danube. So far, then, Leopold had profited greatly by the bargain, and might have afforded to be generous. Unfortunately, the very military prowess of the Serbians operated to their disadvantage, for the War Council of Vienna was always urging the

¹ Lazar Hrbelianovitch (*Servian People*, vol. i. p. 328) gives 80,000 families, but this number is probably too high.

Emperor to keep those fine fighters directly under his control. Arsen III. is universally blamed by Serbian historians for his complaisant surrender to the Austrian oppressor. But it is by no means certain that the withdrawal of this large element of Serbians from Serbia proper did not preserve their national character better than it would have done if they had remained in their own land. Thought was more free and civilisation more accessible on the north side of the Danube, and it was in that region that the literary renaissance of the Serbian race was made possible. The future developments of the Serbians in Hungary will be related elsewhere.

At the end of the seventeenth century the Serbians of Serbia had to face the full wrath of the Ottoman, deprived of great part of his lands, and enraged at the Serbian uprisings which had aided in that disaster. During the whole period of the war the Turks appeared to the Serbians in the new light of religious persecutors. In reality the Turks had not changed, and it is doubtful whether they have ever persecuted anyone purely because of his religious beliefs.¹ All non-Mohammedan races are necessarily inferior and therefore unworthy of political or military distinction, "but man cannot constrain the opinions ordained of God." The Mohammedan law in fact actually forbids the forcible conversion of any unbelievers above the age of puberty, and thus forbids interference with religious opinion. "If God had so willed it, every man who liveth on the earth would have believed. Wouldest thou be so mad, O

¹ When I was in Albania in 1910 the Bektashi dervishes were being persecuted not for their religious faith but because it was believed they had instigated the Albanians to revolt. I have been informed that this is the first occasion of their persecution in Turkish history, and so far as I can verify the matter this statement appears to be true. Yet the Bektashis date from the fourteenth century and are practically free-thinkers. It is safe to say that they would have been more persecuted by any Christian power than they have been by the Turk.

mortal, as to seek to compel thy fellow-creatures to believe? No, the soul believeth not unless by the will of God.”¹

The Turk persecutes Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, or Armenians only when he believes that their religious beliefs lead them to political conspiracy against the Ottoman rule.² In fact, their religious beliefs have usually led the Serbs in the past to what the Turks would regard as political treachery. It is true that the Turk often persecutes Christians on very flimsy evidence of conspiracy, and that his punishments are always severe and frequently inhuman, but this fact does not prove him to be a religious persecutor like Philip II. or Bloody Mary. It only proves that cruelty and credulity are two Ottoman vices, it does not prove that religious intolerance is a third. Certainly the treatment of the Serbians at this period does not support the charge of persecution on religious grounds as such.

The relations of the Serbians with Leopold of Austria, with Peter the Great of Russia, and with their free comrades of Montenegro, had not been those of loyal Turkish subjects. Further, the establishment of Serbs within the military frontiers of Austria-Hungary proved a constant menace to the Turkish rule in Serbia. Under these circumstances the religious attitude of the Ottoman Government toward the Serbian Patriarchate was singularly patient and tolerant. They massacred and impaled a certain number of Serbians as rebels, and took the opportunity to abolish almost all the old semi-feudal liberties of the Bashi-Knezes. But after these lessons of political intimidation they came to terms on religious

¹ Quoted by Finlay, *Greece* (1897), v. 39 n.

² Even the Armenian massacres were probably induced by fear of Russian conspiracies. In conquering a revolted district, churches were sometimes defiled by Ottomans, as they were sometimes appropriated in time of peace; but these exceptions do not impair the general principle.

matters. The Turkish Grand Vizier Kiuprile, the last of that great race, was a singularly enlightened man and one of the first to make legal efforts to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte. He offered in 1691 to restore intact the religious liberties of the Serbian Church as granted by Mehemet Sokolovitch in 1557. After a decent interval he deposed Arsen III. from the Patriarchate of Ipek. The new Patriarch elected was Kalinik, who made a compromise with the Sultan, promising that he would keep the Serbians quiet so long as they were unmolested by the Ottomans. In fact, the circumstances were not such as allowed the Serbians to remain quiet. In 1702 the Montenegrins by a bloody massacre of Mohammedans laid the foundations of their freedom on an unshakable basis, and the Montenegrin relations with Russia still further encouraged and enlightened the Serbians of Turkey. But a more important influence was that of Austria, which still cast greedy eyes on Belgrade and the fair vale of the Morava. In 1715 the Turks attacked the Austrians only to meet with a terrible vengeance from Prince Eugène. That great general in the last of his victories routed the Turks and once more took Belgrade (1717). At the Peace of Passarowitz (1718), which the Turks were forced to conclude, they ceded South-Eastern Hungary (the Banat of Temesvár), Slavonia, Belgrade, and portions of modern Serbia and Bosnia. Thus for some twenty years (1718-39) the Serbs of Hungary and the Serbians were temporarily united. The former had been treated with a good deal of oppression by the Magyar Government, and their civil and religious liberties had both been violated. In 1735 there was a widespread revolt in Hungary which was stamped out with brutal cruelty. The Serbians of the districts round Belgrade fared little better under Austrian governors. Religious persecution began, and financial and military levies were made with exact-

ing rigour. The Serbian peasants soon learnt to prefer the capricious cruelty and contemptuous tolerance of the Turk to the systematic orthodoxy and severity of the Austrian. A sure proof of this preference is the fact that large numbers of Serbians actually migrated to the districts still ruled by the Turks. A further result was that, when war broke out again in 1738, the Serbians did little or nothing to help their new masters. Cowardly generalship and military inefficiency were added to civil misgovernment, and the Austrians suffered a shameful defeat. Belgrade and the Morava valley were surrendered to the Turks, and the Danube again formed the boundary between Austria and Turkey. The real meaning of this peace was that Belgrade and the vale of the Morava were permanently lost to Austria. Bosnia and Herzegovina could not long have remained Turkish with Austria well over the Danube and established in that valley which is the only strategic road to the Ægæan and to Constantinople. So long as the Austrians held a bridge-head over the Danube the invasion of Turkish territory was easy. It is difficult to see how the famous "Drang nach Osten" could have failed of success if Belgrade had remained Austrian in 1739. An Austrian Serbia would have shortened the road to Salonica, that objective of Habsburg desires. With a Serbia Turkish or hostile the road became an indefinitely long one. There have been few operations in the history of the Balkans so important and so neglected as this campaign of 1738-39. There is none in which the permanent independence of Serbia was more seriously threatened.

VIII

MONTENEGRO AND HER SHARE IN SERBIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

It is an old saying in Montenegro that her fate has been nothing but war for five centuries, and an older saying in Europe that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Each is as true as such sayings can be, and if there has always been some part of the Montenegrin rocks held by a few Christian shepherds and goatherds against Islam, this hard liberty has only been won by a tireless warfare. Nor has it been simply a ceaseless struggle with men against overwhelming odds; it has been a struggle against climate and conditions which have imposed almost superhuman trials upon the Montenegrins. The relation of a Vēnetian traveller at the beginning of the seventeenth century makes it probable that the climate was then warmer, and that the beech, ash, and fir covered the slopes of the Black Mountain more thickly than they do to-day. But even so, nature must have imposed appalling trials of endurance upon man. The face of even a young Montenegrin is often wrinkled from exposure to the weather; and it is common for him to sleep out on the mountain-side, exposed to the cruel wind amid mist and rain, covered only with a cloak. It is obvious that the bravest, fiercest, and hardiest warriors could alone survive under such conditions of nature and warfare.

The present borders of the country form a rough

square—with a long arm stretched out eastwards along the Albanian Alps. This territory was greatly enlarged both in 1878 and again in 1913. As it now stands it very fairly corresponds to the territory of the Old Serb kingdom of Zeta. Except for the fact that Zeta had an outlet to the sea at the port of Cattaro and a great fortress in Skodra at the east end of the lake of Scutari, the limits are almost identical. But Old Montenegro, which beat back Islam for five hundred years, contained hardly one-fourth of the existing territory and numbered less than one-sixth of its population.

The approach from the blue bay of Cattaro, at the end of which is a mediæval walled town wedged under the heights, leads to the mountain plateau of Cetinje up infinitely steep limestone cliffs, which sparkle in the sun like frosted silver. This great rock barrier, with Mount Lovtchen as its highest peak, is typical of Old Montenegro. Cattaro was nearly always under the influence of Venice, and from it provisions could be painfully carried up the goat-tracks to the impregnable rock fortresses lying between it and Cetinje.¹ It is almost impossible to see how life could have been supported among these wildernesses of bare grey stone, where "God threw a shower of granite from heaven," according to an old ballad. The earth seems to have disappeared altogether in many places, leaving a heaving mass of stones. Even where there are cultivated patches of earth some twenty feet square, they seem to have been painfully smoothed in the rock and then to have been covered with earth drawn from the clefts and the crannies in which it has drifted. The conditions in winter are sometimes appalling, and the mountain, which glistens so brightly in the sun, is called Tchernagora, or Black Mountain, by Montenegrins, from the gloom which the

¹ The present magnificent roads of Montenegro are of very recent creation.

winter rain and mist bring upon it. This is Old Montenegro, waterless, barren and wildly romantic, full of caves and gorges, and admirably suited for mountain warfare. To descend from Cetinje to the lake of Scutari and then follow up the rivers of the Moratcha and the Zeta is to find a wholly different country. These streams run through valleys which are broad, fertile, and smiling. Maize and tobacco, figs, apples, oranges, and mulberries are easily cultivated, and Podgoritsa, the only large town of modern Montenegro, lies here.¹ It has an old Turkish quarter, and beyond it again to the north lies the ruined Turkish fortress of Spuz. North-east of this fertile strip lies the district of Brda, or New Montenegro, a hilly district cleft with streams, well wooded, and with high pasture-lands.

This brief description of the natural features makes clear the military aims of the Turks. They attempted always to hold the valley of the Zeta with their fortresses at Spuz and Podgoritsa, and thus to sever Old Montenegro from Brda. There was then a real chance of starving the former into submission—a purpose which would certainly have been effected but for the back-door connection with Cattaro. The battles, such as they were, usually took place in the valleys. Sometimes the Turks made an advance in force into the hills, and Cetinje itself has been at least thrice in the hands of the invaders. But even when their numbers or their strongholds failed, the Montenegrins could always rely on famine. A small Turkish force was always beaten, an army always had eventually to retire, and there was a Montenegrin behind every rock to hasten its retreat.

The early history of the kingdom of Zeta has already been touched upon. Here it is enough to say that Zeta proved the refuge of Serb national feeling in the

¹ It has between 10,000 and 14,000 inhabitants.

tenth and eleventh centuries, and took up the task again after the fatal defeat of Kossovo. Shortly after that era Zeta was in the hands of the Balsha princes, who alternately quarrelled and allied themselves with Venice. These were eventually succeeded by a mysterious person known as Stephen Tchernojevitch, who appears as ruler of Zeta in the middle of the fifteenth century just at the moment when Islam was winning great victories over all the Christian powers. In 1444 the Turks utterly routed the Hungarians at Varna, in 1448 they crushed the Serbs of Rashka a second time on the field of Kossovo, in 1453 they buried the last Byzantine Emperor and his Venetian allies beneath the ruins of Constantinople. Effective resistance was only offered by the heroic Scanderbeg in Albania and Epirus, and by Stephen Tchernojevitch as Lord of the Zeta, who fought as allies. The struggle was severe and the odds too great to withstand, and Scanderbeg died in 1468, almost at the end of his resources.

Stephen died just before Scanderbeg, and was succeeded by his son Ivan. The latter was compelled to withdraw from the lake of Scutari and from the great fortresses of Skodra (Scutari)¹ and Zabliak. He fixed his capital high up in the mountains of Old Montenegro, at Cetinje, on a lofty plateau surrounded by mountains, and in this rock stronghold bade defiance to the Turk. Though he had been defeated and forced to abandon territory, Ivan instilled into his subjects that dauntless spirit of heroism which they henceforth displayed. That Ivan thus inspired them is shown by the fact that he is the hero of so many legends and that guslars (bards) still sing his prowess. They tell how he pierced with his

¹ *The Building of Skadar* (Scutari) is one of the most beautiful of all Serb poems. It has been finely translated by Sir John Bowring, *Servian Popular Poetry* (1827), and the translation has been reprinted in Petrovitch, *Hero Tales and Legends*, pp. 198 sqq.

arrow the side of a giant goat and caused a river to flow from its side, of how he sailed over the sea to Venice to bring back the Doge's daughter as a bride for his son, and how the Doge and a hundred nobles attended him to his galley. They sing too of his great fortress of Zabliak, where the gold was piled in the cellars, where horses and falcons abounded, and where Ivan judged the people sitting on a silver settle. Lastly they sing of how he lies sleeping in the cave of Obod, his head pillowed on a veela's (fairy's) breast, and destined to awake when the time is at hand when the Turk shall be chased from the land.¹

Between 1478 and 1696 Montenegro has almost no history; the only records are a few ballads and an occasional account by a Venetian agent. The population numbered some eight thousand, of whom some were certainly never subdued. That thousands of unknown heroes died in scores of nameless battles we may be sure, but there is nothing but legend to tell how the Turkish assaults were repelled. It is worth while, then, to pause for a moment and try and estimate the racial characteristics of the Montenegrins. During these years hundreds of Serbs from Bosnia and "Old Serbia" sought refuge on these heights, which thus became peopled with the boldest and most enterprising of the race. The tradition that many of them were nobles is probably correct, for the Montenegrin women still have pale, beautiful, regular profiles, clean-cut as a cameo, and the men have an air of true dignity about them and an eagle look such as I have seen in no other Slavonic

¹ It was at Obod that a printing press was set up in 1493 which is claimed as the first one that ever set up Slavonic type. In fact, there were earlier ones at Cracow and in Bohemia, but none in Russia till 1553. The press at Obod was eventually smashed by the Turks. Another printing press set up in Montenegro by Peter II. in the nineteenth century had to be melted down into bullets at a critical moment.

land. Over the border Albanians have the same martial, chivalrous air, but their women have neither the dignified bearing nor aristocratic features of the Montenegrins.¹ In stature the men are often gigantic—the average must be very high—and men exceeding six feet are quite common, just as tall men (though not such tall men) abound in Dalmatia and Bosnia. Their features are often fine, the hair light brown, with blue or light eyes. The Northern Serbians, who are a more mixed race, have darker hair and features and are shorter in stature, the same suggestion of grace but not the same dignity. The Montenegrin type has many of the primitive Slav characteristics, and suggests relative purity of blood.

On the other hand there are certainly strong Albanian and Roumanian influences present, whilst other elements have been introduced through Montenegrin commerce which is as of old in the hands of Italians, and by the dark-skinned gipsies who wander freely over the land as they have always done. The Montenegrin type is mixed, as is that of every Balkan race, but is probably more pure than that of any other. The weaklings have been exterminated by warfare and the rigours of the climate, and the generous blood of the old Serbian nobles is the strongest current in the veins of a Montenegrin.

The social system in Montenegro is different from that of the Serbians, but the differences can be explained by the pressure of new conditions produced by a life of permanent poverty and warfare. The fact that Byzantine armies penetrated to Zeta is shown by the annihilation of one in 1043, somewhere on the boundaries of Zeta along that white and purple line of

¹ Until recently the status of the Montenegrin women was almost as low, relatively to the man, as that of the Albanian. Chivalry in Montenegro as in Albania is usually shown to unprotected women, so that the air of greater refinement, beauty, and dignity of the Montenegrin woman is probably due to birth and heredity.

mountains which lie west of Prisrend. With Byzantine armies entered Byzantine influence and Byzantine methods of taxation. At any rate the administrative and financial system in Zeta had caused the erection of a Zadruga system at an early date. The Zadruga, we may again remark, is not a primitive type of community, but a change imposed by an economic system at a relatively late date. The Zadruga system then remained as the basis of organisation, and though the house communities were collected in small spaces, Montenegrin villages were, and still are, scattered over wide areas and ill-adapted for defence. The Zadruga system has always had a remarkable influence in promoting equality, and even in rendering it permanent after the Zadruga itself has disappeared. Equality was and is a notable feature of Montenegro. Peasants, shepherds, and warriors were all crushed by a common poverty and attacked by a common enemy, and the natural conditions allowed no difference to exist between man and man. The distinction between noble and peasant was soon blurred. The Sabor, or Serbian National Assembly, had ceased to be popular in any real sense under Stephen Dushan, and represented only nobles and higher clergy. We do not know whether a similar fate befell that of Zeta when transferred to Montenegro. In all probability the National Assembly disappeared. There seem to have been four districts or nahies in Tchernagora, each probably with a local or county Assembly. But of these districts Rijeka, as being relatively fertile and approachable by river, is known to have been constantly in the hands of the Turks. It is equally probable that some of the others were at different times. At any rate there is abundant reason for seeing why a central Assembly may have been formed from these four county Assemblies. Now in Serbian local Assemblies, as distinguished from national ones, the democratic and popular element

had always remained. It is then very likely that the Assembly called to Cetinje would naturally have that character. At any rate liberty revived again in the free air of the Black Mountain, and each warrior was free to attend the Assembly where, with yataghan in his belt and musket in his hand, he gave his vote for peace or war.¹ But this wild liberty, which each Montenegrin now won, was not all to the good. The blood-feud existed in a most savage form in Montenegro until the nineteenth century, and this relic of extreme barbarism was either introduced from Albania or revived by the new life. Some of their myths, too, seem too primitive to have been retained by the Zetans before 1450, and were, like the blood-feud, probably borrowed from the Albanians.

Every forest, lake, mountain, and even house has its siren or evil spirit (the Turkish *dzin*). There are woods in which the gathering of a leaf brings on mist and fog and terrible visions ; there are districts in which it is dangerous to kill a bee. These myths and these influences indicate a reversion to a more primitive state of things, for though all Southern Slavs still retain many quaint superstitions, the Serbian nobles could hardly have been the most credulous of Slavs. In all probability during the wild days of Stephen and Ivan Tchernojevitch the Serbian nobles and Zetans, associated with the ferocious Albanians in resistance to the Turk, actually retrogressed and borrowed primitive lawlessness from the Albanians which the new life favoured. There can be no question that the scattered villages, the roving existence, and the wild life threatened the stability

¹ On the other hand several of the *pjesmas* or ballads represent questions of peace and war as being decided by the *glavars* or captains ; but these may, as in Homer, only have formed a preliminary council before the question was submitted to the General Assembly. At any rate the democratic General Assembly ultimately triumphed.

of the little state, and that the dwellers or refugees on the Black Mountain threatened to develop into robbers who valued Christian property and life as little as they valued Turkish.

It is at this point that the immense influence of the Orthodox or Eastern Church made itself felt on Montenegro, and gave it a special character. At some time between the days of Ivan and the Vladika Danilo (*i.e.*, between 1468 and 1696) Montenegro was transformed from a civil kingdom into a theocratic state governed by a Prince-Bishop. The transition was not as abrupt and remarkable as it would have been in a Western state, for the Church and State were always very closely allied in the East. Constantine the Great was known as *ισαποστόλος*, the equal of apostles; every Emperor was in some sense a religious person, and no Byzantine Patriarch ever claimed the same independence of the Byzantine Cæsar as the Pope did his German master. Czar Dushan, who was deeply imbued with Byzantine models, showed exactly his conception of the Church when he proclaimed himself Emperor of Romans and Serbs and made the Serbian Archbishop of Ipek a Patriarch, in order to make the extension of his Imperial power evident in both Church and State. The inseparability of the altar and the throne was then a Serbian conception transmitted by the greatest of Serbian rulers. But whereas under Dushan the Czar was always supreme over the Church, the Vladika or Bishop in Montenegro ruled the State for over three centuries.

It is not altogether easy to account for this change, but the monks of Cetinje, from whom the Bishop was elected, had always exercised great influence over the Black Mountain. They were fanatically patriotic: their black gowns were often seen on the battlefield; their monasteries were always a fortress and a refuge against the Turk. They must have conducted such diplomacy

and correspondence as the relations with Venice and Ragusa required. They founded and controlled the printing press of Obod until the Turks destroyed it, and represented the only permanent cultural or civilising influence in the land. Finally, the Tchernojevitch rulers seem to have been often absent on missions to obtain succour from Venice ; these missions sometimes lasted years, for the Tchernojevitches were seduced by its delights to remain longer in Italy than was necessary. It is probable that on these occasions the Bishop would govern the state in the lay ruler's absence, and would in this way gradually increase his power. Also the Montenegrin Bishops were always consecrated by Serbian Patriarchs, and at Ipek the Serbian Patriarch though conquered by the Turk was becoming a civil ruler as well as an ecclesiastical one. He may have given advice, or the Montenegrin Bishops may have taken the hint. There is no evidence on the subject but tradition, though in Montenegro that is often the best history. The story goes that the last Tchernojevitch, about the year 1514 or 1515, decided to leave the Black Mountain, solemnly convoked an Assembly of the people, and transferred his whole authority to the revered Bishop of Cetinje, the Metropolitan of the old kingdom of the Zeta. The legend sounds very like that of the origin of the papal supremacy, when Constantine, obliged to leave Rome to found Constantinople, conferred his powers on the Pope. There is, however, this difference, that the Pope of Rome claimed secular supremacy over Princes but seldom in practice exercised it ; on the other hand, the Vladika once elected became actually reigning Prince as well as supreme Bishop. There can be no doubt that the legend is true in one respect. The fusion of Prince with Bishop was made peaceably and gradually, and was an arrangement carried out with the thorough approval of the whole community.

The consequences of power being concentrated in the Vladika were exceedingly important from every point of view. A civil governor indeed remained and his office became hereditary, but his status and position were inferior to the Vladika, who could dismiss him at will. Thus the Church had swallowed the State, and the Orthodox Church was the eternal foe of the Turk. It was not impossible for a lay ruler to make terms with the Turk. Indeed, there are several heroic ballads which relate how one of Ivan's sons became a Moham-medan and how other Christian princes were won to Islam by the offer of splendid marriages or of rich bribes. King Nicholas's drama, *The Empress of the Balkans*, is based on this idea, and tells how the love of a Montenegrin maiden rendered unavailing the seductive temptations offered by the Sultan to one of the Balsha dynasty. The Vladika was more effective than any maiden in rendering such a betrayal impossible. As a celibate Bishop, he was not to be won by the offer of a Turkish princess; and his religion, which never sat as lightly on him as on a lay ruler, made him the eternal foe of the Turk. His connections with the Serbian Patriarchs in Hungary or in Turkey were all with open or concealed enemies of Islam, and his faith and his interest both led him the same way. Further, the Vladika's election prevented any of those jealous quarrels which were so common in Serbian dynasties, and guaranteed a perpetual succession of men who were men of some intellect as well as deadly enemies of the Ottoman, and whose whole wealth and influence could be thrown into the patriotic scale.

We know very little of Montenegro from 1515 to 1600. During this period the Turkish power increased, all but one-third of Hungary was conquered, Vienna was besieged, and the only real check received by the Turks was the naval victory of Spain and Venice

at Lepanto in 1571. Certainly during this period the Turks advanced far up the Tchernagora; the fortress of Obod was destroyed, and the famous Slavonic printing press broken into fragments by the barbarous conquerors. Rijeka seems to have been in their hands, and it has even been asserted that tribute (haratch) was paid by the Montenegrins.¹ There can be no doubt, however, that they inflicted a severe defeat on the Turks in the year 1604, when the Pasha of Skodra was caught in the defiles. Bolizza, a Venetian envoy to the Turk, writes a report on the Montenegrins at this time, estimating their fighting force with suspicious accuracy at 8027 warriors and their villages at 93, and describing the strictly limited independence which the mountaineers had then obtained. In 1612-13, 1623, and 1627 severe defeats were again inflicted on the Turks, who fell back

“Before their dauntless hundreds in prone fight
By thousands down the crags and through the vales.”

These victories were gained at the time that no nation in Europe was equally successful against the Turk, yet they did not serve to avert grave perils from Montenegro. During the seventeenth century at least two-thirds of the Albanians became converted to Islam, and a number of Mohammedanised Slavs seem to have inhabited the lower slopes of the Tchernagora. Even when it could not win its way by arms, Islam was pursuing a slow process of assimilation which seemed bound in the end to convert Montenegro as it had converted Bosnia, Herzegovina, and parts of Rashka.

The failure of the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, and the great defeats which befell the Ottoman arms in Hungary in 1686-87, enabled the Montenegrins to

¹ There is some evidence for this fact, and it is certain that tribute was demanded even in the eighteenth century.

win a great victory near Castelnuovo in the latter year. But this success was followed by disaster : the Turkish attention was turned to this hornets' nest in the mountains ; a huge Turkish army advanced up the valleys, was aided and guided by Montenegrin renegades and enabled once more to occupy Cetinje. In spite of risings in Bosnia and of aid rendered by Austria to the Southern Slavs, the Montenegrins were unable to gain any real advantages over the Turks, though they eventually compelled them to evacuate Cetinje. The independence of Montenegro was still insecure, and it might have perished but for the election of a new Vladika, the remote ancestor of the present reigning house, whose powerful personality impressed a new character on the warfare of Turk and Christian, and began a fresh era in Balkan history.

In 1696 or 1697 a new Vladika was elected, by name Danilo Petrovitch Njegush, a native of Njegush, that barren, stony, inaccessible village just below the heights of Mount Lovtchen, where dwelt the oldest and noblest families in the land. Like so many of the famous Serbs, Danilo came from Herzegovina. The fables which trace his descent to French or Italian houses are needless, for he himself was of the type of whom ancestors are made. Attaining chief power at the early age of twenty, he saw that Montenegro could only be saved to Christianity and independence by deeds of savage rigour. There was no rigid line drawn between Christian and Mohammedan communities ; Turkish garrisons still lingered in fortified posts in the defiles of Tchernagora, there were Montenegrin traitors who abjured Christianity or betrayed military secrets for a bribe, there were Christian communities which lived amicably with Turks in the vales of the Zeta and of the Moratcha. Mohammedan influence was slowly and insensibly spreading up the lower slopes of the Black Mountain itself. How

Danilo freed Montenegro from this danger may be learnt from a grim ballad of the time named *Sve Oslobod* ("Entirely emancipated"). In the winter of 1702 Danilo was asked to consecrate a church for the Christian community at Podgoritsa. When the little building was finished, the pope (priest) appeared before the elders of the tribes assembled in Sabor (Assembly) and said to them : "Our church is built, but it is no better than a heathen cavern until it hath been blessed ; let us therefore obtain a safe-conduct by money from the Pasha (of Skodra) that the Bishop of Tchernagora may come and consecrate it." The Pasha delivered the safe-conduct for the black Vladika. . . . Danilo Petrovitch, on reading it, shook his head and said : "No promise is sacred among the Turks ; but for the sake of our holy faith I will go, though it be my fate not to return." He had his best horse saddled and departed. The treacherous Mussulmans let him bless the church ; then they seized him and marched him with hands bound behind him to Podgoritsa. At that news the whole Zeta, plain and mountain, rose up and went to the accursed Skadar (Scutari) to implore Omer Pasha, who fixed the Bishop's ransom at 3000 gold ducats. To complete that sum along with the tribes of the Zeta, the sons of Tchernagora had to sell all the sacred vessels of Cettinje.

"The Vladika was unbound. At the return of their dazzling sun the mountaineers could not restrain from transports of joy." Danilo, who had long mourned over the spiritual conquests of the Turks settled in Tchernagora, now called on the assembled tribes to agree upon a day on which the Turks should be attacked and massacred all over the country. Otherwise the people would bow the knee to Baal. Most of the war captains were silent at that proposal ; the five brothers Martinovitch alone offered themselves, to execute the plot. The night before Christmas Day was chosen

for the massacre, which was to take place in memory of the victims of Kossovo.

"The time fixed for the holy vigil arrives; the brothers Martinovitch light their holy tapers, pray earnestly to the new-born God, drink each a cup of wine to the glory of Christ. Seizing their consecrated maces, they set out in the dark." Wherever there were Turks the five executioners appeared: all who refused baptism were massacred without pity, all who embraced the Cross were presented as brothers to the Vladika. The people, assembled at Cetinje, hailed the dawn of Christmas with songs of gladness; for the first time since the battle of Kossovo they could exclaim, "Tchernagora is free."¹

This massacre, more terrible than Glencoe, Drogheda, or St. Bartholomew, was celebrated by monks with hymns of gladness on the day that brought goodwill to men and peace on earth. The spirit of the poem and the needs of the time are remote from almost anything that we can conceive. Memories of Kossovo in the past, deadly danger from Islam in the present, a hatred as intense as that of Israel for Moab or Amalek, a stern holy exultation as of an Ironside—these seem the elements in this horrible tragedy. There should be no attempt to obscure the fact of a cold-blooded murder, organised and deliberate, of all men (and apparently of all women) who refused to abjure Islam. But there were political motives behind the deed and necessities in the case such as did not exist at Glencoe or St. Bartholomew. The standards are those of Homer or of Joshua, of clan and tribal morality when the knife is at the throat and the struggle one of death. We cannot compare the rage or design of the iron Vladika with the deeds of silken diplomatists.

¹ A slightly different version of this fierce ballad is given by F. S. Stevenson in his excellent *History of Montenegro*, pp. 123-4.

Highlanders did not threaten the third William, nor Huguenots the ninth Charles, as Turkish renegades threatened the Vladika. Montenegro was not in the ordinary sense a state with an organised and unified system, but a collection of scattered villages, which could be separated from one another and slowly absorbed and devoured one by one and inch by inch. The remedy was the amputation of a diseased limb to prevent its growing corruption causing mortification in the body. It was a measure of sternest military precaution, though carried out with a savage religious exultation. "Danilo's Purge" saved Montenegro for the moment, and though it was a crime, it was not in any immediate sense a blunder. The Montenegrins themselves have always looked back on this massacre with proud rejoicing, and Peter II., the poet-predecessor of King Nicholas, composed an epic on the event. Henceforward the ranks were closed, and there were no traitors in the Montenegrin camp. The Mohammedan was now eternally abhorred: during the eighteenth century a Turk who approached the boundaries of Montenegro was fired on as a matter of course without being challenged. The Albanians, who had often been friendly with the Montenegrins, became their most resolute foes, and this savage enmity has existed till the present day,¹ and is still the most serious obstacle to Montenegrin advance in Albania. The fact shows that great historical crimes may be profitable for the moment, but that ultimately they need to be expiated.

Henceforward it was a fight to the death. Though he had eternally estranged one race, Danilo was more than to balance this evil by the kinship which he claimed with another, a mighty Power whose friendship and riches have almost ever since been at the disposal of

¹ Even the Catholic tribes, as the Mirdites, of Albania have usually been hostile to the Montenegrins.

Montenegro. In 1711 two messengers reached Danilo from the greatest of all Russian Czars, and told of how Peter the Great had conquered Charles XII. at Pultava and was now advancing against the Turks. Russia explicitly recognised the independence of Montenegro a century and a half before any other great Power did so, and called on her Slavonic brethren to unite against the Crescent. It was an epoch in history as important as that Christmas Eve of eight years before, for it meant that the future of Montenegro was bound up with that of her mighty protector in the North.

Popular feeling is always well expressed in the Montenegrin pjesma or ballad. One tells how the Czar's letter was read to a Grand Sabor at Cetinje. "Warriors of the Black Mountain, you are of the same blood as the Russians, of the same faith, of the same language. Are you not too, as are the Russians, men without fear? . . . Awake you who are heroes worthy of old times, and remain that terrible people eternally at war with the Turks." "At these words of the Slav Czar, of the great Christian Emperor, all brandish their sabres and run to their muskets." The pjesma goes on to relate the victories of the Montenegrins and of how, though they heard with sorrow of Peter's defeat and humiliating treaty with the Turks, they resolved to fight on alone for their liberty. "Oh—it is no shadow the freedom of Tchernagora. No other than God could quell it, and who knows but God Himself would tire of such an enterprise." The Turks were not prepared to do so yet, and another pjesma tells how fifty thousand Turks came to Podgoritsa. Their leader demanded hostages and a little haratch (or tribute) from the Vladika. Danilo wept sorely, and summoned the chiefs of Tchernagora to Cetinje. "Let us give the haratch," said some. "Let us give stones rather," said others. "Comrades, give what you please," said one chief; "as for me, I will not

give up my brethren as hostages, unless they carry off my head with them." At length the Sabor resolved, "We will die to the last man for faith and for sweet liberty rather than surrender to the tyrants."

While the Vladika was praying to the veela which dwelt on Mount Koumo, the spies were observing the Turkish camp. They came back and said, "We found the enemy so many that, were we all three turned into salt, we should not have been enough to salt their soup." The bard then tells how the spies had to encourage the timid, and how the Vladika set out their order of battle—then having "received their dear Vladika's blessing and sprinkled with holy water," they advanced on the foe. The sleeping Turkish camp is assailed, rich booty captured, Turks hurled from precipices and blasted by fire. "Oh, it was a fine sight to see how Serb sabres flashed, how they drove in the heads of the foe, and how the very rocks flew in splinters when they came in their way! Thus it was that in July 1712 Tchernagora covered itself with glory and was filled with the richest booty. O brother Serbs and all you who have free hearts in your breasts, rejoice, for the ancient liberty will not perish so long as we possess the Black Mountain."

This fine ballad reveals the solid historic fact that Montenegro won a great victory over the Turks in 1712 at a trifling cost, though Danilo himself was wounded. As often happened, however, a defeat roused the Turks to renewed efforts, and in 1714 Cetinje was again captured and occupied by the Turks, and only evacuated after some time. In the next year Corinth and the Peloponnese were captured from Venice by the Turks, and Danilo went on a mission to Petrograd, whence he brought back promises and money, and the first of those annual subsidies which Russia has since abundantly bestowed on Montenegro. During the next few years

the pressure on Montenegro was relieved by the victories of Prince Eugène over the Turks, and the capture of Belgrade by the Austrian General in 1717. In 1727 the Montenegrins won another great victory, and were uniformly successful in a series of smaller actions. The Vladika was always at their head, and Montenegrins still tell how twenty-two Turks fell to his sword in one battle. The general result of all these operations was that he not only preserved Tchernagora inviolate, but that the rulers of the Brda, the fertile district to the north-east of the valley of the Zeta, were induced to throw in their lot with freedom. Thus Danilo left his country immensely increased in territory and in power, and with allies, near at hand in the Brda, far distant at Moscow, promising a brilliant future. He so extended the prestige of Orthodoxy that the Venetian Catholic prelate of Antivari complained of his proselytising influence ; he doubled the prestige and territory of Montenegro, and his personal renown as Vladika, as general and as diplomatist, was immense. It is not without reason that the present King Nicholas has erected a memorial to him on a hill overlooking Cetinje.

Danilo's last service to his country was the devising of a system by which the Vladika appointed his successor, usually or nominally a nephew. This strange system of nepotism combined the merits of hereditary and elective rule, for it secured the succession within one family, but allowed the ruling Vladika some discretion. Danilo's own choice was not happy, for his nephew and successor Sava was more of a saint than a ruler, and in his period of government (1735-82) he was frequently superseded by bolder or more ambitious men, and was unable to control the different plemena (clans) in the country. The events of the period do not need a long relation ; they include a

great victory gained by the Montenegrins over the Turks in 1754. The spirit of the Montenegrins during this period is finely shown in a pjesma about this date. The Vizier of Bosnia demanded of the Vladika the haratch or tribute, along with the twelve handsomest girls on the Black Mountain. After communicating with his captains, the Vladika replies : "How canst thou, renegade, eater of Herzegovina plums, demand the haratch of the sons of the free mountain? The tribute we will send thee will be a stone from our soil, and instead of twelve virgins thou shalt receive twelve pigs' tails with which thou mayst adorn thy turban, to make thee remember that maids are reared in Tchernagora neither for Turks nor renegades, and that rather than give up a single one of them, we would all die palsied, blind. If thou wilt attack us, come on ! We hope thou wilt leave thy head amongst us, and that it will roll in our valleys, where so many Turkish skulls lie strewn." The voice is the voice of Sava, but the spirit is that which the heroic Danilo had created in Montenegrins by his bloody massacre of Christmas Eve.

Another and still greater victory was won by the Montenegrins in 1768, near Cero. This battle is often called the Marathon of Montenegro. Certainly the situation was highly critical. Venice had abandoned them, and by a blockade at Cattaro cut off Montenegro not only from food, but what was worse, from gunpowder. Ultimately an advance of three Turkish armies, a larger force than had ever previously assailed Montenegro, was frustrated. Two of the armies were beaten with enormous losses at Cero, and the third was pursued down the mountain amid a great storm of thunder and lightning. For these successes the Montenegrins were indebted not to the Vladika, but to a mysterious Russian monk called Stephen, who had

contrived to make the simple mountaineers believe that he was the dead Czar Peter III. Stephen practically ruled Montenegro till his death in 1774. He was not a warrior, but his influence was so great that he could order two mountaineers to be shot for robbery—a deed which the Vladika himself would not have dared to do. His influence was used to humanise and compose the local clan feuds, and with the splendid effect that was seen on the battlefield in 1768. By these victories Montenegro secured recognition for herself, and concluded a very important alliance with Maria Theresa in 1779, which gave Montenegro the assurance of Austrian support.

Sava died in 1782, and was succeeded by his nephew Peter I., one of the ablest and strongest of the Petrovitch line, quaintly termed the Louis XIV. of Tchernagora. He ruled for nearly fifty years, dying in 1830, and leaving a deep impress on the country. Like Louis XIV., his greatest service to his country was to organise and develop its internal resources; like him, his foreign policy was brilliant but chequered. He found a loose coalition of clans and tribes, he left a relatively united state. The Brda and Tchernagora, previously joined by only a loose alliance, were formally united to one another. A code was drawn up in 1798, which systematised and made uniform the customary law, and made it applicable both to Tchernagora and Brda. The government was systematically organised from the clan or pleme, and the tribal gathering up to the National Assembly or Skuptchina (the old Sabor), and a regular judicial system was worked out, ending in the final court of appeal, where the Vladika himself sat to judge in person under the oak at Cetinje.¹ These considerable changes were effected by the diplomatic skill of the Vladika.

¹ This practice has now been abolished, but King Nicholas still gives audiences to peasants, sitting on a chair in front of his palace and conversing with them in true patriarchal style.

Peter I. was also a valiant warrior, and commanded in person when the Turkish troops were hopelessly routed in a defile near Kruze in 1796. But Montenegro gained little save what it already held in all the wars of this period. During the Austro-Russian war against Turkey of 1788-91, Montenegro only repulsed attacks. Peter's attempts to support Russia against Napoleon between 1805 and 1810 were not successful, and the Montenegrins were ultimately repulsed by the French from Cattaro and Ragusa. In 1813-14 Montenegrins aided the English to recover Cattaro, but this coveted seaport was soon wrested from them by Austria. In 1820, however, Peter achieved another success over the Turks, and once more drove them headlong from the valley of the Zeta.

The state of the Montenegrins in 1806-7 was described by a Russian officer, Bronievski. He testifies to their military efficiency, and mentions that their whole forces could be collected in twenty-four hours. Their military system is described as the offensive-defensive, one of sending out a small number of skirmishers as decoys, luring the enemy into rocks and defiles and then destroying him by the attack of the main body. He admits their efficiency as irregulars, in scouting and ambush work, but says they cannot compete with regular troops. It is impossible, says he, to keep them in reserve, and they cannot calmly bear the view of the enemy. When in inferior numbers they allured him from the heights with opprobrious names, just as do the heroes in Homer. When equal in numbers they rushed on with savage cries, some with heads of foemen slung round their necks. They pillage and destroy wherever they come, and leap on the enemy "like wolves on a white flock." When the country was in danger all private feuds were forgotten, and these primitive republicans thought that there was no happiness like that

of dying in battle for their country. This account of Montenegrin warfare under Peter I. has considerable interest, for it exhibits how unchanging are the real characteristics of the Montenegrins. During the recent Balkan War the whole army mobilised in four days, and proceeded to the front with an heroic disregard of the modern impedimenta of hospitals, transport, and baggage.¹ In their great success in the minor operations and reductions of small fortresses and in their relative failure against Scutari, in their contempt of death, of science, and of discipline, in their unparalleled heroism and endurance of hardships, they showed that the old traits still remained. The impression produced on them by the modern disciplined army of Serbia at Tarabosh and Durazzo is well known. A Montenegrin described it to me, and added: "It is wonderful; their troops do not fire until an officer gives the word!" An army of this kind is like that which Prince Charlie led to death at Culloden.

Peter II. succeeded Peter I., and ruled from 1830-51, carrying on the traditions of his uncle. He still further centralised government, and abolished the blood-feud and the civil governor of Cetinje, thus removing the greatest cause of local disunion and centralising all powers of the state in the Vladika. The last step which remained to make the system of government a modern one was to substitute a civil conception of rule for that of the Vladika. This was done by his successor, Danilo II. (1851-61). Danilo fell in love with a beautiful girl at Trieste, and in order to marry her changed the Constitution of his country, abolished the Vladika-ship, and substituted for it the office of a hereditary absolute

¹ Near Rijeka in 1913 I saw a very old Montenegrin and asked him if he had fought in the war. Finding him unable to understand my question, I put it to a younger man. A look of astonishment came over his face: "Why, everyone went." It is still true in Montenegro, and in no other country in the world, that the army is the State.

Prince (1853). A new Code was published in 1855 which defined his powers, and separated the person of the Prince from that of the Metropolitan.

In foreign affairs and war the reign of Danilo was remarkable, though it was bound up with the larger events outside Montenegro, which will be described elsewhere. Danilo had the greatest difficulty in preventing his subjects from fighting Turkey during the Crimean War. Love of Russia and hatred of the Turk made them forget their respect for their ruler, and a rebellion, a thing as unheard-of in Montenegro as it was common in other Balkan states, was only suppressed with difficulty. The treacherous Turk in no way requited this service, and declared war on Montenegro in 1858. The Montenegrins, commanded by Mirko, the brother of Danilo, a wild and savage leader, caught the Turks in the defile of Grahovo and inflicted a colossal defeat upon them. It was again a decisive moment in Montenegrin history, for disaster would have left them a prey to the Turk at a moment when Russia was weakened and humiliated.¹

Between the accession of Peter I. in 1782 and that of Danilo II. in 1861 Montenegro lost her most primitive features, and slowly advanced along the path of civilisation. The work has been most ably carried on by the present astute and diplomatic ruler Nicholas, who is equally renowned as a warrior, as a poet, and as a statesman. A system of free education and a magnificent network of roads, together with a reorganisation of the army, a grant of a free Constitution, and the erection of the principality into a kingdom, constitute his internal achievements. The real domestic difficulties of Montenegro are administrative, for it is hard to find clerks and

¹ Some of the history of Montenegro between 1848 and 1878 is so connected with that of the other Serbs that it has been related elsewhere (*vide* pp. 253-6).

governors among a nation of warriors, and it is impossible for any Montenegrin to obey a stranger. Corruption or inefficiency can hardly fail to be the result, for the modern bureaucrat is as out of place in Montenegro as was Mark Twain's Yankee at the court of King Arthur. These difficulties have been increased by the fact that thousands of Montenegrins have emigrated to America and have returned with new ideas and higher standards of living, which are bound in the end to work havoc in a primitive community. Those who have only seen the magnificent embassies and relative civilisation of Cetinje do not realise the primitive conditions prevalent in the interior or the difficulty of grappling with them. An efficient administration would meet with savage opposition, an indolent one cannot adapt the old conditions to the rapidly changing circumstances. A civilisation of its own Montenegro possesses. The Montenegrin of Podgoritsa is certainly superior to the Albanian of Dibra or El Bassan. He has forgotten the blood-feud, he treats his women-folk with relative kindness, he welcomes strangers with courtesy and dignity. His loyalty is to Montenegro, not to the Zadruga or to a clan chief. But his civilisation is strictly limited ; he certainly has shown himself unable to assimilate the Albanians, who have been under his rule since 1878, and it is in such a test that we find proofs of a high civilisation. The younger generation of Montenegro has no longer the old savage religious fire, which was nurtured by hatred of the Turk. The Ottoman danger is now over, and with it the age-long traditions of Montenegro. There is a Young Montenegrin movement which looks forward to progress, improvement, and civilisation. Yet, in spite of everything, the conservative forces of Montenegro are tremendous, and conservatism there means a mild anarchical equality. Extreme poverty and the mediæval tradition of equality

both retard any capitalistic movements. The Montenegrin of the interior at bottom cares little what administrative efficiency may be, resents external interference, and loathes the machinery of syndicates, exploiters, financial agents, and capitalists who introduce civilisation. He cares almost equally little for the Liberal Constitution granted by the King in 1905.¹ What he wishes to do is to live quietly on his plot of land, to wander over his mountains free and armed as of old, to listen to the old ballads of the guslar over the hearthstone, and to teach his children the sword-dance of winter evenings. Such a man likes "Nikita" far better for having played on a gusle before announcing his declaration of war on Turkey in 1912, than for all the benefits the King has brought to his country.

Certainly until the present war King Nicholas had cause for pride when he looked back on Montenegro as it was in 1860. His reign began with a series of defeats, and the Turks as of old moved up the valleys and severed Tchernagora from the Brda. Yet in 1875-76 Prince Nicholas was not afraid to declare war against the Turks. After a chequered campaign, he inflicted immense losses upon them, eventually captured Niksitch and Podgoritsa, and drove the Ottoman for ever from the vale of the Zeta. Into the details of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and its subsequent modifications we need not enter. Eventually the independence of Montenegro was formally recognised, and the vale of the Zeta and access to the sea at Antivari secured. In 1881 the harbour of Dulcigno was added by the aid of Gladstone; in 1912-13 the limits of

¹ The Constitution provided for an Assembly of 74 members, 62 elected on the basis of universal suffrage, and for 12 *ex-officio* members. Up to the present, however, the strong personal authority of the King and the strong local independence of the districts have prevented any noticeable growth of its power.

Montenegro were extended to Plava, Gusinje, Djakova, and Ipek. Thus during this reign the territory of Montenegro has been for ever freed from the Turk, has been more than doubled in extent, has reached something like the limits of the old kingdom of Zeta, and has secured a legal and universal recognition of that independence which it has in fact enjoyed for five centuries. In all these achievements King Nicholas has done much, perhaps more than any other could have done ; for it is still true that in Montenegro as in every primitive community the man can do more than the ruler. What is still more remarkable is that a ruler with the peculiar qualities which appeal to a wild race should also have been able to exercise great influence on the statesmen of Europe.

In the more ambitious scheme of securing the leadership of the Serbian race for himself and Montenegro, King Nicholas has failed. This is the ideal which seems to be presented to Montenegro in the King's drama *The Empress of the Balkans*, and in view of the past glory of Zeta and Montenegro is one which was entirely legitimate. Unfortunately, it is no longer a possible one, for the very history of Montenegro itself and the services which it has rendered to the Serb race make it now necessary for her to surrender these claims. So long as the kingdom of Serbia was weak and divided and the vassal of Austria, so long Montenegro stood for all that was best in the past—the heroic freedom of the Serb race. But when Serbia showed herself armed and strong, conquered Turkey, crushed Bulgaria, and defied Austria, Montenegro's part became that not of a leader but of an ally. In the last few months before the war King Nicholas practically agreed to a peaceful economic and political union with the kingdom of Serbia. If this agreement ever becomes effective, it will be not only the most self-sacrificing, but probably the most real, of all "Nikita's "

great services to his country. At all events it is now certain that Montenegro can only survive as the "little brother" of Serbia. The fact appears recognised by the Montenegrins themselves, whose enthusiasm for Serbia and for Crown Prince Alexander after the Balkan War was evident to the most casual observer.

Montenegro survived the storm which crushed the Serb race, but it survived at a cost. The Turks could only be repelled by a system which saw to it that every man was a soldier, and destroyed all the arts of peace. The results of the long struggle now ended are that Montenegro remains free and Serbian, but still primitive in ideas and organisation and economics, despite all the civilising efforts of her rulers. The traces of the struggle for survival must remain for very long, and perhaps will never be effaced. Freedom Montenegro has, but it is primitive, savage and uncontrolled, and the stern spirit of many of her sons accords ill with modern ideas. Her task in history is really over, for she has achieved that for which she struggled, and has enabled the Serb race to be united. During their period of despair the eyes of Serbs in Bosnia, in Kossovo, and in Serbia itself, were ever turned to that white and purple mountain line where the unconquerable "sons of Tchernagora maintained their freedom, the eyrie of the eagles." There is a story of how Marko Kralje-vitch when wounded was restored to life by eagles who brought him water in their beaks. The same service was rendered to the wounded Serb nation by the "falcons of the Black Mountain."

IX

THE PREPARATION FOR INDEPENDENCE

(1739-1804)

BETWEEN the years 1739 and 1788 the Serbian land had rest from war, but neither Hungarian Serbs nor Turkish Serbians had rest from struggle. In Turkish Serbia the condition of the Christian people, the rayahs, grew steadily worse after 1739. The position of the Patriarch grew more difficult, for he was under by no means unjustifiable suspicions. In truth, a Christian ecclesiastic under Turkish rule cannot be purely ecclesiastical, for the Turks themselves often make him responsible for civil order. But if Serbian ecclesiastics were deeply tinged with politics, their Phanariot rivals were only lightly tinged with religion. During the eighteenth century the worst features of the Phanariot system were manifested throughout the Balkans. The Patriarch of Constantinople had become an absolutely servile tool of his Ottoman master in political matters. He placed all rebels against the Turkish rule under the ecclesiastical ban, and exhorted all to obedience to that beneficent sway. Yet the Byzantine Patriarch made up for his servility in politics by his tyranny in religion. If politics were to be all Turkish, religion was to be all Greek. This was the underlying idea of the Phanariot system. All the Slavonic Churches of the Balkans were to be made to submit to the Greek theology. Everything that was native or national was to be destroyed, and the Churches and peoples were to be forcibly Hellenised.

Greek bishops and Greek priests replaced all Slavs in religious ministrations, so that clergy who did not know Slavonic controlled villagers who did not know Greek. The Greek language alone was to be taught in the schools, and old Slavonic books and manuscripts were to be mercilessly destroyed. This forcible imposition of a Greek liturgy and civilisation upon Slavonic races would have been bad enough in itself. The violence to national feeling and the destruction of national records would have been cruel even had they been due to religious bigotry. But the Phanariot system was not carried out by pure and stern fanatics, but by grasping and worldly ecclesiastics. Fines, penalties, and taxes were imposed, and large amounts of money extorted from the wretched Slav populations. Ecclesiastical offices, from the Patriarchate downwards, were openly for sale, and the successful bidders rewarded themselves for their original outlay at the expense of their congregations. In some cases ecclesiastics used their position not only to rob the men but to ravish the women under their care, and the way to win favour of a bishop was sometimes to bribe his mistress. The end of forcible Hellenisation, which the Phanariot system sought, was possibly defensible, for the Greek civilisation was still a high one. The Phanariots certainly built educational institutions, produced an imitative literature, and diffused Hellenic culture over areas in which it had never been known. But the cruelty, corruption, and immorality of the means used suggest doubts as to the desirability of the ends. Had the Phanariots sought to make the Greek liturgy and culture win its way by its intellectual and moral superiority, their success would have been greater and their conduct more justifiable.¹

¹ Eliot (*Turkey in Europe*, 250-3, 280-2) says all that can be said for the Phanariots in a most important treatment of the case. *Vide* Jireček, *Gesch. de Bulgarien*, 510 seq., and Finlay, *Greece*, vol. v.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Phanariot policy was applied to all parts of the Balkans except Serbia. The Bulgarians and Roumanians resisted in vain, and the Greek language steadily made its way. An example may illustrate the oppression. A Bulgarian priest was ordered by a Greek bishop to carry away horse-dung from the episcopal stable. He refused, and was punished by a beating from the bishop's deacons, whereupon he fled to the kadi. When the deacons arrived in pursuit, they found him a full-blown Mussulman under the kadi's protection. In Macedonia priests and congregations were taught to babble Greek, the old Slav liturgies were destroyed, and the countryside impoverished. The bitterness of the resistance evoked seems to have induced the Turkish Sultans to support the Phanariots. The first assault was on the archbishopric of Ochrida, which was a Greek see but not subject to Constantinople. The first man who proposed its abolition on the ground of political intrigue lost his head. After 1737 the Patriarch of Constantinople succeeded in getting the nomination of the see of Ipek, which he proceeded to put up to auction. In 1767 the Byzantine Patriarch Samuel succeeded in abolishing the see of Ochrida. A year before, he had obtained the abolition of that of Ipek. The Serbians were at last subject to that religious oppression which had threatened them after the Turkish conquest, and had been mercifully averted by the Serbian Grand Vizier in 1557. The Serbian resistance was an obstinate but hopeless one. All the Serbian bishops were deposed, and many of the lower clergy expelled from their livings. The vacant places were quite openly put up to the highest bidder, with the proviso that the buyer must speak Greek. Ecclesiastical corruption was followed as a matter of course by fiscal oppression. The injury to religion and education was immense, but it was fortunate for the

Serbians that the Phanariot system was only applied in full rigour for a generation. One of the first measures, after the insurrection of 1804, was to expel the Greek priests, to restore the Serbian Church to the native clergy, and to assert independence of Constantinople. It is a curious fact that the Serbian Church, though more continuously national, seems to-day to have less religious influence than any other Slavonic Church of the Balkans.¹ Perhaps this result is due to the strikingly political aspect of the Serbian Church in the Middle Ages, though there was plenty of religious fervour in Serbia in that period. Between Kossovo and the Flight into Hungary in the seventeenth century the political aspects of Serbian religion were intensified. But there can be little doubt that the Phanariot régime still further degraded religion in Serbia. For thirty years the patriot Serbian regarded his bishops and his clergy as foreign blood-suckers and libertines, as Greeks hired by Turks to oppress and enslave the Slav.

The systematic religious oppression of the Serbians by Greeks coincided with an unsystematic political oppression by Turks. During the early centuries of Turkish rule in Serbia the rayahs or Christians were, on the whole, well treated. Oppression, if it occurred, was local and personal, due to a brutal pasha or kadi. The chief grievances were the imposed superiority of the Mussulman over the Christian. For example, the rayah was forbidden to ride a horse, and must descend from his mule or his ass if the Turk passed him on the road. But in quiet times these and similar customs

¹ Chedo Mijatovich (*Serbia and the Serbians*, chap. ii. and pp. 50-3) gives a characteristic modern instance of the Serbian attitude towards religion. The Bishop of Nish in 1889 told some English visitors, "Please tell our (English) friends that it would be much better if, instead of sending us Bibles, they were to send us some guns and cannons" (p. 50). While trusting God the Serbian lays stress on "keeping the powder dry."

were only external grievances. The real danger lay in the fact that Ottoman law did not defend the life of a Christian man or the chastity of a woman against the murder or lust of the Turk. So long as the pasha did not interfere, the individual rayah was at the mercy of the individual Ottoman. It so happened that the pasha could not interfere in the eighteenth century, and thus a new chapter of woes opened for the Serbians. The rayahs had arrived at good working agreements with the spahis, and lived contentedly, paying their taxes in peace. There can hardly have been more than a thousand spahis in the whole pashalik of Belgrade. But the arrival of the janizaries in large numbers introduced a wholly new species of oppression into Serbia. During the eighteenth century the character of the janizaries steadily deteriorated. Ever since the tribute-children had ceased to fill their ranks they had been a close hereditary corporation, and a corporation which became ever more selfish and narrow in interest and prejudices. They quarrelled and fought with the other units in the army, they set up and pulled down more than one Sultan. To avoid the danger of their acting as a prætorian guard in Constantinople, the Sultan finally hit upon the scheme of dispersing the more turbulent of them through the provinces. As Serbia was a distant province the most turbulent were sent there, and towards the end of the eighteenth century their oppressions became almost intolerable. They knew no law, they feared no pasha, they oppressed spahis and rayahs with impartial cruelty. Their chiefs took to themselves the title of Dahis (leaders), and set at nought the authority of kadis or pashas. It was quite a common occurrence for a Dahi to march into a village with a few followers, to declare himself its owner, to shoot the leading inhabitants, and to compel the rest to build him a tower, which riveted his yoke on the district. In this stronghold he kept the money wrung from the

rayahs, whilst the village beauties were carried thither to form his harem. The lot of an unfortunate rayah might be very unhappy in these times, for no profession offered him security. Imagine an example of what might happen to a single individual. A poor Serbian priest, dispossessed of his parish by a Phanariot, decided to enter a monastery. There, after years of toil, he mastered the Glagolitic writing, and had composed a treatise on the Bogomile heresy from the manuscripts in the library. Just as it was completed, the Phanariot officials arrived, threw the manuscripts and the treatise into the flames, and introduced Greeks into the monastery. In despair, the Serbian monk fled to the hills and became a heyduke. There he was so harried by the police of the energetic pasha that he gave up brigandage and bought a piece of land on what was left of his plunder. He settled down as a peaceful rayah, married a wife and had two children. One morning a Dahi entered the village, gave the rayah's land to one of his followers, and took his daughter for himself. In despair the rayah flings himself on the Dahi, is arrested and beheaded. Multiply this instance by thousands and you have a picture of Serbian oppressions.

The reason that the Serbians were before other Balkan races in achieving their freedom is interesting. Serbia had a stronger national life and a stronger local feeling than existed elsewhere. Her life was multicellular ; her strength lay not in any one organ, but in hundreds of free self-governing villages, in the knezes of district and village who were still devoted and patriotic, in the heydukes who reminded her of freedom. It was oppression that was new in Serbia, it was the feeling of nationality that was old. National unity had been fostered by the Serbian Church, and the Phanariot régime had not had time to destroy it. Similarly, the pasha and the spahis had never oppressed and broken the national spirit

as they had broken that of Greece and Bulgaria. Wild freedom still lived in Montenegro and in the mountain fastnesses of Serbia, and the tyranny of the janizaries caused it to descend to the plains. All the elements of national life existed, oppression was needed to cause them to unite.

No internal revolts of any Christian race in the Balkans have ever been uninfluenced by the course of external politics. Serbia was less influenced than the others, but it is necessary to describe the phases of the Eastern Question towards the end of the eighteenth century, in so far as they affected Serbia. In this connection the position of the Serbs in South Hungary is of the first importance. They were subject both directly to Austrian control by the Emperor, and to the control of the Magyar Government of Hungary. The two interests, Austrian and Magyar, were different. The chief one of the Emperor and his war council was to train soldiers. With this view certain districts along the Danube had been cut off from Hungarian control and placed directly under the Emperor. These districts were known as the "military frontiers," and were largely inhabited by Serbs. The Emperor had promised Patriarch Arsen III. to give the Serbs the free worship of the Orthodox religion and some national self-government under a civil Voivode (governor). The Emperor did not keep the Home Rule bargain, and he sought to undermine the religious Orthodoxy of the Serbs by promoting the Uniate faith, *i.e.* a creed using the Greek rite but in communion with Rome. A number of Serbs accepted this faith and became Uniates. The danger was very soon evident, for when the Serb bishopric of Pakratz became vacant in 1704 the old Patriarch Arsen III. was shocked to find a Uniate as candidate for the post, and it was only with difficulty that he was able to buy off this opposition and give the

bishopric to an Orthodox Serb. The above account illustrates the difficulties of the Serbs in connection with the Emperor. There were even greater difficulties for those Serbs in South Hungary who were directly under the control of the Magyar Government. The Magyar policy was a simpler and less subtle one than the Imperial. They wished to make the Serbs Catholics without any pretence of the Uniate compromise. The difficulties were illustrated when the Emperor Charles vi. confirmed the Serbs in all their old privileges, and at the same time assented to a law of the Hungarian Parliament making it illegal for any but a Roman Catholic to hold land in Hungary. Charles vi. was anxious to conciliate Hungary, so that a good deal of Magyar oppression of the Serbs was unchecked by him. A Serb insurrection in 1735 was brutally suppressed. Throughout the century the proselytising zeal of the militant Magyar clergy secured a good many Serb converts to the Catholic faith. But it does not appear that this attempt was made with the view of denationalising the Serbs—that is, as the cant phrase goes, of Magyarising them. That policy of forcible nationalisation was unknown to the eighteenth-century prelates of Hungary. Had it been the aim there can be no doubt that the Parliament would have supported it with more energy and that results more important from the Hungarian point of view would have been secured.¹ As it was, the policy greatly irritated the Serbs and diminished but did not destroy their national and religious status in Hungary. As a result the Serbs looked to the Emperor for protection against the Magyar.

¹ *I*vide Lazar Hrbelianovitch, *Servian People*, ii. 598-9; Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*. Attempts were also made to discriminate between the Serbians of the 1689-90 immigration and previous Serbian settlers. These efforts only further complicated the whole question.

It cannot be said that they looked to him altogether in vain.

The war of 1737-39 and the loss of Belgrade was followed by a further immigration across the Danube from Serbia. Maria Theresa in her early years favoured the Hungarian policy and suppressed the Serb privileges. But in 1745, in deference to energetic remonstrances from the Serb ecclesiastical Assembly and pressed by military needs, she resolved to conciliate them and to restore their old status. For this purpose the "Illyrian Court Deputation" or Commission was set up (1747) to protect the Serb (Illyrian) interests. It at once came into conflict with the Hungarian Parliament, and the result was a further immigration of Serbs not to Turkey but to South Russia (1750-56).¹ Better times came for the Serbs of Hungary with the Russian war against Turkey which ended in 1774. The result was a great increase of Russian territory and prestige, and a recognition by the Sultan of the right of Russia to protect the religious interests of the Christian subjects of the Turk. This concession alarmed the Emperor Joseph, the ambitious son of Maria Theresa, who saw the importance of conciliating the Austrian Serbs and of using them to promote revolt against the Turk in Serbia proper. He was likewise a humane and tolerant man, and his efforts lifted the cloud which overhung the Serbs in Hungary.

It is convenient at this point to sum up the general results of the Serb settlement north of the Danube. There was a considerable difference between the Serbs and other alien races absorbed or oppressed by the Austrian and the Magyar. 'The Serbs . . . are vigorous, impassioned, and capable of zealous attachment to their nation and their faith.'² With such feelings they looked over the water and dreamed of the day when both sides

¹ Their descendants have been absorbed in the local population.

² Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 201-7.

of the Danube would be free and Serbian. There can be no doubt that there was always an intercourse between the Turkish Serbians and the Hungarian Serbs. The idea of one race remained, and something of unity and nationality developed with this intercommunication. For instance, when the Belgrade district became Austrian during the years 1718-39, successful efforts were made to promote religious unity. There was a Turkish Serbian Patriarch at Belgrade, a Hungarian Serb Patriarch at Karlowitz, but the two offices were united in 1731. Again, great efforts were made by the Serb ecclesiastics to promote education, and these efforts were increased in the middle of the century. The Serb ecclesiastical Sabor in Hungary made provision for schoolhouses and for schools. There was rather more wealth among the Serbs than might have been supposed, for they possessed a good deal of the trade of South Hungary. The educational movement progressed, and it was greatly encouraged by the Emperor Joseph, who is still regarded with affection by the Serbs of South Hungary as their kindly guardian and protector. His Edict of Toleration (1781) further secured their religious rights. There was a good deal of contradictory legislation with regard to the Serbs after Joseph's death (1790), and eventually the Illyrian Deputation was abolished. But the upshot was that the religious independence of the Serbs, their churches and schools, were preserved, and that their political status became that of ordinary subjects of Hungary. Under the circumstances the really important point was to preserve education. Its results were very soon seen. Many of the best Serb scholars have come from South Hungary, notably Obradovitch the founder of national education in Serbia, and Jovanovitch the poet. The first Serbian literary society was founded in Budapest; the regenerator of the Serb language, the famous Vuk Karadjitch, published

his works and pursued his studies in Vienna, Budapest, and Karlowitz. Moreover, clergy were better educated, and it was from Hungary that Serbia drew her best priests and bishops. The educational centre of Serbia was north of the Danube for long after Serbia had won her freedom.

Joseph's conciliatory policy to the Serbs was part of a large scheme for partitioning the Turkish Empire which he had long been turning over in his mind. His projects were outlined in 1781 in a secret agreement with Catherine the Great of Russia. In this arrangement for the partition of the Turkish Empire only the Austrian side concerns us: Joseph was to have Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and part of Serbia. In 1787 war actually broke out for the realisation of this plan. Joseph's policy had greatly moved the Serbs, who had communicated with their brethren south of the Danube, so that he was hailed as a deliverer and protector by both sections of the race. The invasion of Serbia was at first a failure, but in 1789 Belgrade was captured and the Turks everywhere defeated. On both sides of the Danube the Serbs fought bravely for the Austrians and greatly assisted them. But the conclusion of peace disappointed their hopes. Austria gained nothing by the war, and was obliged by pressure from England and Prussia to cede her conquests at the Treaty of Sistova (1792). The Serbians of Serbia received an amnesty, and some extension of civil rights. So far Austria had meant more to the Serbians than Russia, but Russia now continued the war and kept her conquests over the Ottoman. Thus she gained in power and prestige while Austria lost. None the less, not even yet was the great Slav Power recognised by the Serbians as their protector. It is deeply significant that when they ultimately revolted their first application for aid was to Austria. Once again Austria had the chance of

winning control over Serbia, and once again she lost it by her own choice. One of the ablest of Austrian statesmen has recorded his regret at the loss of this golden opportunity. Austria conquered and lost Belgrade three times within a century, but she finally renounced it when she rejected the overtures of Kara George.¹

¹ The Austrian attitude towards the Serbian revolt was often unfriendly (*vide* Novakovitch, *Wiedergeburt des Serbischen Staates*; Sarajevo, 1912, pp. 98-101, 125-31, 146-7), and the Austrian desire to hold Belgrade is the chief explanation.

X

THE TWO SERBIAN INSURRECTIONS

"Not a grave of the murdered for freedom, but grows freedom in its turn to bear seed, which the winds carry afar and resow, and the rains and the snows nourish."—WHITMAN.

(I) THE FIRST SERBIAN INSURRECTION AND THE DEEDS OF KARA GEORGE (1804-13)

THE story of the Serbian revolt is an epic, with folk songs for its history and Kara George for its hero.

The deeds of the Serbians and of their leader are so remarkable that even legend can hardly exaggerate them. A handful of rayahs arises suddenly, routs great Turkish armies, besieges citadels, alternately defends and defeats pashas, and finally wins its independence by its own bravery. There is no case in which a single small power in the Balkans has done so much without more aid from the great Powers. What Greece owed to Canning, Roumania to Louis Napoleon, and Bulgaria to Czar Alexander, the tiny states of Serbia and Montenegro owed to themselves. The one maintained, and the other achieved, her liberty in the face of the whole Turkish Empire. History usually supplies the key to political miracles, and it is history alone that explains the difference between Serbia and other Balkan states. If the Serbians achieved their freedom before the others, it was because they were more fitted to do so. The independence which they had long maintained for their Church, which they still preserved in their local government, and the untamed spirit of liberty engendered by the heydukes of their borders, these were the sources

of their strength. Other reasons there were, such as their distance from Constantinople, their inaccessible hills and forests; the money, the arms, and the literature, which came from their brethren over the Danube; the decay and division of the Turks at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which offered an ideal moment at which to strike for freedom. Last of all, there were a hundred fierce chieftains in the Serbian land, full of wild hatred of the janizaries, and thousands of Serbian peasants ready to follow them to the death. The noblest aspect of the Serbian revolt is its universality. There was no hanging back and no treachery, yet there was no pay for those who fought, and every man who joined the ranks joined for love. It was a true peasant uprising, a people in arms for liberty. Perhaps the liberty these men sought led them to cruelty in war and to lawlessness in peace, but this wild freedom was something for which all of them were ready to die. Among wild races a great man always has immeasurable influence, yet the true hero of the revolution is not Kara George, but the individual Serbian peasant. For Kara George is only the greatest, because the most typical, of these fierce sons of freedom.

It has often been remarked that revolution occurs not among the peoples which are most oppressed, but amongst those which are most conscious of their oppression. So it was with the Serbians, who enjoyed privileges under the Turks such as Bulgaria and Macedonia never had. Historic memories of past greatness and consciousness of present strength enabled them to resent and to punish injuries which the Bulgars had to suffer in silence. The very mildness of the Turkish official rule inflamed the Serbians to madness against the tyrant janizaries, who showed equal contempt for the pasha, the spahi, and the rayah. In 1788 a miracle from heaven occurred in Turkey: the new

Sultan was a reformer and an enlightened despot. The path of a reformer in the West is beset with thorns, in the East it is strewn with fire. In the West reforms are generally political, in the East they are always religious. As the institutions are based on the Koran, and as the sanctions of all laws are religious, the Turks must cease to be religious if they consent to be reformed. Hence a change in religion must precede a change in the State, and this fact makes it doubtful whether the reform of a theocracy like the Turkish is not a species of suicide. There can be no doubt that in Serbia the reforms of the well-intentioned Selim only succeeded in making it easier for the Christians to cast off his yoke. Yet, from the Western point of view, his policy was eminently sound. The Austro-Russian War ending in 1792 had revealed to him the weakness of the Turkish arms. He wished to reform and reorganise the army on French lines, so that it could face a European force of equal numbers. He wished also to ensure good government to his Christian subjects and thus to cultivate their loyalty. To both of these aims the janizaries were opposed. They had ceased to be efficient in the army, though they wished to control all military policy. They had never formed part of the civil government, but they wished to depose pashas, to dispossess spahis, to plunder rayahs, and to become landowners in their own right. They were more turbulent and troublesome along the Serbian borders than elsewhere, and Selim's deliberate intention seems to have been to crush them. With this view he sought to infuse energy into the local pashas, and encouraged the Christian rayahs to support them by the grant of privilege and protection.

In the years 1793-94 the Sultan granted Serbia a great deal of local autonomy, in accordance with pledges in the Peace of Sistova. The Serbians made good use of their advantages, and in particular of the privilege of

bearing arms and of conducting a lucrative pig trade with Austria. The new Pasha of Belgrade had the chief janizary assassinated, and expelled all the rest of the janizaries from the pashalik of Belgrade.¹ He put down robbery with a stern hand, restored the spahis to their holdings, and took care to consult the Serbian chief knezes in any measures he proposed to take with regard to the Christians. His policy was carried on by his successor Mustapha Pasha, and this period of Turkish rule was probably the mildest and most beneficent that the Serbians had ever experienced, as is shown by the fact that Mustapha Pasha was called the "mother" of the Serbians. But the janizaries were not yet done with. They had retired over the Bulgarian border vowing vengeance, and found refuge with Pasvan-Oglu, Pasha of Widdin. Secure in an almost impregnable fortress, Pasvan-Oglu welcomed the janizaries.² Like them he hated the Sultan and his reforming ways, and at last openly defied him, and revolted. Pasvan-Oglu defeated the Sultan's armies, and remained independent. He also began to threaten the borders of the Belgrade pashalik. Mustapha Pasha acted with great boldness, called out the Serbian rayahs and allowed them to enrol themselves in voluntary corps officered by their own leaders, on the model of the corps which had fought for the Austrian Joseph. Mustapha owed more to their aid than to his own soldiers, and Pasvan-Oglu and the janizaries were defeated by the bravery and efficiency of the Serbians (1798). Then it was that the conservative prejudices of the Turk asserted themselves. Even the Sultan was shocked at the boldness of Mustapha Pasha. Pasvan-Oglu was a rebel, but how had he been defeated? By

¹ Part of modern Serbia was included in the pashalik of Nish, part in that of Bosnia, part in that of Novibazar, and part in that of Leskovatz.

² The janizaries were accompanied by their attendants — bands of mixed Christian and Turkish mercenaries known as Kerdjalias.

the arms of Christians who had stood up as free men and cut off the heads of Mussulmans, with the approval of a pasha.¹ This scandal must be stopped at any cost in the future. Accordingly, Mustapha was ordered to permit the janizaries to return into his pashalik, apparently on the assumption that they would at once become his loyal subjects, and stop their former protector Pasvan-Oglu from making any further raids ! In fact, the return of these cowardly oppressors produced the death of an able and successful governor, and the revolt of a contented people.

Mustapha Pasha, though unable to prevent the return of the janizaries in 1799, did his best to restrict their power. He did not restore their land, but gave them Court appointments and kept them under observation. Then in 1800 he was ordered by the Sultan to proceed against Pasvan-Oglu and subdue him. Once again Mustapha Pasha, who knew he could not rely on the janizaries, summoned Serbian auxiliaries to his banner, and once again he defeated the army of Pasvan-Oglu. Meanwhile a Serbian had been unjustifiably shot at Shabatz by a janizary. Mustapha with impartial justice sent a body of troops to arrest the murderer, which besieged him and then drove him over the Bosnian border. This refusal to condone their crimes united all the janizaries against the just pasha who threatened to deprive them of their free-born right to murder. While the army was absent on the frontier, the janizaries attacked Mustapha at Belgrade, and by a treacherous stratagem succeeded in recalling and dispersing the army, and in slaying Mustapha himself. Thus fell the best pasha who had ever ruled in Serbia. The finest tribute to his memory is the

¹ It did not apparently occur to the Sultan and his advisers that many of the kerdjalias who fought for Pasvan-Oglu were also Christians ! But the Turk is nothing if consistent.

kindness at first shown by the Serbian revolutionaries to all Turks who were not janizaries.

After the murder of Mustapha the four chiefs of the janizaries assumed the title of Dahi, and instituted a reign of terror. They asked the Sultan for a pasha, but treated the new arrival as a puppet. Wild Albanians and Bosnians flocked to Belgrade, drawn by the hope of plundering the Christians. A number of agents were sent round the towns and villages, who enforced the janizaries' commands against all comers. Neither Turkish kadis nor Serbian knezes dared to interfere with these illegal agents. No man, no woman, and no property was safe against the violence of the Dahis. The spahis, who were as cruelly oppressed as the Christians, attempted resistance; but their plan was discovered, and they were exiled or murdered. The janizaries soon turned their attention to the Christians. The helpless Sultan threatened the janizaries with vengeance, but his interference only increased their sufferings. Selim told the janizaries that he would send against them an army, but an army not of the faithful. In other words, he proposed to raise an army of rayahs against them—the very measure which he had censured Mustapha for taking! The janizaries resolved that at any rate an army of Serbian rayahs should not come against them. The Dahis decided to destroy the Ober-Knezes of the districts. Ten of the most eminent were speedily butchered, along with several famous ecclesiastics. Pillage and robbery were everywhere already, and the horrors and the butchery were growing. Where would these Dahis stop? We are not in the secret of their dark and bloody designs, but there is no doubt that the Serbians began to fear a general massacre.¹ It was

¹ Novakovitch (*Die Wiedergeburt des Serbischen Staates* (1804-13), *Sarajevo*, 1912, p. 15 *et seq.*) believes in the theory of a general massacre and quotes fairly good authorities for it.

dangerous to injure a peasantry proud of their past, flushed with recent military success, and fully armed. The result was inevitable, and the revolt began under Kara George in 1804.

Kara George was one of those great, rough, simple men who in happier days might have spent his life in rustic quiet. But for the rough times and the ruder tyranny of his age, Hofer might have remained at his inn and Cromwell on his farm. Kara George was called from the homely occupation of pig-dealing to head a revolution of a more savage type. His force of character had already marked him out among his fellows, and was illustrated by those striking incidents which abound in Serbian history.

In the war of 1787 he resolved to cross over the Save and join the Austrians, and carried his family with him in true patriarchal fashion. When they reached the river, his old father's courage failed him, and he besought Kara George to return. Kara George refused, and his father then declined to go farther. "How, shall I live to see thee slowly tortured to death by the Turks?" said Kara George. "Better that I should kill thee myself on the spot."¹ Snatching up a pistol, he suited the action to the word and shot his father. Bidding a comrade put the old man out of his pain, and leaving a reward to some neighbouring villagers for burying the body, the murderer went slowly on his way. The act was almost symbolical : it showed that he preferred death to slavery either for himself or for his dependants. He came back to his own territory, a sergeant in a volunteer corps of Austrian Serbians, noted both for his bravery and his impatience of control. Subsequently

¹ *Vide* Ranke, *Servia* (1853), Eng. trans., p. 129. The story is variously told, and has been denied, but on no very convincing grounds. The extraordinary love of the Serbian for the homeland, a marked characteristic of the race, is illustrated by the father's murder.

he left the corps and fought in the mountains as a heyduke, again returned to the corps, and retired into Austrian territory when peace was proclaimed. Then the mild rule of Mustapha Pasha tempted him to return to his native land, where he settled down as a dealer in pigs, and lived peacefully until the revolution summoned him to its head.

“I come from that heroic people who preferred bitter death to comfortable and shameful slavery. My grandfather (Kara George) was a peasant, and I am prouder of that than of my throne. Crowns are lost, but the pure clean blood of those who have lived of the earth does not die.” This reported saying of the present King Peter is profoundly true of his famous ancestor. Kara George had the defects and the merits of a peasant, both raised to white heat. He had the simplicity of the true peasant, and his thrifty avarice. At the height of his fame he wore his peasant’s dress and plain black cap, whilst his followers glittered in silk and gold trappings. He hoarded his gold with thriftiness, and treasured it with greed. He laboured with his own hands in the fields, and his early adventures do not seem to have given him a distaste for a peaceful trading in pigs. He was sometimes moody and silent for hours, occasionally he broke into violence, sometimes he even slew his opponent; then he would weep and bemoan his impetuous nature. Yet though taciturn and gloomy he was not inhuman, and sometimes he grew merry with his neighbours over wine or led the dance at a festival. There was generosity, too, in his disposition, and no vindictiveness. Unlettered and rude in his manners he was yet of a sound judgment, and understood the importance of regularity in civil administration. Diebitsch, who saw him in 1810–11, and whose military talents entitled him to judge, said of him :
‘His countenance shows a greatness of mind which is

not to be mistaken—he has a mind of a masculine and commanding order. The imputation of cruelty and bloodthirstiness appears to be unjust. When the country was without the shadow of a Constitution he was compelled to be severe. He dared not vacillate or relax his discipline.” “As a soldier there is but one opinion of his talents, bravery and enduring firmness.” It was indeed as a warrior that his peculiar gifts led him to excel. Gigantic in stature, with long black hair and deep-set glittering eyes, he was the very type of a barbaric chief. His cheek had been scarred, his right hand disabled by wounds, yet he fought with his left hand and preferred to fight in the foremost ranks on foot. His individual presence on the battlefield had an indescribable effect in invigorating his own men and in dismaying the Turks. His efforts as a strategist are even more striking than his personal exertions in battle. The manner in which he controlled the divided and scattered commandos, the boldness with which he held back one Turkish army with a handful of men, whilst he concentrated his forces to defeat another, the speed and energy with which he brought up reinforcements at the critical moment, were all achievements of a high order. He had as much difficulty with his scattered units as Prince Charlie with his Highland clans, yet he achieved a more permanent success with an authority which was personal and not hereditary. The real source of his power lay indeed in the strength of his character and in his imaginative insight into the minds of his fellow-peasants. He knew when to terrify, when to exhort, when to strike. Some of his cruelties were probably calculated, as when he executed two of his followers for plundering, and exposed their severed limbs on the gates of Belgrade. Others were involuntary, as when he fired at a chieftain for abandoning a position or slew his own father. Yet, whether designed

or unconscious, his gestures, his actions, and his whole existence combined to impress and awe his contemporaries. For his was one of those wild elemental natures, so often found among the savage peasants of the Balkans, cruel yet heroic, wild and yet generous! He was like one of their great limestone crags, forbidding, savage and sublime.

The risings of the Serbian rayahs were at first confined to the pashalik of Belgrade, and covered three main areas—the northern part of modern Serbia east of the Morava, the Shumadya, that is the region between the Morava and the Kolubara (with Kragujevatz as its centre), and the western region between the Rudnik Mountains and the Bosnian Drina. The first conspiracy and uprising took place in the Shumadya. Kara George was on his way to the Austrian market with his herdsmen and his pigs, when he learnt that the janizaries were sending men to arrest him. Leaving his pigs, he fled into the forest with his herdsmen and began conspiring with other leaders of the Shumadya. All resolved to die fighting in battle rather than to await death in their homes. In a moment the whole countryside was in revolt, and the Turks were penned within their fortresses or massacred in the surrounding villages. Kara George was speedily elected Supreme Chief of the Shumadya. The tale of his reluctance is well known, probably true, and certainly characteristic.¹ At first he refused the office altogether, then he told his followers that if he accepted his rule would be stern. “If one of you were taken in the smallest treachery, the least faltering, I would kill him, hang him, punish him in the most fearful manner!” His hearers said they deserved to die for such crimes, swore to go through

¹ The story is given on the authority of an eye-witness, but in Serbia legends easily arise and eye-witnesses are often credulous. *Vide* Lazar Hrbelianovitch, ii. 629–30. Kara George means Black George.

fire and water for him, and held up their hands to prove it. "Do you want that?" asked he thrice; and thrice came the reply, "We do." "Then," thundered Black George, "I too want you!" He was then consecrated for his task by a priest in the presence of several chiefs and some five hundred followers. The real reason of the choice of Kara George lay partly in his own extraordinary character, which was already renowned, partly in the fact that he represented three aspects of Serbian life. The knezes of village and nahie wished to revolt, but, being civilians, feared the wild heydukes from the mountains, whose aid they wished to have. As a pig-dealer Kara George understood civilians, and could conciliate them; as an old brigand he appealed to heydukes and could keep them in check. Finally he had, what the heydukes had not, experience of the regular operations of war. It was specially important that Kara George was in command of the Shumadya, for that district was not only central but fertile and wealthy. Kara George at first called himself only Commandant Serbiae, and was more than once reminded that his authority stopped at the Kolubara. But his supremacy was formed not only by his own superiority of character but by circumstances. He controlled more wealth, provided more arms, and possessed more cannon than any other revolutionary leader. Finally his signal victories gained for him the title of Supreme Leader.

The Serbian revolt had the characteristic of unity in aim and diversity in method. Chiefs of heydukes, village knezes, and warlike priests pursued their own local objects, yet at each moment critical for the national interest they were compelled to sink their differences by the arrival of Kara George. The chiefs were very numerous; they called themselves Voivodes (generals) and were each of them surrounded by a bodyguard of devoted followers (Momkes), numbering fifty to a

hundred men, who rode horses and acted as cavalry. Of these voivodes the most famous in the Shumadya were Kara George himself and Katitsch ; on the east of the Morava was Milenko, on the west of the Kolubara in the heyduke districts Kiurtschia, a famous marksman, and Jacob Nenadovitch, sworn to avenge the death of his brother Alexa. The three districts rose almost simultaneously, and drove the janizaries behind their fortress walls. The Bosnian Pasha sent troops to relieve them, but these were stopped on the frontier, and the Turks learnt with astonishment that the Serbians were well armed and understood the art of taking cover. The news was true, and it came as an unwelcome surprise. It was not the first time that the enemy was to learn the natural military gifts of the Serbian. The Serbian peasant was one of the hardiest of men, enduring, seasoned to all weathers, patient and fearless. The leaders of the heydukes excelled in the skirmish, the old volunteer corps were equal to more regular operations, and the Monikes were good light horse. The chieftains made much use of entrenchments for defence and for siege work. Finally, Kara George managed to use his position as a commander-in-chief in such a way as to co-operate with his numerous and irregular lieutenants.

The Serbians now proceeded to the regular operations of siege. Nenadovitch invested Shabatz, and the army of the Shumadya advanced on Belgrade. Shabatz, terrified by a cannon which Nenadovitch brought, surrendered, and Kara George himself brought the gun and all the men that could be spared to reinforce Milenko east of the Morava. Posharevatz fell, and the allied chiefs now concentrated in front of Belgrade. There Kara George punished one of the followers of Kiurtschia, and that famous brigand-chief withdrew his forces in a rage, subsequently to be murdered by Nenadovitch. The Serbian chiefs were now surprised to hear of the arrival

of the Pasha of Bosnia with proposals of mediation. It appears that he was acting under secret instructions from the Grand Vizier, who was quite ready to get rid of the janizaries and to lull the Serbian rayahs into a state of false security by doing so. The arrival of Pasha Bekir produced immediate results. Gushancz Ali, the mercenary commander of Belgrade, began to waver in his support of the janizaries, and the Dahis fled by water down the Danube to New Orsova (on the present boundary between Hungary and Roumania). Thereupon the mercenary chief flung open the gates, and the pasha entered Belgrade in triumph. For the Dahis a terrible fate was reserved, as the pasha had declared them enemies of the Grand Signior. One day Milenko and some of his men, who had been absent several days, arrived in the Serbian camp before Belgrade, and flung four bloody heads at the feet of Kara George. They were those of the four Dahis who had been murdered at New Orsova by Milenko. Pasha Bekir now informed the Serbians that all that was needed had been done, and ordered them to return to their peaceful pursuits. But his own situation was precarious, and it was beyond his power to enforce their return. Gushancz Ali still held the citadel of Belgrade, and the Serbian chiefs were encamped outside the town.

There is no evidence that the Serbians began the insurrection with an ultimate idea of independence. But they could not be expected to accept Bekir's terms. The Dahis were only the chiefs of the janizaries, numbers of their followers still garrisoned strong fortresses and held certain districts in terror. The Serbians had to secure guarantees for the future, while they still held arms in their hands. Moreover, the rough and turbulent chiefs, who had tasted plunder, were resolved not to submit to the domination of the Turk. It was therefore decided to apply to a great Power for support. There can be no doubt that Austria

was seriously considered, and it is possible that approaches were actually made. Kara George himself always had a regard for Austria. But the power of Russia had greatly increased, and she had recently gained a great influence in Moldavia and Wallachia (the modern Roumania), whose lot she had greatly ameliorated in 1802. It was finally decided to send a mission to Russia, which returned in February 1805 with a promise of Russian support to any petitions laid before the Sultan.¹ A deputation set off to Constantinople to present the Serbian case. Negotiations went on during 1805 hand in hand with a siege of the southern fortresses, of which Udshitze fell before Nenadovitch, who, like all the other Serbian chieftains, still declared that he was acting in the name of the Sultan. Eventually Sultan Selim repudiated the Serbian claims, arrested their deputies, and ordered the whole country to submit. Open hostilities broke out in the autumn of 1805. The plan of defence adopted by Kara George was the only possible one. He trusted to the local chiefs to repel the enemy on the advanced borders, and kept a strong reserve well in hand in the centre of the Shumadya under his own personal command. Thus he was able to reinforce any threatened point and at the same time to retain a general control of operations.

The chief danger in 1805 was from the Turkish army advancing from Nish along the Morava road, which so many great armies had tramped. At the village of Ivanovatz, near Tchupria, on the border of the pashalik of Belgrade, a Serbian force of under three thousand men well entrenched actually repulsed a Turkish army of ten times its number. The pasha in command then retired some miles backward to Paratchyn. But the arrival of Kara George with guns and reinforcements compelled

¹ For the missions to Russia and Constantinople *vide* Novakovitch, *Wiedergeburt des Serbischen Staates*, 28-50.

him to fall back to Nish, where he died of wounds. Ivanovatz was not a defeat, but it was a decisive check for the Turks. It was to the Serbian Commonwealth what Valmy was to the French Republic. It showed that the sons of liberty could stand at bay and repulse a great regular army. Moreover, it proved decisively that the Sultan's writ no longer ran in the pashalik of Belgrade.

In 1805 the Serbians had done well, but in 1806 Kara George earned undying fame. It was known that the Turkish forces would advance from all sides, but the Serbians had the interior lines. Milenko defended the Danube on the east, Nenadovitch faced the Bosnian army in the west, while near Paratchyn a Serbian force contained the main Turkish army which was to march up the valley of the Morava on to Belgrade. In August, Kara George went to the relief of his hard pressed western front, and arrived just in time. He flung up an entrenchment near Shabatz and there awaited the Bosnian attack. The Turks had demanded an immediate surrender of arms by the Serbians. "Come and take them!" answered Kara George. Two bloody assaults on successive days failed to carry the position, but on the third day the superior numbers of the Turks made them confident of success. The operations of the third day showed that Kara George could both discipline his infantry and manœuvre with his cavalry. He concealed his cavalry in a neighbouring wood, strictly enjoining them to attack only when they heard firing from the Serbian entrenchments. The Turkish soldiers pressed on until they had almost reached the parapets of the trenches. Then, at Kara George's signal, volleys rolled out and hit "all together in the flesh." Hearing the sound, the Serbian cavalry charged suddenly on the flanks, while the infantry clambering out of the trenches attacked the already shaken ranks. Pressed on all sides by fire and sword, the Turks gave way in utter rout, their bravest leaders

fell dead on the field, and their army disappeared as a field force. Many of those that left the battlefield were hunted down and shot in the forests by swarms of angry peasants. The disaster was colossal, though the Serbian forces had been outnumbered in the proportion of three to one.

This was not the only victory, for the Pasha advancing from Nish was so impressed by the defeat of the Bosnian army that he began to negotiate. The terms offered were extremely favourable, and included local autonomy, expulsion of the spahis, evacuation of fortresses, and reduction of tribute. Though the negotiations came to naught, the terms have been the basis of every subsequent treaty. At the last moment the Sultan suddenly raised his terms and broke off the negotiation. It is difficult to penetrate the secrets of Turkish diplomacy, but the probable supposition is that the pressure of Napoleon on Russia in the autumn of 1806 removed any fear the Turk had of co-operation between Serbians and Russians. The failure of the negotiation was disastrous for the Turks still beleaguered in their fortresses. Belgrade and Shabatz fell, and by June 1807 Ushitze, the last fortress of note in North Serbia, surrendered.¹ These successes were disgraced by horrible and bloody massacres, sometimes in violation of the terms of surrender. It is to the credit of Kara George that he made some effort to restrain these excesses. The Serbian triumph was completed by actual co-operation with Russia. In the middle of 1807 some Russian troops arrived and supported the Serbians. Good fellowship was the result, and it was increased by Russian aid lent to Montenegro. Moreover, Napoleon made an agreement with Russia in 1807, and the French abandoned

¹ The fortresses or their citadels were still garrisoned by Turks, though the more violent partisans of the janizaries had usually been expelled.

their support of the Turk. Selim managed to repulse a British naval attack on Constantinople in 1807, but was himself deposed in the same year. All was chaos at Constantinople in 1808. Most of modern Roumania was occupied by Russia, and Selim's puppet successor was deposed in favour of Mahmud II. Two Sultans overturned in two years, two great provinces in hostile hands, Greece on the brink of revolt, were events which threatened extinction to Turkey. But the marvellous vitality of the Turkish Empire was soon to reassert itself, and Mahmud II., the greatest sovereign since the days of Suleiman, was to prove the only successful reformer that modern Turkey has known.

The Serbian successes had been too great to be permanent. No army can continue to defeat forces three or four times its own size, when the enemy is approximately equal in bravery and equipment. The amazing triumphs had been due not only to the skill of the leaders and the bravery of the men, but also to the Turkish contempt for the rayah, to the anarchy at Constantinople, and to the independence of the pashas. These blows to Mussulman pride, the intervention of Russia, the danger to the very existence of the Ottomans, had thoroughly roused both pashas and Sultan. The Pashas of Widdin and of Bosnia had each an army fully equal in numbers to the Serbian. The janizaries indeed still remained to depose Sultans and to injure efficiency ; but Mahmud had reorganised some of his forces with the aid of French officers and had armed them with French guns. Yet during 1808 the Serbians still had successes, and the revolt extended far into Bosnia.

In 1809, Kara George tried to execute a still bolder design, to penetrate through the districts of Novibazar and Prisrend and join hands with the free Serbian brethren of Montenegro. The project was actually

accomplished, but only by a mixture of daring and good fortune, which proved the real slenderness of Serbian resources. At the moment of success Kara George was recalled by terrible news from the Morava. One division of the Serbian army had advanced against Nish, and entrenched themselves on heights north of the town. The Grand Vizier moved up against them with a gigantic army, said to number eighty thousand. On 19th May 1809, after a pitched battle lasting for several days, the Serbians retreated, leaving four thousand of their dead lying among fifteen thousand Turks. Peter Sindjelitch, who held the key of the position, blew up the powder magazine. The few Serbian survivors and the many Turkish stormers

“died together,
Whirled aloft on wings of flame.”

This heroic exploit gave Peter Sindjelitch a name in song, like to that of Kiurtschia and Kara George, though his was a purer fame. Seventy years afterwards the Serbian troops entered Nish to find a Turkish tower garnished with the skulls of the Serbians who had died in this great fight. A chapel hard by now contains the skulls, and a modern powder magazine marks, appropriately enough, the scene of the heroic deed of Peter Sindjelitch.

Kara George arrived with reinforcements, but was unable to do more than assist the retreat of his forces up the Morava, until a diversion most fortunate for the Serbians took place. The Russian armies were at last moving in force over the Danube, and the Grand Vizier turned off to meet them, leaving a relatively small army in front of Nish. The Serbians again advanced, and drove back the Turks upon Nish. The situation eventually remained much as it had been in the beginning of the year. This was the first occasion on which Russian

intervention saved the army, and perhaps the existence, of Serbia. Two other occasions may perhaps be noted, in 1878 and in 1914.

The year 1809 was likewise ever memorable to the Jugo-Slavs owing to Napoleon's victory over Austria at Wagram. The resultant peace gave to Napoleon parts of Croatia and Dalmatia, which were organised under the name "the Illyrian Provinces." A very few years of enlightened administration by the French apostle of reason and light made more impression on these regions than centuries of other rule had produced. Feudalism was destroyed, equality before the law proclaimed, schools built and education encouraged, and great buildings and roads projected or executed. So striking was the material improvement that the Austrian Emperor Francis II. on visiting these districts after the fall of Napoleon, naïvely exclaimed, "Really a pity they didn't stay longer!" Napoleon, like the titanic innovator he was, left an impress which has never been forgotten. The first realisation of Southern Slav unity was really achieved in this year, and by methods characteristic of the countries concerned. Croatia and Dalmatia were united in a civilised and progressive government, Serbia and Montenegro joined hands in an armed alliance. The two great sponsors of Jugo-Slav development assisted in these movements, France to whose civilisation and Russia to whose army the Southern Slavs have owed so much.

The new year opened darkly for Kara George. He was blamed for the defeat before Nish, and sorely harassed by the opposition party. Yet the campaign of 1810 included a Turkish defeat on the Bosnian frontier, and another one in front of Nish. Though Khurshid Pasha, the new Turkish commander in front of Nish, was defeated, he had demonstrated the right method of dealing with the Serbians. He had proceeded to invest their

entrenchments, but had not attempted to storm them. His superiority of numbers enabled him to ravage the countryside, as well as to mask the field fortresses. This method was peculiarly deadly, because parts of an irregular force will always dissolve and melt away if they are at a distance when their own locality is attacked. Later years were to show that this method of warfare, if consistently pursued, would be effective.

During the next years the fighting was desultory, and Khurshid Pasha amused and deluded the Serbians with an offer of honourable peace. Kara George declined to make peace without the Russians. His refusal was of material assistance to them, for the Turks would have greatly benefited by a separate peace with Serbia; his loyalty to Russia met with little reward. Threatened by Napoleon's invasion, the Russians hastily made peace with the Turks in May 1812. The Peace of Bucharest contained provisions in favour of the Serbians, stipulating for autonomy and for reasonable tribute. These provisions were actually open to misinterpretation, and the Turks took full advantage of the fact.¹ In truth, the real difficulty of dealing with the Turk has always been his infinite subtlety in interpreting and his inexhaustible talent for evading the written obligation. The Turks quickly broke the peace because of the battle won at Lützen over the Allies by Napoleon in the spring of 1813. This victory, in Turkish eyes, redeemed the colossal failure of his great Russian campaign. While Russia was still occupied it was time to finish off the rebellious Serbian rayahs.

For the year 1813 the traditional strategy was employed by both parties. The Turks planned a

¹ The critical phrase was that in which the Serbians were promised the "same advantages as those enjoyed by the islanders of the Archipelago"; the advantages in different islands varied both in kind and in degree.

simultaneous attack from the Drina, from Widdin, and from Nish: Kara George as usual placed his local levies on the frontiers, and himself commanded the reserves concentrated in the Shumadya. The Serbians at the beginning of the year occupied nearly the boundaries of Serbia as it was before 1878. They numbered about fifty thousand on all fronts, whilst the Turkish main army from Nish alone was double that number. It is doubtful if the boldest leader could have prevented the conquest of Serbia, but it is melancholy to record that the efforts of Kara George were unworthy of the occasion and of his fame. After the first engagements, which went disastrously for the Serbians, Kara George brought up his reinforcements in support of the army which was opposing Khurshid Pasha's advance from Nish. Then suddenly he lost heart, fell back on Belgrade, leaving his comrades without warning or explanation. He hovered mysteriously about from place to place, appeared once more on the Morava, and finally in October fled over the Danube into Hungary with a few followers, leaving his countrymen to their fate. It was a sad end to a great career. The conduct of Kara George at this crisis is one of the numerous unsolved mysteries in his own life and in modern Serbian history. Some have insinuated that it was his desire to secure his buried gold and transport it unscathed to Hungary. So singular an explanation is not impossible for one who combined the coarseness of a peasant with the ability of a soldier and a chief. Yet perhaps a simpler cause was the despair of a gloomy, imaginative nature, the decay of a strong will broken and agonised by suffering. This failure of nerve, this almost womanly terror was shown by Frederic once and by Napoleon twice at important crises of their career. Such collapse is perhaps not astonishing in a man of action rendered desperate by overwhelming responsibility or by

disaster. It is one to which simple natures are specially prone, and the last hesitations of Hofer in the Tyrolese war of Liberation bear a singular parallel to those of Kara George.

One mystery leads to another, and the subsequent career of Black George was equally strange. He returned to Serbia in 1817, hoping to regain his influence and to enlarge the Serbian borders by concerting a league with the insurrectionists of Greece. Milosh Obrenovitch, who was then ruler of Serbia, feared his great rival, possibly contrived, and certainly rejoiced at, his death. The tragedy was of the dreadful Æschylean type, for Kara George is said to have murdered the half-brother of Milosh. For a century the ghastly struggle was continued by the partisans of both houses, until the last living Obrenovitch was assassinated in our own day. "*Le combat est fini, faute de combattants !*" This terrible blood-feud did much evil to Serbia, and proved the strongest ally of her enemies. Sultan Mahmud must have rejoiced when he gazed on the severed bloody head of the man who had defeated so many Turkish armies. His pleasure would not have been the less had he known that the first Liberator of Serbia died by the order of her first Prince.

(2) THE SECOND SERBIAN INSURRECTION (1813-15)—
MILOSH OBRENOVITCH AND THE SECOND REVOLT

Near the village church of Takovo in Serbia stands a large and now partly withered oak tree ; beneath it is a large flat stone. This is holy ground, for on this stone Milosh Obrenovitch stood when he set up his standard for the final revolt of the Serbians. That oak is a veritable tree of liberty, just as is that withered elm near Boston beneath which Washington took command

of the army of the United States. No one indeed could compare the champions of Serbian and American independence, but it is also well to remember that no one could compare the supremacy of George with the tyranny of Mahmud.

It is recorded of the Abbé Sieyès that, when someone scornfully asked him what he had done for France during the reign of terror, he replied calmly, "J'ai vécu." Milosh Obrenovitch might have said even more, for he preserved not only life but office during the reign of terror which now opened in Serbia. Most of the leaders, including Jacob Nenadovitch, followed Kara George into exile in Hungary. Milosh with calm courage resolved to await events in his own home. "What will my life profit me in Austria," said he, in reply to the entreaties of Jacob Nenadovitch, "while in the meantime the enemy will sell into slavery my wife and child and my aged mother? No, the fate of my fellow-countrymen, whatever it may be, shall be mine also." Milosh had not previously been one of the most important of the leaders, perhaps because of his hatred of Kara George, whom he believed to have poisoned his half-brother. His courage in remaining, his enmity to Kara George, and his local experience impressed Suleiman, the Pasha of Belgrade, who had been wounded by him of old on the battlefield. He decided to use Milosh as an instrument to get the Serbians to submit, and he made him Grand Knez of three whole districts (*nahies*), Rudnik, Posdieja, and Kragujevatz. Thus a Serbian became Governor of practically the whole of the Shumadya, which had been the core of the Serbian resistance in the previous insurrection. Pasha Suleiman was proud of his new conquest, and when he came to Belgrade, extended his wounded hand and said, "There, my adopted son, hast thou bitten me." "Now," answered Milosh, "I will also gild this hand." Whether he had

any intention of keeping his promise at the moment cannot be known.

Many Serbians have derived from their intercourse with the Turks that inscrutable character which makes all Eastern politics so difficult to understand. Kara George was a much simpler character than his successor, for Milosh was an adept at hiding his feelings, and was shrewd, wary, and adroit. He was a crafty and astute diplomatist, who excelled in playing one party or person off against another. It may well have been that he was playing a double game on this occasion, but there is not enough evidence to prove it. Possibly he was guided by circumstances, and sought at first for autonomy under the Ottoman sway, and only revolted when convinced of its impossibility. It is at least certain that he used every effort to persuade the Serbians to lay down their arms. The cause was indeed hopeless by the winter of 1813: all the strong fortresses had fallen, and the armed forces of insurrection were disbanded or insignificant. Defeat was bad enough, and submission might possibly avert further evils.

Probably neither Milosh nor anyone else expected that the restoration of order by the Turks would be a humane process. Surrendered fortresses or armed captives expected severe punishment, for the Serbians had themselves committed atrocities when victorious. But on this occasion the Turks seem to have surpassed even their own records of ferocity. We hear not only of the usual massacres of prisoners and impalings of leaders, but of babies flung into boiling water in mockery of baptism, and of men roasted on spits, and of further tortures which exercise ingenuity and forbid description. Massacres cannot continue for ever, but it soon became evident that there would be no reasonable limit to systematic and continual oppression. The return of dispossessed landowners and expatriated subjects is never

a very easy process to arrange with impartiality. In this case the spahis and other Turks, who had previously inhabited Serbia, frequently claimed land and wealth which they had never possessed, and found all their claims allowed. A systematic policy of terrorisation was adopted by planting garrisons of janizaries and Albanians not only in the fortresses but often in remote country districts. Sometimes in accordance with the whims of the rural tyrant, sometimes owing to orders from Belgrade, the chief notables in each locality were sought out, plundered, tortured, and executed. Taxation was fixed at a very high level, and house-to-house visitations took place for the purpose of collecting the taxes and of disarming the population. Neither object was effected without terrorisation, plunder, and violence.

The first rising of any kind which took place was in the Rudnik, in Milosh's own district. Milosh hurried with some armed men to Kragujevatz, dispersed some of the rebels, and induced the rest to submit on a promise from Pasha Suleiman that their lives should be spared. Subsequently this promise, more than once repeated, was broken. One hundred and fifty rebels were beheaded and nearly forty ringleaders impaled. Milosh, whose lenity had rendered him a suspect, was ordered to Belgrade and there kept in honourable captivity. He succeeded by a heavy bribe in obtaining a release, and returned to his own district. His treatment had been such as to convince him that it was folly to trust a Turk, and that his only safety lay in revolt. The reign of terror had begun again with fresh fury, and the Serbians were convinced, as in the days of the Dahis, that a general massacre was being planned. If it was so, it was better to die while some of them still had arms in their hands. This was the conclusion to which many had already come, but it was only after long hesitation that Milosh decided to give the signal.

It was on Palm Sunday 1815 that the decision was taken. Service had been held in the church of Takovo, and crowds loitered round Milosh when it was over, forming one of those rude Sabors (or Assemblies) characteristic among Serbians. After some hesitation Milosh stood on the stone beneath the oak and spoke. His words at first were few and disheartening, but the crowd overbore his objections: "We are ready for anything. Dost thou not see we perish as it is?" Then his eyes grew very bright and he spoke: "Here am I, there stand you, so be it! War to the Turks! With us is God and His Right."¹ Irrevocable decisions had been taken elsewhere already, and the Sabor at Takovo was not the only meeting of irreconcilables. But though revolt had already broken out in several places, the decision of Milosh produced a profound impression, for he was the greatest Christian official in Serbia. If his was the greatest glory in the end, his also was the largest responsibility in the beginning.

The military situation seemed almost desperate from the beginning, for the Ottoman forces then in Serbia were speedily concentrated. A Turkish army of about 10,000 men advanced along the Western Morava deep into the Rudnik and finally pitched their camp at Tchatchak on the right bank of the river, now a railway junction for three lines. Milosh advanced and took up a position to watch it, entrenching himself on the left river bank at Ljubitsch opposite the Turkish camp. Leaving the bulk of his forces behind in this entrenchment, Milosh suddenly marched northward to Palesh, a small town in the angle formed where the

¹ A picturesque description of the whole incident by an eye-witness is quoted in Lazar Hrbeljanovitch, *Servian People*, ii, 666-7. There is evidence to show that Milosh had committed himself elsewhere before the Palm Sunday, and his apparent hesitation was perhaps a ruse to ascertain the feelings of the Sabor at Takovo.

Kolubara flows into the Save. There a number of spahis had been entrenching themselves with a view to intimidating the surrounding district. They fled on the news of the advance of Milosh, but were pursued by him and almost annihilated. The success, in the military sense trifling, was in the political sense decisive. In all revolutions there is a moment of agonising anxiety at the beginning, when the bolder spirits doubt and the timid despair. At such moments even a small success gives an electric shock to public feeling. Milosh gained materially by his victory, for he captured a gun ; morally his advantage was to sweep away all doubt and hesitation, and to bring the laggards and the waverers hot-foot to his banner.

The town of Palesh was well placed for his success, because it was near to the Danube. The Hungarian Serbs over the water heard of the victory, and the Serbian exiles hastened to return with arms, money, and ammunition. From over the Danube old heydukes, old knezes, and men with kindred to avenge, flocked to Milosh's standard. The whole of the Serbian district west of the Kolubara rose in revolt. The decisive character of this stroke is marked by the fact that the town of Palesh has since been renamed Obrenovatz, in honour of this military success of Obrenovitch. He returned in triumph, carrying with him two guns, one captured and one imported from Hungary, and bringing many veterans of Kara George in his train.

At Ljubitsch he found the Turks preparing to attack. Within a few days they advanced to the assault, and carried some of the foremost trenches. But their losses were heavy, and for some inexplicable reason the Turkish commander suddenly withdrew his army and retreated in the direction of Nish. Milosh pursued him, inflicting heavy losses, and, what was more important, capturing his artillery and ammunition column. Kragujevatz

surrendered on the news of this defeat, and thus the whole of the Shumadya, together with most of the Valjevo district to the west, fell to the hands of the Serbians. Milosh gave the enemy no rest, and pressed hastily on to their great fortress at Posharevatz. There he attacked their entrenchments, and, after heavy losses, finally broke the lines and captured the town. Then turning suddenly round to the west Milosh met the advance-guard of the Bosnian army in the Matchva, and totally routed it. By granting a free return to their own territories of Turkish prisoners who surrendered, Milosh induced a large number of Turks to go into voluntary exile. These rapid movements had produced surprising effects. It was only in some of the fortresses that the Turks still held out. The Serbia of Kara George had arisen again.

For rapidity of movement and boldness of conception the four actions of Milosh at Palesh, Ljubitsch, Posharevatz, and in the Matchva, compare favourably with those of Kara George. In defence and in attack, in siege and in manœuvre, Milosh had been equally victorious. But he never had to face the odds over which Kara George had several times triumphed. Great armies were advancing from Widdin and from Nish, and their arrival would have put his military powers to a severer test. But diplomatic pressure removed the deadly danger, and from the time of the victory of the Matchva Serbia was free in fact if not in name.

NOTE ON ENGLAND AND THE SERBIAN REVOLT IN 1807

During the year 1807 an attack by Napoleon on the Turkish Empire was confidently expected by the British Government. Consequently a military agent was sent to report and survey the resources and prospects of resistance of European Turkey—that is, principally Greece, Albania, and Macedonia. Captain W. M. Leake travelled through the countries in question and produced an interesting report, which has considerable

historical value for Macedonia. He described "the dreadful oppressions to which the (Christian) Rayahs are subjected," and estimated the Macedonian population south of Sofia and Skopia as about equal between Christians and Mussulmans. He alluded to the Serbian revolt as follows: "The Servians under their Prince Czerin [*sic*] George have been able to sustain the combined efforts on either side of their territory, and have even succeeded in effecting a junction with the Russians on the Danube between Orsova and Widdin, before the armistice was signed between the contending Powers. Since that period the Turks have prosecuted hostilities against them, but the Servians still continued to gain ground on the side of Bulgaria."¹

Sir A. Paget wrote to Leake from H.M.S. *Thetis* off the Dardanelles: "There exists the greatest probability that the Ottoman Government will in the course of a short time be expelled from their European possessions, in consequence of the concert which appears to be established between France and Russia." Leake was then instructed to report "on the inclination or means to assert and maintain their own independence against the efforts of Russia and France, separate or combined," of the various rebels against Turkish authority.²

The whole incident shows that the oft-repeated legend of the break-up of the Turkish Empire was exercising a powerful influence on English policy even in 1807.

¹ F.O. 57 Turkey, 28 Oct. 1807, Leake to Canning; previous information in Leake to Hawkesbury, 25 Jan. 1807.

² Paget to Leake, 19 Oct. 1807.

XI

THE PERIOD OF PATRIARCHAL MONARCHY

(I) THE FIRST REIGN OF MILOSH OBRENOVITCH (1815-34)

(a) *The Diplomatic Recognition*

IN six months Milosh Obrenovitch had driven the Turks from Serbia ; it took thrice that number of years to set her independence upon a firm foundation. In the diplomatic game he had few equals. Astute and patient, restrained and tenacious, he was well fitted to wear down the obstinate resistance of Mahmud II. Turkish diplomacy was summed up by Lord Strangford, a contemporary British Ambassador at Constantinople, as "coffee, pipes, and preliminary deliberations," and he might have added, "preliminary deliberations, pipes, and coffee." George Canning, not the most patient of our foreign Ministers, once sent a dispatch to Constantinople, saying, "The English Government must no longer be amused by unmeaning promises. We appeal to the honour of the Sultan for facts."¹ But the snail pace and the fictions of Turkish diplomacy, though maddening to foreign diplomats, are by no means futile and ridiculous. The aim of Turkish policy, which has always been the same for a century, is admirably suited to Turkish interests. Conscious of weakness, the Turkish Foreign Office has seldom dared openly

¹ *I*vide my *Life of Canning*, xii. 33.

to defy a great Power. The policy has always aimed at one of two things : either by infinite tergiversation and delays to prolong a negotiation until the great Powers quarrel with one another ; or to make paper concessions and then interminably to delay their application in practice. Milosh Obrenovitch was to have great experience of both methods, and only his infinite resource enabled him to wear down the continued resistance of the Sultan to the independence of Serbia.

In the autumn of 1815 two great armies were preparing to advance into Serbia—one under Khurshid Pasha across the Drina, one under Maraschli Ali Pasha from Widdin. Khurshid was an able man ; he had shown the right way of conquering Serbia, and had actually achieved his aim in 1813. He was a man of unyielding firmness, and declined to trust the Serbians with arms in their hands. Milosh, greatly daring, proceeded to his camp at Losnitza under a safe-conduct. Khurshid declined all terms and insisted on disarmament. Milosh made haste to be gone, and sought out Maraschli Ali Pasha. The latter was the supreme negotiator, and soon proved to be much more yielding. Ali's view was that disarmament did not matter, but that submission to the Sultan did. "Only be submissive to the Grand Signior," said he, "and you may carry in your belts as many pistols as you please"—adding, with broad Turkish humour, "cannons even, for all I care." Ali was not, however, so simple as to believe in submissive words, and insisted on a garrisoning of the chief fortresses by the soldiers of his army on the border. Milosh was obliged to submit to these terms. Ali marched with an army to Belgrade and reinforced the garrison, and there received Milosh and the Serbian chiefs in the presence of fifty Begs. As soon as they were seated Maraschli Ali rose and said, "Are ye Serbians subject to the Grand Signior?" "We are subject to him," answered Milosh.

Question and answer were thrice repeated. Coffee and pipes were handed round, and preliminary deliberations began. They lasted for eighteen years.

The position of Milosh was much more advantageous than might appear at first sight. It is true that the Turks had regarrisoned the fortresses, but the strength of the Serbians lay in their arms, which they retained, and in their forests, in which they could seek refuge. So far as force went, the odds were even. From the legal standpoint, Milosh gained greatly from the previous insurrection of Kara George. He aimed at making the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest the basis of future negotiation. The article states the situation as follows : "It has been deemed just, in consideration of the share borne by the Servians in this war, to come to a solemn agreement respecting their security. Their peace must not in any way be disturbed. The Sublime Porte will grant the Servians, on their petition, the same privileges which her subjects in the Islands of the Archipelago and in other parts enjoy ; and will, moreover, confer upon them a mark of her generosity, by leaving the administration of their internal affairs to themselves—by imposing upon them moderate taxes, and receiving them only direct from them—and by making the regulation requisite to this end by an understanding with the Servian nation themselves." The comparison with the Isles of the Archipelago was a vague one, because different degrees of freedom were given to different islands. But the article did definitely promise the Serbians freedom to administer their internal affairs, though other articles insisted on the right of the Turks to maintain garrisons in certain specified fortresses in Serbia. This disadvantage was offset by the fact that all matters could be the subject of direct negotiations between the Porte at Constantinople and the Serbian representatives. On the whole the terms were good,

Milosh's difficulty was that he could not at first assert that the articles were still in force.

The first concession Milosh managed to extract was that the *Musellims*, who were now the Turkish district judges, should not punish a Christian without consent of the local *Obor-Knez*.¹ Instead of a final Turkish court of appeal in each nation, there was now to be a system of joint courts in which Christian and Turkish officials sat side by side. At Belgrade, Pasha Maraschli Ali held his state, and Milosh also resided in the capital as chief representative of the Christians. The two were to have joint control of a national Court of Chancery. The first president was a Serbian, Peter Moler, a man of rank and ability. A National Assembly, or *Skuptchina*, was also to be held at Belgrade. Its meeting was marred by a tragic incident. At a preliminary conference, held before the Assembly met, Milosh fell into a dispute with Moler and had him arrested. The *knezes* present, overawed by Milosh, signed a petition for Moler's execution, and the Turkish Pasha reluctantly executed the sentence. Thus Milosh proved to the Serbians that he could use the Turkish power to support his own. He had already dismissed an unruly *knez*. Soon afterwards, a bishop who was his opponent was mysteriously murdered. Kara George perished under equally suspicious circumstances in 1817.² Milosh

¹ The *Musellims* were Turkish religious officials who administered justice by the side of the *kadi* in each *nahie*. When the Turkish Government was restored in 1813, the *kadis* were abolished and the *Musellims* re-established as the sole judges in each *nahie* of disputes between Mussulman and Christian.

² It is only fair to state that the responsibility for Kara George's death has not been brought home to Milosh, though the latter's record does not suggest that he would have hesitated to put an opponent out of the way. Ranke (216-7) is far too precise in his repetition of hearsay. The presence of Kara George was, however, distinctly dangerous to Milosh from a national as well as from a personal point of view.

was one whose vengeance was none the less terrible because his personal guilt was not always clearly revealed. The knezes were so thoroughly cowed that they even increased his power, and met in council and appointed him Supreme Knez—that is, Supreme Christian Ruler of the country—in November 1817.

By ruthless cruelty Milosh had imposed his will on the Serbian nation, but from the purely diplomatic point of view his arbitrary rule was an advantage. Concentrated authority was necessary for a skilful foreign policy. The trump card which Milosh held was the fear the Porte had of Russia. But he perfectly understood that the army of Russia could not easily come to the aid of Serbia. Consequently, his policy was to keep Serbia clear of all entangling connections with discontented Christian subjects of Turkey in Greece or Roumania. If Serbia remained free of such intrigues, he calculated that the numerous ambiguities of her situation would gradually be cleared up, and Turkish suspicions would be averted. One day the Sultan would be found in a good mood, or the Grand Vizier would be frightened, or pashas bribed, and then concessions would be made. This attitude explains his hostility to Kara George and his delight at that hero's death. Kara George had returned to Serbia with the object of allying the Serbians with the disaffected Greeks, and of making a joint attack on the Sultan. Milosh judged this policy dangerous and opposed it, and seems to have been justified by events. In 1820 the Porte offered what they considered great concessions to Serbia; because they were beginning to fear a rising in Greece and an invasion from Russia. They offered to recognise Milosh as Grand Knez, to restrict the power of the *Musellims* to the fortresses, and to put the collection of the tribute entirely into the hands of local officials. The two points untouched were the claims of the spahis

and the status of the Serbians. The spahis were now to live in the fortresses, but they still retained jurisdiction over the lands and property belonging to them in the villages, and the right to certain taxes in addition.

The Serbians were still considered rayahs under the Turk, and the claim of Russia to support the Serbians, as defined in the Treaty of Bucharest, was wholly ignored. An official carried the Imperial firman announcing these terms to Belgrade. Milosh, who now resided at Kragujevatz, was ordered to attend at Belgrade to hear the firman read. He seems to have feared for his life, and refused to enter the city without a considerable escort of Serbians. Mutual suspicions were so aroused that the Turkish officials finally met Milosh on the Toptchider, the wooded hill outside the gates of Belgrade: each party brought armed retainers with them. The conference was brief. Milosh began by demanding further concessions. "What?" said the Turkish official. "Our rights as guaranteed by the Peace of Bucharest." "My horse!" yelled the horrified Turk, turning round to his attendants. He mounted and rode away at once, terribly scandalised at the mention of rights guaranteed to Serbia by Russia, a foreign Power and the deadly foe of the Turk. He crossed the Danube into Hungary, and went back to Constantinople *via* Roumania, in order to show that his life was unsafe in Serbia. In spite, or perhaps because, of this demonstration, the first news from Constantinople was favourable. The Serbians were asked to state their terms explicitly and send delegates with their petition to the Reis Effendi (Foreign Secretary). Six delegates were then sent to Constantinople with demand based on the Treaty of Bucharest. Shortly after their arrival they were arrested and the negotiations abruptly broken off. Even "preliminary deliberations" had now ceased, and the Serbian

delegates remained in prison, and Milosh stayed unmolested in Serbia for the next five years.

The revolt which had broken out in Greece and in Roumania profoundly affected Turkish policy. In this greater conflagration the flame of freedom which burnt dimly in Serbia was unnoticed and forgotten. For five years every month added to the strength of Serbia and to the weakness of Turkey. The armies of Turkey were wasted and destroyed in the conflict with Greece, and Mahmud was compelled to seek help from the ruler of Egypt. Russia's interest in the struggle became ever greater, it was only by the Austrian influence of Metternich that the Czar was restrained from war. Czar Nicholas, who succeeded Alexander in 1825, was a stronger man than his brother and very soon forced the Turks to sign the Convention of Akerman, 7th October 1826. The treaty related to outstanding grievances between Russia and Turkey, but a special *Acte séparé relatif à la Servie* was also signed. Sultan Mahmud agreed in general terms to the Serbian interpretation of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Bucharest as being applicable to their present condition, and promised to settle all outstanding grievances with Serbia within eighteen months. These concessions were great, and all that Milosh could reasonably demand. But as usual the Porte had no intention of carrying them out. It was not till Russia had made war upon the Turks, entered Adrianople and threatened Constantinople, that the Sultan was again forced to terms by the Peace of Adrianople (1829). Mahmud then promised to execute the *Acte séparé relatif à la Servie* "with the most conscientious exactness" within a month! He did actually carry out most of his promise within a year.

The Treaty of Bucharest was taken as the basis of the settlement. It was not wholly to the advantage of the Serbians, for the treaty recognised among other

things the right of the Turks to garrison the Serbian fortresses. This provision was quite meaningless if Serbia possessed a real independence, and was the cause of endless friction in the future. But the true difficulty was to construct a system by which the Sultan could grant real rights to his Christian subjects. Acknowledged independence, such as Greece obtained, was a far simpler thing in the Ottoman eyes than an arrangement by which Christians remained subjects of the Turk and yet had rights of their own. In the end the whole internal administration was handed over to Milosh, renamed the Kniaz (Prince), and to his Council of Elders. The *Musellims* were abolished. The tribute-money was to be handed over in one lump sum by the Kniaz without any interference from Turkish tax-collectors. The claims of the spahis were reduced within reasonable limits, and the amounts due to them were to be paid at the same time as the tribute. There was to be a "bag and baggage" deportation of all Turks in the country who lived outside the walls of the Serbian fortresses. The Serbians were to be given complete control of their own Church, with power to elect their own bishops and fix all questions of ecclesiastical tithes—in other words, to end the abuses of the Phanariot régime. Lastly, the Sultan recognised Milosh as Hereditary Prince of Serbia. There remained only the question of boundaries, which had been raised in 1820 and again in 1826, Milosh on each occasion demanding that Serbian territory should coincide with that of the six nahies or districts which Kara George had occupied. Sultan Mahmud refused this concession, and various outlying parts of these districts remained Turkish. Milosh, biding his time, encouraged risings and disturbances in the parts still under Turkish rule, and used the excuse to occupy the disputed territory. Finally, in 1833, when the Turks were particularly

despondent, Milosh used the pressure of Russia to force a formal acknowledgment from the Sultan of his jurisdiction over the districts (25th May 1833). The Serbian boundary included Alexinats and followed a line drawn east to the Timok and west to the Drina. The "preliminary deliberations" were at last over, though they had taken eighteen years to be concluded. The firmness of Milosh, his carefulness in observing neutrality towards the Turks when they were in danger, and his bold readiness to take advantage of their embarrassments, had at last produced the desired result. Serbia was an autonomous principality within fixed and definite boundaries.

(b) The Political Reconstruction of Serbia

It is easy to view the history of Serbian freedom as a picture of dark tragedies or unrelieved gloom. A superficial glance is indeed rather alarming. Of the nine Nemanyid rulers in mediæval times, six were deposed and one murdered; of the ten modern rulers of Serbia, four were deposed and three murdered. The inference is obvious, yet the conclusion as to anarchy is not altogether unjust. It is well to remember that both Romans and Byzantines frequently deposed or murdered their rulers, but that each empire had a high conception of law and civilisation, and preserved the stability of their fabric for many centuries. The uneasiness of the seat on which modern Serbian rulers have sat was due not so much to lawlessness as to parochialism, less to radicalism than to ineradicable conservatism. It is the intense strength of the local feeling of the village patriotism of Serbia which has produced stagnation and unrest at the centre of things. The Serbian peasant is fiery in temperament and attached to his local liberties, neither understanding nor reverencing bureau-

cratic or central control. Small landowners cannot become wealthy or produce wealth rapidly, because they do not possess the capital that all modern enterprises need. Hence even small taxes may be a great burden to a nation of villagers, who in quiet times place their own parish pump before the interests of the State as a whole, and thus cause great unrest and anxiety to the national Government. What the Serbians had fought for was freedom to live as a free people, not freedom to live in a free state.

The independence of Serbia had been made possible by the moral unity of feeling which the people possessed, by the warlike powers of the chiefs and their momkes, and by the strength of local government. But the last two influences were unfavourable to good central government. Serbia had the foundations of self-government in the democratic communes of each village, and in the popularly elected knez of each district, but the Turks had smashed all the upper organs of government so that no trace or shadow of them remained. Serbia was a nation of villagers, all poor, all occupying small holdings, and all intensely attached to their land. They were at once democratic and conservative in sentiment, and for both reasons unwilling to submit to the control or taxation of a Central Government. One of their chief reasons for fighting the Turk was to destroy the monstrous octopus which stretched forth feelers of interference from Belgrade. When once the fighting was over, the Serbian peasant wished to sit at ease beneath the shade of the village trees, drinking plum-brandy and telling tales of Marko Kraljevitch. Yet the obligations and expenses of the new State at once made him bitterly resent the new conditions. It was not only the peasant who was disillusioned; the wild chiefs with their momkes and heydukes found the time hang heavy with no Turks to plunder. They

were turbulent, warlike, and ready to oppose any established government, especially that of one man, which was alien to the Serbian conception of democracy. The establishment of good and stable government was threatened by an old and deep-rooted local democracy, and by a new and lawless military feudalism. The first was a danger when peace came, the second was a danger while the war lasted.

Divisions began almost with the insurrection itself. Some of the hardest struggles and greatest victories of Kara George were over his own supporters, whilst the only defeat of Milosh Obrenovitch was at their hands. The first phase of the war was won by the uprising of individual chiefs with personal followings, who naturally claimed authority in the districts from which they drove the Turks. The chiefs called themselves Voivodes (generals), and their followers were known as Momkes. The old democratic organisation of village-knezes and ober-knezes of nahies naturally gave way to their authority. Many of the knezes were unwarlike, and the Voivode appointed or dismissed any officials he pleased in the district which he commanded. Men like Jacob Nenadovitch and Kiurtshia west of the Kolubara, and Milenko east of the Morava, governed pretty much as they pleased for a time. Nenadovitch quarrelled with Kiurtshia and killed him, and told Kara George himself that his authority stopped at the Kolubara River. But Kara George, as master of the Shumadya, had the advantage, and gradually wore down all opposition until his title was changed from that of Commandant to Supreme Leader. The rule of one military chief was preferable to the petty tyranny of a score.

Kara George, though unlettered and barbaric, was a man of insight, and had seen enough of civilised government under Austrian rule to admire and adapt it to his

needs. So strong was the democratic spirit, that one of the first demands of the country was for a popular Assembly or Skuptchina, so strong were the Voivodes that they and their followers were the popular representatives. Yet a tumultuous Assembly of warriors was not helpful for organising an Executive, and it is greatly to the credit of Kara George that he at once set about the task of producing one. Curiously enough, it was the turbulent Nenadovitch who first proposed to the Skuptchina that a Senate should be created, and Kara George who supported the proposal and carried it into effect. The Senate, which was created in 1805, was moulded in accordance with the ideas of Philippovitch. He was a Hungarian Serb and a doctor juris, who proved an energetic and capable secretary to the body. The Senate was at first a judicial body which sat to adjust claims on Turkish property and to assess the amounts of taxation for each district. It consisted of twelve members, one drawn from each of twelve districts. Its first task was to supply the place of the kadi, the chief Turkish judge in each district town. Some jurisdiction was left to the knez of each village, and a judicial body, consisting of president and assessors, was elected in each district town. With them was associated a secretary or permanent legal official appointed directly by the Senate. Thus the Senate was the supreme Court to which appeals from district and village courts could be made, and a certain amount of uniformity of procedure was secured through the Senate's control of a permanent official in each district court.

It was impossible, even had it been desirable, for the Senate to have functions that were exclusively judicial. Administrative and executive duties of all sorts naturally fell upon this body. It is to its eternal honour that it proceeded to organise a system of education at the very moment when the country was in the agonies of war.

Hitherto education had been conducted purely by monastic schools, poor in resources, scanty in numbers, and often ill-placed for the needs of a district. An elementary school was fixed in every district town, and a secondary school established at Belgrade. Both were devised on the plans of Jugovitch, a Hungarian Serb, and the work was improved by the famous Serb Obradovitch whom Kara George invited to Serbia to be the first organiser of national education. The High School taught history, mathematics and jurisprudence, and had an important influence on the future of the race. It is easy for a great country to laugh at the rude and imperfect attempts of this poor little people to better itself. But, in fact, Serbia anticipated England by two generations in providing a system of national education.

The chief members of the Senate were Mladen and Milori, both partisans of Kara George, but there were others who supported his opponents, the Voivodes. As always happens, a civilian body soon displays impatience of military control and develops a conscience and will of its own. The transactions of the Senate were sometimes unjust and corrupt, on other occasions they flouted the supreme authority. Kara George soon made it clear that he would not yield to the Senate. On one occasion he threatened it with cannon, on another he dismissed two Russian agents whom he regarded as intriguing with members of the Senate against his authority. In 1809 a still more violent quarrel broke out, Nenadovitch supporting a policy of complete subservience to the Russian Czar, Kara George and his partisans in the Senate supporting a more independent attitude. Another Voivode constituted himself an Ambassador to Russia to complain of the misdeeds of Kara George. Nenadovitch went about saying that Mladen and Milori (Kara George's supporters) wished to be czars, but that he wished for a gracious Czar of Russia. For a moment he prevailed, and the

supporters of Kara George were dismissed from the Senate. The Skuptchina and Senate seemed both for Nenadovitch in 1810. But Kara George was not so easily beaten ; he held negotiations with the chief Russian agent, General Kamensky, and induced him to issue a proclamation on 30th May 1810, which addressed the Serbians as "brothers by faith, tongue, and blood," promised Russian aid, and urged them to recognise Kara George as Supreme Chief, and show a united front to the enemy. This bombshell broke up the Opposition party and brought complete success to Kara George. In the following year (1811) he filled both Senate and Skuptchina with his partisans, and passed two most important resolutions in the legislative Assembly. The first resolution placed other commanders under the complete control of the Commander-in-Chief and the Senate, empowering them to dismiss or appoint whomsoever they wished. Thus Kara George for the first time gained complete military and civil control over the districts outside the Shumadya. The second resolution completely remodelled the Senate. Its judicial functions were entirely removed to a new body known as the Supreme Court of Justice. In future the Senate was to concern itself only with administrative and executive functions, and for that purpose Ministries of the usual kind were formed, for war, foreign affairs, finance, justice, for home affairs and religion. Curiously enough, Kara George after appointing Mladen his supporter to the War Office, was willing to compensate Nenadovitch, Milenko, and others with office in the Senate. But he insisted that these malcontents should resign their military commands, and made sure of the support of the Russian colonels and regiments. After some hesitation, Nenadovitch and Milenko complied, and were driven into exile in Russia. The victory of Kara George was complete and important. It meant the decisive rout of a nascent military feudalism, which

threatened to split the country into a series of districts, in which military chiefs held a power like the robber-barons of the Middle Ages. Kara George had not been very scrupulous or very legal in his methods, and in the end had only won by Russian support, but there can be no doubt that he stood for a united authority, whereas the clan chiefs stood for a divided one. As against Nenadovitch, Kara George represented civil order and the law, though his conception of both was peculiar. Yet, for an ignorant military chief, his ideas were really enlightened. Diebitsch said of him in 1811, "Now that there are courts of law and legal forms, he hands every case over to the tribunals," and again, "His judgments in civil affairs are promptly and soundly framed." The institutions which he set up were submerged but not destroyed by the Turkish conquest of 1813, and they were in substance revived by Milosh.

Had Milosh proved as good a civil Governor as he was a general and a diplomatist, he would have been an exemplary ruler. Unfortunately his temper was arbitrary, and the necessities of his diplomatic position increased his natural inclination for despotism. Until 1830, when he was formally recognised as Prince, his position was a dual one. He was both a Turkish Pasha owing obedience to the Pasha at Belgrade and the Sultan, and the chief Christian Ruler in Serbia. He was Grand Knez of three districts and Chief Representative of Christian interests. He adroitly used his Turkish power to support his rule over Serbians, and his Christian position to avert direct Turkish interference from internal affairs.

It has already been mentioned that he induced the Turkish Pasha to execute a Christian official who had defied him. But Milosh was equally ready to defy the Turkish Pasha if it suited his purpose. In 1821 the knezes, who depended on the support of the Turkish

Pasha, declined to receive orders from Milosh. By a mixture of cunning and force, the Serbian ruler flouted the pasha, and forced the rebel knezes to submit. In 1824-25 he had to face a more serious disturbance, a revolt of peasants, which might have had grave consequences had it not been speedily suppressed. It is possible that Milosh was justified in an arbitrary use of his power, while fear of war and of the Turks was still real. But there can be no doubt that his despotic tendencies became more and more unpopular, as the country settled down, and as the democratic ideas of the community became more and more pronounced.

Milosh had started in 1815 by reviving the Supreme Court of Justice, and renaming it the National Court of Chancery. This reform carried with it a revival of the district courts, over which the ober-knezes presided. The village courts of the knezes had remained intact throughout. But Milosh refused to revive the Senate, or to endow the Chancery Court with any executive or administrative functions. All central executive power he concentrated in himself, and appointed his own officials for the purpose of collecting taxes and for general administrative work. The ober-knezes soon found out that it was unsafe to disregard or defy him, and he claimed the power of dismissing a knez and of interfering in the affairs of a district or even of a village. Many of the ober-knezes or the village-knezes were military chiefs, or their nominees, and a strong hand was needful to keep them in order. But the discontent at Milosh's refusal to be guided or governed by a Council was not confined to Voivodes and their puppets. His methods of government were irregular, and even his attempts at assessing and systematising taxation were conducted in so awkward a manner as not to remedy the existing evils. In addition he granted monopolies and indulged in arbitrary confisca-

tions of property. The revolt of 1824-25 had its origin in the discontent of peasants, not of Voivodes, and its widespread character might have taught Milosh a lesson. As it was, he consented to depose two knezes, but made no effort to alter his system of government.

His re-election as Grand Knez was confirmed at the Skuptchina of 1827. Perhaps with the view of securing re-election he made some vague promises of liberal reform. But the only real result of this promise was the compilation of a Serbian Code, based on the Code Napoléon, which was adapted by Vuk Karadjitch and accepted in 1830. Unfortunately, Milosh in no way observed the precepts of the code himself; he took a man's house or fields from him or forced peasants to labour for him at will, without any kind of restraint. After the Treaty of Adrianople, the Serbians no longer feared the Turks, and therefore began to hate Milosh. The one thing to be said in his favour at this time is that he made no attempt to retain for his own personal use the crown-lands now granted to Serbia. He might have parcelled them out in large quantities to his immediate followers, and thus created a class of big landowners in the same way as the Sultan had created spahis. But against this spurious feudalism Milosh set his face, he would have no more landlords with judicial and fiscal powers. The revenue from the crown-lands became the revenue of the State, and this policy not only lightened taxation, but preserved Serbia as a peasant state of small-holders—equal in their poverty, their status, and their freedom, equal also in their hatred of despotism.

The essential service that Milosh was rendering Serbia, by refusing to re-adopt the old Turkish land policy, was wholly forgotten in the mass of his other misdeeds. It was impossible to expect the Serbians to acquiesce in a despotism which was indefinitely pro-

longed. The Sultan's firman which had bound Milosh to govern by a Council of Elders was still disregarded, and the Skuptchina, which occasionally met, grew tired of condoning his irregularities. The rumour that he intended to give over summoning that body was the last drop which overbrimmed the cup of his iniquities. In the first days of 1835 his opponents determined to attend the Assembly in great force and to compel Milosh to make concessions. Many of them actually assembled in arms and marched on Kragujevatz. Milosh at length recognised the inevitable, and agreed to limit his government. His opening speech to the Skuptchina in February 1835 was most constitutional. He would submit to be responsible himself, he would appoint an executive Ministry of six who should also be responsible to a Council of State (or Senate). The Prince was only to retain for himself a veto on legislation. Finally, a written code was to govern the decisions of judges. All these principles were to be embodied in a fresh Serbian Code.

For the time being, Milosh had removed all difficulties by his liberal outpourings. If he had ever any intention of abiding by them, this was removed by a visit to Sultan Mahmud in the autumn of 1835. On his return he put off all questions of constitutional reform, and used language which showed that he intended to be as arbitrary as ever. He still further aggravated his subjects by establishing a monopoly on salt, the bulk of which was imported from Wallachia. The profits from this privilege he invested in property in Wallachia, in estates to which he could retire if deposed. In addition, he imposed forced labour on peasants, and enclosed woods to maintain his own swine, though the pig-trade was the chief industry of the country. Even his wife and his brother turned against him, while Vutchitch, who had sacrificed everything

for him in the revolt of 1825, now led the Opposition. The evident discontent of the country finally brought Milosh into conflict with foreign Powers. Thus by his own folly Milosh produced that external interference which his wiser policy had always sought to avoid, and which was fraught with serious danger to Serbian liberties.

The conflict which now ensued in Serbia was in essence a purely internal dispute. But the obstinacy of Milosh gave a chance to his enemies from without as well as to those from within. The result was a struggle which contributed to the amusement of mankind. England and France supported Milosh in his "absolutism," and Russia and Turkey insisted on his becoming a constitutional monarch. The situation was almost farcical, and resembles that of more recent years, when the British Representative in Persia urged the Shah to govern by the aid of a Liberal Constitution, and assured him of the benefits of a Parliamentary government. "Will you show us the way in Egypt?" said the Persian Grand Vizier. England was, in the one place as in the other, more liberal than might appear. But the paradox can only be explained by allusion to foreign affairs.

Up till 1830 Russia had been a true friend to Serbia. She had allowed Serbia to be neutral in the war of 1828-29, and had secured her advantages at the Peace of Adrianople. Generally Russia had supported her with arms and forced the Sultan to carry out his promises. But in 1833 the Sultan, threatened by his rebellious vassal in Egypt, sought the aid of Russia and made an extremely humiliating submission to her in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Czar promised to send an army in case of need to help him; the Sultan in return not only agreed to close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships, but made other promises which

practically rendered him a Russian vassal. For the time being English and French influence withered away at Constantinople, and the Russian dominated Turkish policies. Consequently it was in a state like Serbia, subject to the Turk and yet half independent, that England and France sought to re-establish their influence. The opportunity offered itself in 1835, when Milosh promised a Constitution. Lord Palmerston and Louis Philippe viewing both Turkish and Russian influence as equally objectionable in Serbia, sought to get rid of both by making Milosh an irresponsible despot. It was a form of the theory that free Slavonic states were the best barrier against Russian aggression. This theory was also held in later days by Sir William White, the greatest of England's more recent Ambassadors in Turkey. But Palmerston's form of freedom for Serbia was an absolute despotism, which outraged the feelings of the country though it did not permit the interference of Turkey or Russia. The British Consul, Colonel Hodges, who was sent out in 1837, was instructed to use all his influence in favour of the arbitrary rule of Milosh. The British missionary of absolutism made himself popular and did much to allay the constitutional agitation.

The Constitution of 1835 had alarmed both Austria and Russia. The former, under Metternich, protested against its being put into operation, but the policy of Russia was different and more subtle. The mystery which is supposed to accompany the Slavonic character is certainly present in her diplomacy. Two voices sometimes sound, one from the capital and one from an Embassy abroad, and they do not sound in unison. The policy of Czar Alexander was particularly mysterious: his Ambassadors preached democracy in foreign capitals at the moment he was practising despotism in his own. The explanation of this extraordinary dualism of policy,

whether in these or more recent instances, varies with the Sovereign, the Court, and the character of the Ambassadors themselves. But the reign of Nicholas I. is freer from ambiguity than any other, because of the gigantic energy of his character, which imposed his will on his subordinates. He had already shown his disinterestedness when he had advised Milosh not to engage in the war in 1828, and he had seen that Serbia profited by the treaty at the close. His idea now seems to have been that if the Sultan granted a Constitution to Serbia, Russia would in practice interpret and guarantee it. Curiously enough, Sultan Mahmud, that iron-willed, centralising despot, was also willing for his own reasons to grant Serbia a Constitution, because he saw in it a means to reassert Turkish authority over Serbia. Thus it came about that Nicholas and Mahmud, two avowed despots, stood for Constitutionalism in Serbia, while Palmerston and Louis Philippe, the two devotees of Liberalism and Parliamentary rule, were violently opposed to it.

The struggle was fairly opened in 1837. Hodges came to Serbia to persuade Milosh to remain a despot, about the same time as a Russian envoy came to teach him to be a constitutional ruler. Shortly afterwards, the Sultan, under Russian influence, informed Milosh that he had heard with regret that he had not instituted the Council of Elders as promised in the Treaty of Adrianople. Consequently he was to send a deputation to Constantinople to discuss this matter and include in it Abraham Petronievitch. As the last-named had been of the Opposition since 1835, Milosh knew what to expect. A Serbian Charter was drawn up under the influence of Russia, and ultimately published in December 1838. Its chief aim was to compel the Prince to submit to the restraint of a Senate or Council. This body was to consist of seven-

teen members, to be chosen by the Prince, one for each of the seventeen nahies into which Serbia was now divided. To be qualified for the office of senator, a candidate must be at least thirty-five years old and hold real property. The powers of the Senate were great, for no new law or tax was to have force without their consent. The Senate was to be the watchdog of the Constitution, and for that purpose was protected against injury. No senator was to be dismissed unless it was made evident to the Sultan that he had infringed the laws of the country. Three Ministers—for finance, home affairs, and justice—were to form the Executive, and were also to be members of the Senate. All officials were to be native Serbians. Forced labour of peasants was abolished, and the proclamation of freedom of internal trade destroyed the system of monopolies. Finally it was declared illegal to imprison any man for more than twenty-four hours without bringing him before a court of law. The judges could not be dismissed, and a complete separation was to be made between judicial and executive functions. The general result was that the Senate, once appointed, was superior to the Prince. There was a further danger that the Turkish Pasha at Belgrade, who had long been a powerless official cooped up in the Citadel, might now interfere directly in Serbian internal affairs. The Sultan retained a power of interpreting the Constitution and of deciding whether or no senators should be dismissed, or whether justice was being administered in accordance with his new-formed Imperial zeal for its strict administration. The power thus allowed to Turkey can only be explained on the assumption that the Czar felt certain of his control. Nicholas had gained by the Constitution in so far as he had transformed the democratic Constitution of 1835 into a narrow oligarchic régime.

The new Constitution was issued in a Turkish decree

of 24th December 1838.¹ It was so distasteful to Milosh that he wished to suppress it, and would probably have done so had the Opposition not known of its import and acted with great promptitude. The National Court of Chancery, which had never forgotten its claims to executive power, practically usurped the nominating power granted to the Prince and appointed both Senate and Ministry. The first senator appointed was Vutchitch, and two of the Ministers were Petronievitch, the author of the Constitution, and Protitch. These three were acknowledged enemies of Milosh, and the rest of the Senate were not his friends. The Prince was therefore bound by a constitutional body which he could not dismiss in law, and which he had not appointed in fact. His opinion of constitutional government could not have been improved by his first experience of it, and must have resembled that which Francis-Joseph is said to have expressed on the same subject. "Constitutional government is not good. It means that the Ministers remain well and safe, while the Sovereign is persecuted." Milosh was in no condition to resist, and at first retired across the Danube to Semlin in fear of his life, announcing that he would not return until his chief opponents were removed from the Senate. This step was a blunder, for it enabled the Senate legally to exercise the whole executive power. Though the followers of Milosh began to arm in the mountains, the general feeling was decisively against him. Vutchitch, who had suppressed the rebellion of 1825 in the name of Milosh, now suppressed the rebellion of Milosh in the name of the Senate. He surprised and surrounded the bulk of the followers of Milosh in a wood and compelled them to surrender. After a skirmish or two with others, he advanced on Belgrade in a journey not without dramatic incident. At a halt at an inn on the way, a woman of

¹ Text is in Ranke.

disordered aspect approached Vutchitch crying for vengeance on Milosh, who had condemned her son to death. Milosh himself sat helplessly in his house in Belgrade, from whence he had once governed all Serbia. Gradually the signs of defeat became evident. One morning the noise of shouting and the tramp of horses' hooves was heard beneath his windows; he looked out, and saw the mob leading in triumph the captured horses of his followers. A few days later he told his weeping princess that the guard of honour which encircled their residence had been removed. Finally, Vutchitch appeared fully armed, followed by a bodyguard of momkes, and roughly told the former dictator that the nation no longer recognised him as its ruler. Milosh answered: "If they no longer desire to have me, it is well; I will no longer intrude myself upon them." After that laconic sentence he signed an instrument, abdicating in favour of his eldest son Milan (13th June). Two days later he left Belgrade in silence and with dignity. Some of his opponents wept as they bade him farewell on the Save shore. Men say that Vutchitch flung a stone into the river, crying, "When this stone floats, you will return to Serbia." "I shall die as Serbia's ruler," said Milosh, turning his head and breaking silence for the last time. Legend grows quickly in a land where bards convert politics into poetry, and many songs soon told of the prophecy of Vutchitch and of the answer of Milosh.¹

(2) THE CONFLICT BETWEEN OBRENOVITCH AND KARAGEORGEVITCH (1834-60)

Milan, the son in whose favour Milosh had abdicated, was a helpless invalid who died without being conscious of his elevation. Michael, the second son of

¹ Petrovitch, *Serbia*, 102. Ranke (pp. 270-1) has another version, and says that Vutchitch wept.

the old Prince, was next chosen by the Senate. The evils of the Turkish influence then speedily appeared, for the Porte declared Michael of age, but associated Vutchitch and Petronievitch with him as special councillors. Peasant disturbances soon began as a protest against this policy. Michael's Government acted with energy, rebuffed the Turkish Commissary, and hastened his departure with threats. Michael's Government was well-intentioned and had great educational schemes, but it was hampered by the unpopularity of Milosh and by discontent at increased taxation. Russian interference forced the return of a new Turkish Commissary, and of Vutchitch and Petronievitch, who had been driven into exile. The discontent increased, and Vutchitch armed his followers and fortified a hill near Kragujevatz. He gave out that he wished not to dethrone Michael, but merely to insist on a change of Ministry, and professed himself willing to refer all differences to the judgment of the Turkish Commissary. Such language was hardly ingenuous, but it served the purpose of concealing the fact that Vutchitch was heading a rebellion. Prince Michael marched out against him in August 1842 with a large body of men. But his dispositions were injudicious, and the popularity of Vutchitch was too strong for him. Yet he showed character in deciding to resign his office rather than submit to be a puppet. Before the end of August Vutchitch, after having driven the son like the father from Serbia, entered Belgrade in triumph and was recognised as "Leader of the Nation."

A provisional Government was hastily formed, of which Vutchitch was the head, and under the influence of the Turkish Commissary the Skuptchina was summoned to choose a new Prince. The Assembly met on the 14th September, deposed the Obrenovitch, and elected Alexander Karageorgevitch. The new ruler

was a son of the great Kara George, born in the year 1806, in the period of his father's greatest triumphs. Unfortunately, Prince Alexander, though well-intentioned and moral, was weak and unfitted to guide the ship of Serbia through the stormy waters she was to encounter. The most striking immediate result of the dethronement of the Obrenovitch was a quarrel between Turkey and Russia. Czar Nicholas considered that he should have been consulted before any such step was taken ; the new Sultan, Abdul Mejid, feeling more secure on his throne, resented this interference, and asserted his rights over Serbia. In recognising Karageorgevitch the Porte gave unmistakable signs of its intention to strengthen its authority. In spite of the Constitution of 1838, which made the Principality hereditary in the family of Obrenovitch, the Turkish decree recognising Kara George did not even admit that his office was granted for life. The Turk meant him to be an official like a pasha, to be dismissed at the imperious pleasure of the Sultan. Czar Nicholas now became the champion of Serbian freedom, and insisted on a free election, by which he meant to prevent Vutchitch and the Turkish Commissary from influencing the Skuptchina. He personally favoured the Obrenovitch line, but the Sublime Porte countered this move by insisting on the exclusion of Michael, as young and inexperienced. Hence there were only two candidates—Alexander Karageorgevitch and old Milosh. Whether Vutchitch and the Turkish Pasha interfered or not, the issue could not be doubtful between the two. On 15th June 1843 a free election was held, in the presence of the Turkish Pasha and the Russian Plenipotentiary. The Skuptchina voted by nahies—that is, by the majority of votes in each district—and the seventeen nahies all voted for Karageorgevitch. Russia insisted on the exile of Vutchitch and Petronievitch, and this demand had to be granted.

None of the events related increased the popularity of Alexander Karageorgevitch, who owed his throne to the men he had been compelled to exile, and who had appeared alternately as the lackey of Turkey and of Russia. He was soon to appear also as subservient to Austria. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that his task was difficult, or that an Obrenovitch party continually intrigued against him. An abortive rising was quelled in 1845, but in 1848 Prince Alexander was faced with a problem of first-class importance, the question of the attitude and policy of Serbia towards the Serbs of Hungary. It has already been noticed that the Trans-Danubian Serbs had exercised a most important influence on the culture and education of Serbia. Neither Kara George, Milosh, nor Vutchitch could write, and the schools and the language of Serbia were founded and moulded by Serbs from over the water. They had aided the Serbians with money, arms, and blood in the revolt against the Turks; they now called for the same support against the Magyar.

During the eighteenth century the Serbs had been subjected by the Hungarian Government to oppression, on account of their religious and civil independence. Speaking generally, they had maintained their religious independence, but had lost all political rights. But during the twenty years previous to 1848 they were subjected to a new pressure, that of forcible nationalisation—that is, of Magyarisation. The policy of the Magyar Government had, in the eighteenth century, been purely religious in its oppression, and had persecuted Serbs who had refused to become Catholics. Now it assumed a more dangerous form, and persecuted Serbs who refused to become Magyars. The policy was national and Chauvinistic in the highest degree; official pressure was applied to destroy the Serb language and to stamp out the Serb nationality in Hungary. Put

shortly, a Serb who declared himself a Magyar was well treated, a Serb who refused to do so was not. Then in the year 1848 came the great uprising, when revolution and freedom were everywhere and every king in Europe trembled on his throne. Headed by Kossuth, the Magyars hastened to extort a pledge of complete self-government from the Austrian Emperor. Liberation and political rights were in everyone's mouth. It was natural that the Hungarian Serbs should think that the Magyars, who spoke so loudly of liberty, would be willing to grant some concessions to them. A deputation of Hungarian Serbs waited on Kossuth in April 1848, and held an interview which has become famous.

They demanded the recognition of their language in public documents, and of their rights as a nation. "What," said Kossuth, "do you understand by 'nation'?" "A race," said the head of the deputation, "which possesses its own language, customs, and culture, and self-consciousness enough to preserve them." "A nation," said Kossuth, "must have its own Government." "We do not go so far," said the head of the deputation. "One nation can live under several different Governments, and again several nations can form a single State!" The discussion outlined clearly the two views—the Magyar unable to conceive a nation unless as a unified government, the Serb conceiving a nation as a linguistic unity. The views were irreconcilable, and Kossuth, recognising the fact, dismissed the deputation with the famous words, "In that case, the sword will decide!"¹ It did, though not in the way anticipated either by Magyar or by Serb.

¹ Vide *Southern Slav Question*, Seton-Watson (1911), p. 47. At the last moment of the Hungarian War of Independence Kossuth made an offer to the Slav nationalities of Hungary in return for co-operation against Austria. But the offer, if seriously meant, was not seriously entertained.

The situation became critical, for in the autumn of 1848 the Magyar Government of Hungary broke out into open revolt against Austria. The Slavs of Hungary generally sided with the Austrian Government against the Magyars. The opponent most formidable to the Magyars was Jellachitch, Governor or Ban of Croatia, a popular colonel who contrived to arouse the Croats and at the same time to ingratiate himself with the Austrian Government. Jellachitch advanced into South Hungary calling on all Slavs to revolt against the Magyars. He was joined by many Serbs of South Hungary, who were already in revolt, and had sent urgent messages to their Serbian brethren to join them. Prince Alexander was placed in a serious difficulty. The great Serbo-Croat coalition, the Jugo-Slav nation, had at last formulated its demands. Slavonia and South Hungary were to be formed into a Voivodate, and like Croatia were to have Home Rule. The Serbians of Serbia were subject to the Turk, and influenced by Russia. A decisive intervention by the Serbians might lead to a definite union of all three branches of the Serbo-Croat race under the Austrian Emperor. The Austrian yoke would perhaps be light, and in any case offered the only possibility of uniting the three long-severed peoples. It was a moment of crisis when a man of genius in Serbia might have changed the current of Austrian history and altered the map of the Balkans.

Had Milosh still worn the princely diadem, it is reasonably certain that he would have thrown in his lot with the Serbs of South Hungary. But Prince Alexander was not the man for heroic decisions, and the weakness of his character was not supported by any particular strength in his position. Consequently he was bound to listen to the remonstrances of the Sultan and the Czar. The latter was preparing to invade Hungary from the north, and was certain of subduing

the Magyar revolt. Russia was not, therefore, anxious for Serbia to be embroiled, as any entanglement might lead to her annexation by Austria. The Serbian Skupchina was summoned, and, apparently under Russian pressure, voted against any overt acts of hostility to the Magyars. Alexander could not prevent, and did not desire to prevent, supplies and arms, ammunition and volunteers being sent to the Serbs of South Hungary. Milosh and Michael Obrenovitch, from their exile in Wallachia, warmly supported the revolt, and still further discredited the unhappy Alexander. The fact that Austrian and Russian Emperors both loaded him with decorations on account of his neutrality did not increase his popularity. Many Serbians thought that he should have risked all recklessly and generously to free those brethren over the river who had done so much to free Serbia in bygone days. In the end neither Croats nor Serbs gained by their support of Austria against the Magyars. The Austrian Emperor took the title of Grand Serbian Voivode, but ultimately handed the Serbs and Croats back to their Magyar masters. In the settlement of 1867-68 the Croats gained a species of self-government and the Serbs certain rights of language and nationality. But neither in one case nor the other has the real concession ever corresponded to the legal one. The extraordinary tenacity of the Croats has enabled them to maintain a semi-independent condition, but the Serbs have steadily lost ground in Hungary. Some of them have been forcibly Magyarised, and the rest have slowly dwindled in numbers and seem to be losing their vitality and self-sufficiency. There are still some six hundred thousand Serbs in South Hungary, but they are no longer of the same importance as in the early nineteenth century, when they gave volunteers, priests, ministers, bishops, money, arms, brains, and inspiration to the Serbians. The result of the events of 1848 has been to exalt the im-

portance of the Serbians south of the Danube and Save at the expense of their brethren on the north.

If Alexander was held to have deserted the Serbs in 1848 he was held to have deserted Russia in 1854. When the Crimean War broke out, Garashanin, an astute diplomatist, was the chief Minister. His aim was to be independent equally of Austria and Russia, and to rely on the support of Louis Napoleon, whose sympathy with small nations was loudly announced and afterwards forcibly expressed in connection with Roumania and Italy. At the moment of the outbreak, Russia demanded and insisted on the dismissal of Garashanin, and Vutchitch, who was in favour of Russia, was called to power. Here Russia's success ended, for though she demanded the armed support of Serbia, she could not enforce it.

Fonblanque, the British Consul at Belgrade, had many opportunities of seeing Alexander and his Ministry during this critical period. His account is of some interest because he foreshadows later developments and reveals more modern policies in the germ. According to him, public feeling showed a desire for further connection between Serbia and Montenegro and relied on Russia to secure both. The Minister of War held long conversations with him in which he spoke of Russia's six million soldiers, and of the danger of going against her wishes. When asked to give details, he admitted that it would be difficult for Russians to advance as far as Serbia. Fonblanque was convinced that the "insurrection of the Turco-Slavs may be relied upon" as soon as the Russians were in force on the right bank of the Danube. The Austrian attitude was resolute as to ends but wavering as to means, for the Government had not decided whether to occupy Serbia or Bosnia first, "when the signal for South Slavic insurrection is given by the advent of Russian troops." The Austrian Government

has been asking the same question and answering it in different ways ever since that time.

Though Ministry and people sympathised with Russia, Prince Alexander confessed himself excessively pressed and intolerably importuned by her attentions. Fonblanque grandiloquently informed him that "in following the distinct line of his duty the Prince of Servia had nothing to fear, as the Greatest Power in the World had resolved on maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." He suggested possible advantages to Serbia from commercial intercourse with England, and made "suggestions for the aggrandisement of Serbia" by diplomatic concessions from Turkey. These were the inducements to prevent the Russian offers from having too much weight. The real pressure on Alexander was from the popular feeling in Serbia as expressed in Ministry and Skuptchina. Fonblanque, consistently with the view that the integrity of Turkey meant absolutism in Serbia, suggested that he might deal with Turkey "on his own responsibility, passing over the Senate and disregarding Ministerial advice at variance with his own duty as a reigning vassal of the Sultan." The Prince did not accept this bold advice, but temporised; for he dared not summon the Skuptchina because of the "dynastic danger." Finally he informed Fonblanque that he wished to remain neutral, but would declare for Russia if forced to do so.¹ As it turned out, the force dictated another decision. An Austrian army was concentrated opposite Belgrade, and a Turkish force approached Serbia from the south. The Sultan demanded a pledge of armed neutrality, but offered once more to guarantee the internal autonomy of Serbia. This was negotiating with the sword in one hand and

¹ F.O. 1008. Turkey, Record Office. Fonblanque to Stratford de Redcliffe, Dec. 31, 1853, Jan. 9, 11, 16, 31, Feb. 8, March 5, 10; Fonblanque to Clarendon, Jan. 26, 1854.

the olive branch in the other, and it was well to choose the peaceful solution. When Austrian forces moved into Roumania and cut off all hope of a Russian co-operation, neutrality became not simply the best but the only policy. In the end it produced useful results to Serbia in the Treaty of Paris, which ended the war in 1856.

This agreement made the signatory Powers guarantors of the Principality of Serbia, in addition to Russia and Turkey, thus strengthening her independence though still preserving the Sultan's suzerainty. A more important result was a permanent estrangement between Russia and Austria, and that fact was not to the disadvantage of Serbia. It was still more in her favour that she could appeal in future to France and England in case of Turkish encroachments. But the peasants of Serbia had not any profound insight into the mysteries of high policy; they saw only the humiliation of their Prince before the Great Powers, and his evident subservience to Austria, which had betrayed the Serbs of Hungary.

The unpopularity of Prince Alexander grew rapidly, and the project of restoring the Obrenovitches was seriously discussed. The main current was anti-Austrian, and was so strong as to unite the old opponents Vutchitch and Garashanin. The Coalition thereby secured a majority in the Senate hostile to the Prince. A plot for the removal of Alexander was hatched in the Senate itself. Alexander, on discovering it, arrested the conspirators and sentenced them to death, afterwards commuting their sentence to imprisonment for life. This act was a breach of the Constitution of 1838, which forbade the Prince to interfere with senators and placed their punishment or removal in the hands of the Sultan. That tender guardian of constitutional liberties at once interfered, and sent a Turkish Commissary to inquire

into this matter. Alexander succumbed, released the prisoners and restored such as were senators to their positions, and included both Vutchitch and Garashanin in his Ministry. The Senate now proceeded to acts of retaliation against the Prince. It made the proposal that a resolution three times passed by the Senate should have the force of law. Almost the only prerogative left to the Prince, when the Senate was hostile, was his veto. Hence its removal would have turned the Senate into an oligarchy and the Prince into a Doge, and made the whole Constitution of that Whiggish and Venetian type so hateful to the soul of Disraeli. But whatever was proposed a new factor was to dispose of both Senate and Prince. That factor was the people of Serbia.

At this time Sir Henry Bulwer (Lord Dalling) was Ambassador at Constantinople, and he visited Belgrade in the autumn of 1858. It is said that he advised some of the Serbian leaders to elect a regular Assembly and settle their differences in a properly constitutional manner. This advice was quite in the style of the Palmerstonian diplomats of that date, though Palmerston himself had favoured the absolutism of Milosh in days gone by, and Fonblanque had recently encouraged Alexander in the same course. But it is not certain that this advice was ever given, or at least the advice may not have been responsible for the desired result.¹ In any case, affairs had reached such a deadlock that some such step was inevitable. The popular opinion was that the Prince was the flunkey of Turkey and Austria, and that the senators were self-seekers and intriguers. The former must be deposed, and the latter restrained, by a Skuptchina. The latter body had not met for ten years, but it was not a moribund body, nor ever will be until democracy is dead in the heart of a Serbian. The Skuptchina dated back to the days of Kara George. It had

¹ *I*vide Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, p. 250.

even been occasionally summoned by Milosh for important decisions and crises. It corresponded roughly to the primitive Assembly of armed warriors, which ratifies or forbids a barbaric king's decision to go to war by a thunder of cheers or of hisses. But its meetings had become irregular under Milosh. Its representation had never been fixed. Any Serbian was theoretically free to attend it, but in practice it had generally been filled with supporters of the reigning Prince. It had been a tumultuous body, usually incapable of debate and acquiescent in proposals offered. The novelty about the Skuptchina that now met, was that it consisted of five hundred representatives, duly elected by taxpayers. It was a regularly constituted body, not a mere meeting packed with armed warriors.

The demand for a Skuptchina to settle existing difficulties was now supported by some of the senators, and by so overwhelming a popular wish that it was impossible to resist it. The Skuptchina was fairly representative, and showed itself hostile both to Prince and Senate. After passing a motion to the effect that it should be annually summoned in future, the Skuptchina denounced the foreign policy of the Prince, and called for his resignation. Alexander refused, and fled to the Turkish fortress in Belgrade for refuge. The senators exulted at his fall ; but they exulted too soon, and found themselves caught in their own trap. The day after securing the flight of Alexander, the Skuptchina demanded the recall of the "Old Lord" Milosh Obrenovitch. For a moment there was a chance that the Senate would unite with Prince Alexander and appeal to the army. But the people were behind the Skuptchina, and every Serbian in these days was a potential soldier as well as a possible revolutionist. The foreign Representatives used their best endeavours to avert bloodshed and violence. Prince Alexander refused to avail himself of the support of the

army, and the Skuptchina solemnly deposed him, appointing a provisional Government until Milosh should return.

The Czar had been angry with Alexander because of his attitude in the Crimean War, and now rejoiced at his fall. Thus England and Russia found themselves at one in supporting the democratic movement—a much happier result than when England supported absolutism in Serbia and Russia guaranteed the Constitution. France immediately recognised Milosh, and Austria most reluctantly followed suit. There remained only Turkey, and Turkey was pleased because the wily Milosh refused to accept the princely office without the consent of the Sultan. The Porte acquiesced in his return to Serbia, but once more showed her desire to interfere by refusing to affirm that the princely office was to be hereditary in the Obrenovitch line. Thereby the Sultan violated one article of the Constitution of 1838, which he had just forced Alexander by threats to uphold in another. The omission showed that the Porte still considered the Serbian Prince as a Turkish official, whom it retained the right of deposing. However, Turkey was hampered by the Treaty of 1856, and it was a happy circumstance for Serbia that no great Power sought to settle her internal affairs by the threat or force of arms. On 3rd January 1859 Alexander legally abdicated. He laid down, not perhaps with sorrow, a burden already too heavy for him. The amiable character of the man should not obscure his weakness as a Prince. The Serbian peasant even in those days was primarily a democrat, but he was capable of forgetting his democratic instincts in the sight of a man. There are three requisites for being a Balkan ruler: the first is Personality, the second is Personality, and the third is Personality. Alexander possessed none and Milosh all of these things.

At the beginning of 1859 Milosh once more returned to Serbia as Prince, after an absence of twenty years. He was received with a welcome and a gaiety which is still remembered in Serbia, and his popularity was only increased by the fact that Austria had refused to allow one of her steamers to ferry him across the Danube. "My only care," said he to the people, "will be to make you happy, you and your children, whom I love as well as my only son, *the heir to your throne*, Prince Michael!"¹ This utterance showed conclusively that he paid no heed to the Turkish refusal to recognise his dignity as hereditary. At the very outset he showed himself anti-Austrian and anti-Ottoman, and neither aspect was injurious to his popularity. But a calm observer might have wondered whether he was going to be anti-Constitutional as well. Milosh, unlike some returned sovereigns, had learned something, though not very much, from experience. He remembered the days when Vutchitch and his armed followers had forced him to resign, and told him he should not return to Serbia till the stone floated on the waters of the Save. He dismissed the Skuptchina, exiled some of his enemies, and threw Vutchitch into prison. There his old enemy died under strange circumstances, though the fact that Milosh refused the Turkish request to examine the body throws some light upon the mystery. His domestic policy was as arbitrary as ever, though his methods were more carefully disguised. He repelled all attempts of foreign Powers to meddle in Serbian internal affairs with the coolest insolence, and showed all his old astuteness in diplomacy. When Austria went to war with France and Sardinia in 1859, Milosh maintained a strictly correct attitude and refused to allow his subjects any opportunity of hostility towards Austria. He also found an opportunity of negotiating with

¹ Quoted by Petrovitch, *Serbia*, p. 120.

Turkey. Some rebellious Bosnians had found refuge in Serbia, and he could offer to deliver them up in return for further concessions. The Skuptchina had already flung down the gauntlet by proclaiming the princely dignity to be hereditary in the Obrenovitch line. The Porte in great indignation refused to ratify this proposal. Milosh, who knew the Turk of old, was entirely unmoved, and on 7th May 1860 he sent a Serbian deputation to Constantinople with two categorical demands. He demanded first the fulfilment of the Treaty of 1830, by which it had been agreed that all Turks in Serbia should reside within the fortress bounds. Secondly, he insisted that the Porte should confirm his title as hereditary. The Porte, as usual, began to engage in "preliminary deliberations." Milosh put a sharp stop to these proceedings, apparently on the assumption that, if he had a Skuptchina, he might as well make use of it. On 22nd August 1860 he publicly announced to the Skuptchina that the Serbian people could no longer regard their Turkish suzerain's will in the two demands rejected by Constantinople. The delighted Assembly hastened to declare that these measures should have the force of law. Within a month of this stroke the aged ruler, now in his eightieth year, was dead.

The last years of Milosh ended an epoch, for with him perished the old patriarchal society of which he had been the leader and the most striking representative. His abilities were undoubtedly great and, despite his age, his last years show the same energy and self-confidence which had always distinguished him. But they show also that he was to the end arbitrary in temperament, a law unto himself, a mediæval clan-chief struggling with a newer age. In dealing with opponents he spared no means to attain his end, and murder had sometimes been the road to tyranny. Such

deeds and methods, if they find any defence, must be excused on the ground of revolution and its accompanying dangers and necessities. Milosh, though admirably suited to effect a revolution, and a match even for the Turk in diplomacy, was as unfit to rule a civilised state as Robin Hood or Rob Roy.

XII

MICHAEL AND MILAN—THE JUGO-SLAV POLICY AND THE SURRENDER TO AUSTRIA- HUNGARY (1860–1888)

THE new ruler, Prince Michael Obrenovitch, had some of the good qualities of Prince Alexander and some of the abilities of Prince Milosh. But the son resembled the father only as tempered steel resembles iron. Old Milosh could not read and had never travelled beyond the Balkans ; Michael was highly educated and had visited the chief capitals of Europe. Milosh to the last remained a despot ; Michael saw that it was necessary to restrict the autocratic power of one man. Milosh based the security of the state on himself as parish constable ; Michael knew the advantages conferred by law and order. Milosh not only did not create, but actually weakened the institutions which he found ; Michael gave to Serbia a civilised basis of government. The short eight years of Michael's rule were the best that his country has experienced since the achievement of her freedom.

Michael took the phrase "*Tempus et ius meum*" as the motto of his government. His work lay in three main directions—the organisation of an efficient internal government, the adjustment of the relations with the Porte, and the development of a national foreign policy. In all these directions he showed originality and a judicious moderation. The internal problem was

attacked first and with results that were brilliant. He found a quasi-patriarchal society, where the clan-chiefs and their warriors threatened the stability of the State, where judges gave decisions against the Government at the peril of their lives, and where the Senate and the Skuptchina were at daggers drawn. His very first measures showed a broad grasp of the political evils in Serbia and of the necessary remedies. His first proclamation had announced that "the law is the supreme authority in Serbia." Political opponents, instead of being tried before intimidated judges, were pardoned and even admitted to office, Garashanin, that able but somewhat reckless statesman, being made the Premier. Thus early, Prince Michael had shown that he was just enough to pardon opponents and strong enough to employ them in his service. He had already removed the old miscarriages of justice before he turned to the anomalies of politics. His proposals, as laid before the Skuptchina of 1861, aimed at limiting the power of the Senate and at regularising that of the Skuptchina. The individual senators were, in future, to be responsible not to the Sultan but to the regular courts of law. Few were found to defend the pretensions of a despicable oligarchy, and his movement for broadening the basis of power was popular. The supreme legislative body was no longer to be the Senate, but the Skuptchina. An electoral law based the franchise for the latter on the payment of taxes, and provided that it should meet at least every three years. Thus Serbia was for the first time properly organised as a political entity. Another law organised her as a military entity, an even more important law in view of the fact that force is often the only support of law in the Balkans.

Up till 1861 Serbia had been what Montenegro has been until very recent times, an irregular army encamped on the soil. When war was imminent, the

clans were called out, and each chief led out his force, or, if he thought fit, sulked like Achilles in his tent, while his momkes idled away their time at his side. At a real national emergency every man became a soldier, but left the main army if his own district was attacked, or if he wished to bury his plunder. Such a force was irregular in every sense of the word and could not be depended upon. In future Michael laid down that there should be a small regular army based on conscription, and a reserve or national militia of the whole nation. The army was to be trained, disciplined, and equipped on Western models, and a French officer was made Chief of Staff for the purpose. Eventually this policy produced a Military Academy and an army of over 100,000 men. To support the expense of these and other projects, another law proposed an income-tax, small in amount but universal in application. All these reforms were eventually carried through in spite of the hostility of some foreign Powers. England apparently feared that a Serbian professional army might be used against the Turks and suggested a reduction of it to 12,000 men, a proposition which was with difficulty foiled. Austria was alarmed but eventually acquiesced. The Sultan, naturally suspicious of any changes, did his best to obstruct them. But Russia and France befriended Prince Michael and enabled him to carry through reforms which at length began to turn Serbia from a rude medley of peasant warriors into the semblance of a modern state.

In his relations with the Porte, Michael trod on delicate ground from the moment of his accession. He succeeded to the throne "in conformity with the law of 1859," which the Sultan had declined to accept, but which the Skuptchina had declared to have the force of law. The Sultan grudgingly ratified his accession, though still declining to yield consent to a hereditary succession.

Michael took an opportunity to raise the question of the fortresses in 1861; but, owing largely to the Turcophile attitude of the British Government, the matter was adjourned. An outrage in Belgrade speedily enabled Michael to press his claims. Availing themselves of a somewhat dubious article, the Turks had continued to occupy not only the citadel of Belgrade, but a portion of the town. The boundaries of this Turkish quarter were ill-defined, and the presence of Mussulmans naturally aggravated an already difficult situation. On 15th June 1862 two Serbians were killed by two Turks, and the Serbian police, who were conveying the Turks to a Turkish gaol, were fired on from the police-station. Their fall was the signal for the Serbian crowd to arise, and for a looting of Turkish bazaars to begin. Prince Michael was absent, but Garashanin as Premier, in conjunction with the foreign consuls, endeavoured to restore order. Arrangements for ensuring tranquillity had been made, when on the 17th the pasha suddenly opened fire with big guns from the citadel, and bombarded the city for five hours.

The fact that a Turkish official had acted like a frantic dervish now proved more important than all the debates of diplomatists. Michael, whose tactful diplomacy had been completely foiled the year before, was now able to come forward again and denounce the existing situation as intolerable. A conference of the Powers was summoned at Constantinople to decide the matter. The question of the fortresses had been altered in the Serbian favour by Act 29 of the Treaty of Paris, so that the Turkish demand of the complete *status quo* was untenable. Michael's demand for the withdrawal of all Turks from Serbia was not perhaps one which he expected to have granted. A *via media* was naturally proposed by the Great Powers, and formed the basis of a settlement. The Turkish quarter in Bel-

grade was given up and the Turkish inhabitants were confined to the fortress. Shabatz, Semendria, Fet Islam, the island of Adakaleh in the Danube, and little Zvornik, a village on the Drina, were still to be garrisoned by the Turks. But all Turks not in these fortresses were to be deported from Serbia, and their property to be valued and sold. A further concession of considerable importance was that the Turks agreed to dismantle the fortress of Sokol on the Bosnian border, and that of Udshitze in the Sanjak of Novibazar, which commanded the communication with Montenegro.

Prince Michael had gracefully accepted the proposal, but only as an instalment of future concessions. He sent his wife, Princess Julia, with a publicist to London to influence English opinion in his favour, and this movement converted Cobden to the Serbian cause. When the ground had thus been carefully prepared, diplomatic inquiries revealed that the British Foreign Office would not oppose the withdrawal of the remaining Turkish garrisons, if the Porte itself consented. Austria, which had just been overwhelmed by Prussian arms, was in a chastened mood. In 1862 she had opposed the evacuation of the Turkish garrisons on the ground that their departure would arouse the Austrian Serbs. In 1866 she seems to have thought that timely conciliation to Serbia might avert any such threatened excitement. France and Russia supported Serbia, so that Turkey alone remained. Michael again exerted his diplomatic arts and bargained with the Turks, taking great care to save the latter's dignity. His policy was successful, and on 3rd March 1867 the Porte agreed to evacuate the Serbian fortresses, on condition that the Turkish flag should wave side by side with the Serbian from the ramparts of Belgrade. Michael willingly granted this concession, which meant nothing to him and much to the Turk.

Before June 1867 Serbia saw the last of the Turks. To adapt the words of Gladstone, employed on another famous occasion, "The Turks now carried away their abuses in the only possible manner—namely, by carrying off themselves." It is difficult to see what advantage had been gained by the retention of Turkish garrisons in fortresses for half a century after the rest of Serbia had been free. The Turkish view was that they would have facilitated the further reduction of the country at any time that the Ottoman Power was free to attempt it. Austria, too, had an interest in keeping Serbia divided and weak. But the half-hearted opposition or reluctant acquiescence of British statesmanship in the removal of these garrisons is far less defensible. British policy, apparently, did not wish to see Serbia strong, though at any favourable moment Turkey might have asserted a control over her which would have led to war. The adroitness of Prince Michael in educating British opinion was no less important than his negotiation in Constantinople. Michael had shown in this affair a skill in dealing with Turkey which old Milosh might have envied, and a knowledge of English public opinion such as his father never possessed. He had achieved a striking diplomatic success. Henceforward, the Principality of Serbia was independent, and the Turkish flag on the battlements of Belgrade represented little more than a coloured piece of bunting.

The negotiations with regard to the fortresses, though separate in themselves, were bound up with the larger aspects of foreign policy. Prince Michael was indeed the first Serbian ruler who may be said to have had a foreign policy in the true sense. His predecessors were so absorbed in internal affairs, in negotiations with the Porte, or in obligations to the Great Powers, that they were hardly able to assert their national independence and make Serbia count for something in the eyes

of the world. This task Prince Michael performed with the address and the prudence which mark his political conduct. At different times he frightened England, Russia, and France, cajoled Turkey, and threatened Austria. Before his time, the Powers had made their influence felt by disturbing Serbia; during his reign, Serbia made her influence felt by disturbing the Powers.

The argument of Lord Stanley prevailed in 1867 over the fears which Austria had previously expressed, that any accession of strength to Serbia meant a disturbance of the Serbs under Austrian rule. Stanley held that what Serbia wanted was freedom from the Turk, and that the Serbs beyond her borders did not interest her. It is usual for historians to charge diplomatists with lack of foresight, but in this instance Stanley's contention appeared reasonable, though subsequent events have falsified it. Possibly a very close acquaintance with the life rather than with the politics of the Near East might even at this time have suggested a different conclusion. Serbia's demand to be rid of the Turkish garrisons in her fortresses had turned European attention from her no less important, because less immediate, aspirations elsewhere. By the middle of the nineteenth century the forces which have created the Southern Slav question in its modern form were already present. In remote schools and in the researches of solitary students were being mustered those formidable forces which do so much to unite divided peoples in the common bonds of language, history, and nationality. The physical and political barriers to Jugo-Slav unity were still tremendous and forbidding, but the intellectual obstacles had already been removed. Already they had scattered the seed

"Of the boundless and invisible thought that goes
Free throughout time as North and South wind blows,
Far throughout space as East or West sea flows."

The early nineteenth century witnessed literary and educational developments no less important for the Jugo-Slav future than for the political evolution of Serbian independence. The first movements were among the Austrian Serbs, where intellectual development was easiest. Singularly enough, Vienna and Budapest, so hostile since to the Slav movements, were places in which Serb printing-presses were set up. Budapest was the centre of the first Serbian Literary Society, founded in 1826; Vienna was the place in which the Serb Vuk Karadjitch worked and died, after having accomplished that great literary revolution which preceded and in part occasioned a political one. The literary impulses of the Serbs as a whole had always been considerable; there had been mediæval literary schools of importance in Croatia, Dalmatia, and Serbia proper. But there had been little if any trace of national unity or of race-sympathy between the individual fragments of the Jugo-Slav race. Unity was not only impaired by the Latin characters which the Croats adopted, but by the different dialects and literary languages employed. Dositz Obradovitch, a Hungarian Serb, was the pioneer of a great reform which made a literary language of the peasants' speech. He was born in the Banat of Temesvár in 1739, but in the course of a wandering life traversed all the Southern Slav countries and most of Europe. Various publications, the most important a book of his own travels and experiences, were issued by him in the popular vernacular. They made an appeal to all the Jugo-Slav lands and broke down all provincial barriers. It is of great symbolic importance that Kara George made him the first Serbian Minister of Public Instruction, and that the old wanderer ended his days in Belgrade. The work that he began at Belgrade has already been referred to and was of capital importance. Under his

direction, and that of other Hungarian Serbs, seventy elementary schools and a High School (now the University) of Belgrade arose and exercised a very important influence on the next generation. Ristitch, one of the ablest Ministers of Prince Michael's reign, received his education in this way.

By the side of Obradovitch was the young Vuk Karadjitch, like him self-educated, like him a friend of Kara George, unlike him in being a pure-bred Serbian. He was a man of commanding abilities, who amid infinite difficulties completed the work that Obradovitch had begun, and made the tongue understood of the people. His work lay in two directions—in the collection and publication of folk-songs, and in the construction of a new literary language, by which, like a new St. Cyril, he was to unite the Jugo-Slavs. On the fall of Kara George he left Serbia and spent the rest of his life in Vienna in constructing his linguistic system. The idioms employed by contemporary writers had been profoundly affected by Russian and other influences. Karadjitch determined to relate the literary language closely to the popular speech, and thus to purify it from foreign elements. A standardised and purified literary language was his end, and for this purpose he employed divers means. Like Macpherson in his search for *Ossian*, though with a more authentic purpose, he gathered ballads from the lips of unlettered peasants in remote villages and of blind minstrels by the wayside. Like the Greek Koraes, his scholarly activity and industry produced a new language. His collection of folk-songs illustrated, his grammar and his dictionary systematised, the modern Serbian tongue. To complete his demonstration, he devised a simplified phonetic system of spelling. These reforms, as was but natural, encountered serious opposition from many quarters. But the fame which Serbian folk-poetry won from his

publications contributed largely to the linguistic triumph. Goethe and Grimm praised the Serbian folk-songs as comparable with the Bible and with Homer. Dante won a triumph for the Tuscan vernacular over the Latin by the *Divine Comedy*. Karadjitch won a triumph not by his own poems but by using the wonderful Serbian epics as the best arguments for the literary use of the popular vernacular. Eventually he prevailed by the combined force of his literary popular and scientific appeal. Before his death in 1864 the battle had long been won. His work had been supplemented and developed by his pupil, George Danichitch (d. 1882), a Serb from Slavonia, and a linguist and lexicologist of a high order. Strangely enough, the most distinguished of recent Serbian scholars and historians, Stoyan Novakovitch, is a pupil of Danichitch, and therefore indirectly owes his teaching to Karadjitch.

The work of Karadjitch supplied the most important stimulus to the development of Jugo-Slav literary ideas. He himself contributed not only by grammar and dictionary, but by articles and editing, to spread the movement far and wide among the Serbs of Hungary. The movement, which first became important in 1826 with the foundation of a Serbian literary society at Pest, was soon associated with great activity in founding organisations and in developing an independent Serbian Press. Eventually the advance in civilisation and education made by Serbia became so marked that the Serbs of South Hungary transferred not their energies but their chief interest to Belgrade, which began to be recognised as an Eastern centre of Jugo-Slav culture. But a result of the energies of Karadjitch far more important even than this in ultimate achievement was the adoption of his policy in Croatia and the impression made by his writings, not only in Croatia but also among the Slovenes in the early nineteenth century. The

literature of Croatia is acknowledged to have been provincial in character, and under influences which were not Slavonic. The reviving national aspirations of Croatia and its rising literary talent found its purest means of expression in the language systematised and standardised by Karadjitch. Agram (Zagreb) became, and has ever since remained, the chief cultural centre of Jugo-Slav activities. The acceptance by the Croatian literary school of the language of Karadjitch meant the ultimate spiritual unity of the Jugo-Slavs. It was a long way to go before there was any real possibility of physical or federal unity between these separated branches of one race. But the ground had already been prepared for such schemes, and Prince Michael's plan of a Southern Slav Union found advocates wherever Vuk Karadjitch had moulded the written tongue.¹

About the middle of the nineteenth century literary and moral influences were making the Southern Slavs conscious of the new and larger unity which awaited them in the future. Croatian artists and scholars were writing the language of Belgrade, and the Serbs of South Hungary, after their bitter political experiences of 1848, were putting their hopes on the free State over the Danube. At the same time practical events were raising in a wholly new form the questions of Serb nationality in Bosnia and Montenegro. Bosnia and Herzegovina were, and perhaps have always been, the most divided and unhappy lands under Turkish sway. Three religions—Mohammedan, Latin, and Greek—divided the people, the Serb land-holding aristocracy had become Mohammedans, and oppressed their fellow-countrymen with the complacent consent of the resident Turkish pashas and officials. In the remote hills

¹ The literary language of Croatia and Serbia is practically identical, but, as has been mentioned before, the former adopts Latin characters, which fact puts a serious obstacle in the way of complete unity.

brigands and heydukes lurked, ever ready to cause or to exploit the local uprisings. A rebellion of the Moslem population against the Turks took place in 1831-32, and the Orthodox inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose in 1853, 1857, and 1861. The importance of these disturbances was that the border of Herzegovina touched that of Montenegro and that the fierce mountaineers of that land were always ready to lend aid to their fellow-Serbs and fellow-Christians, whom the Turks still misgoverned and oppressed.

Hitherto Montenegro, though admired by all Serbians for her heroic maintenance of her freedom, was not considered to be of weight as a political factor. The attempt of Kara George to join hands with the Montenegrins in 1809 had been successful, but had not been followed by any definite political results. Montenegro had been too small and too distant and too unorganised a state to assist Serbia in any real enterprise of importance. But the rule of Peter II. (1830-51) transformed his country into something more like a modern state. His successful rule attracted attention, and his offer to send 10,000 Montenegrin warriors to aid Austria against the Magyars, though refused by Jellachitch, showed his importance and his sympathy with other Serb peoples. More than that, he set up a printing press, the first known in Montenegro since the famous one at Obod, and printed books in Serbian. The most important were works from his own pen, for he is considered the greatest of modern Serb poets. In the *Mountain Garland* and other works he emphasised the heroic character of the Montenegrins and the moral service they had rendered to the Serb race. Events speedily produced the further development of Montenegro. Danilo, the successor of Peter II., turned his country into a hereditary Principality (1853). He also took the opportunity to promote important reforms of his administration, very similar to

those which his brother Serbian ruler, Prince Michael, promoted ten years later. He sought to win his countrymen to civilisation and to abolish the blood-feud and brigandage by a civil code (1855). He also took steps to form the germ of a regular army by training his body-guard in professional methods. The Turks, always suspicious of reforms, had not allowed him to develop this policy in security. Almost before he was settled on the throne, they attacked him, but Danilo induced Austria to intervene and force an armistice upon the Turks (1853). He managed with some difficulty to keep his subjects from attacking the Turks in the Crimean War, but the latter requited his services very ill. The constant risings of rebellious Serbs in Herzegovina were sometimes if not always aided and stimulated by independent volunteers from Montenegro. It was absolutely impossible for Prince Danilo to keep all his wild mountaineers from taking part in a struggle which they regarded partly as a sport and partly as a crusade. But bearing in mind the fact that Prince Danilo had risked his throne in preventing a declaration of war against the Turk in 1854, the Sultan could have afforded to be generous. But the Turk, confident in the support of the three Powers who had fought for him in the Crimea, used the disturbances in the Herzegovina as an excuse for crushing the adjoining Principality of free Serbs. The fact that Danilo had claimed independence at the Conference of Paris in 1856 was a further reason for crushing this insolent little Power. The time had come for the Turks to prove that Montenegro was in fact what they falsely asserted it to be in theory, "an integral part of the Ottoman Empire."¹

All those possessed of a love of freedom, which love

¹ *Vide* Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, p. 240. The contention was ridiculous in view of the Turkish firman of 1799.

perhaps even an historian may share, must rejoice that the Turkish attempt on this occasion failed. Danilo had appealed to the Powers for assistance, but the Russian and French frigates which arrived were hardly adapted for a mountain campaign. Inspired by Mirko, the father of King Nicholas of Montenegro, the gallant mountaineers played upon the Turks that old game which their ancestors had played for eight hundred years on successive Byzantine and Ottoman armies. Amid the rocks of Grahovo a Turkish army was caught and defeated with enormous losses (May 12-13, 1858). The battle has been called the "Marathon of Montenegro." In one sense it was an old story, for defeat of the Turks was but one in a long series of disasters inflicted by the heroic men of the hills. "It was the mountains, and the spirits of the mountains, that were alone invincible. . . . The heathen crests were lowered there, rolled back in a bloody foam." But this victory had certainly a fresh significance. It resulted in the acquisition of new territory to Montenegro, and it proved that the little mountain Principality was of more importance than anyone had imagined. The future, however, showed that Montenegro was no more freed from the Turkish menace by Grahovo than Athens was from the Persian menace by Marathon.

Prince Danilo was assassinated in 1861, and succeeded by Mirko's son Nicholas, the present ruler, whose achievements have been related elsewhere. At the early age of nineteen he was called upon to face a serious national crisis. The Serbs of the districts round Montenegro, both in Herzegovina and "Old Serbia," who had been greatly excited by the victory of Grahovo, rose in revolt in both districts and massacred the Turks. In 1862 Turkish armies invaded Montenegro, and though bravely resisted by Mirko, the Prince's father, forced a humiliating Convention on Montenegro. Eng-

land, under Palmerston, once more showed a regrettable desire to justify the Turk, and to uphold him against a struggling nationality. But eventually the objectionable clauses of the Convention were not enforced, and Montenegro gained a good deal from Michael's diplomacy in this very year. The demolition of the fortress of Udshitze, which had hitherto prevented all communication between Serbia and Montenegro, was an important advantage. Four years later, in 1866, Prince Nicholas gained the consent of the Sultan to his occupation of a strip of sea-coast at Nivasella, near Spizza. The project was vetoed by France and England on the ground that a Montenegrin harbour would, in reality, be a Russian one. Prince Michael, who watched events in the Balkans with a far-seeing eye and realised the ambition and the ability of the young Montenegrin ruler, had begun to establish definite diplomatic relations with him on the basis of a union against the Turk.

The conclusion to which Michael had come about the Prince of Montenegro was the conclusion to which other Balkan Powers had come about the Prince of Serbia. The two Serbian rulers made an alliance, and Michael extended his policy in all directions. It was obvious that revolts in both Herzegovina and "Old Serbia" might be extremely dangerous if supported by the whole power of the two Serbian Princes. The years 1866-67 were fateful in Europe. They were marked by the downfall of Austria before Prussia, and her subsequent concessions to Hungary in the Aus-Gleich (Compromise) of 1867. While Austria was humbled Turkey was distracted by an insurrection in Crete, and Russia remained hampered by the Treaty of 1856. The Great Powers were less formidable than they had ever been, and Michael seems to have conceived the bold idea of a sort of Balkan League for the destruction of the Turk. His diplomatic success in removing the Turkish garrisons

in 1867 encouraged other Powers to support him. Roumania, now settling down under Prince (afterwards King) Charles, actually signed an alliance with Michael, and his relations with Greece were extremely close though apparently not in the treaty-sense actually binding. During 1866-67 Serbian emissaries were everywhere secretly working in the Balkans, in South Hungary, and most notably of all in what is now Bulgaria. Serbian money, Serbian printing presses, and Serbian schoolmasters had benefited the inhabitants of that much oppressed land; and Michael aimed at uniting Serbians and Bulgarians under his rule. There can be little doubt that Michael was speculating on a rebellion in Bulgaria, to be combined with risings in Bosnia and "Old Serbia," and supported by a quadruple alliance of Greece, Roumania, and the two Serbian Princes. The whole project is a curious anticipation of the Balkan League of 1911, and counted equally on the destruction of the Turk and on the preoccupation of the Great Powers elsewhere.

It is extremely difficult to know how far Prince Michael was prepared to go, and how much he was ready to risk in this venture. The theory that it was a Jugo-Slavonic League is only true within severe limits. It was certainly the aim of the two Serbian rulers to release downtrodden Serbian brethren from the Turkish yoke, but it is not clear that Michael conceived a union of the Jugo-Slavs in the modern form. That conception certainly appears in the Serb deputation to Kossuth, which spoke of the Southern Slavs as one nation under several governments, as a linguistic unity overleaping the conventional political bounds. But Michael seems rather to have looked at the practical advantages Serbia could derive from the general unrest than at the more modern and majestic conception of a Southern Slav community based on a federal union.

What is certain is that Michael wished to unite all the struggling Balkan nationalities against the Turk, and in this sense he anticipated the more modern Balkan League which also planned action against the Turk.

The untimely end of Prince Michael is usually given as the explanation of the failure of his great plan. But it is probable that the moment for action was already gone. Austria, completely crushed in 1866, was stronger two years later because of her agreement with Hungary, and because the recent concessions promised by Hungary to the Croats and to Hungarian Serbs were believed to be genuine. Russia too was renewing her strength and her influence. Greece was not yet entirely in Michael's grip, and the Bulgarians were not ripe for rebellion. The moment to strike was either when the Great Powers were occupied elsewhere as in 1866, or when the small Balkan Powers were united and when rebellions were probable within the Turkish Empire, as in 1877. There are signs that Prince Michael had decided not to force a crisis and was satisfied with his diplomatic triumph in getting rid of the Turkish garrisons in 1867. At any rate he dismissed his able Prime Minister, Garashanin, evidently in the belief that the advocacy of a "Greater Serbia" policy was involving the country in grave danger. The Prince was warned in the autumn of 1867 by England, France, and Austria-Hungary of the consequences of stirring up agitation everywhere. Further they advised him to refrain from the military activities he was showing. Russia gave him counsel of a different character in the early days of 1868: she advised him to arm and to put Serbia in a complete state of military preparation. At the same time she cautioned him to be patient and to wait for a favourable opportunity for the realisation of his great plans. Perhaps this advice made the Prince turn again his eyes towards internal affairs. At all

events he seems to have been contemplating a further extension of popular liberties. There can be no doubt at least that a strong party desired reform in this direction. Be that as it may, the career of this enlightened Prince was ended by a blow of bewildering suddenness. While walking in the Toptchider, the famous wooded heights above Belgrade, Michael was shot dead by three assassins (10th June 1868). The mystery of this hideous crime has never been fully solved. Some hinted at disappointed politicians, or ambitious demagogues, but the most popular view fixed the blame on Alexander Karageorgevitch. That worthy was acquitted by an Austrian Court, but condemned in his absence by a Serbian one, while thirteen persons were tried and shot for complicity in the crime. A dark whisper of the time has declared that the weak Alexander Karageorgevitch was a tool in the hands of Austrian agents who brought about the assassination. Certainly there have been several notorious trials of recent years which prove on the evidence of Austrian law-courts that Austrian diplomats can make use of extraordinary means to discredit and humiliate Serbia. It is also true that Austria reaped all the profit from the death of Prince Michael, and that some of the conspirators planned their deed on Austrian soil and found refuge there after the deed was done. There the matter rests in the absence of more decisive evidence. It is one of those dark and terrible tragedies which throw into strong light the savagery which seems ingrained in the nature of the Balkans. For Serbia the loss was irreparable. In his short reign Michael had done more than any other ruler of Serbia to civilise, to educate, and to elevate the Serbian people. A well-trained regular army, a more contented peasantry, a whole people at last free from the Turkish oppression, stretching eager hands towards their brethren in other lands, a wise and powerful Prince asserting the liberty

and importance of his country at Conferences of all the Great Powers. This is the picture of Serbia under Michael. She has seldom been greater, and never happier and more progressive than under his wise and beneficent rule.

XIII

THE TREATY OF BERLIN AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN INFLUENCE IN SERBIA

MILAN AND ALEXANDER OBRENOVITCH

IF the conspirators who slew Michael had hoped for a return of Karageorgevitch, the prompt measures of the provisional Government speedily wrecked their hopes. The Grand Skuptchina was summoned, and elected the thirteen-year-old Milan, a grand-nephew of Milosh, and the last remaining Obrenovitch, to the vacant throne. It then appointed a Regency of three persons, of whom the chief was Ristitch, to hold office for three years or for longer if required. The Regency proceeded at once to reform the Constitution, on lines which Michael himself would probably have advocated. As under similar circumstances in Greece, a Second Chamber was not only impossible because practically all Serbians were on an equality, but was undesirable because of the strength of the democratic sentiment. But a conservative element was introduced into the popular House by causing 30 of the 120 members to be nominated by the Prince. Choice was limited to candidates over thirty years of age and possessed of a small property. This element was expected to exercise a restraining influence on the other three-quarters of the Assembly, just as the aldermanic element does in a City-council. If the franchise of the

Assembly was broad, the legislative privileges were small. The Assembly could not initiate legislation, though the Executive Ministry was in theory responsible to it. But, as so often happens in the Balkans, the Constitution was more liberal on paper than in reality. In practice the Executive retained means of intimidating both Press and individual persons, in spite of the renewed assertion that the Government maintained the liberty of justice. If the reign of law should be supreme it was not, however, intended to submit to the rule of lawyers. Lawyers and state officials were alike declared ineligible for the Skuptchina. The point was that the peasants and small artisans comprised nineteen-twentieths of the population, and that to admit lawyers and educated persons as their representatives would have been to fill the whole Chamber with them. The educated class, however, found representation among the nominated thirty.¹

The main defect of the Constitution of 1869 was that it appeared to be democratic but was not. The Assembly was elected on a liberal franchise, but in theory its powers were small, and in practice they were more restricted still. The separation of Executive from Legislature, and exclusion of Ministers from the Assembly, prevented true ministerial responsibility. The arbitrary dealings of the Executive also injured it in the popular estimation. The Constitution, however, remained the best solution of existing difficulties, because its enemies were divided. Ristitch called himself a "Liberal," and the Opposition groups were respectively termed "Progressives" and "Radicals." The former were for centralisation on the French or Prussian model, what we should call the party of "efficiency." The "Radicals" were for strong local government of the Swiss type, and were the advocates of the policy of "Greater Serbia." In the

¹ Questions of great national importance were to be submitted to a Grand Skuptchina of 480 members specially summoned for the purpose.

clashing ideals of these groups lay the safety of the "Liberal" Constitution.

In 1872 the new ruler came of age and took up the reins of government, but retained Ristitch in office. Personality is the chief factor in successful government everywhere, but most of all in the Balkans. A party favoured Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, and wished to depose Milan. Had it succeeded, the history of both Serbia and Montenegro would have been different. The masterful and far-sighted Nicholas has more than once baffled the diplomats of Europe, but has found Montenegro too narrow a field and too small a support for his ambitions. In Serbia his personality and abilities might have had a larger scope, and have achieved more decisive results. Moreover, the antagonism which has existed between the two Serbian dynasties has more than once injured both Principalities. Prince Milan was unfortunately a far worse ruler than Prince Nicholas would have been. His antecedents were not in his favour, for the life of both his mother and father had been open to reproach. Educated in an unhealthy atmosphere, and in a most unfortunate and friendless position both at Paris and Belgrade, Milan soon became addicted to pleasures and excesses of the worst kind. The excellence of his political abilities might perhaps have compensated for the badness of his private character. But Milan, like his still more unfortunate son Alexander, was never able to clear himself of the suspicion that he was ready to sacrifice his country's needs to his personal desires. Patriotism is a virtue in Serbian eyes which compensates for many faults, its lack is a crime which renders a man or a ruler a political outlaw. Sooner or later the reign of a Serbian ruler who has been convicted of that unspeakable crime must end in abdication or assassination. It was the fate of Milan to experience the first, and of Alexander to undergo the second of these

penalties. Hapless as were their destinies there can be little doubt that their selfishness rendered their country more unfortunate still.

For a time fortune smiled on Milan. All Serbians felt that a supreme moment in the history of the Near East was approaching. Old men of that day envied the young as Voltaire envied them in the days before 1789: "The young men are very lucky, they will see fine things." Milan was young, and there was a widespread belief that he would rise to the great occasion. The opportunity for which Russia had warned Michael to wait came for Milan in 1875. Once more Herzegovina burst into revolt, once more bold mountaineers from Montenegro streamed over the border, and once more the Serbs of "Old Serbia" sought to stretch out hands to their free brethren in Belgrade. But there were new and vastly important elements in the situation. Russia was arming and was preparing to raise a new nation from the dead in the shape of Bulgaria, and to revive the memories of that long-forgotten empire. It has already been related how Serbian influences had helped to educate the Bulgars; that race of dour and sturdy peasants was now growing in national self-consciousness. It had finally received a most important addition to its national power in 1872. In that year a Bulgarian Exarchate was created, with the approval of the Porte, as a counterpoise to the authority of the Greek Patriarchate at Constantinople. It was intended to serve as a Slavonic Patriarchate in European Turkey, and to control and educate all Bulgars under whatever government they were found. It was thus not the creation of an autocephalous Patriarchate like the Serbian, which extended over a political community in a defined area, but of an Exarchate extended over a linguistic community in a wider political area. Ever since its erection the Bulgarian Exarchate has been a

most important factor in the Near East, as a centre of influence, propaganda and intrigue, and has certainly served the Turkish purpose of effectively dividing the Christians. But though it ultimately separated Greeks and Bulgars, it temporarily united the Slavs, and it was the united Slav effort which marked the great events culminating in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.

The rising in Herzegovina and Bulgaria and the campaigns of the Montenegrins and Serbians were the skirmishes which preceded the general engagement. It is unnecessary to detail the events in either Herzegovina or Bulgaria, which followed a course familiar to students of recent Ottoman history. A series of revolts against intolerable oppression and of brutal retaliatory massacres of the Turks upon the rebels, followed by perfectly illusory promises of clemency and reform, then a Conference of the great Powers who were set at odds by Turkish diplomacy, finally armed action by independent states on behalf of the struggling nationalities.

The middle of 1876 saw the fall of two Sultans in quick succession, and finally the elevation of that masterful and ruthless tyrant Abdul Hamid II. Serbia and Montenegro both declared war in the early days of July, but their fortunes and perhaps their aims were very different. Prince Nicholas marched from victory to victory, approached within a few miles of Mostar, and drove the Turks from the vale of the Zeta. His success forced the Turks to conclude an armistice on terms very glorious for Montenegro.

Prince Milan, under the guidance of a Russian General Tcherniaeff went from hesitation to defeat, and was only saved from complete disaster by Russia. The strategy seems to have been based on no idea of co-operation with Montenegro, as only small forces were sent west and south. The main army was intended to act with the Bulgarian insurrectionists, but the Bul-

garians were unable to give effective help, and a Turkish opposing army, under the afterwards famous Osman the Victorious, marched as of old down the Morava. With a force only half that of the enemy, Tchernaiëff could do little except stand on the defensive. Serbians were not impressed by the fact that Milan was saluted with the title of King at the moment that his forces were being everywhere defeated. Aleksinats fell, and on 29th October the Serbians were badly beaten at Krushevatz. The Turks were now in possession of the famous strategic road to Belgrade, and that city must inevitably fall before their arms. Then at the last moment Russia saved Serbia from a great disaster, for the second time in history. On 31st October Abdul Hamid was informed by the Russian Ambassador that he must sign an armistice with Serbia in forty-eight hours. He learnt his first lesson in the art of graceful concession and yielded. The armistice of two months was extended, and subsequently developed into a peace (1st March 1877). The treaty left everything on the basis of the *status quo*, and Milan lost only the men he had left dead on the field of battle.

A Conference of the Great Powers assembled at Constantinople during the winter. Abdul Hamid, with the view of impressing the Great Powers, designed a dramatic stroke of policy which his rivals imitated with deadly effect in after days. He suddenly proclaimed to an astonished world that Turkey had become a constitutional monarchy, and admirers observed that this prescient innovator of Liberalism had endowed his Legislature with two Chambers, a precaution neglected by the hot-headed democrats of Serbia and Greece. But this project does not seem to have deluded the diplomats for long, and even Salisbury, who had come to the Conference at Constantinople with the genuine idea of reforming Turkish abuses, left it in

despair. Before the end of April 1877 Russia had signed an alliance with Roumania and declared war on Turkey, and Montenegro, often sensitive to the Russian wishes, followed suit. Again Prince Nicholas was brilliantly successful, driving the Turks once more from the vale of the Zeta, and conquering part of Herzegovina. On reaching the sea at Spizza he rested on his laurels, and sought fame of another sort by composing a poem on his first sight of the sea. Serbia, shaken by defeat, dared not move until the Turkish armies were definitely crushed.

When the brilliant victories of Osman Pasha failed to avert his surrender at Plevna (10th December), Milan thought the moment ripe for action and declared war. The Serbian army profited by the Bulgarian revolt, the Russian victories, and the Turkish disorganisation, and though not numbering more than fifty thousand, was fairly successful. The leaders had learned from defeat and were able to threaten the left flank of the Turkish army facing the Balkans, and to co-operate with the Montenegrins in the Sanjak of Novibazar. One Serbian force beat the Turks at Pirot on the present Bulgarian border, at the head of another Milan entered Nish, that old city of Serbia, whose strategic importance was so great. Finally, a third victory at Vrania enabled the Serbians to penetrate to Kossovo, that plain with historic and poetic memories so dear to the heart of every Serbian. There, after the lapse of five centuries, Serbians free and armed sang a mass o'er the shrine of Knez Lazar. It seemed that the revival of Serbia's ancient glories was near.

The Russian arms had proved victorious. Adrianople fell, and the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora was the only bulwark of the Turkish Empire. How far Russia and her allies would have gone but for the British opposition is uncertain, but the Treaty of San Stefano signed

between Turkish and Russian representatives on 3rd March (1878) indicates the high-water mark of Slavonic aspirations in the Balkans. Serbia was to receive Nish and a large accession of territory, Montenegro was to be greatly enlarged to touch the coast of Spizza and Antivari, and to be almost contiguous in boundary with Serbia. The essential feature, however, of the scheme was the creation of a "Big Bulgaria" which Russia evidently hoped to make an output of her influence in the Balkans. Put briefly, the independent Principality of Bulgaria was to comprise the most important parts of Turkish territory ceded to the Balkan League in 1913. Bulgaria included all its present boundaries, together with all Macedonia and other parts of Serbia and Greece as extended in 1913.¹

Such a plan realised all that Bulgaria could claim, and its importance on future Bulgarian history is marked by the fact that a map indicating the boundaries of San Stefano is to be found in every Bulgarian schoolroom. The attainment of these boundaries has been the aim of all future Bulgarian policy. The criticism of the settlement as a purely Slavonic one is undoubtedly just. The Hellenic claims to parts of Macedonia and the Ægæan coast-line have been fairly satisfied in the arrangements of 1913, but they would have been permanently rejected by those of San Stefano. The main motive of rejection, however, was the desire on the part of England and

¹ The limits of "Big Bulgaria" were as follows. It included the Bulgarian-speaking districts of Pirot and Vrania (ultimately comprised in Serbia), then ran along the mountains of the Kara Dag and Shar Dag down in a south-westerly direction to the Black Drin River some fifty miles above the northern end of Lake Ochrida. It then turned south, included the Lake of Ochrida and the districts of Koritza and Kastoria. From there the line ran eastwards to Yenidje-Vardar and the mouth of the river Vardar. The boundary line ran north of Salonica and the Chalcidic Peninsula, but included Cavalla and the coast to the Boru Lake (between Xanthi and Gumuljina).

Austria-Hungary to put a barrier to Russian claims. This was done in the subsequent Treaty of Berlin by giving back some territory to Turkey, and allowing Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the Treaty of Berlin, Bismarck, who offered himself as "an honest broker," seems to have acted in consistent support of Austria-Hungary. The details of the Peace only concern us in so far as they bore on the fortunes of Serbia. Ultimately Bulgaria was very much reduced in size, and was constituted as an autonomous and tributary Principality between the Danube and the Balkans. Russia still pinned her faith to the shorn Bulgaria and abandoned Serbia. The Serbian representative, who sought the good offices of Russia, was told to apply to Austria, and the result was seen in the treaty. Austria-Hungary occupied and administered Bosnia and Herzegovina, though she still recognised the Sultan's right of sovereignty therein. Singularly enough, this diplomatic evasion was extremely consoling to the Serbians. They felt that the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be temporary, and that, in the day when the Turkish rule was overthrown, the Serbs of Bosnia might join hands with their brethren to the east and to the south. Montenegro received a complete recognition of independence and enlarged her territories considerably. Spizza was taken from her by Austria-Hungary, but Antivari and eventually (1880) Dulcigno gave her access to the coast, though under conditions which largely neutralised the value of the concession. The indignation of Prince Nicholas at the cession of Spizza is well known, and its retention by him might have gravely altered the naval conditions of the Adriatic, for guns planted there would have commanded the entrance to that incomparable harbour the Bocche di Cattaro. The concession to Serbia included a full recognition of her independent status, and a considerable slice of territory,

chiefly in the south-east. The old boundary ran almost straight east and west from Aleksinats. The new accessions formed an irregular triangle drawn from Pirot on the east to Vrania in the south, and thence to the Bosnian border some twenty miles south-west of Udshitze. This included with it the important city of Nish.

The claims of Serbia had not erred on the side of moderation. They had included all "Old Serbia" and Kossovo, the Sanjak of Novibazar, Macedonia, and Widdin. But these claims, though presented to Russia, were perhaps not such as she expected to be granted. A perfectly reasonable demand was for the extension of her authority in the Serbian-speaking districts of "Old Serbia" and Novibazar. The Pirot district, which she actually received, included many who spoke Bulgarian, whereas some villages included in Bulgaria spoke Serb. There can be very little doubt that the demand for "Old Serbia" was refused owing to the influence of Austria-Hungary. The Habsburg Power was already seriously alarmed at the growth of Serbia, and at Serbian influence over the Serbs of Hungary, and over the Serbs of Bosnia who were now to come under Austro-Hungarian rule. Unfortunately the diplomats of the Congress were not too well acquainted with the history or geography of the lands in dispute, and Austria-Hungary played on these weaknesses to her advantage. Austrian policy, ably directed by the Hungarian Count Andr  ssy, was anti-Slav, or at any rate anti-Serb. His aim was undoubtedly to divide and dismember the Serb race into separate fragments. Under the original San Stefano Treaty the boundaries of Montenegro and of Serbia almost touched one another in the Sanjak of Novibazar. By the revised arrangement of Berlin, Austria-Hungary occupied the Sanjak of Novibazar, a territory stretching from the Tara in Montenegro to above the Lim. By these means Serbia was separated by bands of Austro-Hungarian or Turkish territory from all

access to Montenegro or to the sea, injured commercially by having no maritime outlet, and strategically severed by the Austro-Hungarian fortified outpost at Novibazar from any military co-operation with Montenegro. The Sanjak was an Austro-Hungarian bridge-head by which the Habsburg Power retained its right of entry into and direct connection with the Turkish Empire. It was to be the door open for the road which was to make possible the "Drang nach Osten" and lead Austro-Hungarian trade on an easy road to Salonica, with its magnificent harbour and boundless commercial possibilities.

The triumphs of Andrassy were undoubtedly great. Where Russia had spent thousands of lives and millions of pounds, he spent only ink and paper. Russia deprived her ally Roumania of territory, set up a sadly reduced Bulgaria as autonomous, and abandoned Serbia. Austria-Hungary without fighting occupied two rich provinces, cut off Montenegro from Spizza and Serbia from "Old Serbia," and interposed a dividing wedge of territory between the two small Serbian states. The immediate consequences of the Treaty of Berlin to Russia were the alienation of Serbia and Roumania. The result was in each case a gain to Austria-Hungary, though not comparable to that acquired in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia was victorious in war, Austria-Hungary was victorious in peace.

British policy, which aimed at supporting Turkey, had supplied the counterpoise to Russia. Gladstone's political insight was not perhaps always for the expedient, but he spoke like an inspired seer of the effects of freedom in the Balkans: "People talk of opposing a barrier to Russian aggrandisement. There is no barrier like the breasts of free men!" The judgment of Sir William White, the ablest of recent British Ambassadors in the East, the opinion of Bismarck, the whole history of the generation since that date, has confirmed the truth of these words. In proportion as the Balkan

States have received freedom they have developed national self-consciousness. It is not a little ironical that Serbia, who was abandoned by Russia, is to-day her ally ; that Bulgaria, who was created by her, is to-day her enemy ; that the elaborate measures which were taken to preserve Turkey, the promises of reform by which she gained British support, were equally vain. The gratitude of Turkey to England was like the gratitude of Bulgaria to Russia.

The attitude of Austria-Hungary in occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 might be defended on the ground that a strong administration was necessary. All agreed that the Turk must go : who else but Austria-Hungary could have come ? Eventually the provinces proved difficult to conquer and expensive to settle, and the task of administering them would certainly have been beyond the strength of any but a great Power. It is not easy to see what other solution than the Austro-Hungarian occupation could have been offered. England and Austria-Hungary would alike have prevented a Russian Protectorate of Bosnia. An international administration was possible, but the history of such attempts elsewhere does not encourage the belief that as much money would have been spent or as much energy shown in the government as has been displayed by the Austro-Hungarian administration. One thing, however, is certain, the Austro-Hungarian administration, though modern, progressive, and efficient as compared with the Turkish, has never attracted the sympathies of either Mohammedan or Orthodox Serbs.

The Austro-Hungarian policy towards Montenegro and Serbia seems far less defensible. Gortchakoff himself is said to have told Ristitch, the chief Serbian negotiator, to seek the good offices of Austria-Hungary at Berlin. The logic of events made Serbia dependent on Austria-Hungary, cut her off from Montenegro, and enclosed her on three sides with Austro-Hungarian territory. The

serious lack of a seaport soon appeared, for Austria-Hungary made it clear that her tariff would be used as a weapon to destroy the chief Serbian trade—that in pigs. Ristitch himself was a patriot and stood out firmly for Serbia's economic independence in commercial negotiations with Austria-Hungary in 1880. Austria-Hungary resented this attitude, Prince Milan showed his hand, and dismissed the Minister who had proved anti-Austrian. A new Ministry plunged into lavish expenditure on railways, swelled the national debt, and strained the slender resources of the peasant state.

Meanwhile serious difficulties and disturbances had arisen in Bosnia and in the Sanjak, both caused by the discontent of the Serb inhabitants with the Austro-Hungarian rule. There was also discontent among the Serbs and Croats in Hungary. To the general surprise and indignation of Serbia, Milan showed no sympathy with these movements, and actually repressed demonstrations in their favour in his own land. The explanation was that he had signed a secret Convention with Austria-Hungary in 1881, which afterwards made Milan as infamous in the eyes of Serbians as the Treaty of Dover made Charles II. in the eyes of Englishmen. In each case the charge was that the King had sold his country at a profit to himself. Yet the Convention was signed by Chedo Mijatovitch, then Foreign Minister, and one of the ablest and most upright of Serbian Ministers. The Convention lasted until 1889 : its substance was that Milan promised to abandon Serbian aspirations in Bosnia, in return for Austro-Hungarian support of Serbia's claims "in the direction of the Vardar valley," *i.e.* towards Macedonia. The objection was that Austria-Hungary received benefits at once, while Serbia only got a vague mortgage on a remote future. Whatever the original intention, the ultimate effect signed and sealed the dependence of Serbia on Austria-Hungary. Milan's son Alexander is said to have

called the Convention "an act of treason," and King Peter said of it, in more recent days, "It is of the nature of a feudal State that liberty cannot and must not flourish in the vicinity of Austria. Austria arranged all that in the time of the Obrenovitches. Serbia was made merely a tributary of Austria. She was no longer free at all. By the Treaty of 1881 she renounced all her rights." There is no doubt that this conception ultimately became the popular one, and very little that it is the true one.¹

Milan's position became rapidly worse. He made a poor figure in comparison with the rival Serbian ruler of Montenegro. Nicholas showed his enmity to Milan by marrying one of his daughters to Peter Karageorgevitch, who had fought bravely in the revolt of Herzegovina, and was one day, like his father and grandfather, to be ruler of Serbia, and then an exile in his old age. Nicholas made it very clear that, as the head of the oldest Serbian race, he considered himself the leader of all Serbians. Many felt that Nicholas, the victorious soldier, the poet in the Serbian vernacular, the masterful ruler, would have been a far better choice than Milan, who was wasting his people's money and his own vigour in riotous excesses. His assumption of the title of King in 1882 did not evoke enthusiasm, and in 1883 rebellion actually broke out. The Radical Party, which stood for economy and local government, was implicated in a plot for the restoration of the Karageorgevitch line in the person of Peter. The rising failed, and the punishment of the conspirators was bitter. Many were shot, and others severely dealt with. Nicholas Pashitch, the leader of the Radicals, escaped with his life and lived to be Serbia's Premier. A feeble foreign policy abroad,

¹ A summary of the Convention is given in the *Fortnightly Review* (1909), p. 838. Its existence was long denied, but can now be regarded as established.

severe repression and lavish extravagance within, had already made Milan extremely unpopular. Only one further step was needed to complete his humiliation, and that was defeat by another Balkan state.

By the arrangement on which Disraeli had insisted in 1878, that portion of Bulgaria south of the Balkans had been separated from it under the title of "Eastern Roumelia." It was constituted as an autonomous province under the Turk. In 1885 Eastern Roumelia revolted, dethroned the Turkish Pasha, and united herself to Northern Bulgaria. Sir William White, under instructions from Lord Salisbury, firmly supported this change, on the ground that it accorded with the wishes of the population concerned. English diplomacy had accepted Gladstone's lesson on the utility of freedom, and put it into practice. Russia, already disillusioned with regard to Bulgaria, opposed it in words. Austria-Hungary stirred up Serbia to oppose it by deeds.

It is difficult to know the motives which induced Milan to attack Bulgaria at this moment.¹ The popular pressure does not seem to have been overwhelming, and was a pressure Milan was accustomed to disregard. It is perhaps more likely that he hoped that accessions of territory and prestige would reconcile the people to a war which was a gamble in every sense. But he took little means to secure success. He declared war on Bulgaria in the second week of November 1885, on his demand for territorial compensations being refused. The army, which he led in person, was small and badly equipped, and not inspired by any confidence in the general. The soldiers of Prince Alexander were raw peasants, but they were more numerous and they believed in their leader. The armies met at Slivnitsa on 16th Nov-

¹ Miller (p. 417) takes the view that the war was popular with the Serbian masses. This statement is contradicted by Petrovitch (pp. 143-4), and is open to question.

ember, and on the 19th the Serbians were forced to fall back in defeat. They fell back on Pirot, which the Bulgarians entered. Then, on the 28th November, an Austro-Hungarian ultimatum forced Prince Alexander to conclude an armistice. This developed into a peace in March 1886, which established the *status quo ante bellum*. Milan slunk back to Belgrade, and the Serbians cursed him alike for his military incapacity and for his diplomatic skill. Better that Serbians should have died than that Austria-Hungary should have saved them.

The last act in this singularly disgraceful reign was rapidly approaching. Milan disagreed with his beautiful wife Natalie, and continually insulted and humiliated her. The family quarrel was of serious political importance, for Natalie was a Russophile and Milan a Pro-Austrian. The Queen had a strong will, and both her beauty and her policy won sympathy and support in important political centres. Milan crowned a long series of insults by circulating nauseating scandals about his wife and by obtaining a divorce from her, which was illegal according to the ideas of the Orthodox Church. But though successful Milan was so damaged in reputation that he was forced to attempt a diversion of public interest. He fell back upon the last refuge of bankrupt Balkan politicians and, like Abdul Hamid, promised to endow his country with a free Constitution. His fervour for democracy was entirely new but, if sincere, would have been of real advantage to Serbia. The Constitution of 1889 was intended to remedy the defects of that of 1869. It was drawn up by a Commission representing all parties in the State, and owed something at any rate to the suggestions of Milan, who never lacked intellectual ability. The tendency was democratic, the franchise was widely extended, and freedom of the Press was promised. Lawyers were no longer to be excluded from the Assembly, though the King retained the right of

selecting the nominated part of the Assembly. The real value of Constitutions consists less in their provisions than in the good faith of the ruler. This truth is even more obvious in the Balkans than elsewhere. It was therefore ominous that the King intimidated the Assembly into passing the Constitution as a whole and without discussion (2nd January 1889). It might be thought impossible for King Milan to startle or to shock his subjects further, but he had one more surprise in store for them. On 6th March 1889 he abdicated in favour of his son Alexander. He had reigned for over twenty years, but was still only thirty-five years of age. He has been described as one who subordinated everything to Vienna, but the real Vienna which had subjugated him was not the Vienna of the Ball-Platz, but the Vienna of the cafés and the music halls. His incurable love of pleasure spoilt an intellect far above the average, and deeply injured his country.

Milan handed over the government to three Regents, headed by Ristitch, who were to rule during the minority of his thirteen-year-old son. The ex-King remained in Serbia long enough to indulge in more disgraceful quarrels with his divorced queen, and further to disturb the country. But eventually his manœuvres were seen to be so harmful to the State that a formal reconciliation was achieved between him and his deeply injured partner, and both left the country. Meanwhile, Ristitch had called a Radical Ministry to power, but, though the Radical policy was on the whole the best suited to Serbia's national needs, it did little to check extravagance and improve the government. It was subsequently dismissed, and the Liberals again came into office. Alexander, who was a product of a bad heritage and impossible surroundings, soon showed that he had a will of his own. His proceedings remind one of those of Richard II. proclaiming his majority, or of Richard III. enforcing his

rule. In April 1893 the seventeen-year-old Alexander invited the Regents to dinner, arrested them at his own table, declared himself of age and dissolved the Skuptchina. Next year he dealt with the Radicals, abolished the relatively democratic Constitution of 1889, restored that of 1869, and again gagged and intimidated the Press. Then, to the amazement of all, Milan returned to Serbia in 1897, and became Commander-in-Chief of the army. This last appearance of his resulted in a cruel persecution of all Radicals and Pro-Russians. In another respect it was less harmful, because he devoted much time and all his ability to reorganising the army. There can be little doubt that he took the first steps which made possible the military perfection which Serbia afterwards displayed. This service was marred by the injury to public morality produced by a disgraceful intimidation of justice. Any means were countenanced by Milan in the "smelling out" of Russophiles, who expiated their patriotic bias with their blood.

Alexander, whose character though bad was certainly energetic, surprised everyone by his marriage in August 1900. His bride was a widow, Draga Mashin, whose previous character and connections unsuited her to be a wife and forbade her to be a mother. Of all the scandals of the reigns of the last two Obrenovitches this was the worst, for it was also a political blunder of the first magnitude. Even Milan marked his disapproval, and retired from Serbia, dying in Vienna in 1901. By the people of Serbia as a whole the match was resented as a national humiliation. This fact is the more remarkable because Russia made use of this opportunity to renew her friendship with Serbia, and Czar Nicholas sent a representative to act as best man to the bridegroom and was the first to congratulate the new Queen. Yet nothing could wash out the stain of this union. Alexander sought to make himself popular,

and pardoned the Radicals. He even issued a new Constitution, dignified with a Second Chamber, whose provisions need not detain us. But every expedient to reconcile the people was in vain. The discontented began to dream of supporting Karageorgevitch, and an outbreak in his favour actually occurred beyond the Kolubara in 1902. In April 1903 Alexander turned on his old foes the Radicals. He showed the value of his Constitution by suspending it and proclaiming martial law. After a drastic purge of all persons and laws which appeared objectionable to him, Alexander had the insolence to restore the suspended Constitution and assure the country of his beneficent intentions in the future. But the pledge came too late: it was impossible to trust one who had never allowed any interest or guarantee to stand in the way of his purely selfish ends.

It is necessary to understand the exact political situation in order to explain the hideous tragedy which ensued. Queen Draga was all-powerful with her husband, and had induced him to make one of her brothers a Minister. That was not the only danger. Queen Draga was known to be incapable of having children, but she had shown pretty clearly that she intended to find an heir somewhere. In 1688 the birth of a son to James II. gave rise to the lie that a supposititious infant had been introduced into the palace "in a warming-pan." Draga was accused of wishing to reproduce the "warming-pan incident" in real life and in the twentieth century, and among an excitable and passionate people. Draga had previously simulated an accouchement on one occasion without success. It was believed that she intended either to foist a supposititious child on Alexander, or to alter the succession in favour of her brother. The tyranny of the Obrenovitch was bad enough, but the Draga influence

accumulated circumstances of back-stairs intrigue and of sordid guilt which produced an almost unique sense of national humiliation and wrath. The life of any political opponent of either Alexander, Draga, or her brothers was unsafe, and any moment might bring further and more irremediable disgrace on the nation. The speedy removal of Draga and her influence was an absolute necessity, for it was known that Alexander would stand by her to the last. Political revolution was justified on every ground, and a deposition and peaceful deportation of this unfortunate pair would have been condemned by no impartial observer. Yet the fact that deposition had not got rid of Milosh Obrenovitch nor deportation of Milan showed that peaceful means had not always succeeded. Moreover, Balkan peoples are not in the habit of settling their difficulties with their rulers by the most constitutional methods. Indeed, under Alexander's rule it is strictly true to say that insurrection was the only means of protest that offered a real chance of safety. As insurrection had been tried and failed, the extremists fell back on conspiracy.

On 10th June 1903 certain military officers, who had gained over a part of the soldiery and were supported by some politicians, entered the palace of Belgrade and butchered the King and Queen in cold blood. The assassination was followed by terrible indignities to the dead, and by the murder of Draga's two brothers and of two Ministers. Nothing can excuse the callous brutality and barbarous conduct of the regicides. Yet these horrible incidents, which disgraced the regicides in the eyes of all Europe, did not awaken equal indignation in Serbia. The actual conspiracy was confined to a comparatively small number of persons, but the discontent was widespread. The people had suffered so long under the nightmare of scandal and shame that

the death of the last Obrenovitch was welcomed as a relief. Serbia did not inquire too closely into the surgery of the operation which had removed a poisoned limb. Austria and Russia hastened to recognise the new Government, but other great Powers withdrew their representatives to mark their detestation of the crime, and this action eventually produced good results. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, who had paused from his labours in Armenia, and was now instigating Albanians, Greeks, and Bulgars to massacre one another in Macedonia, lent an ironic touch by his protest against the deplorable midnight crime in Belgrade.¹

The last legitimate Obrenovitch was dead, and the regicides summoned the Skuptchina, which offered the crown of Serbia to Peter Karageorgevitch, who accepted it. Immediately after his accession the Constitution of 1903 was re-adopted with certain alterations. The franchise was extended to all but the very poorest members of society, proportional representation introduced, and further provisions made for a special representation of educated delegates in the Skuptchina.

No ruler could have begun his reign under more unfortunate circumstances—his country disgraced in the eyes of the world, himself shunned by most of the sovereigns of Europe, and called to rule a turbulent democracy at the age of sixty. But King Peter, though modest and without brilliancy, possessed other qualities which invited respect. There is no evidence that he had favoured or instigated the conspirators, and his past life had not been without distinction. He had fought bravely for France and received a decoration in the war of 1870; he had organised and led a small insurrectionary force in

¹ Another occasion on which Abdul Hamid protested against inhumanity was against the Congo administration of the late King Leopold of Belgium.

Herzegovina in 1875. More pacific tastes were indicated by his translation into Serbian of Mill on *Liberty*. There was little doubt that he was well-intentioned and sincere, and his caution and obvious disinterestedness made a good impression on the people.

There is no period of Serbian history in which the rule has been so consistently moderate and liberal as in the reign of King Peter. For the first time the Press has been relatively free, and the monarch genuinely constitutional in aim and in action. His difficulties were very great, because he owed his throne to the regicides, but he gradually showed the Serbians the evil of defying public opinion in Europe. It was this cause, more than any other, which enabled him gradually to get rid of the murderers of Alexander. The last regicides were removed in 1906. Another difficulty lay in his eldest son, George, whose impetuosity and folly scandalised public opinion in Belgrade. During the crisis of 1909 this unsuitable heir was induced to resign his pretensions, his place of Crown Prince being taken by the second son, Alexander, who was in all respects fitted for the destiny that awaited him, and whose courage in the Balkan War, united to amiable manners and ability, made a remarkable impression not only on Serbia but on the sister state of Montenegro. King Peter's policy brought to Serbia not only a respite from the political feuds which had wearied and humiliated her, but a period of revived prosperity and of budgets which balanced expenditure. It was these achievements which made possible the brilliant foreign policy and warlike achievements of Serbia in later years.

King Peter has shown that a cautious and moderate ruler can redeem Serbia from the injuries she suffered through the vices of Milan and Alexander. His reward has come, where he would most like to find it, in the love and admiration of his free peasants. The Serbians

are capable of high and generous feelings, and their contempt of death and their glorious rally at the summons of their old King have showed that there is still a magic in the name of Kara George.

The political past of Serbia has been chequered and uncertain. Its mediæval period, though full of military and cultural activity, does not show much evidence of political cohesion or national unity. The difficulty was the same then as now, for the restlessly democratic spirit of the Serbians has hindered speedy development, stability, and centralisation. In the last century Serbia was called upon to produce a national and civilised spirit after centuries of slavery which had atrophied all the higher organs of government and developed all the local and sectional feelings to an extreme. The Serbian peasant like the Greek, and unlike the Bulgarian, is interested in politics. Like many fighting races he is somewhat averse to the stern art of labour, and prefers singing ballads, sharpening arms, and talking politics, to working in the fields.¹ Without the stress of poverty or the temptation of wealth, with a fierce and excitable temperament, the Serbian is not easily satisfied. Thus the continual unrest has given advantages to intriguers and opportunists of a low type. Even apart from the blunders of government it would have been more difficult for such a state to attain political stability than for Greece or Bulgaria. Though that end has only painfully and recently been reached, there are reassuring signs. An educated class has been developed whose intellectual standards are high. Serbia has certainly produced a number of able diplomats and statesmen, as well as scholars and linguists. The lack of organising capacity and the difficulties of

¹ It is, however, easy to exaggerate these tendencies; the area of cultivated soil had increased from 14 per cent. in the eighties to nearly 37 per cent. in 1904. *Vide* Newbigin, pp. 202-11.

her economic position have proved the most serious hindrances to development. Education still only extends to about one-fifth of the total population. The Serbian is less commercially acute than the Greek, less industrious and plodding than the Bulgar. But one gift he possesses which makes him superior to either. He is like them supremely patriotic, but he also possesses the gift of visualising and recognising a supreme crisis or a superb opportunity.

The defects of the Serbians have been exaggerated by the tyranny of others, but their virtues are certainly their own. There is no race which has shown a more heroic desire for freedom, or achieved it with less aid from others or at more sacrifice to itself. There is no people more homogeneous, more united, more intensely national, when once its sympathies are enlisted and its imagination is awake. This fact explains not only Serbia's single-handed achievement of her freedom in days gone by, but her recent prowess in war.

When the Serbians realised that the shadow of war hung heavy over their country they at once devoted all their efforts to details of organisation and administration which might strengthen and perfect the army. They subordinated all minor issues to the great one, and the result was the magnificent military machine which won a continuous series of triumphs in the Balkan War. In some of the higher intellectual problems of war, as in strategy, in scientific handling of artillery and of cavalry, the Serbian surpassed other members of the Balkan League. The reason was that, for the first time, the intellectual and the democratic forces in Serbia were fused together. The magnificent raw material supplied by the peasant became a finished product in the hands of the Staff.


The military task was easy and congenial, for the Serbian is naturally warlike. "Do you know," writes

an English nurse, "these Serbians can do nothing but fight? Their whole talk is of fighting—their fathers did nothing but fight before them. As soon as they are well they want to go and fight again, they are like fighting dogs or cocks: that is what war has done for them—killed their souls for generations." But there is another side to the picture. For all his wild patriotism and savage ardour, the Serbian has a spirit which has something of true nobility in it. Routine politics are dull, and he is apt to curse or rebel against the politician rather than to force him to amend his ways. But once he is convinced of the greatness of an issue, of the importance to his country of political achievement or success, he is likely to work hard, to see deep and to go far. The Serbian has imagination enough to realise the great political dangers and the supreme political opportunity which peace is likely to offer him. Once the strength and ardour of the peasant is directed in the right channels by the intellectual leaders of Serbia there is no doubt as to the result. If the Serbian puts half the energy into the works of peace that he has expended on those of war, there is no fear as to the future of his race.

XIV

THE RUSSOPHILE PERIOD. FOREIGN POLICY— THE BOSNIAN AND JUGO-SLAV QUESTION (1903-10)

IN contrast to other Balkan states Serbia has always boasted of her native dynasty. The inference is that a peasant Prince is better than a German one. Serbian history has undoubtedly shown that, while a good native ruler is an almost ideal sovereign in a Balkan state, a bad one may bring almost irremediable disaster. It is easier to remove a foreign ruler than a native one, for the last always leaves behind him an opposition in the state. Moreover, Serbia suffered from not one but two native dynasties, and two good dynasties (and one was not good) are worse than one bad one. Serbia had no domestic peace till the dynastic differences were finally settled by the death of the last Obrenovitch. That Prince had shown more spirit than his father, who had been the obedient servant of Austria-Hungary. Yet though Alexander had ultimately emancipated himself from Austria-Hungary, he had done more harm than good to Serbia by his unfortunate marriage. Still, the Austro-Hungarian connection had been severed, and this fact made it easier for King Peter to establish a more definite relation with Russia. As a son-in-law to Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, Peter might have expected his support. But their private relations were not harmonious, and Nicholas stood aloof and married his second son Mirko to Princess Natalie, a



SKETCH MAP OF
 THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
 SOUTHERN SLAVS

Southern Slavs Block
 Southern elements of Southern Slavs
 Boundary between Slavic and non-Slavic populations
 of Liveably Roman - Rutenians
 Orthodox Greeks

cousin of Alexander Obrenovitch. Possibly in the belief that he could show himself a more constitutional Serbian ruler than Peter, Prince Nicholas granted a Constitution to his subjects (1905). But the Constitution was an instrument which the people did not understand and which the ruler misinterpreted. When he realised that the duty of an Opposition was to oppose, he first spoke to them "as a dear father" and, finding the address ineffectual, imprisoned the ringleaders and enforced his will by a threat of abdication. In democratic Serbia, now under the mildest rule it had known, these autocratic proceedings excited widespread indignation. A serious quarrel broke out between the two rulers in 1907, owing to a mysterious bomb conspiracy against Prince Nicholas which was attributed to agencies in Serbia, some said even to Governmental agencies. Others put it down to inspired foreign instigation and declared it had nothing to do with Serbia at all. The whole affair was one of those dark mysteries in which provocative agents and professional conspirators play their unhallowed parts. The Serbian Government—indignant at the charge of complicity—declared the whole conspiracy preposterous, but there can be no doubt that there was active discontent with the Montenegrin ruler among certain hot-headed Serbian democrats. Nicholas was greatly incensed, and only the Bosnian crisis of 1908 smoothed over the difficulty between the two Serbian rulers. Since that date the two houses have parted and once again drawn nearer to one another. The Balkan War of 1912-13 revealed the true proportions of the two Powers to one another, and the subsequent settlement divided the Sanjak of Novibazar between them and made their territory for the first time contiguous. Just before the war of 1914 a complete economical and military union was announced between the two countries. Separate kings were to remain, but not separate peoples or policies.

The popular feeling throughout Montenegro in 1913 was very evidently in favour of Serbia and of Crown Prince Alexander, the hope of the Serbian race. It is certain also that the united action of the two peoples constitutes the surest protection for Serbia and the only hope for Montenegro in the future.

Good relations with Russia were absolutely necessary to Serbia in view of the threatening attitude of Austria-Hungary. The Austrian Crown Prince Rudolph had headed a movement for crushing the hornets' nests at Cetinje and Belgrade, and his imperial father, though not approving of the movement, slowly realised the growing danger in Serbia. Russia's bid for control in Bulgaria had been a definite failure, and her friendliness with Serbia, as shown in 1900, put Austria-Hungary on the watch. From the beginning of the reign of King Peter, Austria-Hungary showed further unfriendliness towards the little state. It is certain that the Austrian General Staff came to the well-warranted historical conclusion that the true military road to Salonica was up the valley of the Morava. In 1878 they had thought the road lay through the mountainous defiles of Novibazar, but at some date before the end of 1908 they recognised that the Sanjak would be a death-trap to an invading army. The way was not through Novibazar at all, but along the old road trodden by Byzantine, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Turkish armies from Belgrade to Nish, and from Nish to the coveted harbour of Salonica. This perfectly technical military opinion had an important influence on policy, for an advance through Novibazar could be made along purely Turkish territory, and Serbian opposition could easily be brushed aside. But an advance through Belgrade could only be made if Serbia were absolutely dependent or utterly crushed by brute force. The annihilation of Serbian independence, in one form or another, was therefore indispensable if

Salonica, the goal of Austro-Hungarian policy since 1866, was ever to be reached. Military opinion in Austria-Hungary therefore weighted the scales in the direction of hostility to Serbia. It is not certain when the Austrian Emperor was converted to this view, but it was undoubtedly before October 1908.

Ever since 1878 the condition of affairs in Croatia, Dalmatia, South Hungary, and Bosnia had become more and more difficult. In all four districts a different Governmental system was applied. There was joint administration in Bosnia, and purely Austrian rule in Dalmatia ; Croatia, with a claim to Home Rule, was subject to the Magyar Government, the Serbs of South Hungary were directly controlled by it. Lavish bribery and the skilful manipulation of parties enabled successive Magyar Bans of Croatia to keep that district fairly quiet. But in 1905 the continued aggression of the Magyar Government caused the Croats and the Orthodox Serbs, the two chief parties in Croatia, to sink their differences and oppose a coalesced front to the Magyar. The practical result was that the Hungarian Government could not rule Croatia except by flagrantly violating the Croatian Aus-Gleich of 1868, by which Croatia had secured Home Rule. A series of disgraceful scandals also discredited the Hungarian Government of Croatia. The moral importance of these events had considerable effect on all the Southern Slav lands. Croatia as the literary and cultural leader of the Jugo-Slavs had an importance out of all proportion to its mere size. Determined opposition to the Magyar from 1905 onwards caused much unrest and discontent among their blood brethren elsewhere. The Serbs of Southern Hungary have developed less than any other Jugo-Slav people of late years. Entirely controlled by the Hungarian Government and subjected to the policy of forcible Magyarisation, they have declined both in power and in population. Still, on the balance

there is no doubt that the adhesion of Croatia to the Jugo-Slav cause far outweighed the decline of the Hungarian Serbs.

In Dalmatia, which was under Austrian control, the most noticeable feature was a development of Serb inhabitants at the expense of Italians, and a great increase of economic strength and enterprise in the face of manifold obstacles. This economic factor made it more difficult to keep back the Jugo-Slav movement in Dalmatia. The Austrian Government, however, took great care to separate the railway systems and the economic interests of Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It deliberately made it difficult for co-operation between the two to take place, for it feared that economic co-operation between the two would react on the political situation and thus further the Jugo-Slav programme. A trivial incident sometimes reveals a tendency more sharply than a volume of print. The traveller at Spalato may see a fountain recently erected by the Town Council. It is surmounted by the form of a goddess, whose outstretched arm points towards Serbia, thus symbolising the hope of the Serbs of Dalmatia. That of Croatia is aptly symbolised by the statue of Jellachitch in the market-place of Agram, which points with drawn sword to Hungary, whither he carried fire and destruction in 1848.

The general attitude of the three districts mentioned had convinced the Austrian Foreign Office of the dangers of a Southern Slav Union. This danger was intensified in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the joint administration of Austria-Hungary. So long as Russia was vainly struggling to dominate Bulgaria, and Serbia was pledged by a Convention to discourage Serb propagandism in Bosnia, Austria-Hungary was reasonably secure. But Serbia's secret Convention came to an end in 1889, Milan the Pro-Austrian died, and Russia was

reconciled to Alexander and friendly with King Peter. Consequently, ever since the latter's accession (1903), Austro-Hungarian policy assumed a new aspect towards Serbia. Austria-Hungary, unable to content her own Jugo-Slav subjects, was driven ultimately to annex Bosnia and intimidate Serbia. That action could not be accomplished without bringing in Russia, and that ultimately meant dragging in allies on both sides and producing a universal war. Thus what seemed to be a series of local discontents in Austria-Hungary led first to a dispute, then to a war with Serbia, and ultimately to Armageddon in Europe. It illustrates Bismarck's wise doctrine that the Southern Slav movement was for Austria-Hungary an internal problem but for Russia a question of foreign policy.

The claims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were made in virtue of the Hungarian Crown, which had possessed these lands at certain periods in the Middle Ages. But the Bosnians of to-day retain no traces of Magyar language or institutions. The weakness of the historical argument is generally admitted, and Austro-Hungarian apologists have usually justified the occupation on quite other grounds. The attention of travellers and journalists has been drawn to the magnificent roads and hotels built by the Government, to districts cleared of brigands, to infidels converted to Catholicism. There can be no doubt that a great material advance has taken place, and that such an administrative achievement would have been far beyond the power of Serbia in the degraded days of Milan. Yet a glance at education reveals that the percentage of illiterates is enormously high, and the Catholic Church is suspected of availing herself too freely of Governmental support. Where a population is so backward as that of Bosnia the discontent of the governed is not necessarily a condemnation of the governor. But the fierce resistance and subsequent wholesale emigration

of many Mohammedan Bosnians was an ominous sign. Of late years the emigration of many Christian Serbs and the discontent of those that remain show the truth. The Austro-Hungarian Government has taken very little trouble to give her subjects any political education, despite her grant of a Constitution. There can be no doubt that one reason of this neglect is that they fear the use to which political power would be put by the Serbs, who form nine-tenths of the population.

Repression of nationalistic ideals in all the Jugo-Slav lands went hand in hand with a policy of declared hostility to Serbia. The first manifestation of real enmity was towards the swine of Serbia. In 1905 Austria-Hungary learnt that Serbia was negotiating with Bulgaria on the basis of a common customs tariff. Inquiries and a correspondence ensued which showed how completely the Austro-Hungarian Government still regarded itself as dominant over Serbia. In 1880 the Austro-Hungarian Government had complained because Serbia made a commercial treaty with England, now it not only protested against the Serbians making a treaty with Bulgaria but made new and extraordinary demands. At this time Serbia was reorganising the army and ordering big guns, Austria-Hungary demanded that she should give preference to her in the matter of munitions instead of to France, from whom they were to be ordered. There can be little doubt that Austria-Hungary intended to control the ammunition supply and that a control of the ammunition supply would have enabled her to dictate to Serbia in matters of war policy. If these proposals had been accepted, Serbia would have been more completely Austro-Hungarian than in the days of the last Obrenovitches. It is perhaps the greatest service of Nicholas Pashitch to his country that he resolutely and, as events proved, triumphantly opposed this

demand.¹ He bluntly declined to admit the question of gun-buying into a discussion on commerce, and eventually Austria-Hungary was reduced to the expedient of declaring war on the Serbian pigs.

The raising of the Austro-Hungarian tariff against cattle and swine imported from Serbia inaugurated the famous "pig-war." It seemed to threaten Serbia with economic disaster, as the British Navigation Act had threatened the Dutch Republic in 1651. The Dutch had had a sole industry, shipping,—the Serbians had a sole industry, pigs, and retaliation upon them might be fatal. Serbia produced a greater proportion of pigs than any other Balkan state: nine-tenths of her exports and three-fifths of her imports touched or left Austria-Hungary. Yet the blow proved less deadly than was anticipated. The Serbians, faced as they were with a great national crisis, rose to the opportunity as they are sometimes capable of doing. Their dealers pushed farther afield, and found new markets in Egypt, France, and even in England. With some immediate loss there was ultimate gain to Serbia, and in fact Austria-Hungary found the price of her own meat greatly enhanced by her tariff. Serbian military and economic emancipation was a political gain of the highest order, and one that proved of great importance for the future. The "pig-war" embittered Serbia and complicated the relations of the countries. It convinced Serbia that Austria-Hungary could not be trusted, and that without a seaport and free access to other nations Serbia depended not only for profits but for existence on the precarious goodwill of neighbours. In the desert, says an Arab proverb, "no man meets a friend"; in the Balkans no people trusts its neighbour. The demand for a "window" on the Adriatic still further

¹ M. Pashitch was not in power during part of the negotiation but he committed his country to a course from which she could not recede, and he concluded as well as initiated the proceedings.

strengthened the desire for connection with the other Jugo-Slavs, especially with the fine harbours of Dalmatia.

The situation gradually grew worse. A solid block of discontented Serbo-Croats in Croatia, a sullen Bosnia, a discontented Dalmatia, and an ambitious and hostile Serbia made the Austro-Hungarian policy more and more difficult. The fact that Russia was preoccupied with Japan and the Far East was the only ray of hope. It is clear that within the first decade of the twentieth century it was still possible for Austria-Hungary to conciliate the Serbo-Croats within her empire. Russia was still weak after the Russo-Japanese War, Bulgaria was still hostile and sullen towards her guardian Liberator, Serbia was still discontented and despised for the scandals of the Obrenovitch régime. Thus during the first years of the twentieth century, when discontent unmistakably manifested itself within the Serbo-Croat lands in Austria-Hungary, a policy of conciliation might still have succeeded. There was indeed a danger in this policy that Austro-Hungarian conciliation might be defeated by Magyar intimidation of the Slavs of Hungary. The basis of the Aus-Gleich of 1867 was that Hungary and Austria should rule their subjects independently, and this arrangement was maintained ; for the Magyars were very tenacious of their rights and the Austrians very timid of interfering with them. But the continued increase of discontent, the absolutist Magyar régime, and the Serbo-Croat coalition in Croatia, the growing economic importance of Dalmatia, and the mutterings of a storm in Bosnia, forced Austrian statesmen to reconsider the position. The Magyar system blocked the way to all possibility of improvement in the lot of Croats or of Serbs of South Hungary, and hampered amelioration in Bosnia. The whole Jugo-Slav question must be settled, if ever it was to be settled, on a common policy within the

Austro-Hungarian states. As the Magyars were uncompromising, the Austrians began to dream of a centralised control of the Slavs. "Trialism" was to be the policy instead of Dualism. That is, instead of splitting Austria-Hungary into Hungarian and Austrian halves, to trisect it into an Austrian section, a Hungarian section, and a Jugo-Slav one. The third section was to include the Jugo-Slav lands—Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, and part of South Hungary. The point of this policy was that it would dethrone the Magyar. Hitherto the Magyar and the Austrian had been coequal in power, but in a triple arrangement the Slav section had the casting vote and would be likely to co-operate with the Austrian. Hence there were many advantages both to Austrian and to Slav in the policy of Trialism.

Trialism was popular and gained much support among the politicians of certain circles, but is wrongly alleged to have been favourably regarded by Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne.¹ Its danger lay in the fact that it was a drastic remedy and might produce resistance or even rebellion from the Magyars. Francis Joseph, cautious and hesitating as always, could not resolve to pursue so bold a policy. Trialism would have solved the problem, because the Jugo-Slavs would have had substantial independence and have gained greater profit from association with a powerful monarchy like Austria-Hungary than with a poor and discredited small kingdom like Serbia. It would have also shown the Jugo-Slavs within the empire that their best interests lay in consolidating their position there, not in intriguing with the Serbians. But Trialism might have caused the Magyars to fight, and was therefore impossible. If Trialism was impos-

¹ Franz Ferdinand's policy was to upset the Dual system and to substitute for it a central executive for the whole monarchy with large local devolutions of power. This was an anti-dualistic scheme but not a trialistic one. *Vide* Seton-Watson, *German Slav and Magyar*, pp. 109-112.

sible, conciliation in another sense was not. "Greater Austria" was the proper reply to "Greater Serbia." This phrase was a conveniently vague one, covering anything between conciliation to Slavs and a centralised federation of the whole empire. "Greater Austria" meant a policy inspiring confidence in the administrative efficiency and the progressive character of the Government. It therefore included a vigorous and spirited foreign policy, which might appeal to Serbo-Croats without, and ultimately a general policy of conciliation which might appeal to them within. This idea lay at the root of some of the views of Count Aehrenthal and his disciples during the years 1906-11. It was not acted on as a complete policy, because political aims are necessarily limited by facts, and the stubbornness of facts is nowhere so great as in Austria-Hungary. But it was the ideal policy to which the better class of Austrian statesmen and diplomatists of that period might be said to aspire. If Trialism was impracticable, "Greater Austria" was not.

The policy of conciliation within the empire may be reckoned as having definitely failed in Hungary after the Serbo-Croat Union in Croatia (1905). Its purpose was later described by its chief author, Franz Supilo, in the following words: "I wanted to make peace with the Serbs because the struggle between Serbs and Croats would have worn us both out. I succeeded in concluding peace, and no power on earth will avail to destroy the unity between us."¹ Croatia so long divided by religion and policy was at last united and enabled to form a spiritual coalition with the other Jugo-Slavs. A response was not long in coming from the independent Serbian rulers. Prince Nicholas sent off his son, Crown Prince Danilo, to attend a meeting at Spalato at which the Austrian Emperor was to be present. The

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Southern Slav Question*, p. 295.

Dalmatians had determined on a demonstration of silence, and the fact was only known just in time to substitute Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, for Francis Joseph. Franz Ferdinand landed from a ship and was received in icy silence ; Danilo, who came overland, was received with a shout so loud that it echoed far across the sea. Possibly with sarcasm, possibly with a deeper meaning, Prince Nicholas alluded in a public speech to the "kind reception" of Prince Danilo on his visit to Dalmatia. The feelings of Austro-Hungarian statesmen may be imagined when this message of unity was answered in Serbia and the Serbo-Croats and Serbians freely communicated with one another. The popular attitude was violently expressed, but it is impossible to discover how far the Government or officials of Serbia were concerned in these movements. Their attitude was certainly sympathetic and not always discreet. In 1907 the famous Serbian geographical scholar Cvijić gave a public lecture in the presence of King and Crown Prince, in which he spoke openly of the Serb brethren in Hungary and Austria and of the superior Balkan position of Serbia. The danger was fully realised by the Austro-Hungarian Government. But as it feared the Magyars even more than the Serbians, it preferred to intimidate the latter. To deal in the matter effectively it had to attack Turkey, for not only Serbians but Turks were interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Bosnian attitude of Austria-Hungary was connected with expansion towards Salonica and the general question of Macedonia. In 1903 Austria-Hungary and Russia had agreed to the Müritzsteg programme of reforms in Macedonia, the chief aim of which was to secure improvement in the government of these districts but to maintain the territorial *status quo*. This policy exactly suited Russia, which was first preoccupied and eventually weakened by a struggle in the Far East. It did not suit

Serbia, which still wished to redeem the Serbs of "Old Serbia" and Macedonia. Still less did it suit Aehrenthal, who with no regard for the past was willing to profit by the Russian weakness, and to make Austria-Hungary the predominant Power in the Balkans. It is usually believed that he bargained with Turkey to drop all reform in Macedonia in return for a railway concession through Novibazar. At any rate, in January 1908, he amazed the world by announcing his project of a railway line which was to run through Novibazar, and thus facilitate an Austro-Hungarian advance on Salonica.

Russia and Serbia were immediately aroused and metaphorically in arms. A counter-project of a Russian railway to the Adriatic which would give to Serbia her much-needed outlet to the sea, was at once made.¹ Aehrenthal was in no way disturbed by this opposition, but his boldness was soon found to exceed his discretion. This scheme had been hastily proposed and announced, and the economic and practical difficulties of laying lines through the mountainous country were found to be very great. It is almost certain that Aehrenthal's railway scheme was about to be abandoned, when the Young Turkish Revolution occurred and Abdul Hamid was overthrown. Aehrenthal was quick to seize the opportunity. Before the world had recovered from the surprise of Moslems embracing Christians and of Turkish officers talking Liberalism to Abdul Hamid, Aehrenthal struck and struck hard. On 5th October 1908 Ferdinand proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria and announced himself as its Czar, and two days later Aehrenthal announced that Austria-Hungary no longer recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as under the Sultan's sovereignty, but regarded these territories as

¹ The Russian counter-project of a line from Danube to Adriatic would greatly have benefited Serbia. But the scheme never got beyond the discussion stage.

annexed outright to Austria-Hungary.¹ He also evacuated the Sanjak of Novibazar in favour of the Turks, thus separating Montenegro and Serbia by a wedge of Turkish territory.

The European aspect of this question only indirectly concerns us. Russia mobilised, England advised "reconsideration," and France negotiated. It must be admitted that the claims of the Triple Entente that Austria-Hungary had violated the Treaty of 1878 were in one sense exaggerated. There is no doubt that diplomats should uphold the binding force of treaties, but they should not choose a treaty which was threadbare with holes to enforce the argument. The provisions of the Treaty of Berlin had already been violated in a dozen instances, and the charge of treaty-breaking as urged by England was, therefore, somewhat pedantic.² It was urged by Russia with far more force that the action of Aehrenthal was a violation of the understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary that neither would attempt to disturb the *status quo* in the Balkans, that this understanding had already been threatened by the railway project of Novibazar, and that it was now completely shattered by this second stroke. This was the real force behind the Russian project and the demand for a Conference. At the same time Turkey showed her displeasure by organising a boycott of Austro-Hungarian goods, and demanding a money compensation. Isvolsky, the Foreign Minister of Russia, took a strong line in the winter of 1908, publishing a Circular Note to the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin. He demanded a European Congress, and appealed to both Turkish

¹ The best accounts in English are Seton-Watson, *Southern Slav Question*, c. ix., and Steed, *Hapsburg Monarchy*.

² Legally the introduction of conscription into Bosnia, which took place after the occupation and in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin, was a serious breach, but when it occurred England recorded no public protest.

and Christian states of the Balkans to unite in a League for guaranteeing their independence. Aehrenthal showed a firmness unexpected in an Austro-Hungarian Minister, and informed the protesting Powers that a Congress should only be summoned to register the accomplished fact of annexation, not to discuss its propriety.

Aehrenthal was not always a wise or reflective statesman, but he relied on the energy of his will and the circumstance that he dealt with a Central European question. England, whom Germany feared, could make no effective intervention in a land question, Russia was weak from her recent disaster in the Far East, hence Austria-Hungary and Germany were stronger than the Triple Entente. "What *can* England do to us?" asked Aehrenthal. He took his stand firmly and relied on the support of Germany. Eventually he prevailed, as he was bound to prevail when the Great Powers would not support Serbia up to the verge of war. If we may judge from the semi-official Press of Aehrenthal, the annexation was due to a desire on the part of Austria-Hungary to discredit the Pro-Serb revolutionary agitation, which had so long spread from Belgrade like a fever to disturb Dalmatia, Croatia, and Bosnia. The only way to meet the danger of this infection was to sterilise Bosnia-Herzegovina by the antiseptic process of annexation. So long as the provinces were only "occupied" by Austria-Hungary and were still nominally Turkish, the Serbians could hope for their ultimate absorption in a Jugo-Slav state. Once they were "annexed," Serbia was cut off by a broad band of Austro-Hungarian territory from Dalmatia and Croatia. This stroke was intended to be the death-blow of "Greater Serbia" and the resurrection of "Greater Austria." Austria-Hungary indeed evacuated Novibazar, but did not benefit Serbia by doing so; the Turks reoccupied it, and maintained the wedge separating Serbia from Montenegro.

Whatever opinion may be held of the justice of the Serbian protest against the annexation, there can be no doubt that Serbian politicians and diplomatists showed a lack of balance that damaged their cause. They certainly had grievances, but they gained nothing and lost much by their intemperate language and open defiance of Austria-Hungary. Crown Prince George, in the last and most violent stage of his political career, fairly excelled himself in vehemence. He went off on a mission to Petrograd to demand Russian support, and became the idol of the war party. His attitude and that of his followers seems to have been deliberately based on the idea that Austria-Hungary was a bundle of mediæval miscellanies which could be shivered into fragments by the Serbian army. The view was grotesque, and Serbia suffered dearly for its absurdity. The Crown Prince found Isvolsky's attitude bellicose and Pan-Slavist, but he could obtain no definite pledges from Russia. He returned to Belgrade more violent than ever, and used all his influence to increase the agitation. Cartoons represented him as St. George slaying the Austrian Dragon, which disgorged the twin sisters of Bosnia-Herzegovina as he plunged in his sword. The Press was more than usually untamable. The agitation reached far beyond the war party and excited even the soberest. The Foreign Minister Milovanovitch, though an able diplomatist, committed some indiscretions. On 2nd January 1909 he spoke violently in the Chamber. It was alleged in Vienna that he described his fellow-Serbs as "enslaved" to Austria-Hungary, a phrase which he subsequently interpreted as "subjected." But whether he used this phrase or not, other expressions were fairly definite. "Austria-Hungary must cease to be a Balkan state—her path to the Ægæan must be blocked. . . . The Danube and Save must at all costs remain the legal boundary between the Habsburg

Monarchy and the Balkan States." The Skuptchina passed a unanimous vote demanding the maintenance of Turkish authority over Bosnia and the cession of a sufficient slice of territory to connect Montenegro and Serbia.

In spite of his unbalanced public utterances, Milovanovitch wrote able dispatches, and the point of view which he urged was not unreasonable in itself. The joint Montenegrin and Serbian policy was expressed in the demand for an "irreducible minimum."¹ This demand meant the cession by Austria-Hungary of a strip of Bosnian territory, sufficient to make a bridge between Serbia and Montenegro, and to give both states a commercial outlet to the Adriatic. It was claimed that such a concession could alone compensate the two Serbian states for the loss of the Serb provinces which Austria-Hungary had taken. There was a great deal more force in this argument than politicians of the West were ready to admit. The conditions had definitely altered in a way that Chancelleries had not realised. In 1878 Serbia and Montenegro were tossed aside as trifling, and the former was practically regarded as an Austro-Hungarian dependency. Previous to the "pig-war" Serbia had been an economic province of Austria-Hungary. Since 1905 Serbia had definitely emancipated herself from this servitude. The agitation in all Jugo-Slav territories was now at its height, and Serbia was justified in demanding a consideration for allaying that discontent. Austria-Hungary had promised support of Serbian designs on Macedonia to the Obrenovitches and had done nothing to redeem that promise, though Milan had faithfully discouraged Serbian propaganda in Bosnia. Finally, Russia now asserted herself as a champion of Serbian

¹ The best statement of this view is in a very able but somewhat criticised pamphlet by Professor Cvijić. Contrast Fournier, *Wie Wir auf Bosnia Kamen*.

claims, whereas in 1878 she had referred their adjustment to Austria-Hungary. None of these considerations was decisive in itself, but taken in the mass they constituted a real claim to compensation.

In the end Serbia was the only state directly concerned in this conflict which gained nothing whatever by the adjustment. In January 1909 Austria-Hungary offered the Sultan a large monetary compensation for abrogating his sovereign rights over Bosnia-Herzegovina; Russia replied by proposals for a Turco-Bulgarian settlement, in which she came to the financial aid of Bulgaria. This new step was a clever move, and placed Russia once more in the position of friend to Bulgaria. Serbia took the measure as a hint that she would be supported also, and the Skuptchina voted a large sum of money for armaments (5th February). On 10th March Serbia sent a Circular Note appealing to the Powers and declaring that the Bosnian question was a European one. Then there began to be Press rumours in Vienna of conspiracies between Austrian-Serbs and Serbians. On 24th March Dr. Friedjung in the *Neue Freie Presse* roundly asserted his knowledge of the complicity of the Serbo-Croat politicians in a plot hatched by the Serbian Government to overthrow Austria-Hungary. He pledged his historical reputation to the genuineness of manuscripts which were afterwards proved by an Austro-Hungarian Court to be absolutely false. The meaning of these assertions, which were inspired by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade and by the Foreign Office at Vienna, could not be mistaken, and it is remarkable that they did not produce war.

A struggle was averted partly by internal complications in Serbia, partly by German action. The Crown Prince, implicated in a scandal, publicly resigned his claim to the succession, and thus destroyed the hope of the Serbian war party. At the same time Germany pressed Russia for an explicit declaration of her intentions.

Isvolsky could not face a war, and expressed his willingness to acquiesce in the annexation of Bosnia. To an observer during these critical days Belgrade appeared less exciting than might have been supposed. There was great military activity and great violence in the Press, but the people were less stirred than at an earlier period. Mobs howled beneath the windows of the Crown Prince and of the Russian Ambassador, and bitter things were said in the Press of how Russia had betrayed a Slav state, but it was recognised that resistance was impossible. On 30th March Serbia was forced publicly to announce her submission, to abandon her protests, and to promise not to disturb the relations of Austria-Hungary with her Serb subjects. In the final settlement Austria-Hungary paid Turkey £T2,500,000 as compensation for the destruction of the sovereign rights of the Sultan; Bulgaria gained independence for herself and the title of Czar for her ruler; Montenegro freed herself from the vexatious Austro-Hungarian police restrictions on her sea-coast; Russia put Bulgaria under an obligation by giving her a loan on easy terms and to that extent developed and recovered her Balkan influence. Serbia deserted and isolated was forced to pledge herself to abandon Serbian propaganda in the Austro-Hungarian lands, and received nothing in return for this humiliating concession.

So far we are on sure ground, but there is evidence, which is more than surmise, for the view that what Serbia really gained was her existence. It is significant that arrests of suspected propagandists of "Greater Serbia" had begun in Austria-Hungary as early as August 1908—that is, before the annexation had produced a great agitation. The extraordinary result of the Friedjung trial proved beyond dispute that the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Belgrade was implicated in the forging of documents intended to prove an anti-Austrian conspiracy of Serbo-Croats. There were

strong suspicions that Aehrenthal himself and perhaps even the Austrian Heir Apparent were involved in these singular transactions. It is of importance that great masses of Austro-Hungarian troops were concentrated on the borders of Serbia during the winter of 1908-9. The Austrian General Staff is known to have declared the Sanjak of Novibazar useless for military purposes, and to have advocated an invasion along the line of the Morava. It was not till almost too late that the Austrian Heir Apparent publicly declared that he was not in favour of war with Serbia, when there were special reasons for this change of front which had not existed before. The general tendency of these incidents seems to suggest that a strong Austro-Hungarian party had determined on crushing Serbia, but was foiled at the last moment by other considerations of high policy and by the pacific inclination of the old Emperor. What Serbia gained from the Bosnian dispute was immunity from immediate attack. Her existence depended upon whether she would be able to use the respite given to her to prepare for greater dangers.

The events of 1908-9 made a permanent impression on Serbia. The annexation passed, the danger and the desire for vengeance remained. Milan had begun the reorganisation of the army, and this reform, though retarded by political disturbance, had already made some headway. After the crisis it was pushed with feverish activity. French military service was enlisted, and French guns and munitions were supplied. The plans and preparations were made with great secrecy, and few realised the developments until the Balkan War of 1912-13. The Serbian peasant was a magnificent natural soldier, more enduring in physique than any other in the world, less dogged than the Bulgarian but with more élan, easily roused to moral enthusiasm by a reference to Marko Kraljevitich or Kossovo. What was needed was

to direct this magnetic fluid along the right wires and enable it to strike at the right spot and with the greatest force. The problem was not an easy one, for the fundamental democracy of the Serbian nature is not easy to reconcile with military discipline or with fixed plan. Strategy and organisation had to conform to national ideals. Discipline, such as the Bulgarians had imparted to them, was impossible : a Serbian officer addresses his men as "Brothers," and must appeal to their sentiments to be successful. Again, strategical plans could not be worked out with a view to pure military necessity, but had to reckon with national impulse and feeling. Yet these apparent disadvantages could be and were surmounted. The Serbian horse was mettlesome and restless, but if well handled his speed and his spirit enabled him to outstrip the country-bred Bulgarian hack.

The Staff problem was to supply a skeleton organisation which would rapidly develop the standing army of thirty thousand to a force ten times that number in war-time. Such a system needed careful thought and organising capacity of a high order. Both were supplied, and the result was that the Serbian army, unknown to anyone but itself, took the field in 1912 with more big guns than any other Balkan Power, with carefully worked out strategical plans, and with a complete national purpose. The possession of a large army by a state has only been recently regarded as a proof of a high standard of civilisation. This modern view contains truth as well as satire, for so much science, thought, and organisation is demanded of military chiefs nowadays that modern warfare is beyond the competence of really uncivilised peoples. The superiority of the Serbian army to the Montenegrin is not of degree but of kind. A primitive, poor, and democratic country like Montenegro may produce soldiers who are heroes, it cannot make soldiers who are regulars. Serbia, with many of the same diffi-

culties to face, had at length overcome them by superiority of resources and concentration of will. The effect produced by the disciplined forces of Serbia on the irregulars of Montenegro during the Balkan War was never forgotten by the latter. More than any other cause the military efficiency of Serbia has contributed to the unity of political interest and sympathy between the two free Serbian peoples.

Looking back on the years 1908-9, it is difficult not to see in them the more immediate causes of later wars—so far at least as the Balkans are concerned. The year 1908 saw the fall of Abdul Hamid and the Austrian resolve to take advantage of the Turkish weakness. The arrival of the Young Turks meant a revived Ottoman movement which was a danger to all Christian peoples under Turkish rule. The Austro-Hungarian success in seizing Bosnia encouraged other Powers, both greater and less, to follow her example, by bolder annexations or more direct conquests. The Italian attack on Tripoli and the conquests of the Balkan League are the direct result of the Austro-Hungarian aggression in Bosnia. But Austria-Hungary, though the chief sinner, does not monopolise the guilt. In so far as she encouraged others by her example to attack the Turkish Empire, Austria-Hungary alone was responsible for dissolving the political truce in the Balkans which the Great Powers had maintained since 1878. But there was another problem in which all the Great Powers were concerned and for the settlement of which each had been responsible. That problem was the regulation of Macedonia, and it was the eventual abandonment of their work there by the Great Powers which furnished the other cause of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

XV

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION (1903-10)

THE new era, which opened for Serbia in 1903, brought a new dynasty and a national policy, and seemed to assure her a future. It is true there was the enmity of Austria-Hungary, but that danger, it could be argued, was balanced by the friendship of Russia. Those who reasoned thus forgot Macedonia. Serbia could no more avoid the Macedonian whirlpool in the twentieth century than she could in the thirteenth. The situation was not indeed dissimilar. The weakness of the Byzantine Empire in the thirteenth century forced Serbia to contest Macedonia with Bulgaria, for otherwise the latter would have become overwhelmingly strong. Similarly, the weakness of the Turkish Empire after 1878 and the power of the newly created Bulgaria turned Serbian aspirations towards Macedonia. At first danger was averted because Austria-Hungary protected Serbia, and Russia Bulgaria. Neither side could go to extremes, and after Slivnitsa Austria-Hungary protected Serbia against Bulgaria. There was thus a balance of power in the Balkans which kept the peace in Macedonia. This balance was upset in 1903, when the Karageorgevitch dynasty abandoned Austria-Hungary for Russia. Henceforth new developments in the Balkans were inevitable, and the struggle was fought out in Macedonia, where conflicting nationalities met.

Nationality is a recent but intense growth in the Balkans. Half a century ago Bulgars, Greeks, and Serbs

hated the Turk, now they hate one another, and this hatred has its fiercest expression in Macedonia. In the racial sense Macedonia seems a medley of tongues, a kaleidoscope of nationalities. But it seems difficult to say that nationality is false when it is so intensely asserted. The feeling of nationality, however artificial or assumed, is the most potent lever of political life in Macedonia. There is not any room for half-measures, for indifference, or for neutrality. Each man will stand by his nationality—even, if he has once assumed it, will live for it, lie for it, die for it. Of two brothers, one may call himself a Bulgar and the other a Greek, but each assumes the obligations of his nationality, for nothing can bridge the racial gulf between Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian.

Macedonia is full of inconsistencies. Some Bulgars still call themselves Greeks and would die for Bulgaria ; the Mussulmanised Serbs known as Arnauts are the bitterest foes of the Serb ; some of those who speak Bulgarian wish to be united to Serbia. These are but the effects of the strife of warring nationalities in Macedonia. Into that dark and turbid lake flow many waters—Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Greek—coloured with the soils of the lands from which they come. Yet the lake itself is disturbed not only by waters from afar, but by springs from within. There seems to be a Macedonian race, independent of these tributary streams—a race strong, repellent, virile, independent, ever ready to call in the stranger to its aid, and equally ready to abandon or deceive him at the first opportunity. Thus it is that Macedonia has remained a perpetual problem to all surrounding nations, a meeting-place and bloody debatable ground between the various aspirants to conquest and to fame. While the Turks still held her, Macedonia perpetually attracted the Balkan nations and perpetually distracted the Great Powers.

The Macedonian Question is the final vortex of all quarrels that are purely Balkan, and until this local disturbance is settled the Balkan States will continue to exert influence beyond their legitimate sphere, and to trouble waters that are more purely European. This aspect of the case was often overlooked or denied by the Great Powers, and the result was a remote cause of universal European war. The local interests of each Balkan Power in Macedonia became vital in the twentieth century, and forced on the crisis. The Turkish Empire, though still under the iron rule of Abdul Hamid, was believed to be nearing its end in Europe. Great disturbances had occurred in European Turkey, more were foreseen. These could not go on for ever, and therefore the remedies were two—either intervention by the Great Powers, or intervention by the small. The first experiment failed during the first decade; the second, attempted with partial success in the years 1912-13, ultimately merged itself in a colossal struggle for remodelling the map, not only of Macedonia, but of the world.

The claims of the Balkan Powers to the reversion of Turkish territory in Macedonia were all based on the plea that these Christian subjects were akin to them in blood and race. The claims made by Bulgar, Greek, and Serb defeat one another, and obscure the real facts. Macedonia, in the largest sense, has elements of Bulgarian, Serb, Greek, and Albanian races within it.¹ History

¹ The part of Macedonia now regarded as Greek was not so much in dispute, but included non-Greek elements. Macedonia was never a Turkish district, but as a general term includes the land bounded on the north by the Shar Dagh and Kara Dagh Mountains, on the east by the Rhodope Mountains and the Mesta, on the west by the Albanian Mountains and a line drawn through Ochrida Lake to touch the Greek boundary of 1878 at Metsovo, thence the southern boundary runs past Olympus to the Ægæan and Thasos Island. Thrace was never considered as part of Macedonia.

has been invoked and misrepresented by all parties in the dispute. The Greeks have pointed to Byzantine dominion in Macedonia, the Bulgars have claimed Alexander the Great as a blood brother, and the Serbians have discovered the primitive elements of their race in these territories. Party politics have invaded history and blinded or confused the issue, and even the most scholarly and accurate of Balkan historians have not been able to escape from the blinding force of prejudice. History as she is written in the Balkans is a dangerous guide, for the historian must deal not only with memories but with hopes.

To an unprejudiced observer some facts in Macedonian history are self-evident. It is certain that though the Greeks retained the coastal area, autonomous Slavs settled in the interior of Macedonia. At an early date other elements were added by the infiltration of Albanians, and of that strange race—the Kutzo-Vlachs or nomadic Roumans; then Macedonia was influenced by Kosger and more permanent conquerors, Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Serbian. The long period of Byzantine rule did not turn the inhabitants into Greeks, though it made many proselytes.¹ Bulgarian claims to Macedonia rest on some centuries of rule and on two empires; Serbian claims rest on one shortlived empire and upon two centuries of confusion, during which Serb princelets ruled West Macedonia. Yet Serbian architecture has left deeper traces on fortress, convent, and church than Bulgarian ever did, thus proving that an influence may be more enduring than a domination. It is certain that the bulk of the Macedonian population is Slav—it is by no means certain that it is Bulgar. There is much, therefore, to be said for the view that the real population is neither Bulgarian nor Serbian, but half-way between

¹ *E.g.* even in Stephen Dushan's time there was a party of "Greeks" in Skoplje.

the two.¹ According to this view the autonomous Macedonian would then be neither one nor the other, but the product of those original Slav tribes which settled in these districts about the time Serbians or Bulgars settled elsewhere. This fact explains why Bulgar and Serbian can both plausibly claim the bulk of this population as their own blood-kinsmen. There is a Macedonian language and a Macedonian race, which can understand the tongue and adapt itself to the customs of either Bulgarian or Serbian, but which is in itself independent of either. Given the necessary time, money, intimidation, inducement, and educational pressure, the Macedonian can probably be assimilated to one or the other competing race. But if the history of past ages is really to have weight, Slavonic Macedonia should be autonomous and independent. On the other hand, if history is to be disregarded and expediency advanced as the principle, then the settlement depends not only on existing political conditions in Macedonia, but upon the balance of power outside it.

The history of Macedonia in the past having failed to give a decisive Bulgarian stamp to the whole population, the question remained to be solved by the politics of the present. These were decisively altered in the seventies of the nineteenth century by two events of great importance, the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1870-72) and the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin. Both gave a considerable impetus to Bulgarian propaganda, and a corresponding depression to that of Serbia.

¹ The whole problem is still an unsettled one. The Macedonian Question has a vast literature of its own. The best summary for the general reader is Brailsford's *Macedonia*, London 1906. The latest views of Cvijić—which have undergone several changes—are given in *Des Questions Balkaniques*, Paris 1916. The Serbian case is moderately stated by Professor Paule Popović. The Bulgarian case may be found in many writers, and is moderately given by Constantine Jirecek.

In earlier days Prince Michael of Serbia had exploited Bulgarian discontent and fostered Bulgarian schools in the hope of eventually ruling a united Serbo-Bulgarian people. The creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate (from 1870-72) was intended by the Turks as a blow to the Greeks, whose schools were turning the population of Macedonia into Hellenes. It was equally a blow to the Serbians. A Slavonic Exarchate was erected, which was to be independent of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. The Exarch was to hold ecclesiastical jurisdiction in specified districts of Macedonia and of modern Bulgaria—wherever two-thirds of the population of a district expressed a desire to come under the Exarch's sway. This Exarchate was intended by the Turks to be a centre of Slavonic influence which would arrest the Greek influence in Macedonia. But the Exarchate soon proved anti-Serb as well as anti-Greek, and became the centre of Bulgarian intrigues for independence. In 1878, as the result of the Russian War, the Turks closed the Serbian schools in Macedonia, and henceforward the Serbian pressure and penetration of Macedonia became purely external. Bulgaria became autonomous and powerful, and used the Exarchate as an instrument for Bulgarian propaganda throughout Macedonia. At the same time Greece, by means of her schools and her monks, continued the Hellenising process. Both races subsidised brigands or revolutionaries to promote their national propaganda. The Serbians, with little money and no schools for propaganda, were left behind in the struggle. All that they could do was to hold out some hopes to the brigand chiefs and bands who called themselves Serbs and to lend them unofficial support. At the same time the Turkish misgovernment combined with the propaganda of the then interested neighbours to produce great unrest, misery, and suffering throughout Macedonia. The inhabitants were exposed to blackmail

from brigands, and to even worse fiscal robbery from Turks. Bands of *comitadjis*—Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian, or Albanian—periodically oppressed and maltreated various districts. One often saw the peasant labouring with his gun at his back even when between the stilts of his plough. Women were violated or villages exterminated at the pleasure of brigands. Plains naturally rich and fertile became deserts, and whether Turk, Greek, Serb, or Bulgar triumphed, the Macedonian always suffered.

It was possible, perhaps necessary, for the Great Powers to look on while Armenia was bleeding, but they could not disregard the sufferings of Macedonia. Too many interests were involved, too many ambitions were concentrated there. Austria-Hungary dreamed of a port at Salonica, Russia of a capital at Byzantium; Germany, reflecting longer calculations of her own, planned for a road through to Mesopotamia, a railway to the Persian Gulf. For the Great Powers Macedonia was a stepping-stone to other and higher objects, for the Balkan states it was the goal itself. Serbia dreamed of reviving the glories of Dushan, Bulgaria of the days of Czar Simeon, Greece of Byzantine emperors who had ruled Macedonia for ten centuries. During the period of the Armenian massacres the Russian Government had bitterly declared that the example of Bulgaria did not incline her towards supporting autonomy for Armenia. Yet when Macedonia was disturbed Russia could not stand idle, for disturbance in Macedonia meant the triumph of the Turk or the extension of Bulgarian influence, and to both Russian interests were opposed. This attitude was strengthened by the fact that Russia was absorbed in the Far East at the beginning of the twentieth century, and wished to settle Manchuria before she turned to Macedonia; consequently her aim was to suppress disturbance by promoting good government and by reforming administration in Macedonia.

After 1886 the real disturbing factor of the situation was the growth in the power of Bulgaria and the influence of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In 1885-86 Bulgaria almost doubled her territory by the accession of eastern Rumelia, beat Serbia in battle, obtained a new and ambitious sovereign in Ferdinand the present ruler, and defied Russia. The Bulgarians had been abandoned by Russia, but this fact did not diminish their energy or success. The people, frugal, hardy, and industrious, were good tax-payers and good soldiers, proved capable of paying their way, of constructing good roads, and of initiating some industrial development. It is safe to say that all true Bulgars had and have but one object—summed up in one word—Macedonia. For them the treaty of San Stefano was the Law and the Prophets. The limits assigned to them in the treaty of San Stefano would have given them Vrania, the Lake of Ochrida, Koritza, Kastoria, and the lower reaches of the Vardar. Though it gave them neither Salonica nor the Chalcidic Peninsula, it would have opened a path to the sea at Cavalla and given them the outlet for the rich tobacco-districts of Thrace. Since 1878 this vision of a literally promised land has been always before their eyes. A map marking the lost territory of Macedonia hung in every Bulgarian school, and every Bulgarian peasant brooded over its loss and resolved in his sullen, dogged fashion to win it back. A Macedonian party well provided with newspapers and bombs—that is, with the theory and practice of intimidation—existed to put pressure on all politicians. There were Macedonian officers in the army and Macedonian ministers in the cabinet. In the Exarchate the Bulgarian Government possessed a lever of propaganda which could be and was used with entire ruthlessness and inflexible purpose to transform the inhabitants of Macedonia into Bulgars; they met with a considerable measure of success, and by bribes, violence, and

cajolery secured that the bulk of Macedonians, if not Bulgarian, should at least be Bulgarophile. If that result was really based on conviction and not on intimidation, that fact and not the dubious historical title-deeds would constitute the true Bulgar claim to Macedonia.

But though Bulgaria might plot and scheme, it was still possible for the Great Powers to check her aspirations. The first step towards reforming Macedonia was taken by a *rapprochement* and mutual explanation between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments in 1897, which amounted to a repudiation by both parties of designs of conquest in the Balkans, and to a public avowal of their resolve to maintain the *status quo*. This arrangement kept the Near East quiet till the first years of the twentieth century. At length, in 1902, the combined forces of Turkish misgovernment, Balkan brigandage, and Macedonian misery threatened to produce an insurrection, and the two Great Powers chiefly concerned again made efforts to improve the state of Macedonia. This new effort resulted in an agreement between the two Governments, the substance of which was presented to the Porte on 21st February 1903, and hence became known as the "February Programme." Reforms were suggested in the districts of Salonica, of Kossovo, and of Monastir, and a Turkish Inspector-General was appointed to carry them out. But neither reforms nor Inspector-General could avert the Macedonian insurrection which burst out in the summer of 1903.

Under pressure from the British Government, Austria-Hungary and Russia again combined to settle the Macedonian problems. Sovereigns and diplomats met at a Styrian shooting-box and produced the famous Mürzsteg Programme. This agreement was said to have been influenced in the Russian sense by the carelessness of the Austrian Count Goluchowski, who was out with the guns

at a time when important clauses of the programme were being drafted. The main idea of the programme was to make Austria-Hungary and Russia jointly responsible for arrangements by which the Porte would be compelled to carry out reforms. The Turkish Inspector-General was to be accompanied by a Russian and an Austro-Hungarian Civil Agent on all his visits of inspection, who could see for themselves and report on the situation to their own Governments. The Civil Agents were appointed for a period of two years. Mixed Mussulman and Christian Commissions under Russian and Austro-Hungarian surveillance were to deal with political crimes and with measures to repair the losses produced by the insurrection. A foreign general was to organise and to control a Gendarmerie force for the maintenance of order, assisted by officers drawn from among the Great Powers. The fourth clause provided for the admission of local Christians to some share in local administration and in the judicial system. So far the clauses were concerned with the Turkish Government, and it was largely responsible for the failure to carry them out.

But there was another clause, the third of the programme, which reacted on Balkan politics in a tragic manner, and whose sinister consequences brought more evil to Macedonia than all the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. This clause provided that, when the country had been pacified, the Turkish Government should be requested to modify the territorial delimitation of the existing Turkish administrative districts, in order to secure "a more regular grouping of the various Macedonian races." This clause, in appearance harmless enough, was in result most fatal. Each of the smaller Balkan peoples realised that its claims to a large enclave for its own race would depend on the vigour and extent to which it staked out its claims before pacification. Each

brigand band therefore started a policy of massacre and intimidation wherever the nationality of a village or of a district differed from its own. For years a terrible series of massacres went on, in which brigands generally and bishops sometimes led armed bands to unholy conquests of the faith, which the foreign Gendarmerie could not prevent and which the Turkish Government openly encouraged. All the Balkan nations had their share of blame, but it seems to be generally admitted that the Greeks and Bulgars were the worst. Finally the Great Powers interfered, and in August 1907 the intervention of England brought Austria-Hungary and subsequently Russia to agree to the abrogation of this fatal clause, which in a very literal sense had been written in red.

For the failure of the third clause the Great Powers were not primarily responsible, but the carrying out of other parts of the programme was the task first of Russia and eventually of the Concert of Europe. Ultimately the Müritzsteg Programme was internationalised. Macedonia was divided into five spheres, over each of which one of the Great Powers presided, with the ominous exception of Germany which stood aloof.¹ Parts of the district of Monastir and most of that of Kossovo (the most disturbed area) were, however, excluded from this arrangement. The Gendarmerie was reformed, better order was kept, and excellent work done by an International Finance Commission which controlled and reformed Macedonian finance. The credit was largely due to England, which untiringly supported the work of amelioration, and was aided by Italy, then by France in April 1904, and ultimately by Russia. Finally, in November 1905, England took the lead in a naval

¹ Austria-Hungary, sphere of Kossovo ; France, sphere of Seres ; Italy, sphere of Monastir ; Great Britain, sphere of Drama ; Russia, sphere of Salonica.

demonstration at Mitylene, which forced the Turk to accept the financial reforms. Austria-Hungary was not by any means disinterested in the matter, and steadily opposed any attempt to internationalise the work. Had there not been a clause in the Mürzsteg agreement that the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Civil Agents were only appointed for two years, Austro-Hungarian opposition to the internationalised control, which was aided by Germany, might have been successful. German diplomacy, always tender to the Turk since the fall of Bismarck, seems to have been steadily averse from putting pressure on the Porte. Germany refused to take part in the work of Gendarmerie reform, and took over no sphere of police influence in Macedonia, though she was represented on the financial Commission. Her motives and those of Austria were probably different, for it is a mistake to suppose that their political aims were identical before 1913. Germany seems to have wished to avoid any action that would offend the Turk, Austria-Hungary to avoid any action which would avert the "Drang nach Osten" by interposing a neutralised or internationalised barrier between Vienna and Salonica. Both Powers therefore, though for different reasons, preferred that Macedonia should suffer.

The consequences of German opposition and of Austro-Hungarian resistance to the internationalised control of Macedonia were very serious. Its causes have been elsewhere discussed, and are still one of the mysteries of diplomacy. It is reasonably certain, however, that Austria-Hungary, under the masterful guidance of Aehrenthal, wished to strike out a new line and push on towards the East. As she was supported by Germany, she was able to put the brake on the international machine.

In 1908-9 several efforts made by England to increase the efficacy of the measures failed, and the Powers of

the Entente seem to have finally decided to abandon further interference. Their motives were probably two—fear of driving Austria into war, and belief in the efficacy of the Young Turkish movement.

In July 1908 one of the most remarkable movements of our time burst forth. At Salonica there had long been a Committee of Moslems and Jews, which had planned a Young Turkish movement, and which had established relations with the Mohammedans of Macedonia. The movement owed its strength to Jewish capital, Macedonian brigandage, and Turkish resentment of the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. Two young officers, Niazi Bey and Enver Bey, the latter afterwards destined to a sinister renown, raised the flag of rebellion and of European liberalism in Macedonia. At a tumble-down inn at Resnja, near Monastir, the Constitution was proclaimed. The movement had wonderful success and spread like a prairie-fire. Abdul Hamid acknowledged the Constitution, and the phrases of liberty were on the lips of all. Tyranny was overthrown, liberty triumphant, and a wave of lyric enthusiasm swept through Macedonia. Albanians fired off revolvers to celebrate the "Constitution"; the Greek Archbishop and the Bulgarian Committee Chairman embraced at Seres; a Bulgarian *comitadju* chief fraternised with the Pasha of Monastir; Christians and Mohammedans kissed one another in the streets; free Greece sent her greeting to free Turkey. "Henceforth," said Enver Bey, "we are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Roumans, Jews, Mussulmans under the same blue sky; we are all equal, we glory in being Ottoman!"

In all movements of enthusiasm, in 1908 as in 1848 and in 1789, there was the terrible power of intrigue, calculation, and design behind the lyric rhapsodies celebrating the fall of a cruel despotism. Yet it is difficult

to suppose that the movement was altogether a sham even to such hardened conspirators as the Turks. Many of the revolutionists were young and unpractical, all had found the Hamidian tyranny insupportable. In the gladness of relief and in the enthusiasm of different creeds and races there was, for a moment, a hope of a new heaven and a new earth—that is, of a Macedonia at peace. The vision faded soon enough, yet it was a dazzling one. It certainly affected the diplomats, and in this dream of a free and a liberal Turkey some saw the solution of the Macedonian problem. Certain it is that from the time of the establishment of the Young Turks, Macedonian reform schemes were doomed. But though sentiment undoubtedly affected diplomacy, there were also more practical considerations. The long and steady opposition of Austria-Hungary to the reform schemes was immensely strengthened by the vision of a liberalised Turkish Empire. It had become apparent already that the path of Macedonian reforms might lead to war, and that the simplest solution was to abandon them altogether. England's last attempts in 1908-9 to revive or maintain the reform schemes were unsuccessful, and the whole question was quietly dropped. For this the responsibility undoubtedly rests on Austria-Hungary, who with German support had pushed her opposition to the reforms to the verge of war, and the events of 1908-9 proved that this was a contingency which the Entente then declined to face.

The practical effect of the situation was to close an epoch. The Great Powers had sought to reform Macedonia, and had not only failed but had abandoned the project altogether. Only two courses remained for the small Balkan Powers—either to trust in the Young Turks, or to reform Macedonia themselves. Trust in the Young Turks was speedily dispelled. The promises of Enver vanished into thin air. It soon became apparent

that Young Turk and Old Tyrant were not very different in aim, however much they differed in name. Editors or opponents of the Young Turks died suddenly of mysterious diseases or from open assassination. In certain directions and in certain places, as for instance in Adrianople, some real progress and improvement was achieved. But in those parts of Turkey not under European observation a very different tale began to be told. Even the Albanians, the spoilt children of Abdul Hamid, who were for the most part co-religionists of the Young Turk, were not left in peace. Their beys were flogged and tortured, their language was suppressed, they themselves were persecuted, and Turkish armies penetrated even into the northern fastnesses of Albania. So many fugitives fled to Montenegro that old King Nicholas declared that even war would be preferable to providing for so many refugees. If the Albanian atrocities could be defended on the ground that they were measures of war, the same could not be said of the treatment of the Macedonians, with whom the Turks were professedly at peace. Life and property were less secure than ever, though the Macedonian was now disarmed, persecuted, cowed, robbed, or injured, not by brigands, but by Young Turkish soldiers or officials. The general policy may be illustrated by two incidents which came under my own notice in 1910. A Bulgarian at Ochrida refused to pay taxes and fled up to the mountains. The Turkish soldiers descended on his house, set it on fire, and drove his family out on the hillside. "So this is your liberty, this is your equality!" muttered the crowd, as they stood round the flaming house.¹ Again, at Cavalla, where there is a mixed Greek and Mohammedan population, a Turk murdered a Greek in cold blood.

¹ I afterwards found that this incident, like so many others, would have been denied by the Turkish Government but for the fact that it happened to have been witnessed by myself and another Englishman.

The Greek workmen in a certain factory thereupon struck work as a protest. They were summoned before the Governor, a Muslimised Jew, who addressed them as follows: "Your conduct is treacherous. You are not Greeks but Turks. You wish to be Slavs and Greeks in secret communication with those outside the Turkish Empire. You may have secret arms as you have secret opinions. Rest assured we shall find out both! For every musket you have we have two, for every one of your bullets we have six!" This, then, was the end of brotherhood and equality, of Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, and Turks embracing one another beneath the blue sky of heaven and glorying in the name of Ottoman.

Long before 1910 it had become evident to diplomats that the Young Turkish constitutionalism only differed from Old Turkish despotism in being more tyrannical. It was more oppressive because it was intended to be more efficient and progressive in all that concerned the science of destruction. It aimed at a centralised military despotism, armed with German science and discipline, crushing all resistance in the name of Ottoman nationality. So far from being lenient towards other needs and nationalities, it was even less tolerant than Abdul Hamid. That astute tyrant, conscious of his weakness, had played Greek off against Bulgar and Albanian against Serb. The Young Turks, confident in a new strength, seem genuinely to have believed that they could denationalise the Christians of Macedonia and absorb the Albanians. Unmistakable signs of this policy appeared: the population, Christian or Mohammedan, was forcibly disarmed; some schools were suppressed, and some military colonies of Mohammedans were planted in Christian territory. Ultimately the Albanians were attacked in force, their territory overrun, their beys arrested, and their population dis-

armed. These instances of tyranny were but the sketches of a larger plan of universal Osmanisation. If they were to be carried out, the hopes of the small nations of the Balkans were doomed. Considering their present and their past, it is not surprising that these tiny states resolved to have a future.

The Great Powers had withdrawn from the struggle of reforming Macedonia, and if anything was to be done the small states must act for themselves. The idea of such action had long been dormant, and had been expressed as far back as 1891 by the famous Greek statesman Trikoupis when he struck out the phrase "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples." But the real unity and the real solution of the Balkan problems necessarily depended on friendship and alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria. Such a reconciliation was rendered possible by the accession of King Peter. It had developed in the years 1905-7 on the line of economic agreements, and would undoubtedly have gone further but for the arbitrary action of Austria, which interfered with these arrangements by declaring the "pig-war." Subsequently her annexation of Bosnia threatened Serbia directly and Bulgaria indirectly, and enabled Russia, for almost the first time, to support the claims of both. The interests of both nations, which had previously at times been influenced by a pro-Turkish policy, seemed now to point to a reliance on Russia. This was the inner cause of the Balkan League, and of that diplomatic revolution which brought the Bulgarians and Serbians into the same orbit. The adhesion of Greece is easier to explain, because the success of the Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia had already brought Greeks and Serbs into good relations and, when Serbia was reconciled to Bulgaria, there was no reason for Greece to lag behind. As for Montenegro, she was gathered in by the action of the other states. Thus the forces leading towards an

alliance against the Turk were all present. Despairing of assistance from the Great Powers, dreading and hating the Turk, who stood between them and their future, the Balkan states realised at last that unity was their interest and division their destruction. It needed only firm policies and commanding personalities for these little states to produce great events. None of these elements were wanting, and the result was the Balkan League and the startling changes of 1912 and 1913.

It has been said that rebellion and discontent, after being endemic in Macedonia, at length became an epidemic which affected all surrounding peoples. This epigram contains a profound truth. The Balkan peoples could not stand idly by when their brethren were perishing, when the Turk was increasing his oppression, and when the Great Powers were unable to intervene. Serbia and Bulgaria and Greece, from being national states, were gradually drawn into a struggle which involved imperialistic ambitions for each of them. The time had gone by when an increase of power to a Balkan state could be viewed by the Great Powers with equanimity. In Europe the balance of power had been perfect and the needle had poised evenly between the two great diplomatic combinations, until Macedonia had upset the equilibrium.

In the narrowest sense a settlement of Macedonia was vital to Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. In the larger sense it was equally vital to the Great Powers. For the valleys of the Vardar and the Maritza control the railways which lead to Salonica and Constantinople, and the power which controls Macedonia must ultimately control these two routes. Thus a Serbia leagued with Bulgaria in a peaceful control of Macedonia would have opposed an almost impregnable barrier to German and Austrian aspirations. The last would not have

reached Salonica, the first would have been cut off from Constantinople and Bagdad. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia blocked the road to the Ægæan and the Euphrates.

Yet even before the Balkan League became a reality, Serbia had reached a decisive point in her national history. As in the days of old, she nurtured her strength in the lands between the Drina and the Morava before she expanded to the Vardar. As in the days of Dushan, the transition from a purely local and national policy to one of expansion in Macedonia was marked by the most serious dangers. As in those days, there was danger over the Danube as well as danger from Bulgaria and Byzantium. In one sense the world had changed, for economic forces had strengthened. These forces might have allowed Serbia to exist as an inland state with national independence in the fourteenth century, they could not allow her so to exist in the twentieth. Powerful neighbours made it clear to Serbia that, if she did not obey them, they could compass her destruction, and thus offered her the choice between dependence and extinction. There was no doubt about the choice or about the decision. If Serbian statesmen retained any illusions in 1906 they could not have preserved them after 1909. Yet with the consent of the nation they then made a choice which they knew to be irrevocable, and pursued a path which they saw to be full of peril. Serbia was bound by a chain to the heroic memories of Kara George and of Kossovo, and prized national independence above every material gain. Sooner than forget the past, she preferred to endure the present and to risk the future, and by this final decision asserted her right to be a nation.

APPENDIX

CAPTAIN W. M. LEAKE'S REPORT ON MACEDONIA

Salonica, 25th Jan. 1807 [Record Office F.O. Turkey, vol. 57]

THE following notes of a tour by a British Agent in 1807, whose main report is elsewhere referred to, have not so far as I know yet been published. They are reproduced here, as they are of interest even to-day. The spelling, etc., is as in the original : a list of modern names or equivalents is given at the end of the report.

SALONICA, 25th January 1807.

MY LORD,¹—I had the honor of representing in my No. 4 of last year, the motive which had induced me to await for some time at Corfú, the instructions of Government, a resolution, in which I had been supported by the advice of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

But unwilling to lose the only season, which my health would allow me to employ in travelling, I determined on proceeding through such of the eastern provinces of Roumilé, as I had not yet seen, and having left Corfú in the beginning of September, I passed by sea to Mount *Athos*, from whence I made the tour of part of the *Chalcidic* Peninsula, and by the antient *Amphipolis* to Serres, from whence I proceeded to this place. I soon after pursued my tour through *Macedonia* by the way of Jenige and Vodhená and from thence southward to Veria, and across the great barrier of mountains, which separated the *upper* and *lower Macedonians* into the plains of the River *Haliacmon* by Kózani and Selfigé to Elasoná and Lária. From thence I returned by the vale of *Tempe* and the coast of the *Thermaic* Gulf to this city.

My chief object in this tour was to ascertain the military features of the country and from the remotest points, which I visited, to obtain some information respecting the interior pro-

¹ Right Honorable Lord Viscount Howick, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

vinces, and particularly concerning the great routes, which cross from the plains of Servia, Sófia, and Filippópolis to those of Serres and Salonica, as well as the divisions between these latter, and those of *Thessaly* and *Upper Macedonia*, which occupy the interior part of the *Grecian Peninsula*.

The result of these enquiries, I shall now have the honor of laying before your Lordship, together with a sketch of the geography of these provinces, illustrative of the observations which follow, and constructed with as much attention to accuracy, as the want of time and materials would admit.

The plains of Servia and Sófia as well as the vallies of the *Hebrus*, which extend from Basargik to Adrianople are separated from the plains of the *Strymon* and *Axius* by the great chain of mountains, called by the antients *Rhodope*. The road from Serres, the chief town in the *Strymonic* plain, to Filippópolis, the capital of that of the *Hebrus*, is a journey of six or seven days, great part of it over Mount Dhespát, the highest summit of the range of *Rhodope*. But the ordinary track from Serres into the champaign country on the north of Mt. *Rhodope*, leads along the left bank of the *Strymon*, or over the hills at no great distance from it, as far as the sources of that river at Dupnitza,¹ from whence there are roads, branching to Guistendil, Sófia, Basargik, and Filippópolis. The chief pass in this road, is a point about half way between Meléncio and Dgiumá, where precipices overhang the banks of the river, and leave scarcely the passage, necessary for a horse. It is called the Sérbená Dervény.

These are the usual routes from Serres into the northern plains, but they are too difficult to be worthy of much consideration in a military point of view. The two chief passes of this range of mountains, and those alone worthy of much attention are—

1. The Pass of Katzaniti.
2. The Pass of Mastoritza.

The first is very short, leaving the upper plains of the *Axius* or Vardar four hours above Scopia and crossing in three hours into the hilly country at the back of Presdin. The shortness and narrowness of this pass, joined to the rugged nature of the mountain, render it of the utmost importance. It seems to have been fortified in all ages, and is now in the hands of a colony of Albanian banditti, who suffer no travellers to pass unmolested, unless they go in a sufficient body to command respect.

2. The Pass of Mastoritza begins at the town of Vrania, and continues for six hours along a narrow valley to Mastoritza, from whence begins the passage of a woody mountain, which continues

¹ About Dupnitza and Guistendil are the sources of the *Strymon*, *Hebrus*, and of some of the branches of the Danube.

for eight hours to within a short distance of Lescóvitza in the plains of Servia. This pass though much longer, than that of Katzaniti, is not so rugged or so easily defended.

Such are the two defiles, which being the only openings, that lead from the northern frontiers of Turkey into *Greece*, are evidently the most important on the western side of European Turkey. And there is a third, which relatively to *Thrace* and Constantinople has the same degree of importance, as the two others in regard to *Greece*. This is the antient pass of Trajan's Gate between Sófia and Basargék. The road crosses a range of hills of no great height or difficulty, extending for six hours, between Iktiman at the extremity of the Valley of Sófia to Jenikieny on the edge of the plain of the *Hebrus*. The most difficult passage is in the middle at a point called Capulic Dervény, where there is a Turkish guard.

Before leaving *Macedonia*, it is right to mention a defile of some importance, which separates the lower plains of the *Axius* at the head of the *Thermaic* Gulf from the upper plains of the same river around Velisá and Scópia. It is called Demir-Capé or the Iron-Gate, being a point where the Vardar runs between two rocky steeps, over one of which a road of a mile in length has been formed, and in one place cut to a considerable height through the solid rock. This pass is likewise a point of communication between the plains of Salonica, and those of the Tcherná or *Erigon*, and becomes therefore of very great importance, if a corps of troops, marching from Durazzo and the western coast, and desirous of avoiding the mountains, which lie between Monastir and Vodhená should pursue the plains of the Tcherná and Vardar. Even in this case, however, they would have to pass a lofty chain of hills extending for four hours between Pýrlipé and Tikfis, called the Mountain of Morikhovo.

It now remains for me to describe the communications between the plains, occupying the extremity of the *Thermaic* Gulf and those of *Thessaly* and *upper Macedon*.

Having in former letters remarked the construction of the country of *Thessaly*, and the adjacent regions, it is only necessary to recapitulate that the champaign districts occupy all the center of the Peninsula of Roumilé, being bounded on the west by the great range of *Pindus*, on the north by the chain of mountains, which extend from Larisa, and Tréjala to Okhri; on the south, by the ridges of *Othrys* and *Dolopia*, and on the east by the continued barrier of *Pelion*, *Ossa*, and *Olympus*, the last being connected with the range, which lies at the back of Véria and Naoussa, and is separated only by the pass of Vodhená from the great mountains, which border the plains of the Tcherná on the south.

There are only three passages through the eastern barrier—

1. The antient *Tempe*, called by the Turks the pass of Babá, where the *Peneus* runs for five miles between the rocky precipices of *Ossa* and *Olympus*, leaving only the space sufficient for a narrow road. This pass is of so very formidable a nature, that it would be impossible for an army to force it, in the presence of an active enemy. *Xerxes* with his millions would not venture to attempt it, but preferred a circuitous route through *Upper Macedon*. Which of the two remaining passages he took, is not quite evident, but probability seems to incline in favor of that which leads from Veria to Selfigé across Mount *Citarius*, a little on the right of the impracticable gorges, where the River Vistritza finds its way from the plain of Selfigé into that at the head of the *Thermaic Gulf*.

2. The passage of Mount *Citarius*, demands five hours, and is much shorter and easier than the third route, which leads from Caterina to Elasona, crossing to the north of the great summits of *Olympus*, by very difficult heights.

3. This, last is usually called the pass of Petra, from a remarkable opening in the rocks near the summit of the ridge, where once stood a town of the name of Petra.

Though this passage of Mount *Olympus* is much longer and more difficult than that of Mount *Citarius* behind Veria yet it must be remarked, that it leads directly into the vallies, which conduct to Elasona and Larisa, whereas the latter route, which leads to Selfigé, has to surmount a very remarkable pass at the back of that town, over Mount *Pieria* before it attains the same vallies.

In the course of my late tours I have followed from Orfana to Vodhená the course of the Roman road called the *Ignatian Way*, which antiently was measured and marked with mile-stones all the way from *Dyrrhachium* to the mouth of the *Hebrus*. From Salonica to Vodhená, it crossed for near fifty miles the vast plain at the head of the *Thermaic Gulf*, where formerly stood the cities of *Thessalonica*, *Pella*, *Edessa*, and *Berrhæa*. At Vodhená the antient *Edessa*, the *Via Ignatia* entered the mountains, and crossed by the lake of Ostrovo into the plains of Petolia (Monastir). These are divided from the plain and lake of Okhri, by the mountain, which lies at the back of that town. The lake extends for twelve miles to Struga, where the vallies are again separated from the great levels of Upper Albania, and the plains of *Dyrrhachium* and *Apollonia*, by the lofty mountains, which lie on the east side of Elbassan and are called Mount *Candavia* by *Cicero*, *Strabo*, and other antient authors.

It appears therefore that the *Ignatian Way* presents four difficult passages between Salonica and Durazzo. 1. From Vodhená to Ostrovo by the pass of Vládova, a very strong and narrow defile, which I visited at a few miles beyond Vodhená.

2. From Ostrovo to Tilbeli, a march of four hours over the mountain of Kurnitziova. 3. In passing from the plains of Petolia, watered by the *Erigon*, into those of Okhri, the antient *Lychnidus*, there is a passage of five hours, across the mountain, which lies at the back of Okhri on this side. (4) The passage of Mount *Candavia*, lying between Struga and Elbassan, and requiring a two days' march over the summits. It is the most difficult of the four passages I have mentioned, and the principal obstacle to the progress of an army from Durazzo to Salonica.

The route from Salonica to Constantinople meets with no difficulties, 'till where it passes through a narrow opening at the end of the lake of Bisikia (antiently called *Bolbe*), into the plain of *Strymonic* Gulf. The next is that of Cavalla, the most important perhaps in the whole route, formed by a part of Mount *Pangaion* extending into the sea. Beyond this point the chief obstacles in the march to Constantinople, are the passages of the rivers *Nestus* and *Hebrus*, and of the mountain called Tekir Dagħ on the west of Ródosto.

From the above account of the *Via Ignatia*, your Lordship will remark, that it not only affords the most direct and easy route across the Continent of Roumili to Constantinople, but conducts through some of the richest countries of European Turkey, particularly the plains of Salonica and Serres, the latter of which, together with the adjacent district of Zikhna, is renowned for being the best cultivated region in all this continent.

To the westward of Salonica also, the plains of Okhri and Petolia furnish ample resources to an invader. It must be allowed indeed, that it would be an undertaking of some difficulty to gain a footing in the Albanian plains of the western coast, the jealousy of that warlike people being likely to present a formidable barrier to the intrusions of a foreign Power. The French Government, however, seems to be at work to surmount this difficulty, having lately established a political Agent at Scodra, the seat of Government of the Chieftain, whose influence extends over all the martial tribes of Northern Albania. There is even some reason to believe that the Enemy has long seen the advantage of this route across Roumili, as I have been repeatedly informed by Greeks, who conversed with Bonaparte at Trieste, when he entered that city in 1797 that he held out to them promises of restoring their antient liberty by landing forty thousand French in the Gulf of Avlona.

I shall conclude this letter, my Lord, by a few words respecting the political condition of the northern parts of Greece and Albania.

All the country lying to the south of Servia, as far as the territories of Ali Pasha may be divided into three provinces. 1. The country commanded by Ismail Bey of Serres. 2. The northern part of Albania inhabited by the tribes called Ghéghe

(Ghegs), where the influence of Ibrahim Pasha of Scodra is predominant. 3. The province of Salonica.

1. Next to Ali Pasha of Ioannina, the Bey of Serres is perhaps the most powerful chieftain in European Turkey. Like Ali Pasha, his authority in the districts, his commands is unlimited, the regions themselves are some of the most productive of this country, and his riches give him the ability to make use of his other advantages to the utmost. He has been rapidly increasing his power during the last few years, and his authority now extends northward to the districts of Sharkieny, Sófia, and Filippópolis, westward to Ishtip, and eastward to Gumergina. To the south, the summits of the mountains, which border the *Strymonic* plain on that side, separate his province from that of Salonica. It is supposed the troops of Ismail Bey in regular pay do not exceed two thousand, though upon occasion, he might easily raise fifteen or twenty thousand. These, like the generality of the Turkish troops, have many of the qualities, adapted to make excellent soldiers, but in their present undisciplined state, are best calculated to keep in awe the ferocious populace of *Macedon*, or engage in a desultory warfare with the neighbouring chieftains.

2. The country, commanded by Ibrahim Pasha of Scodra, though deprived of most of the local advantages, and rich productions of the plains of *lower Macedon* furnishes in a superior degree those hardy mountaineers, from whom the best Albanian troops are extracted. Many of those in the north-western parts are Catholics. Ibrahim Pasha is supposed capable of bringing into the field a force of thirty thousand men upon an occasion of necessity, and I am inclined to think they would not amount to much less than that number, though it is likely that the urgency would never occur, but in the defence of his own authority, and that his want of pecuniary resources would not allow him to keep such a force united for any considerable length of time.

3. The province of Salonica includes all the *Chalcidic* Peninsula as far as Mount *Athos*, together with the fine plains, which lie at the head of the *Thermaic* Gulf. This rich country is chiefly owned by a few great proprietors, who reside in the Gulf of Salonica, where they usurp such an influence, that the Pasha is a mere cypher, unless he comes accompanied with a sufficient body of attendants to enforce his authority. But this seldom happens, as the poverty of the Pashas, and the large sums they are obliged to pay at the Porte for their appointments, generally disable them from any such exertion.

The population of the three provinces, to which I have had the honor to direct your Lordship's attention, is nearly equally divided between Christians and Mussulmans, though perhaps rather inclining in favor of the latter, as many of the Greeks have

emigrated within the last few years, and many others have changed their religion, in order to avoid the dreadful oppressions to which the Rayahs are subjected.

In the provinces of Salonica, Serres and Monastir, the Yeureuks of the *Chalcidic* peninsula, and of the districts of Sarigheul, Karagióvasi, Tikfis, Caradagh, Orfana, and many others to the north of Serres, contribute the largest share to the Turkish proportion of the population. These people live in small detached hamlets, and raise the greater part of the tobacco which is exported from Salonica. They were Asiatics, settled in the country, by Sultan Murat the Second, at the time of his conquest of Salonica, with gifts of land, as a reward for their services, under condition of serving six months, with their own arms, whenever called upon. They are reckoned capable of collecting twenty thousand troops, but no more than two thousand have as yet been summoned, half of them destined to march to the frontiers, and the rest for the Morea.¹ The Yeureuks are under the separate Government of a Bey, and it is generally one of the Beys of Salonica who purchases their appointment from the Porte.

To the eastward of the *Strymon*, as far as the Black Sea, and Mount Balkan, the proportion may be three to two in favor of the Turks, when the large cities of Constantinople and Adrianople and the populous districts of Kirgilá, are taken into consideration.

But to the northward of the great range of *Haemus* and *Rhodope* are all Christians, with the exception of the inhabitants of the great towns in Bulgaria.

I have thought it right to state these leading facts on the subject of the population of European Turkey, as it may lead to a judgement of the probable result of the present contest between the Turks and Russians, and of what is likely to be the progress of the latter in a country, where so large a share of the population is inclined to favor their cause. Nor upon reflexion will it appear that they can meet with any formidable opposition to the south of Mount Balkan, if they should succeed in penetrating through the passes of that barrier. For almost the only force that can be brought against them will be the disorderly Janissaries of Constantinople and the adjacent regions, together with the Asiatic troops, which may be collected to reinforce them. The greater part of the best troops of European Turkey, and those, which could alone be serviceable in arresting the progress of the invaders, will certainly be deficient on this occasion. All those chieftains, who have acquired their power either by conquest or inheritance, will have no hesitation in turning their attention to its protection, in pre-

¹ The Yuruks, who are a nomad race, are now chiefly to be found in the Chalcidic peninsula, and even there in small numbers.—EDITORIAL NOTE.

ference to the vain hope of supporting the tottering Government of Constantinople.

The three Viziers of Albania in particular, when they see the enemy so near their coasts, will only think of concentrating their strength for the defence of their proper authority, and the succours they may send will not only be tardy and deficient in point of numbers, but being unaccompanied by any leader of weight will oppose a feeble and divided resistance to their disciplined enemies.

Already has Ismail Bey shewn a determination not to follow the direction he has received to move forward to the frontiers. And Ali Pasha who sees in the present crisis a probability of advancing his authority and establishing his independence, seems intent only on occupying the ex-Venetian places on the western coast, and extending his acquisitions towards the Morea.

Mousa Pasha of Salonica whose want of men and money will not admit his shewing any resistance to the orders of the Porte is preparing with great unwillingness to march to the frontiers as Seraskier. He is at the same time endeavouring to place the batteries of Salonica in a state of defence: but the want of money, ammunition, cannon and artillery-men will render his efforts unavailing, and such is the feeble structure of the antique fortifications of Salonica, that I do not think all their efforts could save the city from a contribution, if one or two Russian men of war should arrive to demand it.

The Janissaries of the city, who amount to about four thousand, being all natives of the place, and most of them engaged in trade, or other civil occupations, cannot be expected to afford much assistance to the Government in opposing a foreign enemy. But they might perhaps make a very active use of their arms in plundering and massacring the peaceable Rayahs, if the operations of war should approach this quarter of the Empire. It may even be apprehended, that the European merchants, established in the great commercial cities, would not be quite secure from the excesses of the Turkish soldiery, if the Sultan should meet with any alarming reverses, but more particularly, if any of the other Sovereigns of Europe, engaging in the contest, should give the people reason to suspect a concerted design on the part of the Christian Powers to dismember the Turkish Empire. I mention these observations, as the notion has obtained considerable credit in Salonica, and the adjacent parts of *Macedonia*.

I have the honour to be

My Lord

Your Lordship's most obedient

humble servant

WILLIAM MARTIN LEAKE.

LIST OF NAMES AND MODERN EQUIVALENTS

Amhipolis . . .	= near Yeniklaf, on the stretch of river between the lowest of the Struma Lakes and the sea.
Axius . . .	= river Vardar.
Basargik . . .	= Tatar Bazarjik.
Bisikia . . .	= Beshik Lake.
Dhéspat . . .	= Dospat.
Dgiuma . . .	= Jumaia-i-Bala.
Edessa . . .	= Vodena.
Erigon . . .	= Tcherná River.
Guistendil . . .	= Küstendil.
Gumergina . . .	= Gumuljina.
Haliacmon . . .	= Vistritsa River south-west of Salonica.
Hebrus . . .	= river Maritza.
Iktiman . . .	= Ihtiman.
Jeni-kiény . . .	= Jeni-keui.
Jenige . . .	= Jenidje-Vardar.
Katzaniti . . .	= Katchanik defile.
Masteritza Pass . . .	= defile north of Vrania.
Melencio . . .	= Melnik.
Orfana . . .	= Orfano.
Pella . . .	= ruins about seven miles east of Jenidje-Vardar.
Presdin . . .	= Prisrend.
Pyrlipe . . .	= Prilep.
Sari-Gheul . . .	= Sari Gol (yellow marsh), near Kozani.
Scodra . . .	= Scutari.
Scopia . . .	= Uskub or Skoplje.
Selfigé . . .	= Serfidje, Serbica, or Servia town.
Serbena Dervény . . .	= Kresna defile half-way between Jumaia and Melnik.
Shar-kiény . . .	= possibly Shar Planina.
Strymon . . .	= Struma River.
Tikfis . . .	= Tikvesh—plain south of Ishtib, or Stip.
Treiala . . .	= Trikella.
Velisa . . .	= Veles (Koprülü).
Vladova Pass . . .	= near Vodena.



TABLE OF SERBIAN AND MONTENEGRIN RULERS

SERBIAN MEDIÆVAL RULERS

- c. 850 . . . Vlastimir, ruler of Zeta and Rashka.
 1025 . . . Stephen Voislav, King of Zeta.
 c. 1090 . . . Bodin, King of Zeta.
 1190-96 . . Stephen Nemanya, Grand Župan of Rashka.

SERBIAN KINGS

- 1196-1228 . . Stephen the First-Crowned.
 1228-34 . . Stephen Radoslav.
 1234-43 . . Stephen Vladislav.
 1243-76 . . Stephen Urosh I.
 1276-1316 . . Stephen Dragutin, joint king after 1282.
 1282-1321 . . Stephen Urosh II. (Miliutin) (practically sole
 King).
 1322-31 . . { Stephen Urosh III., rex veteranus.
 { Stephen Dushan, rex iuvenis.
 1331-55 . . Stephen Dushan, Emperor of Serbs and Romans.
 1355-71 . . Stephen Urosh, Emperor.
 (Marko Kraljevitich, King of Prilep, *d.* 1394.
 Knez Lazar, King of North Serbia, *d.* 1389.)

SERBIAN MODERN RULERS

1804-13 . . Kara George, Supreme Chief.

PRINCES

1817-39 . . *Milosh (first time).
1839 . . . *Milan.
1839-42 . . *Michael (first time).
1842-59 . . Alexander Karageorgevitch.
1859-60 . . *Milosh (restored).
1860-68 . . *Michael (restored).
1868-72 . . Regency.

KINGS

1868-89 . . *Milan (King from 1882).
1889-93 . . Regency.
1889-1903 . . *Alexander, last of the Obrenovitches.
1903 . . . Peter Karageorgevitch.
1914 . . . Regent, Crown Prince Alexander Karageorgevitch.

RULERS OF MONTENEGRO

1356-1427 . . Balsha dynasty.
1427-66 . . Stephen Tchernojevitch.
1466-90 . . Ivan Tchernojevitch.
1515 . . . End of Tchernojevitch dynasty—Vladikas established.

VLADIKAS

1696-1737 . . Danilo Petrovitch.
1737-82 . . Sava.
1782-1830 . . Peter I.
1830-51 . . Peter II.

PRINCES

1851-60 . . Danilo [Vladika till 1853].
1860- . . Nicholas [King, 1910].

* Obrenovitch line.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SERBIAN HISTORY

THE Slavonic literature is enormous, but a good deal is accessible in German or French translations, Novaković being the chief exception to this rule among Serbian historians. The books specially recommended are indicated by an asterisk.

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